Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 267998, April 23, 2025
ELOISA MALIWAT-MELAD, PETITIONER,
vs.
AMANCIO REYES MELAD AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
LOPEZ, M., J.:
The present Petition1 assails the October 27, 2022 Decision2 and the May 17, 2023 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 117590, which affirmed the March 1, 2021 Decision4 of Branch 11, Family Court, Tarlac City, Tarlac (RTC) in Civil Case No. 808-2018, which denied the petition for nullity of marriage between Eloisa Maliwat-Melad (Eloisa) and Amancio Reyes Melad (Amancio).
Antecedents
On March 23, 1990, Eloisa and Amancio got married at the Municipal Hall of Tarlac City, Tarlac. Their marriage contract showed that the marriage was solemnized by a certain Judge Conrado De Gracia (Judge De Gracia). Their union produced three children.5
Throughout their marriage, Eloisa and Amancio encountered various marital problems. In 2017, Eloisa consulted her lawyer, Atty. Eduardo Cunanan (Atty. Cunanan), regarding the possibility of filing a legal separation case against Amancio. Eloisa showed her marriage certificate to Atty. Cunanan, who claimed that he knew Judge De Gracia.
Eloisa also presented pictures of the marriage ceremony to Atty. Cunanan, who noticed that Judge De Gracia was not in the pictures. According to Atty. Cunanan, the person who appeared to be the solemnizing officer was a certain Rosalio Florendo (Florendo),6 whom he allegedly also knew as a co-member of the Rotary Club of Tarlac City.
Eloisa explained to Atty. Cunanan that although she arranged the wedding, neither she, nor anyone else knew Judge De Gracia. She thought that the person who solemnized their marriage was the judge himself.
Consequently, on January 5, 2018, Eloisa filed a petition with the RTC to declare her marriage to Amancio as void on the ground of lack of authority of the solemnizing officer. Summons were served upon Amancio, but he failed to file a responsive pleading and appear before the court. Deputy City Prosecutor Liza C. Olinares-Agliam certified that no collusion existed between Eloisa and Amancio.7
Pre-trial and trial ensued. Eloisa presented herself, Roland Atiburcio Quilana (Quilana) and Atty. Cunanan.
Eloisa submitted the three pictures of her marriage ceremony as evidence. She claimed that the person wearing a white polo shirt with stripes, and who officiated her marriage, was Florendo and not Judge De Gracia. The ceremony was attended by their godparents, Estela Reyes, the wife of one Mateo Briones, Quilana, and other witnesses. Eloisa explained that the solemnizing officer gave them marriage advice before officiating the marriage. Afterwards, the solemnizing officer used his right hand to join the hands of Eloisa and Amancio and used his left hand to "bless" the couple and declare them husband and wife. Eloisa also claimed that the solemnizing officer was still present at the time Eloisa and Amancio signed the marriage certificate, but that the couple was told to just leave the marriage contract at the table. Afterwards, the newly married couple and their guests proceeded to Antigua Restaurant for the reception.8
As for Quilana, he testified that he was one of the guests present during the marriage ceremony of Eloisa and Amancio on March 23, 1990. He also admitted that he did not know what Judge De Gracia looked like, and he thought all along that the person in the picture who appeared to officiate the marriage was the judge.9
Finally, Atty. Cunanan testified that he personally knew Judge De Gracia as a municipal court judge in the 1990s because he used to visit him in his chambers. Before 1990, he and Judge De Gracia were part of a religious-oriented group called "Marriage Encounter 3" in Tarlac City where they used to do bible study, among other Catholic activities. When Eloisa showed him a picture of her marriage ceremony, he identified the solemnizing officer as Rosalio Florendo, whom he also personally knew as a co-member of the Rotary Club in Tarlac City. He also noted that Judge De Gracia was not in the pictures. During cross-examination, Atty. Cunanan admitted that he was not personally present during the marriage ceremony and that he was also not certain whether the picture showed the actual marriage ceremony or merely the giving of marriage advice to Eloisa and Amancio.10
Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision11 dated March 1, 2021, the RTC denied Eloisa's petition. The RTC ruled that the testimonies of Eloisa, Quilana, and Atty. Cunanan did not sufficiently establish the identities of Judge De Gracia and Florendo, and who among the two actually officiated the marriage of Eloisa and Amancio. In any case, Eloisa admitted that she believed that Judge De Gracia was the person who officiated the marriage. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the instant Petition is DENIED for failure of the petitioner to prove the grounds relied upon in the petition and for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved, Eloisa appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision13 dated October 27, 2022, the CA affirmed the RTC in toto. The CA ruled that the marriage contract, being a public document, serves as a prima facie proof of marriage and evidence of the facts stated in the document. However, Eloisa failed to present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the prima facie presumption. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The March 1, 2021 Decision and July 26, 2021 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Tarlac City in Civil Case No. 808-2018 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.14 (Emphasis in the original)
Hence, this Petition.15 Petitioner Eloisa Maliwat-Melad reiterates her arguments that her marriage to private respondent Amancio Reyes Melad was void due to the lack of authority of the solemnizing officer.
Ruling of the Court
The Petition is unmeritorious.
Marriage is a special contract whose terms and conditions are not merely subject to the stipulations of the contracting parties but are governed by law.16 Since it is a lifetime commitment which cannot be dissolved by the simple whim of the parties, the State has surrounded it with safeguards to preserve its purity, continuity, and permanence.17
Any petition to declare the nullity of marriage can only be based on the exclusive grounds provided by Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code:18
.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the quantum of proof in nullity cases is clear and convincing evidence,19 which is greater than a preponderance of evidence for ordinary civil cases but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases.20
Here, the Court finds that petitioner failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that her marriage to private respondent was void ab initio on the ground of lack of authority of the solemnizing officer.
Petitioner failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the lack of legal authority of the solemnizing officer
Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code provide that one of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. In the absence or lack of an essential or formal requisite of marriage, the marriage is deemed void:
Article 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Article 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). (Emphasis supplied)
A solemnizing officer is considered clothed with legal authority to solemnize the marriage if he or she belongs to any of the following, viz:
Article 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted him by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; or
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the marriage certificate shows that petitioner and private respondent's marriage took place in Tarlac City and was solemnized by Judge De Gracia, a judge of Tarlac City. The solemnizing officer, being then an incumbent judge within the jurisdiction of Tarlac City, had the legal authority to officiate the marriage pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Family Code.
However, petitioner and Atty. Cunanan argued that it was not Judge De Gracia who solemnized petitioner and private respondent's marriage, based on the pictures of the marriage ceremony. According to them, the pictures showed that the man who appeared to officiate the marriage was Florendo, who is not an authorized solemnizing officer under the Family Code. Thus, according to petitioner, her marriage should be declared void for lack of authority of the solemnizing officer.
We do not agree.
Foremost, all of petitioner's witnesses failed to establish the identities of Judge De Gracia and Florendo. Petitioner had no personal knowledge to distinguish the persons of Judge De Gracia or Florendo. She even admitted that she thought the person who solemnized the marriage was Judge De Gracia. She did not present any evidence to identify either Judge De Gracia or Florendo.
Likewise, Atty. Cunanan, petitioner's lawyer who testified for her, claimed that he knew Judge De Gracia because he had previously visited him in his chambers and that they belonged to a religious group. Atty.(awÞhi( Cunanan also contended that he and Florendo belonged to the same organization, that is, the Rotary Club of Tarlac City. Yet, aside from his bare allegations and despite claims of personal connection with the individuals in question, he did not present other documentary or testimonial evidence to buttress his claims. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Atty. Cunanan's claims that he personally knew Judge De Gracia were not only unsubstantiated but also self-serving:
However, Atty. Eduardo [Cunanan]'s statements, standing alone, do not credibly establish the identities of Judge Conrado and Rosalio [Florendo]. He claimed that he personally knows Judge Conrado and Rosalio but failed to present any evidence to prove their identities or establish his relationship with them. The belatedly submitted baptismal certificate of Atty. Eduardo [Cunanan]'s daughter could not prove his affiliation with Judge Conrado because the person named as godparent therein was a certain Viola, and not Conrado De Gracia. There is also no proof of Viola's relationship with Conrado.21
Finally, Quilana established that he personally attended the marriage ceremony, but he also admitted that he did not know what Judge De Gracia or Florendo looked like.
It is a fundamental legal precept that a person who alleges must prove his or her allegations. In Gatmaytan v. Dolor,22 the Court emphasized that a mere allegation is not evidence, and he who alleges has the burden of proving the allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence. Logically, a party who fails to discharge his or her burden of proof will not be entitled to the relief prayed for.23
In this case, the identities of either Judge De Gracia or Florendo could have been established by numerous documentary or testimonial evidence of various competent and disinterested persons. Atty. Cunanan could have secured the presence of Judge De Gracia himself, his court staff (considering that he was a judge in Tarlac City), or any other competent person who can personally identify him; yet they failed to do so. Similarly, Atty. Cunanan claimed that he belonged to the same organization as Florendo, and yet, he failed to produce competent evidence, aside from his own testimony, as to the identity of Florendo.
On the other hand, Judge De Gracia's name and signature appeared in the marriage contract as the solemnizing officer. The authenticity of his signature was never assailed. The marriage contract, being a public document, is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.24 Hence, as against the petitioners' self-serving allegations, the marriage contract must prevail.
More importantly, it is settled in jurisprudence that an officer or clergyman who officiated the marriage is presumed to have legal authority to do so, absent sufficient contrary evidence. As explained by the Court in Alcantara vs. Alcantara:25
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner — that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel — will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, since petitioner failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the lack of authority of the solemnizing officer, the marriage is valid. The legal presumption accorded to public documents, in favor of the authority of the solemnizing officer, and towards the validity of marriage, must be upheld.
At any rate, petitioner had always believed, in good faith, that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to officiate the marriage
In any case, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the person who solemnized the marriage was not Judge De Gracia, the marriage is still valid because the case falls under Article 35(2) of the Family Code.
Article 35(2) of the Family Code provides that marriages officiated by a person with no legal authority are considered void, except if one or both parties to the marriage believed in good faith that the officer had legal authority to solemnize the marriage, to wit:
ARTICLE 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the records show that petitioner had always believed in good faith, since the inception of her marriage in the year 1990, that the solemnizing officer was Judge De Gracia—a person who had the legal authority to solemnize the marriage. She had never doubted the authority of the solemnizing officer. It was only in 2017 that she sought legal advice on how to be legally separated from her husband, wherein she was notified by her lawyer that Judge De Gracia was not the actual person who officiated the marriage. However, as discussed, petitioner and Atty. Cunanan palpably failed to establish the veracity of their allegations.
Thus, petitioner's case falls under the exception of void marriages as provided in Article 35(2) of the Family Code. Petitioner's marriage with private respondent is valid owing to her genuine belief, in good faith, that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to officiate her marriage with private respondent.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. The October 27, 2022 Decision and the May 17, 2023 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 117590, upholding the March 1, 2021 Decision of Branch 11, Family Court, Tarlac City is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), see dissenting opinion.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 10-30.
2 Id. at 31-42. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales and concurred in by Associate Justices Carlito B. Calpatura and Michael P. Ong of the Sixteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3 Id. at 52-53.
4 Id. at 63-71. The Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Joefferson B. Toribio of Branch 11, Family Court, Tarlac City.
5 Id. at 63.
6 Id. at 32.
7 Id. at 64.
8 Id. at 65.
9 Id. at 66.
10 Id. at 67.
11 Id. at 63-71.
12 Id. at 71.
13 Id. at 31-43.
14 Id. at 42.
15 Id. at 13-30.
16 Tilar v. Tilar, 813 Phil. 734, 741 (2017) Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
17 De Silva v. De Silva, 913 Phil. 524, 535 (2021) [Per J. J. Lopez, First Division].
18 Executive Order No. 209 (1987).
19 Tan-Andal v. Andal, 902 Phil. 558, 591 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
20 Riguer v. Mateo, 811 Phil. 538, 547 (2017) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
21 Rollo, p. 40.
22 806 Phil. 1 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
23 Id. at 26.
24 558 Phil. 192, 200 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
25 558 Phil. 192 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
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