[G.R. Nos. L-31566 & L-31847. August 31, 1970]
ROGELIO O. TIGLAO, Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CORNELIO SANGA and THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PAMPANGA, Respondents.
The majority opinion penned by Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee in effect overhauls — in part — what heretofore has been the procedure followed in proceedings for the correction of election returns in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Election Code. While I concur in the result arrived at, I find myself unable to accept some statements and conclusions set forth therein. I, therefore, submit this separate opinion stating the reasons for my concurrence and dissent.
(1) It is well settled that, under Section 154 of the Revised Election Code, a competent court may authorize the correction of an election return upon unanimous petition of the members of the Board of Inspectors of the precinct concerned (Benitez v. Barredo, Et Al., 52 Phil. p. 1; Board of Inspectors etc. v. Sizon, 55 Phil. 914). In justification of this We said in Benitez-Barredo that "Mistakes of all sorts are too common in human experience to justify anyone in denying the possibility of honest error in a case like the one under consideration; and it was in contemplation of the possibility of such error that the lawmakers provided for their correction with judicial approval" (52 Phil. 47-54). The requirement of unanimity on the part of the election inspectors was, of course, intended to prevent the misuse of the legal provision, the prevailing opinion on the matter being that, from the moment there is lack of unanimity amongst them the case becomes contentious and makes the correction improper.
For reasons of expediency — to avoid undue delay in the proclamation of the winning candidate — the proceeding for correction was deemed to be summary, so summary that it has been held that a petition for the purpose may be heard and resolved without notice to the other affected candidates (Gumpal v. Court of First Instance, Et Al., G.R. Nos. L-16409 and L-16416, November 29, 1960). While the purpose of the law, as construed by the courts, was undoubtedly laudable, experience has shown that a determined losing candidate, with the aid of unscrupulous inspectors or of election inspectors acting under threats, could resort to this proceeding for correction of election returns to enable the former to "grab the proclamation" leaving to his opponent no other recourse but to avail himself of the tedious and expensive remedy of an election contest to protect his rights.
Because of the summary character of the correction proceeding, it was thought not proper, generally, for the Court to inquire extensively into the circumstances under which the election inspectors committed the alleged mistake, nor to order the opening of the ballot box as an effective means of verifying the truth of the allegations regarding the alleged commission of a mistake by the election inspectors. Thus, to prevent undue delay in the proclamation of the winner, judicial practice had in truth created the possibility of an injustice being committed against other candidates who would be affected adversely by the correction. For these reasons, I agree with the majority that the procedure followed heretofore in correction proceedings should be so changed as to give the parties who might be adversely affected by the proposed correction, an opportunity to be heard, and enable the Court. in doubtful cases, to verify the truth of the allegations made in the petition for correction not only by receiving pertinent oral evidence but also by ordering the opening of the ballot box for the purpose of making a physical count of the ballots contained therein and the number of votes cast in favor of each of the candidates for the contested position. It is to be understood, however, that this is no authority for said Court to go into the matter of appreciation of ballots and the resolution of particular objections against anyone of them.
(2) The Revised Election Code (Section 144) provides that after the counting of the votes, the Board of Inspectors shall make a written statement of the result, this statement being what is generally known as an election return. These election returns are then submitted in accordance with law to the Provincial or Municipal Board of Canvassers who are to make the canvass of the result and the proclamation of the winning candidates in accordance with the provisions of Section 158 to 170 of the same Code.
Now, what really are the powers of these Boards of Canvassers? While it has been generally stated that their duty in the premises is ministerial, the truth is that, under the law, as construed by Us in Lagumbay and other cases, these Boards of Canvassers are not supposed to be mere adding machines but may exercise a certain amount of discretion — however limited — to determine whether or not any given election return is genuine, or is an obviously manufactured return, for the purpose of determining whether or not the same should be used in canvassing the result of the election. From their resolution, of course, any aggrieved party may seek relief either by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections or the power of review of this Court. I deem it to be the settled rule, however, that the Boards of Canvassers, pursuant to the provisions of the Revised Election Code, have not only the right but the duty to determine, in the first instance, whether any given election return before them is genuine or is obviously manufactured. In the present case, the Provincial Board of Canvassers appears to have failed to comply with its duty in the premises because when the election returns for the contested precincts came up for consideration and questions were raised against their use for the canvassing of the results, said Board referred the whole matter to the Commission on Elections who, after hearing the parties, rendered the resolution assailed in these proceedings. My view on the matter is that said resolution was irregularly rendered, the Comelec not having authority to decide, in the first instance, the matter thus submitted to it. In the exercise of its supervisory powers over the Board of Canvassers, it should have required the latter to decide the matter first, and thereafter any party aggrieved thereby could take up the matter with the Comelec or with this Court. For this reason I agree with the majority that the resolution aforesaid of the Comelec should be set aside.⌊aшΡhi⌊
(3) The majority opinion holds that after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga had authorized the correction of the election returns under consideration and after the same had been corrected in accordance with the petition of the members of the Boards of Inspectors, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga had only one duty in the premises: to accept and use the corrected returns in the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winner in the elections for the position of one of the Representative districts of Pampanga, and that neither the Comelec nor the Provincial Board of Canvassers had authority to review the aforesaid decision of the Court of First Instance of said province. While the undersigned agree with the legal proposition that neither the Comelec nor any Provincial or Municipal Board of Canvassers has jurisdiction to review and, as a result thereof, to modify or reverse the decision rendered by a Court of First Instance in a proceeding for correction of an election return, I do not admit that the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga cannot refuse to use the corrected election returns in question for the purpose of the canvass it has to make, if in its opinion they do not speak the truth or are obviously manufactured because, as corrected, they give rise to a manifest and unexplained considerable excess of the votes cast over the number not only of the registered voters in each precinct but also over the number of registered voters who actually cast their votes. If in the exercise of their discretion on the matter they would refuse to use the corrected returns, I submit that such action does not amount to reversing or modifying the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. It should be remembered in this connection that said Court simply authorized the Board of Inspectors, on the strength of the evidence presented, to correct the election returns in the manner prayed for in their unanimous petition. Upon the other hand, it seems clear to the undersigned that the possible negative action of the Provincial Board of Canvassers referred to above would not amount to saying that the Court of First Instance erred in authorizing the correction because the evidence presented before it was not sufficient. This is what would amount to a review of the decision of said Court.ℒαwρhi৷
(4) Finally, my understanding of the majority opinion is that it annuls all the proceedings had heretofore in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga relative to the petition for correction of the election returns in question and directs said Court and the parties concerned to start all over again, with the court’s powers on the matter either amplified or merely clarified. I agree with this ultimate result because of the peculiar circumstances of the case — which could easily be repeated to future similar cases. To be remembered is the fact that it was first attempted to have the election returns in question declared void because they were "gun point returns" ; that after the failure of this attempt, a tentative canvass made showed a favorable result for Sanga; that it was then that the Boards of Inspectors of the affected precincts — who at the beginning were or might have been ready to sustain the "gun-point returns" theory — come out with the petition for correction mentioned heretofore; that, according to the evidence presented before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, these Boards of Inspectors, while holding session in separate premises, happened — by accident perhaps — to commit the same mistake in registering the number of votes received by the same candidate — Tiglao because of shots fired outside the election precinct premises; that the presiding judge authorized the correction of the questioned election returns without even having them before him and without having any notice served on the other candidates for the same position for which Tiglao ran, who would inevitably be adversely affected by the correction sought. These circumstances more than justify, in my opinion, the resolution to annul the aforementioned proceedings.
Makalintal, J., concurs and dissents.
