Baguio City
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 242133, April 16, 2024 ]
ROSELYN AGACID Y DEJANIO* PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARIA ALEXANDRIA BISQUERRA Y NUEVA,** RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, SAJ.:
Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 also applies even if the perpetrator is a woman, so long as the victim is a woman.
This Court resolves the Petition for Review1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial of Court when it issued Orders3 denying the Motion to Quash with Motion to Defer Arraignment and Pre-trial filed by Roselyn Agacid (Agacid).
On August 31, 2014, Maria Alexandria Bisquerra (Bisquerra) went to the Cubao Police Station to complain about her ex-partner Agacid. In her Complaint-Affidavit,4 she narrated that she and Agacid were in a four-year relationship until they broke up in March 2014. They met again on August 31, 2014 in Starbucks, Ali Mall, Cubao, Quezon City at around 4:00 p.m. so Bisquerra could return the items that Agacid gave her during their relationship.5
According to Bisquerra, Agacid thought that they would talk and fix their relationship, but Bisquerra insisted on the break-up as she no longer liked Agacid. At that moment, Agacid got angry. She slapped Bisquerra and stabbed her on her right forearm with a sharp object which wounded her.6
Bisquerra ran away and asked for help from the guards at Ali Mall, but Agacid had already escaped. Bisquerra went to Quezon Memorial Medical Center to have her wound treated, after which she went to the Cubao Police Station to file her Complaint.7
Agacid was eventually charged with violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 9262 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.8 The Information reads:
That on or about the 31st day of August 2014, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously commit physical abuse upon one MARIA ALEXANDRIA BISQUERA y NUEVA, her former lover and live-in partner, by then and there slapping her and stabbing her on the forearm with a cutter causing laceration on the proximal 3rd or the right forearm, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
Agacid moved to quash the Information and to defer her arraignment and pre-trial. She argued that the allegations in the Information did not constitute an offense because a woman cannot be charged with violation of Republic Act No. 9262. According to her, the law was "intended to protect women and their children from the abusive acts of men [and] not women[.]"10
Relying on this Court's pronouncements in Garcia v. Drilon,11 the Regional Trial Court issued a February 17, 2017 Order12 denying Agacid's Motion to Quash. It likewise set the date for arraignment and pre-trial.13
Agacid moved for reconsideration, reiterating her argument that Republic Act No. 9262 only covers dating relationships between men and women.14 However, this was denied in the Regional Trial Court's March 20, 2017 Order.15
Agacid then filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari16 before the Court of Appeals, which was also denied.17 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Orders dated 17 February 2017 and 20 March 2017 both issued by Branch 229, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-16-10244-CR are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.18
Hence, a Petition19 was filed before this Court.
Petitioner Agacid justifies her resort to a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals, arguing that it was the proper remedy to assail an interlocutory order by a lower court.20 Moreover, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in agreeing with the Regional Trial Court's reliance on the alleged obiter dictum in Garcia as it did not involve a lesbian relationship.21
According to her, Garcia explained "why the law limited its protection to women [and their children] against their male partners"22 and that the main discussion was on the substantial distinctions between men and women.23 Thus, the Regional Trial Court erred when it relied on the obiter dictum in Garcia, which merely mentioned the gender-neutral word "person" in the law, as basis for denying her motion.24
Additionally, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court should not have merely relied on statutory construction; instead, they should have looked into the intent behind the law.25 She says that the legislative intent is "to protect women from the abusive acts of men, the latter being physically stronger than women."26 Petitioner Cites legislative deliberations to support her claim.27
She likewise states that the phrase "husband and wife" indicates that the law intended to cover only relationships between men and women. Petitioner further argues that the law refers to violence against women with whom one has a common child, which is not possible in a relationship between two women.28
In its Comment,29 respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a petition for certiorari was not the proper remedy to assail the denial of the Motion to Quash because of the available remedy of appeal.30
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise points out that petitioner makes it appear that the Court of Appeals ruled on her substantial defenses in the assailed Decision, when the Court of Appeals only confined itself to the issue of the propriety of petitioner's remedy.31 It did not rule on the correctness of the Regional Trial Court's conclusions.32
The Office of the Solicitor General insists that there was no error on the part of the Regional Trial Court when it relied on Garcia in denying the Motion to Quash.33 It argues that the plain text of the law states that violence against women and their children may be committed by any person and not just men.34 The intentional use of the pronouns "his/he" is only present in instances where the law describes marital relations or the common children,35 but shifts to the gender-neutral term "person" when referring to those involved sexual or dating relationships with women.36 Since the plain text of the law is clear, it adds that construction and determination of legislative intent are unnecessary because the bills pending before the Congress are different from the final document passed and signed into law.37
As to the reliance on Garcia, the Office of the Solicitor General claims that the equal protection issue in that case focused "more on ensuring victim protection rather than limiting abuser prosecution."38 It is in this context that the Court declared that any abuser, male or female, may be prosecuted under Republic Act No. 9262.39
The issue for this Court's resolution is whether Republic Act No. 9262 covers lesbian relationships.
This Court finds it clear that it does.
The Court or Appeals correctly denied the Petition for Certiorari. When petitioner questioned the Regional Trial Court's Orders before the Court of Appeals, she failed to show that the trial court issued these with grave abuse of discretion:
What the Petitioner really wanted to do was to question the legal correctness of the court a quo's assailed orders through certiorari. She kept insisting that a woman cannot be charged with violation of [Republic Act No.] 9262 because the said law only punishes the abuses committed by a husband against his wife or a man against a woman in a dating relationship. Clearly, this is beyond the ambit or a Rule 65 Petition because the same only seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction.40
The Court of Appeals limited its discussion on the propriety of the remedy of certiorari. In ultimately dismissing the Petition, it found that petitioner still had the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy of entering a plea of not guilty during arraignment, participating in the trial, and if convicted, appealing the judgment.41 Furthermore, petitioner failed to show that the Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion, when in truth, all it did was "to abide by its duty to evaluate and resolve the motion to quash and the subsequent motion for reconsideration in accordance with procedural rules."42
The Court of Appeals only resolved the procedural issue of whether a petition for certiorari was the proper remedy in this case. We agree that it is not. In any case, even on the substantive issue, the Petition fails.
Republic Act No. 9262, Section 3(a) defines violence against women and their children:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation or liberty[.]
From the plain text of the law, it is clear that the offense may be committed "by any person" against a woman or her child. The law uses a gender-neutral term when referring to offenders. Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that further interpretation and determination of legislative intent are not necessary because there is no ambiguity in the law.
The pivotal case of Garcia, where this Court ruled on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262, already made observations regarding this point:
As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word ''person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.43
While petitioner is correct that Garcia did not involve a lesbian relationship, this pronouncement has nevertheless been reiterated and affirmed in a succeeding case.
Jacinto v. Fouts44 discussed the application of Garcia in a lesbian relationship. Jacinto involved a woman accused of violating Republic Act No. 9262 against her live-in partner who is also a woman. During trial, she also moved to quash the Information, arguing that the facts charged do not constitute an offense as the law does not apply to lesbian relationships.45
When the Regional Trial Court denied her motion, she went to the Supreme Court through a Rule 45 petition for review, raising the same argument.46 Procedurally, the Court in Jacinto also reiterated the rule that:
"[t]he remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari because of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law."47 (Citation omitted)
In denying the petition, this Court squarely ruled that Republic Act No. 9262 applies to lesbian relationships:
Contrary to petitioner's submission that the foregoing disquisition in Garcia was a mere obiter dictum, the Court notes that one of the issues raised in Garcia is the supposed discriminatory and unjust provisions of [Republic Act No.] 9262 which are likewise violative of the equal protection clause. The foregoing discussion of the Court as to the applicability of the law to lesbian relationships is clearly a resolution of the particular issue raised in Garcia and not a mere obiter dictum or an opinion of the Court. The statement of the Court that "[t]here is likewise no merit to the contention that [Republic Act No.] 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit" further amplifies that the issue of whether [Republic Act No.] 9262 only applies to male perpetrators was indeed raised in the said case.48 (Citation omitted)
Thus, when Jacinto said that the law likewise applies to lesbian relationships, this was in response to the petition in Garcia as it shows that the law is indeed not discriminatory.
Republic Act No. 9262 seeks to protect women from the various forms of violence they endure in their private relationships. The nature of this social legislation is to empower women who find themselves in situations where they are left vulnerable to their abusers who are their intimate partners. The dynamics within the intimate relationship of two people, with all its intricacies, difficulties, and power play, is the context within which the law places the violence it penalizes. Aside from being a gender-based issue, violence against women is necessarily a power issue:
It is true that numerous literature relate violence against women with the historically unequal power relations between men and women, leading to domination over and discrimination against the latter. Sociologists cite the 18th-century English legal tradition on the "rule of thumb" giving husbands the right to beat their wives with a stick no thicker than a thumb. In America, women were regarded as property until the latter half of the 19th century with marital violence considered a husband's privilege and men, as of right, exercised physical domination over women.
The perspective portraying women as victims with a heritage of victimization results in the unintended consequence of permanently perceiving all women as weak. This has not always been accepted by many other strands in the Feminist Movement.
As early as the 70s, the nationalist movement raised questions on the wisdom or a women's movement and its possible divisive effects, as "class problems deserve unified and concentrated attention [while] the women question is vague, abstract, and does not have material base."
In the early 80s, self-identifying feminist groups were formed. The "emancipation theory" posits that female crime has increased and has become more masculine in character as a result of the women's liberation movement.
Feminism also has its variants among Muslims. In 2009, Musawah ("equality" in Arabic) was as launched as a global movement for equity and justice in the Muslim family. It brought together activists, scholars, legal practitioners, policy makers, and grassroots women and men from all over the world. Their belief is that there cannot be justice without equality, and its holistic framework integrates Islamic teachings, universal human rights, national constitutional guarantees of equality, and the lived realities or women and men.
There is now more space to believe that portraying only women as victims will not always promote gender equality before the law. It sometimes aggravates the gap by conceding that women have always been dominated by men.1aшphi1 In doing so, it renders empowered women invisible; or, in some cases, that men as human beings can also become victims.
In this light, it may be said that violence in the context of intimate relationships should not be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue.49 (Citations omitted)
Thus, understanding women's struggle only as a gender issue might present a simplistic understanding as it fails to paint a complete picture of why this phenomenon occurs. The oppression of women is a result of the patriarchal view that women are proper subjects of dominance. Their oppression is not simply because they are women and that their oppressors are always men. Some women, because gender is a cultural issue, can also imbibe the patriarchal culture that other women are reduced to weak objects when they are in intimate relationships. That a woman is subjected to violence because of this view, no matter the identity the perpetrator is sufficient to trigger the law's protection.
To quote the Regional Trial Court's Order:
The purpose of [Republic Act No.] 9262 is to protect and rescue women and their children from distinct and unique forms of violence known as [Violence Against Women and Their Children]. It is the distinctiveness and uniqueness of [Violence Against Women and Their Children] that sets it apart from other crimes. [Violence Against Women and Their Children] owes its distinctiveness to the domestic, private, hidden and invisible relationships from which these forms of violence emanate and gain significant uniqueness.
A lesbian who maltreats . . . her female partner physically, psychologically. economically cannot be any different from a male perpetrator of [Violence Against Women and Their Children] or a mother-in-law who conspires with her daughter-in-law's partner to commit [Violence Against Women and Their Children] against her. The same object of [Republic Act No.] 9262's protective mandate is given succor—the woman.
The violence is as distinctive and unique as those that make [Violence Against Women and Their Children committed by men] deserving of this special attention. Indeed, to exclude lesbians from the protective mantle of [Republic Act No.] 9262 would . . . create an artificially and arbitrarily privileged section or domestic violence that is exempt from scrutiny when other facets or domestic violence somehow similarly situated would otherwise be ordinarily prosecuted as such.
To be sure, while intersectionality would better inform, the distinctiveness and uniqueness of lesbian relationships, the same impunity, invisibility, and imbalanced power relationships that characterize [Violence Against Women and. their Children committed by men] and [what Republic Act No.] 9262 aims to eradicate also infect and afflict lesbian relationships. As experts have put it, abusive tactics can be used in any relationship, regardless of gender.50
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The August 24, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 151014 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 229 is ordered to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. R-QZN-16-10244-CR with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.
Singh, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Footnotes
* "Roselyn Agacid y Dejano" in some parts of the rollo.
** "Maria Alexandria Bisquerra y Nueva" or "Maria Alexandria Bisquera" in some parts of the rollo.
1 Rollo, pp. 13–43.
2 Id. at 44–51. The August 24, 2018 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 151014 was penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion and concurred in by Associate Justices Pedro B. Corales and Gabriel T. Robeniol of the Special Seventeenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3 Id. at 65, 80–99. The February 17, 2017 and March 20, 2017 Orders in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-16-10244-CR were issued by Presiding Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III of Branch 229, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City.
4 Id. at 145.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 45.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
12 Rollo, p. 65.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 46.
15 Id. at 80–99.
16 Id. at 100–120.
17 Id. at 44–51.
18 Id. at 50.
19 Id. at 13–43.
20 Id at 21–25.
21 Id. at 25–26.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 25–26.
25 Id. at 26–27.
26 Id. at 29.
27 Id. at 30–32.
28 Id. at 28.
29 Id. at 191–214.
30 Id. at 193–194.
31 Id. at 196–197.
32 Id. at 197.
33 Id. at 197–198.
34 Id. at 198.
35 Id. at 199.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 201–202.
38 Id. at 206.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 49.
41 Id. at 49–50.
42 Id. at 50.
43 712 Phil. 44, 103–104 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
44 G.R. No. 250627, December 7, 2022 [Per J. Inting, Third Division].
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 169–171 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
50 Rollo, pp. 84–85.
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