G.R. No. 263341, February 4, 2025,
♦ Decision,
Lopez, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Caguioa, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Leonen, [J]
EN BANC
G.R. No. 263341, February 04, 2025
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
ALFREDO ACDANG Y BALANGEN AND ALLAN ACDANG Y BALANGEN, ACCUSED,
ALLAN ACDANG Y BALANGEN,** ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, SAJ.:
The majority acquitted accused-appellant Allan Acdang y Balangen (Allan) of violating Section 16,1 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.2 In so ruling, the majority found that, although the Allan was arrested in flagrante delicto cultivating marijuana plants,3 the failure of the arresting officers to strictly adhere to the chain of custody rule casted doubt as to the integrity of the illegal flora presented as evidence.4
I dissent.
With regard to the chain of custody rule, the majority pointed out that the arresting officers failed to strictly-comply with what is required under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended, particularly that there were no witnesses when the officers inventoried and took photographs of the seized marijuana plants.5 While the majority acknowledged that noncompliance with these requirements can be excused under justifiable grounds,6 the prosecution failed to show that the arresting officers "exerted earnest efforts to ensure that the required witness accompanied them in their planned police operation."7
I disagree. First, the chain of custody8 finds application in prosecutions under Section 16 of the law. "[T]he three-witness requirement applies to seizures of cultivated plant sources of dangerous drugs."9 Deviations from this rule are allowed, especially when the risks associated with non-compliance are adequately addressed, as will be discussed below.
Second, an in flagrante arrest justifies a warrantless arrest, thereby authorizing any subsequent search and seizure following that valid arrest. In other words, both the doctrines of in flagrante delicto and plain view unequivocally justify a warrantless arrest and the immediate seizure of evidence. This is distinct from the procedural requirements set forth in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended, which governs the chain of custody rule and imposes standards for handling evidence.
While Allan did not question the validity of his warrantless arrest, he raised an error regarding the subsequent warrantless search that followed his arrest. Allan argues that "the search and seizure in the second plantation and at the house of [Alfredo Acdang (Alfredo)] cannot be considered as continuations of the search and seizure conducted in the first (1st) plantation, since the purported target of the operation was the first (1st) plantation only."10 According to Allan, the police officers should have prepared separate inventories instead of incorporating them in a confusing inventory making it appear that the items were confiscated from the same place and at the same time.11
I write this Opinion to explain the nuances surrounding it.
I
The Constitution requires that arrests, searches, and seizures cannot be carried out without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority based on probable cause.12 In People v. Rangaig,13
[t]his constitutional provision prevents violations of privacy and security in person and property, and protects against "unlawful invasion of the sanctity or the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted." Thus, in conducting an arrest or search and seizure, there must be a warrant hinged on probable cause or the "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion to believe that the accused has committed, or is committing a crime." The suspicion must be "supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged." Any evidence resulting from a violation of a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures will be deemed inadmissible in court.14 (Citations omitted)
Nevertheless, the Constitution leaves room for warrantless arrests and/or searches and seizures provided that the same be reasonable.15 Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides when a warrantless arrest is permissible:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For this to be valid: "(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."16
Further, it is required that in arrests made in flagrante delicto, the police officer must have probable cause to arrest the person – that which refers to "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent [person] to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested."17
Meanwhile, there are recognized exceptions for a permissible search without a warrant:
[T]here are instances when a warrantless search is valid. The following are recognized instances of permissible warrantless searches: (1) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless searches; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.18 (Citation omitted)
A mere tip from an informant does not constitute probable cause for warrantless arrests, searches, and seizures. Other circumstances that will bring forth a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed or is actually being committed must accompany the informant's tip to justify a warrantless arrest and/or search.19
In People v. Bolasa,20 a warrantless arrest and search based solely on the strength of a tip, without any prior surveillance, is invalid:
[I]t indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal must follow in Faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.21
II
The overt act of weeding and cleaning the beds of the marijuana plantation, coupled with their prior surveillance of the sites the day before, constitutes probable cause that the crime—cultivation of plants classified as dangerous drugs punishable under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 9165—has been committed and is actually being committed in the presence of the arresting officers. This resulted to accused-appellant Allan being caught in flagrante delicto, leading to his lawful warrantless arrest.
The majority, in so ruling that Allan was arrested in flagrante delicto, said that the overt act of tending to marijuana plants gave the police officers a valid reason to arrest him without any judicial warrant.22 I agree.
To recall, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office 1 and Cordillera Administrative Region, together with the Regional Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Group of the Philippine National Police – Cordillera Province (PNP PRO-COR), the Philippine Army, the Philippine Navy, and the Philippine Airforce organized Oplan Farmville in response to the proliferation of marijuana plantations in La Union, Ilocos Sur, and Benguet Provinces.23 From this, Team Omega was formed with instructions to go to Sitio Mocgao, Kibungan, Benguet, where a certain Alfredo allegedly maintained two marijuana plantations.24
Team Omega left Camp Diego Silang at Carlatan, San Fernando City, La Union in the evening of February 9, 2011 and arrived at Ramot, Santol, La Union at 12:30 a.m. on February 10, 2011. After seven hours of hiking, the team arrived at Sitio Mocgao at around 7:00 a.m.25 At that point, the police officers were able to corroborate the information provided by their superior, Director Roberto S. Opeńa, through surveillance conducted in the vicinity, where they discovered a marijuana plantation. Such circumstance led them to believe that indeed, an offense had been committed.26
However, there was no person in the area to be arrested. While probable cause was already present by then, securing a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant would be futile given how far and remote the area was—so much so that the nearest public road can only be reached after a six-hour walk.27 Thus, the course of action taken by the police operatives to hide and spend the night in an area with a higher elevation around 30 to 50 meters from the plantation site, and to return to the plantation site the next day, February 11, at around 7:00 a.m. was not only justified, but also 'a prudent and practical response under the circumstances.
In the recent case of People v. Bation,28 "[t]he decision of the police officers to wait out and arrest the person who cultivates the plants, instead of obtaining a search warrant, is valid"29 since "[t]here was no invalid intrusion as the plants were located in an open area visible to passersby."30
The marijuana plantations were located not only in an open area but also in a highly remote region spanning a vast expanse of land.31 Both the police officers and Alfredo had to be airlifted by two Philippine Air Force helicopters to reach the police station at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet—a fact admitted even by the defense.32
Moreover, the defense's theory that the possibility that Allan was merely weeding fruits and vegetables, rather than marijuana plants,33 is untenable. First, the defense did not deny the presence of marijuana plants in the plantations, which subsequently tested positive in the laboratory examination conducted by the police. Second, Section 16 does not stipulate that plantations must be solely dedicated to the cultivation of plants classified as dangerous drugs or their sources. The phrase 'regardless of quantity' in that section implies that the cultivation of plants classified as dangerous drugs, such as marijuana and opium poppy, is punishable regardless of whether these plants are mixed with other crops. Therefore, the presence of fruits and vegetables in the same plantation does not absolve the accused-appellant of liability under the law.
II (A)
On to the validity of the warrantless search and seizure subsequent to his arrest.
Accused-appellant posits that the search and seizure in the second plantation and at the house of Alfredo cannot be regarded as extensions of the search and seizure carried out at the first plantation.34 However, he does not challenge the validity of the search and seizure themselves but instead argues that the police officers erred in complying with the chain of custody requirements, insisting that separate inventories should have been prepared rather than combining the seized items into a confusing inventory.35
The warrantless search and seizure in the first and second plantations are valid for being searches of evidence in plain view.
A plain view search is usually had when a police officer is not searching for any evidence, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.36 The requisites for this kind of warrantless search are settled:
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.37 (Citation omitted)
In the case at bar, the search and seizure of the first plantation, which covers approximately 5,000 square meters, is uncontested by both parties.38 Meanwhile, the second plantation, located adjacent to the first and measuring about 1,000 square meters, was only 100 meters away from the place of arrest.39 The defense even claimed that the second plantation was merely 20 meters from the first.40
The search of the first and second plantation under plain view is valid because: first, considering the vastness of the area, there could be no expectation of privacy in their location; second, the police officers were in a position where they could view the area; third, the discovery of the marijuana was inadvertent—that is, the incriminating object is plainly exposed to sight; and fourth, it is immediately apparent that the items are evidence of the crime. Besides, as ruled by the majority, the in flagrante arrest was valid making the intrusion of the police officers in the area justified.41 Thus, the valid warrantless arrest justified the search and seizure that followed.
However, I respectfully submit that the plain view search conducted by the arresting officers in Alfredo's house, which was about a 30-minute walk away from the marijuana plantations, was invalid. This search yielded a hydraulic jack, a marijuana molder, a weighing scale, and a sack of dried marijuana leaves weighing approximately 1.7 kilograms.42
A search under the plain view exception does not apply to one's home, including the area immediately surrounding the dwelling. In Rangaig:
This gives emphasis to the sanctity of the home which is accorded special protection in line with "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." The concept of curtilage was explained in United States v. Dunn, in this wise:
[C]urtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. We do not suggest that combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, yields a "correct" answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration — whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's "umbrella" of Fourth Amendment protection.
Thus, law enforcers may seize evidence and contraband that are in plain view, as long as the officer is in a place where he has a legal right to be, and the seizure does not involve entering one's home or curtilage.43 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Here, the prosecution justified their presence in Alfredo's house by claiming they allowed the two accused to retrieve provisions for humanitarian reasons.44 I find this justification problematic.
First, after the arrests and subsequent searches in the first and second plantations, the arresting officers had completed their operation. At that point, and with the evidence they secured, they could successfully prosecute both accused for cultivating plants classified as dangerous drugs. Had it not been for their careless actions, accused-appellant Allan would not have escaped, and it would not have taken the prosecution five years to try the case against him, who only voluntarily surrendered on June 29, 2016.
Second, the police officers deviated from their operation when they acceded to the request of Alfredo and Allan. Therefore, their presence in Alfredo's house cannot be justified as it constituted a breach of their own protocol. Ergo, the officers had no prior justification for their intrusion into Alfredo's home.
This notwithstanding, even assuming that the police officers had a legal right to be in Alfredo's house, the right to contest the legality of the search and seizure belongs to the party whose rights have been violated—in this case, Alfredo, as the owner of the house. Bation further instructs:
The right to contest the legality of a seizure belongs only to the party whose rights have been impaired. The right is personal, and only a party whose rights were violated can assail the act and move to exclude the evidence gathered pursuant to the act. A person who is not the owner or legal occupant of the place cannot validly give consent to the search therein.45 (Citations omitted)
Nonetheless, the seized items—a hydraulic jack, a marijuana molder, a weighing scale, and a sack of dried marijuana leaves weighing approximately 1.7 kilograms—do not constitute the corpus delicti for the charge against accused-appellant. Invalidating this seizure and excluding these items from evidence will not affect the prosecution's case against the accused-appellant. Therefore, his conviction will still stand.
III
The validity of the arrest and seizure stands independently and is wholly distinct from the provisions of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended. The chain of custody requirement specifically addresses the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence after it has been seized.
The law provides the procedural safeguards that must be observed in the handling of seized illegal drugs to remove all doubts concerning the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti.46 Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640, provides the requirements for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia anchor laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said examination and certification[.]
People v. Que47 explains the importance of compliance to this rule:
Compliance with Section 21's chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the seized items. Non-compliance with them tarnishes the credibility of the corpus delicti around which prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act revolve. Consequently, they also tarnish the very claim that an offense against the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed[.]
. . . .
Fidelity to the chain of custody requirements is necessary because, by nature, narcotics may easily be mistaken for everyday objects. Chemical analysis and detection through methods that exceed human sensory perception, such as specially trained canine units and screening devices, are often needed to ascertain the presence of dangerous drugs. The physical similarity of narcotics with everyday objects facilitates their adulteration and substitution. It also makes planting of evidence conducive.
. . . .
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act requires nothing less than strict compliance. Otherwise, the raison d'etre of the chain of custody requirement is compromised. Precisely, deviations from it leave the door open for tampering, substitution, and planting of evidence.48 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
While a wealth of jurisprudence has applied Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended, to prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, it is important to note that compliance with the chain of custody rule also applies to prosecutions under Section 16 of the same law.49
Jurisprudence has also recognized that strict adherence to the chain of custody rule may not always be feasible, allowing for deviations but only under the most stringent and exceptional grounds. In People v. Abdulah,50
[I]n situations that render strict compliance impossible or impracticable, deviations from Section 21's requirements do not invalidate the seizure of illegal items. Noncompliance may be excused when "(a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved." The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the items presented are authentic without any indication of tampering.(awÞhi(51 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
People v. Lim52 provided for some justifiable reasons that the prosecution may allege—and concomitantly prove—for non-compliance:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.53 (Emphasis supplied)
Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to strictly comply with Section 21 particularly: (1) that none of the necessary witnesses were present at that time of his apprehension; and (2) the alleged irregularities surrounding the inventory of the seized items.54
The majority noted that the "none of the required insulating witnesses were present when members of Team Omega inventoried and took photographs of the marijuana seedlings/plants that they supposedly seized from the plantations tended to by the accused-appellant, which is a clear violation of the first link in the chain of custody."55
While the majority acknowledged that "the absence of the required insulating witnesses does not automatically invalidate the police operation that resulted in the seizure of illegal drugs,"56 it still acquitted accused appellant for failure of the prosecution to show that earnest efforts were made to secure their presence.57
It is my view that the deviations from the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended, were sufficiently justified in this case. The integrity and evidentiary value of the marijuana plants classified as dangerous drugs were duly preserved.
As to the justifiable ground, it remains an established fact that the place of apprehension was in a highly remote area—reachable only by a two-hour vehicle ride followed by a treacherous seven-hour trek by foot.58 While we recognize and appreciate the sense of duty and bravery demonstrated by our witnesses in the fight against illegal drugs, it would be profoundly irresponsible for our law enforcers to send them into such a perilous situation. These ordinary individuals lack the necessary training to navigate treacherous, uncharted terrain over extended periods. Exposing them to such risks not only jeopardizes their safety but will undermine the success of the operation itself.
The records also lacked any indication that the defense challenged the remoteness of the area of apprehension. This absence of objection strengthens the justification for the witnesses' absence, further validating the prosecution's case.
As to the alleged irregularities surrounding the inventory, the prosecution has sufficiently established the four links to prove a continuous and unbroken chain of custody. First, the seized marijuana plants—53 marijuana seedlings and 11 fully-grown marijuana plants—in the first and second plantations were marked, photographed, and inventoried in the respective locations of confiscation, the lack of witnesses notwithstanding.59 Second, the apprehending officer, Investigating Officer I (IO1) Acosta, had custody of the marijuana plants from the time it was seized until he turned these over to IO1 Tinda-an in Camp Dangwa.60 Third, after conducting an investigation, IO1 Tinda-an turned over the seized items to Police Senior Inspector (PSINSP) Canlas at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Dangwa for examination.61 Fourth, after performing several tests which yielded positive results, PSINSP Canlas testified that the marijuana plants subject of the tests were the very same ones she presented before the court.62
Besides, as required by Nisperos v. People,63 the prosecution: (1) acknowledged that there were no insulating witnesses during the inventory and photographing of the seized items in the first and second marijuana plantations; (2) proved the existence of a justifiable ground – in this case the remoteness of the area; and (3) the proper steps taken to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the marijuana plants.64
The dangers associated with non-compliance to the chain of custody rule—such as tampering, substitution, and planting of evidence—are less egregious in cases involving large quantities of marijuana plants compared to miniscule amounts of shabu. It is not to say though that these risks will not be present in cases involving marijuana. Thus, I remain firm in my view that strict adherence to the chain of custody rule as laid down under the law and as elaborated by our jurisprudence remains to be the general rule. This is essential to ensuring the integrity of the evidence and upholding the principles of due process in prosecutions involving dangerous drugs. Nevertheless, deviations from this rule are permissible, especially when the potential risks of non-compliance are effectively addressed and justified by the prosecution, as in this case.
Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 14950. Accused-appellant Allan Acdang y Balangen is GUILTY of violating Section 16, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Footnotes
1 Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 16 provides:
Section 16. Cultivation or Culture of Plants Classified as Dangerous Drugs or are Sources Thereof. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who shall plant, cultivate or culture marijuana, opium poppy or any other plant regardless of quantity, which is or may hereafter be classified as a dangerous drug or as a source from which any dangerous drug may be manufactured or derived: Provided, That in the case of medical laboratories and medical research centers which cultivate or culture marijuana, opium poppy and other plants, or materials of such dangerous drugs for medical experiments and research purposes, or for the creation of new types of medicine, the Board shall prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines for the proper cultivation, culture, handling, experimentation and disposal or such plants and materials.
2 Ponencia, pp. 1-23.
3 Id. at 9-13.
4 Id. at 13-21.
5 Id. at 16, 18.
6 Id. at 18-21.
7 Id. at 21.
8 Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 16.
9 People v. Bation, G.R. No. 237422, February 14, 2024 [Per J. Hernando, First Division].
10 CA rollo, p. 31.
11 Id.
12 See CONST., art. III, sec. 2 which provides:
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except the saving clause because to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
13 901 Phil. 390 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
14 Id. at 404.
15 Id. at 404-405.
16 People v. Cogaed, 740 Phil. 212, 238 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division]. (Citation omitted)
17 Macad v. People, 838 Phil. 102, 120 (2018) [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].
18 People v. Jumarang, 928 Phil. 27, 31 (2022) [Per J. J. Lopez, Second Division].
19 People v. Rangaig, 901 Phil. 390, 406-407 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
20 378 Phil. 1073 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
21 Id. at 1080.
22 Ponencia, p. 13.
23 Rollo, pp. 11-12.
24 Id. at 12.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 28.
28 G.R. No. 237422, February 14, 2024 [Per J. Hernando, First Division].
29 Id. at 9. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of this Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
30 Id.
31 Ponencia, p. 21.
32 Rollo, p. 13.
33 CA rollo, p. 28.
34 CA rollo, p. 31.
35 Id.
36 People v. Rangaig, 901 Phil. 390, 409 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
37 Miclat v. People, 672 Phil. 191, 206 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
38 Rollo, p. 12.
39 Id.
40 CA rollo, p. 26.
41 Ponencia, p. 9.
42 Id. at 4.
43 Id. at 409-410.
44 Rollo, p. 22.
45 G.R. No. 237422, February 14, 2024 [Per J. Hernando, First Division] at 9. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of this Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
46 People v. De Guzman, 825 Phil. 43, 54 (2018) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
47 824 Phil. 882 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
48 Id. at 896, 901.
49 See People v. Bation, G.R. No. 237422, February 14, 2024 [Per J. Hernando, First Division].
50 872 Phil. 1124 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
51 Id. at 1134-1135.
52 839 Phil. 598 (2018) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
53 Id. at 621-622.
54 CA rollo, pp. 31-36.
55 Ponencia, p. 18.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 21.
58 Id. at 3.
59 Id. at 5, 17-18.
60 Id. at 5.
61 Id.
62 See CA Decision dated June 21, 2022, p. 21.
63 931 Phil. 945 (2022) [Per J. Rosario, En Banc].
64 Ponencia, pp. 3-6, 18, 21.
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