Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.
Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer1 on the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no justification .... for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I would only add the following observations:
This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness required by the due process clause of our Constitution. Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit — roaming around and announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain place for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is no violation."2 Acting upon petitioner's application, however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition — "provided that there are no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of election propaganda, is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district, respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make use of the mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove more expensive and less effective than using a recorded or taped voice.
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basic freedom of speech and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary.ℒαwρhi৷
Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I would note that respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election advertisements — to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the voters — is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression, even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right.
The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another person with his knowledge and consent.
Footnotes
1 L-32546 & 32551, Oct. 17, 1970, re: sections 8(A) and 12(F) and other related provisions.
2 Petition, page 9.
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