CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, S.A.J.:
I concur with the ponencia that the Commissioner of Customs must be enjoined from ruling on the pending claims of refund for the periods covered in this case. However, I clarify my position regarding the jurisdiction of petitioners Commissioner of Customs and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, as well as on the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals, over the claims filed by respondents Air Philippines Corporation (Air Philippines) and Philippine Airlines Inc. (PAL).
The Petitions for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in this case involve the claims of respondents Air Philippines and PAL for refund of taxes they had previously paid for the importation of Jet A-1 fuel for their domestic operations for various periods.1
According to the ponencia, either the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or Bureau of Internal Revenue has jurisdiction over the claims for refund of excise taxes on imported goods. Therefore, the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9282. I agree.
As the ponencia noted, special import taxes and excise taxes are governed by different laws and are implemented by different agencies.2 While the law on special import taxes is implemented by the Commissioner of Customs, the law on excise taxes on importation is implemented by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.3
What is involved in this case are excise taxes assessed pursuant to Section 148 of the National Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code),4 as opposed to customs duties assessed pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP). It is undisputed by the parties that the tax assessments were under Section 148 of the Tax Code.5
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Carrier Air Conditioning Philippines, Inc.,6 this Court stated that "applications for refunds of internal revenue taxes lie within the primary jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue."7 This is consistent with Sections 2 and 4 of the Tax Code, which respectively provide: (a) the power and duties of the Bureau of Internal Revenue as comprehending the assessment and collection of all national internal revenue taxes; and (b) the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's original and exclusive power to interpret the provisions of the Tax Code and other tax laws, as well as their power to decide refunds of internal revenue taxes. The pertinent provisions are replicated as follows:
Section 2. Powers and duties of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. - The Bureau of Internal Revenue shall be under the supervision and control of the Department of Finance and its powers and duties shall comprehend the assessment and collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees, and charges, and the enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties, and fines connected therewith, including the execution of judgments in all cases decided in its favor by the Court of Tax Appeals and the ordinary courts. The Bureau shall give effect to and administer the supervisory and police powers conferred to it by this Code or other laws.
Section 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax Cases. - The power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance.
The power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under this Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the Commissioner, subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 602 of the TCCP provides that the general duties, power and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs include "assessment and collection of the lawful revenues from imported articles and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties accruing under the tariff and customs laws,"8 as well as "[t]he enforcement of the tariff and custom laws and all other laws; rules and regulations relating to the tariff and customs administration."9
Based on the foregoing provisions, filing of written claims for refund must be done with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, not the Bureau of Customs, pursuant to Section 204(C) in relation to Section 229 of the Tax Code.
The Bureau of Customs cannot validly acquire jurisdiction over these claims and therefore cannot act on these written claims for refund. Any action upon these claims will be a nullity and would not produce the effect of res judicata. Likewise, the parties cannot be held liable for forum shopping for instituting claims for refund simultaneously with both administrative agencies.10 Air Philippines and PAL's formal written protests with the Bureau of Customs11 are superfluous.
Under Section 204(C) in relation to Section 229 of the Tax Code, in case taxes have been erroneously or illegally received, a taxpayer may, within two years from payment of the any national internal revenue: (1) file a written claim for refund with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and (2) institute a suit or proceeding in any court for the recovery of said erroneously and illegally assessed or collected tax.
Notably, this two-year period to file an administrative claim for refund under Section 229 of the Tax Code is merely prescriptive and not jurisdictional as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may waive the period or the filing of written claim within said period in exceptional circumstances.12 Meanwhile, the same two-year period within which to file a judicial claim before the Court of Tax Appeals is mandatory and jurisdictional.13 In Carrier, this Court countenanced the filing of a judicial claim without awaiting the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's action on its administrative claim, as long as the judicial claim was filed within the two-year prescriptive period.14
It must be emphasized, however, that when a tax is paid in installments, the prescriptive period of two years provided in Sections 204(C) and 229 of the Tax Code should be counted from the date of the final payment,15 and not based on the date when the first installment was paid. This rule proceeds from the theory that in contemplation of tax laws, there is no payment until the whole or entire tax liability is completely paid.16
Both Air Philippines and PAL have timely filed their written claims for refund with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, as well as their judicial claims for refund with the Court of Tax Appeals. The relevant periods are summarized below:
| Date of Importation |
Date of Payment under Protest |
Last Day of Two-Year Prescriptive Period |
Date of Filing of Administrative Claim |
Date of Filing of Judicial Claim |
| G.R. No. 249407 - Air Philippines' Refund Claim17 |
| May 15, 2003 |
1st Installment – May 30, 2003
2nd Installment – June 12, 2003
3rd Installment – June 27, 2003 |
June 27, 2005 (Monday) |
April 28, 2005 |
May 16, 2005 |
| October 29, 2003 |
November 7, 2003 |
November 7, 2005 (Monday) |
October 28, 2005 |
November 7, 2005 |
| December 5, 2003 |
1st Installment – December 12, 2003
2nd Installment – December 19, 2003 |
December 19, 2005 (Monday) |
November 21, 2005 |
December 9, 2005 |
| April 5, 2004 |
1st Installment – April 16, 2004
2nd Installment – April 30, 2004 |
May 1, 2006 (Sunday) |
March 28, 2006 |
April 17, 2006 |
| June 13, 2004 |
1st Installment – June 24, 2004
2nd Installment – June 29, 2004 |
June 13, 2006 (Tuesday) |
June 20, 2006 |
June 23, 2006 |
| August 16, 2004 |
1st Installment – August 31, 2004
2nd Installment – September 14, 2004 |
September 14, 2006 (Thursday) |
March 28, 2006 |
August 31, 2006 |
| August 28, 2004 |
September 23, 2004 |
September 23, 2006 (Saturday) |
March 28, 2006 |
September 21, 006 |
| December 17, 2004 |
January 12, 2005 |
January 12, 2007 (Friday) |
December 29, 2006 |
January 12, 2007 |
| G.R. No. 250032 - Air Philippines' Refund Claim18 |
| August 8, 2008 |
September 1, 2008 |
September 1, 2010 (Wednesday) |
November 18, 2009 |
August 17, 2010 |
| August 9, 2008 |
August 15, 2008 |
August 15, 2010 (Sunday) |
| August 23, 2008 |
September 18, 2008 |
September 18, 2010 (Saturday) |
| September 24, 2008 |
October 22, 2008 |
October 22, 2010 (Friday) |
| October 22, 2008 |
November 19, 2008 |
November 19, 2010 (Friday) |
Under Section 7(a) of Republic Act No. 9282, the Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal any of the following cases:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial[.] (Emphasis supplied)
In Carrier, this Court stated that the Court of Tax Appeals may acknowledge applications for refunds on an appellate basis.
Thus, applications for refunds of internal revenue taxes lie within the primary jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and the Court of Tax Appeals may take cognizance of these claims only on an appellate basis. Specifically, under Section 7 [of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282], the Court of Tax Appeals can review by appeal decisions, or "inactions deemed denial," of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in applications for refund of internal revenue taxes.
It is on these bases that I agree that the present claims fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. This is insofar as they relate purely to tax refund and other matters within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
It must be noted that the power to interpret the provisions of the Tax Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under Section 4 of the Tax Code is wielded through the promulgation of administrative issuances, which include rulings of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR Rulings).19 In this case, BIR Ruling No. 001-2003 Is the basis for the assessments made against Air Philippines and PAL.
To illustrate, the BIR Rulings are the official position of the Bureau of Internal Revenue regarding queries raised by taxpayers and other stakeholders relative to clarification and interpretation of tax laws, the primary purpose of which is simply to determine whether a certain transaction is taxable based on the circumstances provided by the taxpayer.20 In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Co,21 this Court noted that a ruling merely operates to "confirm" the existence of the conditions for exemption provided under the law, such that if all legal requirements for exemption are complied with, the transaction is considered exempt.22
Admittedly, the validity of BIR Ruling No. 001-2003 clearly falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals under Section 7(1) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended. However, it must be emphasized that Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8424 expressly requires that the validity of BIR Ruling No. 001-2003 must be raised before the Secretary of Finance.
As explained in Banco de Oro v. Republic of the Philippines:23
[W]ith respect to administrative issuances (revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, or rulings), these are issued by the Commissioner under its power to make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws. Tax rulings, on the other hand, are official positions of the Bureau on inquiries of taxpayers who request clarification on certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, other tax laws, or their implementing regulations. Hence, the determination of the validity of these issuances clearly falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals under Section 7 (1) of Republic Act No., as amended, subject to prior review by the Secretary of Finance, as required under Republic Act No. 8424. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Incidentally, the Secretary of Finance laid down the procedure and requirements for filing an appeal from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to its office in DOF Department Order No. 007-02.
BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 44-2001 dated October 11, 2001 provides:
Section 3. Rulings Adverse to the Taxpayer. A Taxpayer who receives an adverse ruling from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may, within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of such ruling, seek its review by the Secretary of Finance, either by himself/itself or through his/its duly accredited agent or representative. The request for review shall be in writing and under oath and must:
....
These are mandatory requirements and failure to comply with any of the stated substantive requirements shall be sufficient basis for the Secretary of Finance to dismiss with prejudice the request for review.
Pursuant to DOF Department Order No. 007-02 and BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 44-2001, a taxpayer is granted 30 days from receipt of the adverse ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to file with the Office of the Secretary of Finance a request for review in writing and under oath.24
In Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees v. Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue25 this Court explained the remedy available to a taxpayer aggrieved by an adverse decision of the Secretary of Finance:
[The] rulings of the Secretary of Finance in its exercise of its power of review under Section 4 of the [Tax Code], as amended, are appealable to the [Court of Tax Appeals]. The Court explained that while there is no law which explicitly provides where rulings of the Secretary of Finance under the adverted to [the Tax Code] provision are appealable, Section 7 (a) of RA No. 1125, the law creating the [Court of Tax Appeals], is nonetheless sufficient, albeit impliedly, to include appeals from the Secretary's review under Section 4 of the [Tax Code], as amended.26 (Citations omitted)
Furthermore, this Court stated that a petition filed before an appellate court seeking the nullification of an administrative issuance may be dismissed due to lack of cause of action owing to the parties' failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
It is settled that the premature invocation of the court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must first be exhausted before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. The party with an administrative remedy must not only initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.27 (Citations omitted)
Here, the records do not show that Air Philippines and PAL (questioned BIR Ruling No. 001-2003 before the Secretary of Finance within days from receipt of the ruling. While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and Air Philippines and PAL may seek judicial intervention questioning BIR Ruling No. 001-2003 directly before the Court of Tax Appeals, they may only do so under exceptional circumstances, which do not appear to exist in the present case. Moreover, BIR Ruling No. 001-2003 is final and executory for failure of the proper party to file a request for review with the Secretary of Finance. As things stand, the BIR Ruling No. 001-2003 shall be presumed valid considering that it has not been shown to have been overturned or modified by the Secretary of Finance.
Similarly, the records do not show that petitioners properly contested the validity of the December 20, 2002 DOE Certification before the Office of the President nor did they seek any reconsideration of the findings. While PAL challenged the validity of the December 20, 2002 DOE Certification in a separate proceeding before the Regional Trial Court,28 absent any final and executory decision nullifying this certification, this issuance must likewise be presumed valid, and accordingly, its contents must be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated.29
While prima facie evidence is sufficient to establish a given fact or group of facts constituting a claim or defense and will remain sufficient if not rebutted or contradicted, such evidence may be contradicted by other evidence.30
This Court is not a trier of facts and the scope of this Court's judicial review of decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals through a petition for review on certiorari is generally confined only to errors of law. Questions of fact are not entertained.31 This Court's judicial review does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which a lower court has based its determination.32 Consequently, the review of appeals filed before this court is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion.33
While this general rule is not absolute, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 250032 and 250047 do not fall under any of the exceptions.34 In these cases, petitioners assail the appreciation of evidence by the Court of Tax Appeals, which is a question of fact. As such, this Court is duty-bound to respect the consistent prior findings of the Court of Tax Appeals which have previously weighed the parties' claims and personally perused the evidence.35 To emphasize, when supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the appellate courts are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court.36 Petitioners' rehashed arguments in G.R. Nos. 250032 and 250047 have already been decided consistently against them by the Court of Tax Appeals Division and the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. Thus, I agree that the petitions in G.R. Nos. 250032 and 250047 must be denied and that petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue must be ordered to refund or issue a tax credit certificate in favor of PAL.
Additionally, I agree that the Petition in G.R. No. 249407 must be denied because the evidence presented during the proceedings before the Second Division of the Court of Tax Appeals were sufficient to establish that aviation fuel is not locally available in reasonable quantity, quality and price for the period covered by Air Philippines' refund claim.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 249407 raise Air Philippines' alleged failure to comply with the conditions set by Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 159037 for its imported Jet A-1 fuel to be exempt from excise tax. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,38 this Court stated that the conditions under Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1590 are: first, such supplies are imported for the use of the franchisee in its operations and other incidental activities; and second, they are not locally available in reasonable quantity, quality and price.39
This issue surrounding Air Philippines's supposed compliance or noncompliance with the conditions set by Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1590 are factual determinations that are best left to the Court of Tax Appeals.40 It is settled that "this Court is bound by the findings of fact of the [Court of Tax Appeals]. Only errors of law, and not rulings on the weight of evidence, are reviewable by this Court. Findings of fact of the [Court of Tax Appeals] are not to be disturbed unless clearly shown to be unsupported by substantial evidence."41
It must be noted that in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,42 this Court has already stated that an Authority to Release Imported Goods and the Certification issued by the Air Transportation Office constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein:
With regard to the requisite that the imported articles or goods must be used in PAL's transport and non-transport operations, the CTA En Banc held that the Authority to Release Imported Goods (ATRIGs) submitted by PAL constituted sufficient proof thereof. ATRIGs were issued by the CIR and/or his duly authorized representatives, upon verification and processing of the importation documents submitted by taxpayers and may be regarded as entries in official records which constitute prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Thus, the contents in the subject ATRIGs — to the effect that the Jet A-1 aviation fuel "will be used exclusively for domestic flight operation" or "will be used exclusively for daily domestic flight operation" — must be given weight. The ATRIGs were also further supported by the testimony of the witnesses presented by PAL. As to the other requisite that aviation fuel was not legally available in reasonable quantity, quality, or price during the time of importation, the CTA En Banc agreed with PAL that the Certification issued by the Air Transportation Office (ATO) to that effect was in line with its general powers under its charter. Likewise, the Certification also stood as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The CTA En Banc rejected the [Commissioner of Internal Revenue] and the [Commissioner of Custom's] argument that only the DOE was in a position to determine the local availability of Jet A-1 aviation fuel.43
In this case, in support of its claim for tax exemption, Air Philippines submitted (a) its Authority to Release Imported Goods to show that the imported Jet A-1 aviation fuel is for its operations and other incidental activities;44 and (b) the Certification issued by the Air Transportation Office, as well as a witness testimony, to show that at the time of the subject importations, there was no locally available Jet A-1 fuel in reasonable quantity.45
In this regard, as noted by the ponencia,
...[T]he [Court of Tax Appeals En Banc] held that the said [Department of Energy] Certification covers historical data, and the BIR Ruling No. 0012003 was meant to address BIR Ruling No. 013-99 issued to PAL on January 29, 1999. Such certification was based on data from the years 2001 and 2002. As such, neither the DOE Certification nor BIR Ruling No. 0012003 covers the period of May 2003 to December 2004, which is subject of [Air Philippines'] refund claim.
... on the issue of whether aviation fuel was indeed locally available in reasonable quantity, quality or price, the [Court of Tax Appeals En Banc] ruled in the negative...
... the [Court of Tax Appeals En Banc] noted that, as testified in the Division proceedings by Glendalyn P. Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), a Senior Research Specialist of the DOE, the Total Industry Petroleum Products Demand (Domestic and International Demand) will always be greater than local refinery production. Likewise, the subject importations of [Air Philippines] were supported by Certifications issued by the Air Transportation Office (ATO) which stated that the aviation fuel was not locally available in reasonable quantity, quality, and price. The [Court of Tax Appeals En Banc] declared that the ATO has the power to issue such certifications following Section 35(q) RA 9497, and Section 32 of RA 776. As such, the ATO Certification negates the [Commissioner of Internal Revenue's] contention that the [Department of Energy] could best determine the local availability of aviation fuel.
Anent the issue on tax exemption, the [Court of Tax Appeals En Banc] held that all the requisites for [Air Philippines'] tax exemption were met. The [Court of Tax Appeals En Banc] explained that the use of the conjunctive "or" in the relevant clause of Section 13 of PD 1590, i.e., "the imported articles supplies or materials are not locally available in reasonable quantity, quality or price," connotes alternative, not cumulative, qualification. Thus, it was sufficient that [Air Philippines] was able to prove one qualification to avail of the exemption, i.e., that at the time of the subject importations, there was no locally available Jet A-1 fuel in reasonable quantity. Accordingly, the [Court of Tax Appeals En Banc] held that [Air Philippines] is entitled to a refund or the issuance of a Tax Credit Certificate (TCC) in the amount of PHP235,613,134.47, representing excise taxes paid on importations for Jet A-1 fuel for the period of May 2003 to December 2004.46
Thus, there is no reason for this Court to disturb the findings of the tax court.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the petitions.
Footnotes
1 See ponencia, p. 2. In G.R. No. 249407, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed excise taxes on Air Philippines' importation of Jet A-1 fuel for its domestic operations for the period of May 2003 to December 2004. Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 250032 & 250047, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed excise taxes on Philippine Airlines' importation of Jet A-1 fuel for its domestic operations for the period of August 2008 to October 2008.
2 Id. at 23-24. See also TAX CODE, Title I, secs. 2, 4.
3 Ponencia, p. 23-24.
4 See rollo (G.R. No. 249407), p. 17.
5 Id. at 117.
6 908 Phil. 681 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
7 Id. at 692.
8 Ponencia, p. 31.
9 See TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, sec. 602(d).
10 See Heirs of Mampo v. Morada, 888 Phil. 583, 590 (2020) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division].
11 Ponencia, pp. 6, 12.
12 See National Internal Revenue Code, sec. 229, which reads:
Section 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. – No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected without authority; or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest; or duress. In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied)
See also 2 ATTY. EUFROCINA M. SACDALAN-CASASOLA, NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 1275-1276 (2013), citing Re: Request of Atty. Zialcita, 268 Phil. 637 (1990) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc]; Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. CIR, 134 Phil. 735 (1968) [Per J. Angeles, En Banc]; Filinvest Development Corporation v. CIR, 556 Phil. 439 (2007) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; Atlas Consolidated v. CIR, 551 Phil. 519 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
13 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Carrier Air Conditioning, 908 Phil. 681, 689 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
14 Id. at 685.
15 See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc., 282 Phil 199, 208 (1992) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
16 See Collector of Internal Revenue v. Prieto, 112 Phil. 907-922 (1961) [Per J. Dizon, En Banc].
17 See Ponencia, pp. 6-7.
18 See id. at 12-13.
19 Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. Bureau of Customs, 825 Phil. 809 (2018) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division], citing Banco de Oro v. Republic of the Philippines, 793 Phil. 97 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
20 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Co, 871 Phil. 862, 880 (2020) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division].
21 871 Phil. 862 (2020) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division].
22 Id. at 880.
23 825 Phil. 809, 825 (2018) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
24 See also Manila Peninsula Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 229338, April 17, 2024 [Per J. Cagouia, Third Division].
25 835 Phil. 297 (2018) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
26 Id. at 316-317.
27 Id. at 315.
28 See rollo (G.R. No. 250032 and 250047), p. 497.
29 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, sec. 23 which reads:
Section 23. Public documents as evidence. – Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
30 Wa-acon v. People, 539 Phil. 485, 496 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division]. (Citation omitted)
31 Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, 749 Phil. 388, 415 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
32 Id. at 416.
33 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 6.
34 In Pascual v. Burgos, this Court has held that it will review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals in any of the following instances: (1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals ana the trial court are contradictory; (2) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4) when there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the Appellate Court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) when the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record. 776 Phil. 167 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
35 Ebuenga v. Southfield Agencies, Inc., 828 Phil. 122, 129 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
36 De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil 534, 545 (2002) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division].
37 Presidential Decree No. 1590, sec. 13 reads:
Section 13. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay to the Philippine Government during the life of this franchise whichever of subsections (a) and (b) hereunder will result in a lower tax:
(a) The basic corporate income tax based on the grantee's annual net taxable income computed in accordance with the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code; or
(b) A franchise tax of two per cent (2%) of the gross revenues derived by the graMee from all sources, without distinction as to transport or nontransport operations; provided, that with respect to international air-transport service, only the gross passenger, mail, and freight revenues from its outgoing flights shall be subject to this tax.
The tax paid by the grantee under either of the above alternatives shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license, and other fees and charges of any kind, nature, or description, imposed, levied, established, assessed, or collected by any municipal, city, provincial, or national authority or government agency, now or in the future, including but not limited to the following:
1. All taxes, duties, charges, royalties, or fees due on local purchases by the grantee of aviation gas, fuel, and oil, whether refined or in crude form, and whether such taxes, duties, charges, royalties, or fees are directly due from or imposable upon the purchaser or the seller, producer, manufacturer, or importer of said petroleum products but are billed or passed on the grantee either as part of the price or cost thereof or by mutual agreement or other arrangement; provided, that all such purchases by, sales or deliveries of aviation gas, fuel, and oil to the grantee shall be for exclusive use in its transport and nontransport operations and other activities incidental thereto;
2. All taxes, including compensating taxes, duties, charges, royalties, or fees due on all importations by the grantee of aircraft, engines, equipment, machinery, spare parts, accessories, commissary and catering supplies, aviation gas, fuel, and oil, whether refined or in crude form and other articles, supplies, or materials; provided, that such articles or supplies or materials are imported for the use of the grantee in its transport and transport operations and other activities incidental thereto and are not locally available in reasonable quantity, quality, or price;
3. All taxes on lease rentals, interest, fees, and other charges payable to lessors, whether foreign or domestic, of aircraft, engines, equipment, machinery, spare parts, and other property rented, leased, or chartered by the grantee where the payment of such taxes is assumed by the grantee;
4. All taxes on interest, fees, and other charges on foreign loans obtained and other obligations incurred by the grantee where the payment of such taxes is assumed, by the grantee;
5. All taxes, fees, and other charges on the registration, licensing, acquisition, and transfer of aircraft, equipment, motor vehicles, and all other personal and real property of the grantee; and
6. The corporate development tax under Presidential Decree No. 1158-A.
The grantee, shall, however, pay the tax on its real property in conformity with existing law.
For purposes of computing the basic corporate income tax as provided herein, the grantee is authorized:
(a) To depreciate its assets to the extent of not more than twice as fast the normal rate of depreciation; and
(b) To carry over as a deduction from taxable income any net loss incurred in any year up to five years following the year of such loss.
38 806 Phil. 358 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
39 Id. at 372.
40 Id.
41 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, 535 Phil. 481, 499 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division]. (Citation omitted)
42 G.R. Nos. 245330-31, April 1, 2024 [Per J. Dimaampao, Third Division].
43 Id.
44 Ponencia, p. 38.
45 Id. at 40.
46 Id. at 11-12.
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