Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 260233 and G.R. No. 266039, August 12, 2025
JEFFREY GRAMATICA Y LAURISTA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 266039
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
XXX266039,** Accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
INTING, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated cases involving the application and interpretation of Section 5(b)1 of Republic Act No. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act:
1. In G.R. No. 260233, the Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the Decision3 dated March 11, 2021, and the Resolution4 dated March 29, 2022, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 42318. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision5 dated July 5, 2018, of Branch x, Regional Trial Court (RTC), La Trinidad, Benguet in Criminal Case Nos. 15-CR 10797 and 10798 that found petitioner Jeffrey L. Gramatica (Gramatica) guilty of violating Sections 5(b) and 10(a)6 of Republic Act No. 7610.
2. In G.R. No. 266039, the notice of appeal7 filed by accused-appellant XXX266039 questions the Decision8 dated October 7, 2021, of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 44840 which affirmed the Decision9 dated February 19, 2020, of Branch █, RTC Lucena City in Criminal Case No. 2018-1383. The RTC found Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610.10
The Informations in G.R. No. 260233
Gramatica was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10794
That sometime in the second week of June 2015, up to the last week of June, 2015 at xxxxxx, Municipality of ███████, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver, or give away methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug to [AAA]11 and [BBB], which they thereafter use and consume together inside his room at FE-037L, Mamaga, Balili, La Trinidad, Benguet, in violation of the said law.
The commission of the crime is aggravated by the fact that the victims, [AAA] and [BBB] are minors, they having been born respectively on ███████ and ███████.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
Gramatica was further charged with violation of Sections 5(b) and 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, under the following three Informations:
Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10797
[Violation of Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610
That from the second week of June 2015, up to the last week of June 2015, at xxxxxx, Municipality of ███████, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, commit acts of sexual intercourse with [BBB], a child who was born on ███████, and who is deemed under the law to be a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse as she indulged in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct for some consideration and due to the influence of the accused who is an adult, thereby demeaning her intrinsic worth and dignity as a child, to her great damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.13
Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10798
[Violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610
That from the second week of June, 2015 up to the last week of June, 2015 at xxxxx, Municipality of ███████, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly commit child abuse upon the person of [AAA], a minor born on ███████, by placing or causing her to be in a situation or condition prejudicial to her growth and development as a child, that is, by selling, delivering, or giving away methamphetamine hydrochloride also known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, to her and allowing her to use and consume the drug in his place, to her great damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10799
[Violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610
That from the second week of June, 2015 up to the last week of June, 2015 at xxxxx, Municipality of ███████, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly commit child abuse upon the person of [BBB], a minor born on ███████, by placing or causing her to be in a situation or condition prejudicial to her growth and development as a child, that is, by selling, delivering, or giving away methamphetamine hydrochloride also known as "shabu," a dangerous drugs, to her and allowing her to use and consume the drug in his place, to her great damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon arraignment, Gramatica entered pleas of "Not Guilty" to the charges.16
Joint trial on the merits ensued.17
The Information in G.R. No. 266039
XXX266039 was charged in an Information18 dated August 29, 2018, with violation of Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about August 24, 2018, at Brgy. x, xxxxxx City, Quezon Province, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, did then and there knowingly, willfully, and feloniously caress the breasts and vagina of [CCC],19 his 17-year old granddaughter, and through his intimidation, coercion, and influence the child indulge in such lascivious conduct, thus subjecting her to sexual abuse.
Contrary to law.20
During the arraignment, XXX266039 entered a plea of "Not Guilty" to the charge.
After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.21
The Antecedents
The two consolidated cases involve the unfortunate experiences of three minors.
On the one hand, G.R. No. 260233 concerns BBB and AAA, who were close friends addicted to shabu. They engaged in sex in exchange for the drug with Gramatica and Darwin Santiago (Darwin). When AAA went missing, her mother reported it to the police, who located her at Gramatica's residence, discovered drugs, and arrested him. BBB subsequently assisted the police, leading to Darwin's arrest after he locked her in a room. Medical examinations confirmed that both BBB and AAA had engaged in sexual activity.
On the other hand, G.R. No. 266039 involves CCC, a 17-year-old student who was sexually molested by her grandfather, XXX266039, while she was asleep.
The Court begins with the unfortunate story of BBB and AAA in G.R. No. 260233.
BBB and AAA lived in the same locality and were the best of friends. At a young age, both got addicted to shabu and dropped out of school. When their drug addiction worsened, they engaged in sex in exchange for shabu with Gramatica and Darwin Santiago.22
According to AAA, she met Gramatica and Darwin through a pimp, who she called lolo. From May to June 2015, she got shabu from Darwin in exchange for sex. Also, she would use the money she got from Darwin to buy illegal drugs from Gramatica.
Meanwhile, BBB testified that it was AAA who introduced her to Gramatica and Darwin; that like AAA, she engaged in sexual intercourse with Darwin several times in exchange for shabu; that she also had sexual liaisons with Gramatica after they would consume shabu in his apartment; and that Gramatica became her boyfriend. However, she clarified that she would not have engaged in sexual intercourse with Gramatica or Darwin had she not been under the influence of drugs.23
On July 1, 2015, Police Chief Inspector Radino Belly (PCINSP Belly) received a complaint from AAA's mother that the latter had not gone home for almost a month. After inquiring from BBB, they found out that AAA was living with Gramatica in his boarding house in La Trinidad, Benguet; she was also being used as a drug courier. Immediately, PCINSP Belly coordinated with the Municipal Anti-Illegal Drugs Operatives for the possible arrest of Gramatica and the rescue of AAA. With the help of BBB, the police officers entered Gramatica's boarding house. Gramatica was not home at the time, and it was AAA who opened the door for them. Inside the boarding house, one of the police officers noticed an improvised tooter and a used foil on a blue tray placed just below the portable DVD player. The other police officers also found drug paraphernalia inside the containers on the floor. When Gramatica arrived, the police operatives arrested him.24
In the meantime, BBB received a text message from Darwin who asked her to proceed to his boarding house in xxxx, La Trinidad, Benguet for a pot session. The police operatives and BBB went to Darwin's boarding house. BBB went ahead of the police operatives and entered the boarding house. Later, the police operatives received a text message from BBB that stated that Darwin had gone to the comfort room and locked her inside of his room. The police operatives went inside the boarding house and forcibly opened the room where BBB was locked in. The police operatives searched for Darwin, and they found him inside a locked comfort room in front of the boarding house. They then brought Darwin back to the boarding house, where BBB identified him as the one who locked her inside the room. The police officers arrested Darwin.25
Based on the medico-legal examination of the victims, the ano-genital area of AAA26 showed that her hymen had a deep notch at the 9 o'clock position; while that of BBB showed complete hymenal transection at 7 o'clock position and notched at 3 o'clock position.27
In defense, on the other hand, Gramatica denied the accusations against him. He alleged that in May 2015, his friend, Denver Estigoy, introduced BBB and AAA to him; that he allowed them to stay in his boarding house because they had no place to go; that during their stay, he saw them use shabu; that later on, he courted BBB and had a sexual relationship with her; that he did not force her to have sexual intercourse with him; and that he had no idea that BBB was a minor at the time because her face looked mature.
According to Gramatica, the police officers arrested him in his boarding house and accused him of selling shabu.28
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision29 dated July 5, 2018, the RIC acquitted Gramatica in Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10794 for the failure of the prosecution to establish the elements of illegal sale of shabu.
Still, the RTC convicted Gramatica of violation of Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 in Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10797. It found that Gramatica had sexual relations with BBB, a minor; and that the age disparity between them placed Gramatica in a stronger position over BBB which enabled him to force his will upon the latter.30
The RTC also convicted Gramatica in Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10798. It found that Gramatica's act of selling, delivering, or giving away shabu to AAA was prejudicial to her development.31
Lastly, the RTC acquitted Gramatica in Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10799 on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The RTC decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby adjudged:
1. In Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10794, there being reasonable doubt that accused committed the crime charged, accused JEFFREY LAURISTA GRAMATICA is hereby ACQUITTED of Violation of [Section 5 of] Republic Act No. 9165.
2. In Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10797, there being proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused committed Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, JEFFREY LAURISTA GRAMATICA is hereby found GUILTY thereof. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, he is hereby imposed (sic) the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of [p]rision [m]ayor medium as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.
He is likewise directed to pay the fine of [PHP] 15,000.00 pursuant to Section 31(f) of R.A. No. 7610. He is further directed to indemnify private complainant [BBB] the following amounts as damages: the amount of [PHP] 30,000.00 as moral damages; civil indemnity of [PHP] 20,000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of [PHP] 15,000.00, all amounts subject to an interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
3. In Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10798, there being proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused violated Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, JEFFREY LAURISTA GRAMATICA is hereby found GUILTY thereof. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
He is also directed to pay moral damages to [AAA] in the amount of [PHP] 20,000.00.
4. In Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10799, there being reasonable doubt that accused committed the crime charged, accused JEFFREY LAURISTA GRAMATICA is hereby ACQUITTED of Violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
The period of preventive imprisonment of the accused is credited to his period of imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.32
Aggrieved, Gramatica appealed to the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its Decision,33 the CA affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. The fallo thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 9 dated 5 July 2018, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby adjudged:
. . . .
3. In Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10797, there being proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused committed Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, JEFFREY LAURISTA GRAMATICA is hereby found GUILTY thereof. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, he is hereby imposed (sic) the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.
He is likewise directed to pay the fine of [PHP]15,000.00 pursuant to Section 31(f) of R.A. No. 7610. He is further directed to indemnify private complainant YYY the following amounts as damages: the amount of [PHP] 50,000.00 as moral damages; civil indemnity of [PHP] 50,000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of [PHP] 50,000.00, all amounts subject to an interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
4. In Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10798, there being proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused violated Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, JEFFREY LAURISTA GRAMATICA is hereby found GUILTY thereof. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
He is also directed to pay moral damages to BBB in the amount of [PHP] 20,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.34 (Emphasis supplied)
The CA found that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements for violation of Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. It ruled that Gramatica, who was then 23 years old, courted and had a sexual relationship with the 14-year old BBB, who was then staying with him in his boarding house; that he took advantage of BBB's minority and unfortunate situation; and that he caused her to believe and trust him so that he could wield influence upon her to submit to his sexual desires.35
In the case of AAA, the CA ruled that the prosecution established all the elements of violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610. AAA testified that Gramatica sold shabu to her on several occasions which showed his utter disregard for the law and intent to demean AAA's intrinsic worth and dignity as a child.36
Aggrieved, Gramatica moved to reconsider the Decision, but the CA denied it in the assailed Resolution.
Hence, he filed a Petition37 before the Court docketed as G.R. No. 260233 and advanced his arguments as follows:
The CA gravely erred in affirming the RTC Decision despite the prosecution's failure to establish the elements of the offenses charged against him. He insists that the consensual sexual intercourse between him and BBB should have been considered in determining his guilt.38 He adds that there was no evidence that he persuaded, enticed, or influenced BBB to take shabu for him to have sexual intercourse with her. While it might be true that BBB was under the influence of prohibited drugs during the three occasions that they had sex, there was no evidence to prove that it was of his own doing.39
As for AAA, Gramatica alleges that the prosecution failed to prove that his actions debased or demeaned her dignity as a human being. The purchase of shabu, in itself, is not prejudicial to AAA. Neither does it automatically debase her dignity and intrinsic worth as a human being. Even granting that he sold shabu to AAA, there was no proof that she consumed the very same shabu purchased from him.40
In its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,41 the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintains that the arguments raised in the present Petition were the same arguments already considered and passed upon by the CA in the assailed Decision.42 To avoid being redundant, it is adopting the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee43 dated September 30, 2019, as its comment to the Petition.44
Thus, the core issue in G.R. No. 260233 is whether the CA erred in finding Gramatica guilty of violation of Section 5(b) and Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
In a different and equally troubling instance, G.R. No. 266039 describes the abuse of CCC by her own grandfather, XXX266039.
The prosecution established that CCC was a student and 17 years old at the time of the incident. On August 24, 2018, at around 1:00 a.m., while she was sleeping, she was suddenly awakened by someone inserting his hand inside her panties. Upon opening her eyes, she saw that it was his grandfather, XXX266039. Terrified, she could not move or shout. XXX266039 then placed his hands inside her bra and fondled her breasts. Then, he stood up and left the room as if nothing had happened.45
However, XXX266039 denied the charge. He maintained that he merely woke CCC up to ask her to assist him in applying medicine in his eyes as he was suffering from glaucoma.46
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision47 dated February 19, 2020, the RTC found XXX266039 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. The RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused [XXX266039] is found GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" and he is hereby sentenced the indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days of, as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as maximum.
He is further ordered to pay the victim, CCC, moral damages, exemplary damages, and civil indemnity .in the amount of [PHP] 50,000.00 each. All damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.48 (Emphasis in the original)
The RTC determined that all the elements of the crime charged were present. First, XXX266039 committed lascivious conduct; CCC testified that he touched her breasts and vagina.49 Second, CCC experienced sexual abuse. A child is considered to have been subjected to other sexual abuse when they are a victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of an adult. In the case, CCC was 17 years old at the time of the incident, while XXX266039 was 62. The age disparity of more than 20 years gave XXX266039 a greater ability to impose his will on her. Further, his relationship as the grandfather created a level of trust in him, which he evidently exploited.50
Finally, CCC's Certificate of Live Birth demonstrated her minority status, indicating that she was born on ███████. Thus, she was only 17 years old when the incident occurred on August 24, 2018.51
In XXX266039's defense, he simply requested CCC's assistance with his eye medication; this assertion cannot outweigh CCC's clear identification and affirmation that XXX266039 was the one who perpetrated the sexual abuse against her.52
Aggrieved, XXX266039 appealed to the CA.53
In his Brief,54 XXX266039 asserted that there are serious doubts as to the credibility of CCC's testimony. He noted that other people were at the house, including her cousins and relatives.55 He also stressed that there was no evidence that he used any weapon, or that he threatened her or exerted any force upon her. Thus, she had ample opportunity to shout or call for help.56 He further alleged that if he really sexually abused CCC, then her relatives would have at least supported her statements and testified in her favor.57
On the other hand, the People, through the OSG, countered in its Brief58 that CCC's failure to shout for help does not discredit her testimony, as it would not be unusual for her to be immobilized at the time due to shock and helplessness. Moreover, jurisprudence provides that there is no standard behavior for a victim of a crime against chastity, especially when the victim is a child.59 Anent the nonpresentation of other witnesses, it maintained that such is not fatal to the prosecution's case because no law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in actions for rape or acts of lasciviousness.60
The Ruling of the CA
The CA sustained the RTC's conviction of XXX266039 in the assailed Decision.61 The fallo of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 19, 2020 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 15 in Criminal Case No. 2018-1383 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION to the extent that accused-appellant [XXX266039] is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay private complainant [CCC] the following amounts: (a) a fine in the amount of [PHP] 15,000.00, (b) moral damages in the amount of [PHP] 75,000.00; (c) exemplary damages in the amount of [PHP] 75,000.00; and (c) civil indemnity in the amount of [PHP] 75,000.00. All monetary awards are subject to six percent (6%) interest from finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.62 (Emphasis in the original)
The CA affirmed the RTC in finding that the prosecution proved all the elements of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610.63 Anent XXX266039's contention that CCC's relatives did not testify in her favor, the CA held that CCC's testimony is an eloquent statement to the truth of her complaint.64 Moreover, XXX266039 failed to impute any ill motive on the part of CCC to falsely testify against him.65 As such, XXX266039's bare denial fails in the face of CCC's positive identification of him as the perpetrator.66
Hence, XXX266039 filed an appeal to the Court.67
Both the prosecution and the defense filed their Manifestations In Lieu of Supplemental Briefs.68 The OSG manifested that it is adopting the facts and arguments in its Brief to expedite the disposition of the case and to avoid the rehash of arguments.69 On the other hand, XXX266039 repleaded and adopted the arguments raised in the Appellant's Brief which his counsel opined as squarely and sufficiently refuting the arguments raised by the plaintiff-appellee.70
The issue in G.R. No. 266039 is whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of XXX266039 for lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610.
The Ruling of the Court
First, in G.R. No. 260233, Gramatica is found guilty of child prostitution as defined by Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. The law considers any sexual intercourse with a minor for consideration as prostitution, regardless of consent. Gramatica is liable because BBB, the minor, engaged in prostitution at the time of their sexual encounter. Moreover, in Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10798, Gramatica is guilty of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Accordingly, selling drugs to minors exploits their vulnerability and has harmful developmental effects, degrading their worth and potentially damaging society.
Second, in G.R. No. 266039, the Court determines that the necessary elements for violating Republic Act No. 7610 are not present. CCC was asleep when XXX266039 touched her, which indicates that she did not partake in any lascivious conduct. Furthermore, XXX266039 did not use any form of coercion or influence to induce or persuade CCC. Consequently, the legal requirements concerning coercion or influence and the minor's participation in lascivious conduct under Republic Act No. 7610 are not met in the case.
The Court explains.
Central in the issues to be resolved in the case is Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, which reads:
SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
. . . .
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.]
On the other hand, Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code states:
ARTICLE 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.
At this point, the Court shall revisit the legal principles regarding lascivious conduct directed at minors over 12 but under 18 years of age.
Re-examination of the legal principles and jurisprudence concerning lascivious conduct directed towards minors aged over 12 but under 18
The Court established guidelines concerning the proper nomenclature of acts of lasciviousness and lascivious conduct directed at minors, especially those aged over 12 but under 18, in the case of Dimakuta v. People,71 as follows:
Under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. This statutory provision must be distinguished from Acts of Lasciviousness under Articles 336 and 339 of the RPC. As defined in Article 336 of the RPC, Acts of Lasciviousness has the following elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.
. . . .
Therefore, if the victim of the lascivious acts or conduct is over 12 years of age and under eighteen (18) years of age, the accused shall be liable for:
1. Other acts of lasciviousness under Art. 339 of the RPC, where the victim is a virgin and consents to the lascivious acts through abuse of confidence or when the victim is single or a widow of good reputation and consents to the lascivious acts through deceit, or;
2. Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 if the act of lasciviousness is not covered by lascivious conduct as defined in R.A. No. 7610. In case the acts of lasciviousness is covered by lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610 and it is done through coercion or influence, which establishes absence or lack of consent, then Art. 336 of the RPC is no longer applicable
3. Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where there was no consent on the part of the victim to the lascivious conduct, which was done through the employment of coercion or influence. The offender may likewise be liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.72 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Dimakuta's enumeration of the elements of the crimes clearly distinguished between the violation of Republic Act No. 7610 and a charge of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in this wise: the former involves a child engaging or indulging in lascivious conduct under the coercion and influence of the accused, while the latter concerns the accused committing any act of lasciviousness or lewdness towards the victim through the use of force or intimidation. Thus, if the victim is between 12 and 18 years old, liability may arise: (1) under Article 339 of the Revised Penal Code if certain conditionsvirginity, deceit, abuse of confidenceare met; (2) under Article 336 if the act does not fall under lascivious conduct as defined in Republic Act No. 7610; and (3) under Section 5(6) of Republic Act No. 7610 if the lascivious conduct was committed through coercion or influence.
While Dimakuta recognized force or intimidation as an element of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, the Court maintained that acts of lasciviousness carried out through coercion and influence should warrant the application of Republic Act No. 7610. Without specific definitions and clear distinctions between force and intimidation on the one hand, and coercion and influence on the other, the law presents a considerable gap, leaving unresolved the issue of when a minor victim is subjected to either force or intimidation or to coercion and influence.
Three years later, the seeming difference hinted in Dimakuta was further blurred in Quimvel v. People,73 where the Court held that "coercion and influence" is synonymous with "force and intimidation"; thus:
The term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover "force and intimidation" as used in the Information. To be sure, Black's Law Dictionary defines "coercion" as "compulsion; force; duress" while "[undue influence]" is defined as "persuasion carried to the point of overpowering the will." On the other hand, "force" refers to "constraining power, compulsion; strength directed to an end" while jurisprudence defines "intimidation" as "unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear." As can be gleaned, the terms are used almost synonymously. It is then of no moment that the terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different[.]74 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The Court must note, however, that the pronouncements in Quimvel should be considered in light of the context in which they were made. In Quimvel, the Information charged the accused therein of violating Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, specifically alleging that he forcibly and intimidatingly mashed the vagina of a seven-year-old minor. In an attempt to exculpate himself from criminal liability, the accused argued that the Information was deficient, as it only alleged the elements of acts of lasciviousness, particularly force and intimidation, and not coercion and influence under Republic Act No. 7610.
It is clear that the Court's statement in Quimvel was intended specifically to address the inadequacy of the Information as pointed out by the accused. It should not be construed as a categorical ruling that eliminates the distinctions between acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code and violations under Republic Act No. 7610.
Regrettably, the ruling in Quimvel sowed confusion in subsequent cases, resulting in the Court consistently treating "force and intimidation" and "coercion and influence" as interchangeable, thereby allowing changes under Republic Act No. 7610 even in cases where traditionally the Revised Penal Code should apply. It has inevitably created a void or gap in the law, obscuring the fine distinction between acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code and lascivious conduct under Republic Act No. 7610. As a result, regardless of whether the sexual abuse upon the minor victim was done through coercion and influence or through force and intimidation, the charge against the accused may be classified under Republic Act No. 7610.
Subsequently, in People v. Tulagan,75 the Court recognized the problematic situation caused by this doctrinal confusion. It laid down new guidelines to harmonize the application of the Revised Penal Code vis-a-vis Republic Act No. 7610, viz.: (1) where the victim is under 12 years old, the prosecution should be under Article 335 or Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) where the victim is 12 to 18 years old, and sexual abuse is committed, it should be called "Lascivious Conduct" under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 with no reference to the Revised Penal Code; and (3) coercion or influence qualifies the child as a victim of sexual abuse under Republic Act No. 7610, whereas force and intimidation pertain to cases under the Revised Penal Code. It laid down the guidelines as follows:
At this point, it is not amiss to state that the rulings in People v. Tubillo, People v. Abay and People v. Pangilinan should be clarified, because there is no need to examine whether the focus of the prosecution's evidence is "coercion and influence" or "force and intimidation" for the purpose of determining which between R.A. No. 7610 or the RPC should the accused be prosecuted under in cases of acts of lasciviousness or rape where the offended party is 12 years of age or below 18.76
. . . .
Whereas if the victim is 12 years old and under 18 years old, or 18 years old and above under special circumstances, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, but it should not make any reference to the provisions of the RPC. It is only when the victim of the sexual assault is 18 years old and above, and not demented, that the crime should be called as "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision mayor.77
. . . .
In Quimvel, it was held that the term "coercion or influence" is broad enough to cover or even synonymous with the term "force or intimidation." Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that "coercion or influence" is used in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 to qualify or refer to the means through which "any adult, syndicate or group" compels a child to indulge in sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the use of "money, profit or any other consideration" is the other mode by which a child indulge in sexual intercourse, without the participation of "any adult, syndicate or group." In other words, "coercion or influence" of a child to indulge in sexual intercourse is clearly exerted NOT by the offender whose liability is based on Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 for committing sexual act with a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse. Rather, the "coercion or influence" is exerted upon the child by "any adult, syndicate, or group" whose liability is found under Section 5(a) for engaging in, promoting, facilitating or inducing child prostitution, whereby the sexual intercourse is the necessary consequence of the prostitution.78
. . . .
The term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, should be construed in relation to the definitions of "child abuse" under Section 3, Article I of R.A. No. 7610 and "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases. In the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. Thus, the term "other sexual abuse" is broad enough to include all other acts of sexual abuse other than prostitution. Accordingly, a single act of lascivious conduct is punished under Section 5(b), Article III, when the victim is 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special circumstances. In contrast, when the victim is under 12 years old, the proviso of Section 5(b) states that the perpetrator should be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC for acts of lasciviousness, whereby the lascivious conduct itself is the sole element of the said crime. This is because in statutory acts of lasciviousness, as in statutory rape, the minor is presumed incapable of giving consent; hence, the other circumstances pertaining to rapeforce, threat, intimidation, etc.are immaterial.79 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
It is evident from Tulagan that the definition of "other sexual abuse" encompasses all forms of sexual abuse aside from prostitution, even a single act of lascivious conduct. This definition is based solely on the provision of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 which defines child abuse as the "maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child[.]"
Tulagan further blurred the line or distinction between charges under Republic Act No. 7610 and those under the Revised Penal Code by ruling that it is not required to determine whether the prosecution's evidence focuses on "coercion and influence" or "force and intimidation" when deciding which law applies.
Even with the guidelines established in Tulagan, there continues to be uncertainty and confusion in the Court's efforts to align, harmonize, and reconcile the existing laws involving minors, particularly those aged 12 or older but under 18.
In the recent case of People v. Hernandez,80 notwithstanding the pronouncement in Tulagan, the Court concluded that although the Information did not explicitly state the element of force, it still unequivocally ruled that the act was carried out with "threat and intimidation," which is also a fundamental means of committing Rape according to Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code. In that case, the victim stated that she was threatened with a gun. This, in turn, instilled in her a profound sense of fear that compelled her to remain silent and submit to the heinous act. Thus:
It is settled that "intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime." Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It suffices that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the exercise of the free will of the private offended party into yielding to the lustful desires of the accused. Corollary to that, this Court held that:
Intimidation includes the moral kind such as the fear caused when threatened with a knife or pistol, or when words employed are of such nature as would incite anxiety or distress leaving the victim without any choice but to surrender. As this Court held in Nacario v. People, "[i]ntimidation is a state of mind, which cannot, with [absolute] certainty, be discerned. Whether a person has been intimidated can only be inferred from the simultaneous or subsequent acts of the person subjected thereto." It involves largely an appreciation of the state of mind of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. Hence, rather than the appellate courts which relies only on the cold and mute pages of the records which do not graphically convey emotion, the assessment of the trial court must be given binding finality in this respect.81 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In light of the decision in Hernandez and the difference outlined in Tulagan, as applied to the present case, the Court deems it essential to re-evaluate and, ultimately, clarify Tulagan.
A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 indicates that it addresses scenarios in which a child gives consent, even if flawed; it does not apply to cases where the minor is entirely unaware, coerced, or unconscious
Simply put, the Court is tasked to resolve, once and for all, whether all cases of sexual abuse committed against minors must be prosecuted under Republic Act No. 7610.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 reads:
SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
(c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the establishment where the prostitution takes place, or of the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place of entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or which engages in prostitution in addition to the activity for which the license has been issued to said establishment.
Various cases on child abuse have belabored the definition of "children subjected to sexual abuse" and explored the similarities and differences between the elements of the crimes outlined in the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 7610, and attempted to harmonize the provisions of the two laws while recognizing the legislature's intended purpose.
Now, the Court is tasked anew to conduct a study of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610.
It is a hornbook jurisprudential82 doctrine that the primary rule in a problem in the interpretation of a law is to examine the law itself. When the words of a statute are clear, there is no need to interpret them in a manner different from what the word implies.
In Globe-Mackay v. National Labor Relations Commission,83 the Court, in the interpretation of a statute, gave great deference to the words chosen by the legislature in drafting the statute. It elucidated as follows:
[U]nder the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given ifs literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure[.]84 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Here, a plain and straightforward interpretation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 provides a clear definition of children subjected to other sexual abuse as those who indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of an adult. Yet, despite extensive jurisprudence on child abuse cases, the word "indulges" in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 has never been specifically examined or analyzed. The word "indulges" is of significant importance in resolving the issue in the case at bar.
The table below provides a comprehensive list of dictionary definitions to help the Court determine the meaning of "indulge" as used in Republic Act No. 7610.
| Black's Law Dictionary | - a yielding to inclination, passion, or the propensity for gratifying one's desires, especially to excess self-gratification
- the habit of allowing oneself to do whatever one wants, or of allowing someone else to do whatever he or she wants85 |
| Britannica Dictionary | - to allow (someone) to have or do something even though it may not be proper, healthy, appropriate, etc.86 |
| Merriam-Webster Dictionary | - to yield to the desire of
- to give free rein to87 |
| Cambridge Dictionary |
- to give someone anything they want and not mind if they behave badly88 |
| Collins Dictionary | - to yield to or gratify
-to yield to the wishes of89
- |
The different meanings of the word "indulges" in various dictionaries suggest a notion of "consent" or "permission," albeit with some reservations.
The Court finds that the term "sexual abuse," as defined under Republic Act No. 7610, encompasses situations wherein a minor indulgesor, put differently, consents, albeit defectivelyto engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct as a result of coercion or undue influence exerted by an adult.
The presenceor, at the very least, the semblanceof consent on the part of the minor, which justifies the application of Republic Act No. 7610, is further reinforced by Section 2(g) of the law's Implementing Rules and Regulations90 (IRR). The IRR defines sexual abuse as including the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
A review of Section 2(g) leads to the conclusion that the word "engage" suggests active participation by the child, who is not merely a passive victim of sexual abuse but engages in it precisely due to the "employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion" exerted by the adult.
For better understanding, the following are dictionary definitions of the term "engages" viz.:
| Black's Law Dictionary | - to employ or involve oneself; to take part in to embark on.91 |
| Britannica Dictionary | - to cause (someone) to take part in (something)92 |
| Merriam-Webster Dictionary | - to bind (someone, such as oneself) to do something
- to induce to participate:93 |
| Cambridge Dictionary | - to become involved, or have contact, with someone or something:94 |
| Collins Dictionary | -to take part; participate95 |
Indeed, the use of the word "engage" clearly indicates the legislature's intent for Republic Act No. 7610 to cover situations where a child consents, albeit with the consent being defective. It is not designed to cover acts where the minor is completely unconscious, overpowered, or unwilling from the outset.
To illustrate the point, the Court shall examine the liability of Gramatica.
G.R. No. 260233
In the main, Gramatica attacks the credibility of BBB and AAA; he avers that their narration of facts and circumstances is questionable. Specifically, he points out that he and BBB were sweethearts and the sexual intercourse between them was consensual;96 that there was no showing that he exercised moral ascendancy over BBB, nor was it shown that he took advantage of the latter's condition to influence her;97 and that although BBB averred that she and Gramatica had sexual intercourse three times because she was under the influence of shabu, there is nevertheless no proof that the shabu came from him.98
As regards AAA, Gramatica asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that he sold or even possessed illegal dangerous drugs; that the purchase of shabu in itself does not automatically debase AAA's dignity and intrinsic worth as a human being;99 that assuming that he sold shabu to AAA, there was nonetheless no evidence to show that she consumed the very same shabu allegedly bought from him;100 and that there is no evidence that he forced AAA into addiction.101
The Petition lacks merit.
All the arguments raised are a mere rehash of Gramatica's arguments before the CA that were carefully considered and found without merit. The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and the CA.
Well settled is the rule that "findings of the trial court[,] which are factual in nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses, are accorded respect[,]" if not finality by the appellate court, "when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings."102 This is because of a quite simple reason: the trial judge is better situated to ascertain the conflicting testimonies of witnesses after having heard them and observed their deportment and mode of testifying during the trial.103 Thus, generally, the Court will not re-examine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
In Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10797, Gramatica is guilty of child prostitution under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610
Sexual abuse and lascivious conduct as defined in the IRR of Republic Act No. 7610, known as the "Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases," pertinently provides:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in these Rules, unless the context requires otherwise
. . . .
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
The elements of Section 5(b) are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.104 Hence, for a child under Republic Act No. 7610 to prosper, the minor victim must be a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" (EPSOSA).
In the present case, the prosecution both alleged and proved that BBB was a child in EPSOSA. The criminal information in Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10797 specifically indicated that BBB "is deemed under the law to be a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse as she indulged in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct for some consideration." She also candidly testified that she agreed to have sexual intercourse with Gramatica in exchange for shabu. She testified:
Q: Let us clarify this, you said they were allowing you to use this shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
. . . .
Q: And you said that after using it, they take advantage of you?
A: After they let us use, something will happen to us.
Q: What will happen to you?
A: They will have sex with us.
Q: Including [AAA]?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What is the effect of taking this shabu to you?
A: We cannot sleep and sometimes, we do not know what we were doing.
Q: Why do you use that shabu?
A: I was curious at first but when I tasted it, I continued.
. . . .
Q: And where is that particular place wherein this Darwin Santiago let you take in shabu?
A: At our house in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet.
Q: After using shabu, [is he] having sexual intercourse with you?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Where did he have sex with you?
A: At his house.
Q: Why did you allow Darwin Santiago to have sexual intercourse with you?
A: Because that is the effect of the shabu that I wanted to have sex.
Q: How about Jeffrey Gramatica, where did he sell shabu to you?
A: At the boarding house but I forgot where is he staying.
Q: How about the area?
A: Km. 5, La Trinidad, Benguet.
Q: Aside from selling you shabu, is there anything that Jeffrey Gramatica did to you?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What did he do to you?
A: He also had sex with me.
Q: Why did you allow Jeffrey to have sex with you?
A: I was under the influence of shabu.
Q: You mean, everything Jeffrey and Darwin have sex with you, you were under the influence of shabu?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And they know you are under the influence of shabu?
A: Yes sir[.]105
Under the circumstances, BBB engaged in sexual intercourse with Gramatica for a consideration. This is precisely the situation contemplated by the law and covered by the definition of prostitution. Unlike rape, consent is immaterial here as the mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes a violation of the law. While BBB may have agreed to have sex with Gramatica, the latter is nevertheless criminally liable considering that BBB, then 14 years old,106 was a minor who engaged in prostitution at the time of their sexual congress.
In People v. Tulagan,107 the Court explained:
To avoid further confusion, We dissect the phrase "children exploited in prostitution" as an element of violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. As can be gathered from the text of Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 and having in mind that the term "lascivious conduct" has a clear definition which does not include "sexual intercourse," the phrase "children exploited in prostitution" contemplates four (4) scenarios: (a) a child, whether male or female, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in lascivious conduct; (b) a female child, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in sexual intercourse; (c) a child, whether male or female, who due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in lascivious conduct; and (d) a female, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse.
The term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, is construed in relation to the definitions of "child abuse" under Section 3, Article I of R.A. No. 7610 and "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases. In the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual abuse'' includes the employment; use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person lo engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
In Quimvel, it was held that the term "coercion or influence" is broad enough to cover or even synonymous with the term "force or intimidation." Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that "coercion or influence" is used in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 to qualify or refer to the means through which "any adult, syndicate or group" compels a child to indulge in sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the use of "money, profit or any other consideration" is the other mode by which a child indulges in sexual intercourse, without the participation of "any adult, syndicate or group." In other words, "coercion or influence" of a child to indulge in sexual intercourse is clearly exerted NOT by the offender whose liability is based on Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 for committing sexual act with a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse. Rather, the "coercion or influence" is exerted upon the child by "any adult, syndicate, or group" whose liability is found under Section 5(a) for engaging in, promoting, facilitating [,] or inducing child prostitution, whereby the sexual intercourse is the necessary consequence of the prostitution.
For a clearer view, a comparison of the elements of rape under the RPC and sexual intercourse with a child under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 where the offended party is between 12 years old and below 18, is in order.
Rape under Article
266-A (1) (a, b, c)
under the RPC | Section 5 (1) of R.A. No.
7610 |
| 1. Offender is a man; | 1. Offender is a man; |
| 2. Carnal knowledge of a woman; | 2. Indulges in sexual intercourse with a female child exploited in prostitution other sexual abuse, who is 12 years old or below 18 or above 18 under special circumstances; |
| 3. Through force, threat or intimidation; when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. | 3. Coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group is employed against the child to become a prostitute. |
As can be gleaned above, "force, threat or intimidation" is the element of rape under the RPC, while "due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group" is the operative phrase for a child to be deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse," which is the element of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. The "coercion or influence" is not the reason why the child submitted herself to sexual intercourse, but it was utilized in order for the child to become a prostitute. Considering that the child has become a prostitute, the sexual intercourse becomes voluntary and consensual because that is the logical consequence of prostitution as defined under Article 202 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10158 where the definition of "prostitute" was retained by the new law[.]"108 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Simply stated, sexual intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years of age (now under 16 years old, following Republic Act No. 11648109) or is demented is always statutory rape and an accused will be prosecuted under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353.110
On the other hand, as in the present case, if the victim is 12 years old (now at least 16 years old, following Republic Act No. 11648) or less than 18 and is deemed to be a child "exploited to prostitution and other sexual abuse" because she agreed to the sexual intercourse "for money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," the crime could not be rape under the Revised Penal Code as there is consent. Instead, the offender should be penalized under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610.111 The law, in effect, acknowledges that minors subjected to such circumstances may have consented to the act or the transaction. Still, their consent cannot be deemed free, genuine, and fully informed. Accordingly, the law recognizes the child's inherent vulnerability and the exploitative nature of the situation.
Meanwhile, when the victim consents to the sexual intercourse, and no consideration, coercion, or influence is involved, then no crime is committed, except: (1) where "force, threat, or intimidation" as an element of rape is substituted by "moral ascendancy or moral authority;" and (2) in cases involving qualified seduction under Article 337, or simple seduction under Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code.112
The first exception occurs when the usual element of "force, threat, or intimidation" required in rape is supplanted by the offender's exercise of moral ascendancy or moral authority over the minor. In such cases, the law recognizes that a child may be compelled to submit to sexual acts not through physical force but through dominance, trust, or authority wielded by a person in a position of influencesuch as a parent, guardian, or teacher.
The second exception involves the crimes of qualified seduction and simple seduction, penalized under Articles 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.
Under Article 337, qualified seduction is committed against a virgin over twelve years and under 18 years of age, by any person in public authority, priest, house-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced, or the seduction by any person of his sister or descendant, whether or not she be a virgin or over 18 years of age. The crime of qualified seduction consists of these elements: (a) the victim is a virgin; (b) she must be between the ages of 12 (now 16 years old, following Republic Act No. 11648) and 18; (c) the perpetrator engages in sexual intercourse with her; (d) there is an abuse of authority, trust, or a relationship. If, on the other hand, the offender is the victim's brother or a relative, elements (a) and (b) are not required. It is worth noting that the relationship between the offender and the victim must be one of blood relation, but does not need to be legitimate.113
The crime of simple seduction pertains to the seduction of an unmarried woman or a widow with a good reputation, who is over 12 (now at least 16 years old, following Republic Act No. 11648) but less than 18 years old. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the complainant possesses a good reputation.114
Collectively, this regime of rules underscores the State's heightened responsibility to safeguard minors from sexual exploitation and abuse, mindful of the complexities surrounding the concepts of consent, vulnerability, and undue influence in the context of a child's evolving maturity.
In the present case, BBB's harrowing reality highlights the most heinous violations of human rights and dignity. When a minor, like BBB, is manipulated or forced into engaging in prostitution or other forms of sexual abuse for a consideration or price, it represents a profound betrayal of the minor's weakness or vulnerability. The consequences for these minor victims are unimaginable and far-reaching. They experience physical and psychological trauma; they endure emotional scars and are at risk of unwanted pregnancies; they also suffer from deeply seated feelings of shame and worthlessness. In the long term, their ability to form healthy and normal relationships may likewise be irreparably damaged.
Prostitution continues to persist due to deeply rooted gender inequality and the widespread disregard for women's human rights. It is driven by the misguided notion that women are inherently inferior, often perceived as mere sexual objects and commodities, while men are regarded as superior, occupying positions of power, making decisions, and owning property. These societal beliefs, unfortunately, foster an environment where the exploitation of women becomes normalized and even perpetuated. This exploitative system thrives on a combination of sociocultural and economic factors, including poverty, lack of education, unemployment, and significant economic disparities. These conditions create power imbalances that enable those with wealth and influence to exploit vulnerable individuals, drawing them into the world of prostitution and sex trade. Women, in particular, often lack the resources and opportunities to break free from these oppressive structures, leaving them with no real choice but to engage in this work.115
Truly, sexual abuse and exploitation are closely intertwined. In both cases, there is a significant power imbalance between the perpetrator and the victim. Such dynamics make it even more difficult for minor-victims, like BBB, to resist, or even escape, the advances of their perpetrators. It also exposes the vulnerable background of minors, who often face poverty, homelessness, and lack of social support. This vulnerability made minors like BBB more susceptible to exploitation and manipulation.
The penalty for child prostitution under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW) is applicable because reclusion perpetua is merely used as the maximum period consisting of a range starting from reclusion temporal, medium period, which is a divisible penalty.116
In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the indeterminate sentence shall be taken from the medium period of the aforesaid penalty which has a range of 17 years, four months and one day to 20 years. The minimum term, on the other hand, shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or eight years and one day to 14 years and eight months.
Based on the preceding discussions, considering the circumstances of the case, Gramatica should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of PHP 50,000.00 each are proper in light of prevailing jurisprudence.117
In addition, a fine of PHP 15,000.00 shall be imposed on Gramatica according to Section 31(f)118 of Republic Act No. 7610.119
All monetary awards, except the fine, shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.120
In Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10798, Gramatica is guilty of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610
There is also no compelling reason to overturn the ruling of the lower courts that found Gramatica guilty of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 which provides that "a person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty, or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period."
Under Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, "Child abuse" refers to maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) [p]sychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) [a]ny act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) [u]nreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) [f]ailure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his [or her] growth and development or in his [or her] permanent incapacity or death. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the following distinct acts: (a) child abuse; (b) child cruelty; (c) child exploitation; and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development.121 Araneta v. People,122 discussed these four punishable separate acts:
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child's development. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development" supposes that there [are] four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.123
A person who commits an act that debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being, whether habitual or not, can be held liable for the above-mentioned provisions of Republic Act No. 7610. It bears stressing, however, that coercion and intimidation are not material elements for an accused to be held culpable under this section.124
To be punishable under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, the important consideration is whether Gramatica's act of selling shabu to AAA, a minor, is prejudicial to her development.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Gramatica defends that he cannot be held liable for violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 because there was no intent to debase, degrade, or demean AAA's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. However, selling drugs is prohibited per se and punishable by law. What is more, selling drugs to a minor, like AAA, has the effect of impairing her dignity and worth as a human being. It infringes upon her right to grow up in a safe, wholesome, and drug-free environment. AAA narrated:
Q: How did come to know of Jeffrey Gramatica?
A: Because he was our boardmate at Km. 3 so the 3 of us are staying in the same boarding house.
Q: You also came to know of him because of drugs.
A: Yes sir.
Q: Why is drugs related with your acquaintance with Jeffrey Gramatica?
A: If we have no drugs with [BBB], we will buy drugs from him.
Q: How much will you pay Jeffrey Gramatica?
A: [PHP] 500.00 and up.
Q: You are still a minor, where [did] you get money to pay Jeffrey Gramatica?
A: From Darwin.
Q: What do you mean that you get from Darwin?
A: Because if he will use me, he will pay me money and drugs and if I do not have anymore drugs, I will use the money to buy drugs.125
Verily, when an individual sells drugs to minors, the former is taking advantage of the latter's vulnerability and impressionability. Minors like AAA are still developing physically, mentally, and emotionally. Hence, exposing minors to drugs can have long-lasting and harmful effects on their health and well-being. Worse, selling drugs to minors degrades and disregards their humanity and worth as a person. It reduces them to mere objects for profit, rather than recognizing their inherent worth. Such reprehensible acts should never be tolerated. This kind of system can have destructive consequences for the minors' self-esteem, relationships, and opportunities. Further, it contributes to the degradation of society as a whole.
Under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, the penalty to be imposed against Gramatica should be prision mayor in its minimum period, which has a period of six years and one day to eight years. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty to be imposed upon petitioner shall be taken from the medium period of the imposable penalty which is six years, eight months, and one day to seven years and four months. Applying the ISLAW, the minimum penalty to be imposed shall be taken one degree lower from the imposable penalty, which is prision correccional maximum, with a range of four years, two months, and one day to six years.
Under the prevailing circumstances, the Court deems it proper to impose the penalty of six years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven years and four months of prision mayor minimum, as maximum.
Following recent jurisprudence,126 the Court affirms the CA ruling that Gramatica should be liable to pay AAA the amount of PHP 20,000.00 as moral damages. To serve as an example of the correction of the public good,127 the Court also imposes the award of PHP 20,000.00 as exemplary damages. These civil liabilities shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
In light of the circumstances, BBB and AAA are referred to the Department of Social Welfare and Development and/or the Department of Health for evaluation. If the assessment suggests it is necessary, they will also receive proper treatment and rehabilitation. Their initial exposure to and dependence on drugs may have had enduring impacts on their health and conduct. Consequently, it is imperative to evaluate their current state and apply necessary interventions based on the results of the assessment. The primary objective is to support their reintegration into society and offer them a renewed opportunity for a dignified and meaningful life.
Women often find themselves in prostitution due to a multitude of intersecting factors such as gender and racial discrimination, poverty, abandonment, and the lasting effects of sexual and verbal abuse. The limited access to formal education and the existence of low-paying jobs keep them stuck in this cycle of exploitation. Addressing prostitution requires dismantling these structural inequalities, providing opportunities for education and economic empowerment, and fostering a society that upholds the dignity and rights of all individuals, particularly women and vulnerable groups.128
G.R. No. 266039
The case of XXX266039, on the other hand, is different.
The Court finds that the elements required to prove a violation of Republic Act No. 7610 are lacking. Unlike BBB, CCC cannot be considered to have "indulged" in lascivious conduct. Her clear and categorical testimony reveals that she was asleep when XXX266039 touched her vagina and breasts. There was no consent, not even a semblance of it. Neither can it be said that XXX266039 employed coercion or influence, as he did not compel or persuade CCC to submit to his desires. Even assuming that coercion or influence was used, CCC could not be said to have "engaged" in lascivious conduct in the legal sense, as she was asleep when XXX266039 placed his hand inside her panties without her consent. Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 regarding coercion or influence and the minor's act of indulging in lascivious conduct are patently wanting in this case.
At this point, the Court dismisses XXX266039's appeal and affirms his conviction but for the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and not as charged in the Information for lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610.
The provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 did not repeal the Revised Penal Code
Tulagan discussed the effects of repeal, specifically in relation to Republic Act No. 8353 and the Revised Penal Code, noting that the former did not repeal the latter. From this fact, the Court concluded that acts of lasciviousness which do not amount to rape by sexual assault and do not fall under Republic Act No. 7610 may still be prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code:
We further note that R.A. No. 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336 of the RPC, as amended. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8353 only states that Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, and all laws, rules and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions thereof are deemed amended, modified or repealed, accordingly. There is nothing inconsistent between the provisions of Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, and R.A. No. 8353, except in sexual assault as a form of rape. To recall, R.A. No. 8353 only modified Article 336 of the RPC, as follows: (1) by carrying over to acts of lasciviousness the additional circumstances applicable to rape, viz.: threat and fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; (2) by retaining the circumstance that the offended party is under 12 years old, and including dementia as another one, in order for acts of lasciviousness to be considered as statutory, wherein evidence of force or intimidation is immaterial because the offended party who is under 12 years old or demented, is presumed incapable of giving rational consent; and (3) by removing from the scope of acts of lasciviousness and placing under the crime of rape by sexual assault the specific lewd act of inserting the offender's penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Hence, Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, is still a good law despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8353 for there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between their provisions. When the lascivious act is not covered by R.A. No. 8353, then Article 336 of the RPC is applicable, except when the lascivious conduct is covered by R.A. No. 7610.129 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A thorough reading of Tulagan shows that it did not discuss the effect of Republic Act No. 7610 on the provisions of the Revised Penal Code; it merely held that "when the lascivious act is not covered by Republic Act No. 8353, then Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable, except when the lascivious conduct is covered by Republic Act No. 7610." Nevertheless, the issue of when acts of lasciviousness to a child must be prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code or under Republic Act No. 7610 remains unresolved.
Tulagan acknowledged that existing legislations, particularly Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law, and Republic Act No. 7610, are silent and do not address sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct involving minors who are 12 years old but less than 18, thus:
Records of committee and plenary deliberations of the House of Representative and of the deliberations of the Senate, as well as the records of bicameral conference committee meetings, further reveal no legislative intent for R.A. No. 8353 to supersede Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. The only contentious provisions during the bicameral conference committee meetings to reconcile the bills of the Senate and House of Representatives which led to the enactment of R.A. No. 8353, deal with the nature of and distinction between rape by carnal knowledge and rape by sexual assault; the threshold age to be considered in statutory rape [whether Twelve (12) or Fourteen (14)], the provisions on marital rape and effect of pardon, and the presumptions of vitiation or lack of consent in rape cases. While R.A. No. 8353 contains a generic repealing and amendatory clause, the records of the deliberation of the legislature are silent with respect to sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct against children under R.A. No. 7610, particularly those who are 12 years old or below 18, or above 18 but are unable to fully take care or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.130 (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the silence and gap, the Court in Tulagan proceeded to rule that acts of lasciviousness committed against minors must be prosecuted in accordance with Republic Act No. 7610. At this juncture, the Court considers it imperative to address the gap by undertaking the task which Tulagan seemingly left unresolved: to determine whether Republic Act No. 7610 has repealed the provisions on acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code.
The answer is in the negative.
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7610 specifies that all laws, decrees, or rules inconsistent with its provisions are repealed or modified accordingly. On the other hand, the law explicitly mentions that the Revised Penal Code applies when the victim of rape or lascivious conduct is below 12 years old.
Therefore, it is clear that Republic Act No. 7610 did not repeal the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Although Tulagan referred to the Revised Penal Code as being applicable to cases involving minors below 12 years old, and recognized the absence of explicit legal provisions for those 12 years old and above but below 18 years old, it merely concluded that all other acts of lasciviousness committed against children subjected to sexual abuse shall fall under Republic Act No. 7610.
Considering the previous points and noting that there has been no repeal between Republic Act No. 7610 and the Revised Penal Code, the Court concludes that not all cases of acts of lasciviousness committed against minors aged 12 years old and above but below 18 years old should be prosecuted under Republic Act No, 7610. The application of this law should be confined to cases where minors are subjected to sexual abuse.
The Court now rules that based on the explicit wording of Section 2(g) of the IRR of Republic Act No. 7610 and the preceding discussion, minors subjected to sexual abuse are those who indulge or engage in, or, in other words, consent, albeit such consent being defective under the law, or are those who are convinced, cajoled, prevailed upon, to participate and engage in lascivious conduct, due to the "employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion" conducted by the adult.
Legislative intent and historical context indicate that Republic Act No. 7610 is relevant only to a specific a group of minors
In light of recent legal developments and jurisprudence, the Court deems it necessary to review and elucidate the actual extent of Republic Act No. 7610. A straightforward examination of Section 5 of the law indicates that it addresses scenarios where children engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious behavior due to coercion or manipulation. Importantly, as stated, the word "indulge" suggests some level of consent, although it may be flawed or inadequate.
In Tulagan, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa), who likewise offered the same view advanced in the present case, forwarded a comprehensive discussion as to why the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 apply only to a specific class of children. In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Tulagan, Justice Caguioa astutely observed that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7610 was the legislature's response to the circumstances after the Court's Decision in People v. Ritter.131
In the case of Ritter, therein accused Heinrich S. Ritter was acquitted of rape with homicide. The Court determined that considering that the prosecution did not prove that the victim, Rosario Baluyot (Baluyot), was below 12 years old, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the element of force and intimidation in the fact of sexual intercourse for the crime of rape to apply. Unfortunately, the Court concluded that Baluyot had consented to the sexual intercourse, as she was a street child engaged in prostitution. This led to the unfortunate acquittal of Ritter, even though Baluyot died due to infection-related complications, as Ritter had left what is thought to be a sexual vibrator inside her vagina. Pieces of the object remained inside her vaginal canal, and it was only after seven months that Baluyot complained of pain and was given medical help, at which point the object was fully removed. The Court explained:
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the appellant will continue to enter the Philippines and foreign publications catering to them will continue to advertise the availability of Filipino street children unless the Government acts and acts soon. We have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express the Court's concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against them. Something must be done about it.132 (Emphasis supplied)
The circumstances in Ritter prompted the legislature to enact Republic Act No. 7610, as highlighted in the sponsorship speech of Senator Santanina Rasul (Senator Rasul), in which she stated:
But undoubtedly, the most disturbing, to say the least, is the persistent report of children being sexually exploited and molested for purely material gains. Children with ages ranging from three to 18 years are used and abused. We hear and read stories of rape, manhandling and sexual molestation in the hands of cruel sexual perverts, local and foreigners alike. As of October 1990, records show that 50 cases of physical abuse were reported, with the ratio of six females to four males. Now, Mr. President, I ask: Is there a new life, a future for sexually abused children? Why do we have victims like them when Filipinos are known for their close family ties? How do we explain the increasing and alarming number cases of child abuse?
There are still a lot of abuses and injustices done to our children who suffer not only from strangers but, sadly, also in the hands of their parents and relatives. We know for a fact that the present law on the matter, the Child and Welfare Code (PD No. 603) has very little to offer to abused children. We are aware of the numerous cases not reported in media.
. . . .
Perhaps, more lamentable than the continuing child abuses and exploitation is the seeming unimportance or the lack of interest in the way we have dealt with the said problem in the country.ᇈWᑭHIL No less than the Supreme Court, in the recent case of People v. Ritter, held that we lack criminal laws which will adequately protect streetchildren from exploitation by pedophiles. But as we know, we, at the Senate have not been remiss in our bounden duty to sponsor bills which will ensure the protection of streetchildren from the tentacles of sexual exploitation. Mr. President, now is the time to convert these bills into reality. (Emphasis supplied)
Senator Rasul's speech clearly indicates that Republic Act No. 7610 was enacted in response to the inadequacy of existing laws on child abuse. Indeed, the law was intended to "provide protection for children in special areas where gaps existed prior to its enactment." Furthermore, Senator Rasul's mention of the inadequacy of criminal laws reinforces the conclusion that the law was enacted to fill the gaps to address instances of sexual abuse against minors that were not addressed by prior laws. In other words, Republic Act No. 7610 was meant to complementnot repealthe Revised Penal Code, particularly in cases where the latter fell short in providing adequate legal remedies.
The discussions during the legislative process regarding Republic Act No. 7610 suggest that there was no intention to completely exclude or otherwise repeal sexual crimes against minors from the scope of the Revised Penal Code's provisions:
Senator Pimentel. Just this question, Mr. President, if the Gentleman will allow. Will this amendment also affect the Revised Penal Code provisions on seduction?
Senator Lina. No, Mr. President. Article 336 of Act No. 3815 will remain unaffected by this amendment we are introducing here. As a backgrounder, the difficulty in the prosecution of so-called "pedophiles" can be traced to this problem of having to catch the malefactor committing the sexual act on the victim. And those in the law enforcement agencies and in the prosecution service of the Government have found it difficult to prosecute. Because if an old person, especially a foreigner, is seen with a child with whom he has no relation - blood or otherwise -- and they are just seen in a room and there is no way to enter the room and to see them in flagrante delicto, then it will be very difficult for the prosecution to charge or to hale to court these pedophiles. So, we are introducing into this bill, Mr. President, an act that is considered already an attempt to commit child prostitution. This, in no way, affects the Revised Penal Code provision on acts of lasciviousness or qualified seduction.
In addition to providing a clear and straightforward response, Senator Jose David Lina, Jr. (Senator Lina) highlighted in his sponsorship speech that Senate Bill No. 1209 aims to enhance current penal provisions on the matter, thus:
Senate Bill No. 1209, Mr. President, is intended to provide stiffer penalties for abuse of children and to facilitate prosecution of perpetrators of abuse. It is intended to complement provisions of the Revised Penal Code where the crimes committed are those which lead children to prostitution and sexual abuse, trafficking in children and use of the young in pornographic activities.
These are the three areas of concern which are specifically included in the United Nations Convention o[n] the Rights of the Child. As a signatory to this Convention, to which the Senate concurred in 1990, our country is required to pass measures which protect the child against these forms of abuse.
. . . .
Mr. President, this bill on providing higher penalties for abusers and exploiters, setting up legal presumptions to facilitate prosecution of perpetrators of abuse, and complementing the existing penal provisions of crimes which involve children below 18 years of age is a part of a national program for protection of children. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court considers Senator Lina's repeated use of the word "complement" as a clear indication that the legislature did not intend to repeal Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. In this context, both Senator Lina and Senator Rasul affirmed that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7610 did not repeal Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. The purpose of the law was to strengthen law enforcement rather than to restrict the existing legislation. The intention, in particular, was to impose penalties for exploitative actions that the Revised Penal Code was not equipped to address, such as those involving minors who are enticed into prostitution or coerced into compliance, as illustrated in Gramatica's case.
The fundamental concept is complementarity, rather than overlap
The Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 7610 serve different purposes. One focuses on acts carried out through force or intimidation, while the other addresses exploitative situations where coercive social and personal factors undermine the child's consent.
For instance, Justice Caguioa referred to the Dissenting Opinion of retired Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Olivarez v. Court of Appeals.133 He observed that the term "other sexual abuse" refers to any sexual abuse other than the acts of lasciviousness complained of and other than exploitation in prostitution.134 Thus, the phrase "other sexual abuse" should be understood to signify that the child is already subjected to sexual abuse other than the crime for which the accused is charged under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610. In other words, the term "other sexual abuse" denotes a component that is separate and. distinct from the acts of lasciviousness that the accused committed against the child.
In sum, as Justice Caguioa noted: "[Republic Act No.] 7610 and the [Revised Penal Code], as amended by [Republic Act No.] 8353, have different spheres of application; they exist to complement each other such that there would be no gaps in our criminal laws. They were not meant to operate simultaneously in each and every case of sexual abuse committed against minors."
All told, all aspects of the legislative intent behind Republic Act No. 7610 indicate that the law was designed to operate alongside the existing provisions of the Revised Penal Code.ℒαwρhi৷Thus, when no evidence exists that the child was induced, influenced, or persuaded into the actas in the case of CCCthe Revised Penal Code governs.
With this, the Court finds applicable the ruling in People v. Abello135 that Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, not Republic Act No. 7610, should apply in cases of acts of lasciviousness committed against minors 12 years old and above but below 18 years old.
In Abello, the 21-year-old victim contracted polio at the age of seven months, which resulted in difficulties with walking that prevented her from attending school. As a result, she only learned to read and write her name and those of her friends. On June 30, 1998, the victim was asleep in her home located in Navotas alongside her sister-in-law and nephew. Suddenly, she was awakened when Abello grabbed her breast. On July 2, 1998, around 3:00 a.m., Abello again touched her breast in a similar manner while she was asleep. During both incidents, the victim identified Abello due to the light from outside that illuminated the house. On July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Abello placed his soft penis inside the mouth of the victim. The latter awakened when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand. The victim then exclaimed "aray" which forced the accused to enter his room hurriedly. The victim, nevertheless, saw Abello. On the same date, she reported the incident to her sister-in-law and mother.
In that case, the Court determined. that the prosecution did not provide any proof indicating that force or coercion was involved in Abello's sexual abuse of the victim; the evidence shows that the victim was asleep when these offenses occurred and only became aware when she sensed her breasts being touched. Therefore, she would have been unable to resist Abello's advances because she was unconscious during the incident. Similarly, there was no evidence demonstrating that Abello forced her or intimidated her into silence regarding his sexual assault after she was awakened. There is also no proof that she had the opportunity to express a conscious lack of consent or resistance to Abello's actions. Besides, the prosecution failed to present any testimonial or documentary evidence from a qualified physician, psychologist, or psychiatrist affirming that the victim's physical condition made her incapable of fully caring for herself or protecting herself from sexual abuse. Given these circumstances, the Court did not classify the victim as a child under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
In the same case, the Court recognized that because Republic Act No. 7610 is a special law addressing a specific group within society, the prosecution must establish that the victim truly belongs to this category to justify the application of its provisions. Any uncertainty regarding this matter must be resolved in favor of the accused. The Court instructed:
In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any evidence showing that force or coercion attended Abello's sexual abuse on AAA; the evidence reveals that she was asleep at the time these crimes happened and only awoke when she felt her breasts being fondled. Hence, she could have not resisted Abello's advances as she was unconscious at the time it happened. In the same manner, there was also no evidence showing that Abello compelled her, or cowed her into silence to bear his sexual assault, after being roused from sleep. Neither is there evidence that she had the time to manifest conscious lack of consent or resistance to Abello's assault.
. . . .
In arriving at this conclusion, we consider that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special law referring to a particular class in society, the prosecution must show that the victim truly belongs to this particular class to warrant the application of the statute's provisions. Any doubt in this regard we must resolve in favor of the accused.
From another perspective, we also note that no evidence has been adduced showing that AAA's physical disability prevented her from resisting Abello's attacks; the evidence only reveals that Abello took advantage of the opportunity presented to him (i.e., that AAA and her companions who were then asleep) to commit the sexual abuses; this inference is supported by the fact that he stopped his sexual assault when AAA started to awaken. It can also be reasonably deduced from these circumstances that Abello sought to commit the sexual abuses with impunity without AAA's knowledge and without any interference on her part.
In light of these conclusions, we cannot hold Abello liable under R.A. No. 7610. However, we still find him liable for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended.136 (Emphasis supplied)
In Abello, the Court emphasized that there was no coercion or influence as the victim was asleep, which is directly comparable to the current case of XXX266039.
The case at bar presents a case for violation of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code
With the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that XXX266039 is liable for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of the crime, as enumerated by the Court in People v. Bon,137 are as follows:
The elements of the crime of acts lasciviousness are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done: (a) by using force and intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.138 (Emphasis supplied)
The direct, straightforward, and categorical testimony of the victim, CCC, reveals that XXX266039 committed acts of lasciviousness or lewdness upon her while she was unconscious. While asleep, she felt a hand inside her underwear. She recognized XXX266039, her own grandfather, touching her private parts. She recalled that after touching her vagina, XXX266039 proceeded to touch both her breasts, viz.:
Q: Ang inirereklamo mo dito ay si [XXX266039, kaano ano mo ito?
A: He is my grandfather, ma'am.
Q: Paano mo siya naging lolo?
A: He is my father's father, ma'am.139
. . . .
Q: Anong oras ba nangyari itong inirereklamo mo noon?
A: At around 1:00 am, ma'am.
Q: Ala-una ng madaling araw, ano ang ginagawa mo noon?
A: I was sleeping. Ma'am.
Q: You were sleeping, and then you said that may nararamdaman ka?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Can you tell me ano yung nararamdaman mo?
A: I felt that there is (sic) a hand inside my underwear, ma'am. When I opened my eyes, I saw him because there is light in the room.
Q: Pagkatapos mo siyang makita, anong ginawa mo?
A: I wasn't able to move because of fear, ma'am.
Q: Pagkatapos, noong hindi ka makagalaw, ano ang ginawa ng akusado kung mayroon man?
A: After he put his hand inside my underwear, he pulled it out and then he put his hands inside my bra and touch (sic) my left breast ma'am, and then after that, he touched my right breast.140
. . . .
Q: Kapag sinabi mong ipinasok ang kamay mo sa loob ng panty, mayroon ba siyang hinawakan sa loob ng panty?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Anong parte ng katawan mo? Ang ibig mo bang sabihin ang iyong ari?
A: Yes, ma'am.141 (Emphasis supplied)
The Information in the present case states that XXX266039 touched the genitals of CCC using intimidation, coercion and influence, but it does not provide that XXX266039 committed it while CCC was unconscious. Following Rule 120, Section 4142 of the Rules of Court and the mandate that the accused must be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, XXX266039 may not be held liable for the charge of acts of lasciviousness committed while the victim is unconscious.
However, XXX266039 may still be held liable for acts of lasciviousness considering that the Information provides that XXX266039 accomplished the crime through intimidation. While indeed the first incident of touching CCC's vagina happened when she was asleep, XXX266039 was able to further gratify his desire by using moral ascendancy against her. XXX266039's position as CCC's grandfather and the wide disparity between their ages undoubtedly gave XXX266039 moral ascendancy over CCC. It is settled in jurisprudence143 that in cases of incestuous sexual abuse, moral ascendancy supplants the element of intimidation. In the same way that the Court has recognized that a father exercises moral ascendancy over his child,144 so must such principle apply in the case of XXX266039 in relation to his granddaughter, CCC.
As XXX266039 managed to perform lewd act by leveraging moral authority, which supplants intimidation, he should be held liable for violation of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
XXX266039's defense that the crime could not have been committed due to the presence of other persons in the house where it occurred has no merit. The Court has consistently held that there is no standard time or place for the commission of rape, or similarly, sexual abuse. In People v. XXX,145 the Court held:
On this score, the alleged inconsistency or improbability in the victim's testimony pertaining to whether appellant's father was also inside the house when she got raped or whether there were also many people nearby since it was then the feast day of the barangay refer to trivial matters which do not affect the credibility of the victim's testimony. For another, the proximity of a number of people at the rape scene does not disprove the commission of rape. For lust is no respecter of time and place. Rape can be committed anywhere, even in places where people congregate. People v. Balora decrees:
The court has time and again held that "the evil in man has no conscience. The beast in him bears no respect for time and place, driving him to commit rape anywhere even in places where people congregate such as in parks, along the roadside, within school premises and inside a house where there are other occupants." "Rape does not necessarily have to be committed in an isolated place and can in fact be committed in places which to many would appear to be unlikely and high-risk venues for sexual advances." Indeed, no one would think that rape could happen in a public place like the comfort room of a movie house and in broad daylight.146 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Under the circumstances, the mere presence of other occupants in the house where XXX266039 committed his lewd act upon CCC did not make the commission of the lascivious conduct impossible or even improbable.
Anent XXX266039's argument that CCC did not shout when he allegedly touched her, this has been sufficiently explained through her testimony in court, where she consistently said that she was unable to move due to fear.147 The Court has recognized this as a common reason why victims fail to shout for help in cases of sexual abuse. In People v. Ofemiano,148 the Court elucidated:
Jurisprudence holds that the failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate rape. Even the victim's lack of resistance, especially when intimidated by the offender into submission, does not signify voluntariness or consent. In People v. Corpuz, we acknowledged that even absent any actual force or intimidation, rape may be committed if the malefactor has moral ascendancy over the victim. We emphasized that in rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, moral influence or ascendancy substitutes for violence or intimidation.149 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Finally, XXX266039's argument that the prosecution's inability to support CCC's testimony with that of her relatives diminishes its credibility and reliability does not persuade the Court.
It is well-settled that the prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to prosecute a case. Likewise, the prosecutor has the discretion to present witnesses.150 In People v. Montierro,151 the Court held:
However, it must be noted with import that the exclusive prerogative of the Executive begins and ends with matters involving purely prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutorial discretion pertains to who to prosecute, what case to prosecute, and how the case would be pursued based on the evidence available to the prosecution. The prosecution has the freedom and authority to determine whether to charge a person, what Information to file against them and how to prosecute the case filed before the courts[.]152 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the absence of testimony from CCC's relatives who might have seen the incident does not undermine the prosecution's case; it is not fatal in establishing XXX266039's liability. At most, such testimony only serves as corroborative and is not essential or indispensable for establishing that the crime took place. Additionally, the Court has often ruled that the lone testimony of a victim of acts of lasciviousness is sufficient to produce a finding of guilt on the part of the accused. In Garingarao v. People,153 the Court emphasized:
The Court has ruled that in case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the testimony of AAA credible over Garingarao's defense of denial and alibi. It is a settled rule that denial is a weak defense as against the positive identification by the victim. Both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration by a credible witness. Garingarao's defense of denial and alibi must fail over the positive and straightforward testimony of AAA on the incident[.]154 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The Court is satisfied that the prosecution has proved XXX266039's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the Court affirms his conviction for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
The penalty to be imposed for acts of lasciviousness under Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional or six months and one day to six years.
The Information alleged that XXX266039 was the grandfather of CCC. He likewise admitted this fact through stipulation during pre-trial.155 Relationship, an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, is an aggravating circumstance in crimes against chastity, whether the offender is a higher or a lower degree relative of the offended party.156
Considering the presence of an aggravating circumstance, the penalty imposed shall be in its maximum period, or within the range of four years, two months, and one day to six years of prision correccional. Applying the ISLAW, the minimum of the penalty shall be taken from that one degree lower or arresto mayor which has a range of one month and one day to six months.
Thus, XXX266039 must suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months of arresto mayor to six years of prision correccional.
The Court deems it proper to increase the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to PHP 150,000.00 each, given the following: (1) the penalty imposed upon XXX266039 is considerably lower than that which would have been imposed had XXX266039 been found liable under Republic Act No. 7610; and (2) the presence of the alternative circumstance of relationship, XXX266039 being the grandfather of the minor victim, CCC. This is also consistent with People v. ABC260708,157 which recognized that law and jurisprudence set the minimum amounts of civil indemnity and damages but do not impose a maximum limit. It increased the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages from that outlined in Tulagan to deter incestuous sexual abuse perpetrated against minors.
All monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of the Decision until full payment.
Guidelines on the proper application of Section 5(b), Republic Act No. 7610, in relation to acts of lasciviousness involving minors
In clarifying the proper application of Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, particularly in relation to acts of lasciviousness involving minors, the Court finds it necessary to delineate the scope of this provision and distinguish it from the related crimes under the Revised Penal Code. The following guidelines are thus issued to aid in the uniform and consistent prosecution of such cases, especially in the light of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 11648 and the relevant jurisprudence.
First, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as amended by Republic Act No. 11648 (which raised the age of sexual consent to 16), applies to minors aged 16 and above but below 18 years old who are subjected to other forms of sexual abuse. This provision specifically covers situations where a minor engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of an adult, even when the minor appears to "consent" to the act.
Second, the provision contemplates a semblance of consent that is defective or vitiatedwhere the minor allows, yields, or participates in the act not through free will but because of the coercion or influence exerted by an adult. Such coercion or influence is distinct from the concepts of force or intimidation under the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, when the minor's participation is induced by pressure, manipulation, or abuse of authority that does not rise to the level of force or intimidation, Section 5(b) properly applies.
Third, Section 5(b) does not apply when the lascivious conduct is committed through force or intimidation, or when the victim is deprived of reason, unconscious, or otherwise subjected to fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. In such cases, the proper charge is acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, and Republic Act No. 7610 does not find application.
Fourth, suppose the victim is below 12 years old, or below 16 years old, and the case does not fall under the specific conditions of Section 5(6). In that case, the offense should be prosecuted as either rape or acts of lasciviousness, as the case may be, under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The rules are summarized as follows:
| Lascivious conduct committed through force, threat, or intimidation, or where the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or by fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority | Where the child indulges and engages in lascivious conduct, thus subjected to sexual abuse, through the adult's employment of coercion and influence, or in other words, when the child gives defective "consent" |
| A child below 12 years old | Statutory Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code | Statutory Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code |
| A child 12 years old or above but below 18 years old | Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code | Sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 |
These principles on the delineation of the elements of force and intimidation on one hand, and coercion and influence on the other, and the applicability of Republic Act No. 7610 only as to minors who are EPSOSA, shall also apply to other similar crimes sexual in nature, including rape by carnal knowledge and rape by sexual assault.
Final note
"The true character of a society is revealed in
how it treats its children. "
-Nelson Mandela in his speech at
Worcester Station, September 27, 1997
All told, it cannot be gainsaid that the Court is aware of the deficiencies in our present laws, which have resulted in situations such as the instant casewhere a grandfather like XXX266939, who committed abhorrent and bestial acts against his minor granddaughter, is meted a penalty that is regrettably lower than that prescribed under Republic Act No. 7610. The Court fully recognizes that the punishment imposed does not reflect the full gravity and depravity of the acts committed. Nevertheless, the Court emphasizes that, while it is neither blind nor indifferent to the manifest injustice brought about by the current state of the law, it is bound to interpret and apply the law as written. The Court's duty is to give effect to the clear letter of the law, not to rewrite it to impose a penalty more suited to the moral outrage evoked by the facts. Any modification or enhancement of the prescribed penalties lies within the exclusive province of the legislature, not the judiciary.
In line with the above, and in fulfillment of the Court's duty to uphold the Constitution, which mandates the special protection of children from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development, let this serve as a call to the legislature to fulfill its bounden duty of reviewing and amending our present laws and ensuring the safety, well-being, and dignity of our Filipino children.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:
1. DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 260233. The Decision dated March 11, 2021, and the Resolution dated March 29, 2022, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 42318 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
a. In Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10797 filed before Branch x, Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, petitioner Jeffrey Gramatica y Laurista is found GUILTY of child prostitution under Section 5(6) of Republic Act No. 7610. He is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of eight years and one day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay the victim, BBB, PHP 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, PHP 50,000.00 as moral damages, and PHP 50,000.00 as exemplary damages. In addition, he is ORDERED to pay a FINE of PHP 15,000.00 according to Section 31(f) of Republic Act No. 7610.
b. In Criminal Case No. 15-CR-10798 filed before Branch x, Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, petitioner Jeffrey Gramatica y Laurista is found guilty of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610. He is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven years and four months of prision mayor minimum, as maximum. Further, he is ORDERED to pay the victim AAA PHP 20,000.00 as moral damages, and PHP 20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
All monetary awards, except the fine, shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Further, BBB and AAA are both REFERRED to the Department of Social Welfare and Development and/or the Department of Health for evaluation, and if deemed necessary, for treatment and rehabilitation.
2. DISMISS the appeal in G.R. No. 266039. The Decision dated October 7, 2021, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 44840 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that accused-appellant XXX266039 is found GUILTY of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 2018-1383 filed before Branch x, Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, and he is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six years of prision correccional, as maximum.
In addition, he is ORDERED to PAY CCC the sum of PHP 150,000.00 as civil indemnity, PHP 150,000.00 as moral damages, and PHP 150,000.00 as exemplary damages, each of which shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Villanueva, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ. and Zalameda, J., see separate concurring opinions.
Caguioa, J., see concurring.
Singh, J., no part and on leave.
No part and on leave.
Footnotes
1 SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
. . . .
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.]
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 260233), pp. 11-40.
3 Id. at 42-66. Penned by Associate Justice Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig and concurred in by Associate Justices Danton Q. Bueser and Raymond Reynold R. Lauigan of the Special Twelfth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4 Id. at 68-70. Penned by Associate Justice Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig and concurred in by Associate Justices Pedro B. Corales and Raymond Reynold R. Lauigan, of the Former Special Twelfth Division, Court of Appeals Manila.
5 Id. at 101-119. Penned by Presiding Judge Marietta S. Brawner-Cualing.
6 SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
7 CA rollo (G.R. No. 266039), pp. 90-92. Notice of Appeal dated November 3, 2021.
8 Id. at 68-86. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Maria Filomena D. Singh and Bonifacio S. Pascua of the Third Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
9 Rollo (G.R. No. 266039), pp. 30-36. Penned by Presiding Judge Aristotle M. Reyes.
10 Id. at 36. Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, approved on June 17, 1992.
11 Also referred to as "AAA" and "AAA" in some parts of the rollo.
12 Rollo (G.R. No. 260233), p. 101.
13 Id. at 44, 102.
14 Id. at 44, 46, 102.
15 Id. at 102.
16 Id. at 46.
17 Id.
18 Rollo (G.R. No. 266039), p. 10, CA Decision.
19 CA rollo (G.R. No. 266039), pp. 5, 8.
20 Id. at 10, 30, respectively.
21 Id. at 30.
22 Rollo (G.R. No. 260233), p. 45. Darwin was separately charged in Criminal Case Nos. 15-CR-10786 for violation of Republic Act No. 9165; and 15-CR-10790, 15-CR-10791, 15-CR-10792, and 15-CR-10793 for violation of Republic Act No. 7610.
23 Id. at 45, 47.
24 Id. at 47.
25 Id. at 47-48.
26 RTC records, 13. See Medico Legal Certificate.
27 Rollo (G.R. No. 260233), p. 48
28 Id. at 48-49.
29 Id. at 101-119. Penned by Judge Marietta S. Brawner Cualing of Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet.
30 Id. at 113-114.
31 Id. at 118.
32 Id. at 118-119.
33 Id. at 42-66. The March 11, 2021 Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 42318 was penned by Associate Justice Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig and concurred in by Associate Justices Danton Q. Bueser and Raymond Reynold R. Lauigan of the Special Twelfth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
34 Id. at 64-65.
35 Id. at 53, 55-56.
36 Id. at 58, 60-61.
37 Id. at 11-40.
38 Rollo (G.R. No. 260233), p. 24.
39 Id. at 32.
40 Id. at 34.
41 Id. at 149-156.
42 Id. at 150.
43 Id. at 120-137.
44 Id. at 154.
45 Rollo (G.R. No. 266039), p. 31.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 30-36.
48 Id. at 36.
49 Id. at 32.
50 Id. at 33.
51 Id. at 34.
52 Id. at 35.
53 CA rollo (G.R. No. 266039), p. 10. See Notice of Appeal dated February 24, 2020.
54 Id. at 19-30. Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated October 30, 2020.
55 Id. at 25.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 47-56. Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee dated February 24, 2021.
59 Id. at 52.
60 Id. at 53.
61 Id. at 68-86. The October 7, 2021 Decision in CA-G.R. No. 44840 was penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Maria Filomena Singh and Bonifacio S. Pascua of the Third Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
62 Id. at 85.
63 Id. at 76-80.
64 Id. at 80-81.
65 Id. at 81.
66 Id. at 93.
67 Id. at 90-92. See Notice of Appeal dated November 3, 2021.
68 Rollo (G.R. No. 266039), pp. 40-41, 45-47, respectively.
69 Id. at 40.
70 Id. at 45.
71 771 Phil. 641 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
72 Id. at 668-669.
73 808 Phil. 889 (2017) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
74 Id. at 919.
75 849 Phil. 197 (2019) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
76 Id. at 239.
77 Id. at 229.
78 Id. at 243-244.
79 Id. at 256-257.
80 951 Phil. 48 (2024) [Per J. Lopez, J., Second Division].
81 Id. at 73-74, citing People v. XXX, 944 Phil. 517, 529-530 (2023) [Per CJ. Gesmundo, First Division]; People v. Sernadilla, 930 Phil. 1, 9 (2022) [Per J. Gaerlan, Third Division].
82 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Commission on Audit, 900 Phil. 575, 586 (2021) [Per J. Lazaro- Javier, En Banc].
83 283 Phil. 649 (1992) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
84 Id. at 660.
85 Black's Law Dictionary, 11th Edition (2019).
86 Britannica Dictionary. Available at //britannica.com/dictionary/indulge [Last accessed on September 19, 2025.]
87 Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Available at //merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indulge [Last accessed on September 19, 2025.]
88 Cambridge Dictionary. Available at //dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/indulge [Last accessed on September 19, 2025.]
89 Collins Dictionary. Available at //collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/indulge [Last accessed on September 19, 2025.]
90 Rules and Regulations on the reporting and investigation of child abuse cases (1993).
91 Black's Law Dictionary, 11th Edition (2019).
92 Britanica Dictionary. Available at //britanica.com/dictionary/engage [Last accessed on September 19, 2025.]
93 Cambridge Dictionary. Available at //dictionary.cam bridge.org/dictionary/english/engage [Last accessed on September 19, 2025.]
94 Cambridge Dictionary. Available at //dictionary.carnbridge.org/dictionary/english/engage [Last accessed on September 19, 2025.]
95 Collins Dictionary. Available at //collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/engage [Last accessed on September 19, 2025.]
96 Rollo (G.R. No. 260233), p. 24.
97 Id. at 29.
98 Id. at 30.
99 Id. at 34.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 35.
102 People v. Aspa, 838 Phil. 302, 311-312 (2018) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division], citing People v. De Guzman, 564 Phil. 282, 290 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
103 Id. at 312, citing People v. Villamin, 625 Phil. 698, 713 (2010) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
104 People v. Jaime, 836 Phil. 871, 879 (2018) [Per J. Martires, Third Division].
105 TSN, AAA, September 12, 2017, pp. 7-9.
106 RTC records, p. 17. See Certificate of Live Birth.
107 People v. Tulagan, 849 Phil. 197 (2019) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
108 Id. at 242-245.
109 Approved on March 4, 2022.
110 People v. Sernadilla, 930 Phil. 1 (2022) [Per J. Gaerlan, Third Division].
111 Id. at 14.
112 Id.
113 People v. Servano, 454 Phil. 257, 301 (2003) [Per J. Corona, En Banc], citing Reyes, REV. PENAL CODE, Book 11, 14th ed., 1998, p. 865.
114 People v. Lee, 432 Phil. 338, 362 (2002) [Per J. Puno, En Banc] citing Act No. 3815, REV. PENAL CODE (1930), art. 338 and V. Francisco, Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, Vol. VII, Part I, p. 752.
115 //pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/07/PCW-WPLA-Policy-Brief-9-Anti-Prostitution.pdf?x16957
116 People v. Tulagan, 849 Phil. 197, 226 (2019) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
117 Beleta v. People, 914 Phil. 777, 784-785 (2021) [Per J. Inting, Second Division]
118 The said provision states:
ARTICLE XII Common Penal Provisions
SECTION 31. Common Penal Provisions.
. . . .
(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be imposed and administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate member of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense.
119 People v. VVV, 874 Phil. 811, 835 (2020) [Per J. Inting, Second Division]; People v. BBB, 856 Phil. 540, 567 (2019) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; People v. Caoili, 815 Phil. 839, 896(2017) [Per J. Tijam, En Banc].
120 See Lara's Gifts & Decors, Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc., 929 Phil. 754 (2022) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
121 Araneta v. People, 578 Phil. 578 Phil. 876, 884-885 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
122 Id.
123 Id. at 884-886.
124 Dela Cruz v. People, 903 Phil. 801, 818-819 (2021) [Per J. Lopez, J., Third Division].
125 TSN, AAA, September 26, 2017, p. 8.
126 San Juan v. People, 933 Phil. 889, 916 (2023) [Per J. Lopez, J., En Banc].
127 See CIVIL CODE, Title XVIII, Chapter 3, art. 2229, sec. 5 which states:
ARTICLE 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
128 //pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/07/PCW-WPLA-Policy-Brief-9-Anti-Prostitution.pdf?x16957.
129 People v. Tulagan, 849 Phil. 197, 293-294 (2019) [Per. J. Peralta, En Banc].
130 Id. at 225.
131 272 Phil. 532 (1991) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division].
132 Id. at 569-570.
133 503 Phil. 421 (2005) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
134 Id. at 445.
135 601 Phil. 373 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
136 Id. at 393-395.
137 444 Phil. 571 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
138 Id. at 583-584.
139 Rollo (G.R. No. 266039), pp. 11-12.
140 Id. at 12.
141 Id. at 12-13.
142 SECTION 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
143 People v. ZZZ, 955 Phil. 733 (2024) [Per J. Singh, Third Division].1äwphï1.ñët
144 Id. at 755.
145 887 Phil. 734 (2020) [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division].
146 Id. at 749-750, citing People v. Balora, 388 Phil. 193, 203 (2000) [J. Pardo, First Division].
147 Rollo (G.R. No. 266039), p. 12.
148 625 Phil. 92 (2010) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
149 Id. at 99.
150 See Montelibano v. Yap, 822 Phil. 262, 273 (2017) [Per J. Martires, Third Division].
151 926 Phil. 430 (2022) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
152 Id. at 463-464.
153 669 Phil. 512 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
154 Id. at 522.
155 Rollo (G.R. No. 266039), p. 10.
156 People v. Orilla, 467 Phil. 253, 283 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
157 950 Phil. 199, 235 (2024) [Per J. Lopez, M., En Banc].
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