G.R. No. 216603

G.R. No. 216603, December 5, 2023,
♦ Decision, Kho, Jr., [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Gesmundo, [CJ]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]

Manila

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 216603, December 05, 2023 ]

JAIME MANUEL N. LEGARDA, PETITIONER, VS. CLERK OF COURT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MUNTINLUPA CITY AND BENJAMIN CALAWAGAN, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

KHO, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated September 4, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated January 26, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 135217. The assailed Court of Appeals rulings essentially reversed and set aside the Order4 dated January 15, 2014 of Branch 256, Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-021, which granted the Petition for Mandamus5 filed by petitioner Jaime Manuel N. Legarda (Legarda) against respondents Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (COC-RTC Muntinlupa) and Benjamin Calawagan (Calawagan; collectively, respondents) and accordingly, ordered the issuance of a Final Certificate of Sale6 in Legarda's favor.

The Facts

This case stemmed from a Petition for Mandamus filed by Legarda against respondents. In his mandamus petition, Legarda alleged that Calawagan had purchased, as highest bidder, a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2108357 (subject property) at a public auction under Foreclosure No. 07-016.8 On July 25, 2007, a Certificate of Sale9 was issued in Calawagan's favor. The redemption period of the subject property was set to expire on October 1, 2008, which was one year from the annotation of the sale on TCT No. 210835 on October 1, 2007.10

During the redemption period, or on April 8, 2008, a Deed of Assignment11 was executed between Calawagan and Legarda wherein the former assigned to the latter all his rights and interests under the Certificate of Sale for the amount of PHP 3,000,000.00. On April 10, 2008, the assignment was annotated on TCT No. 210835.12

According to Legarda, despite having informed the COC-RTC Muntinlupa of the said assignment and the lapse of the redemption period, no Final Certificate of Sale was issued in his favor. Upon his further request, the COC-RTC Muntinlupa replied through a letter13 dated February 25, 2010 stating that its office is not inclined to grant said request, considering that: (a) the existing guidelines on extrajudicial foreclosure only made mention of the highest bidder, buyer, purchaser, and redemptioner to whom a Final Certificate of Sale may be issued; and (b) an assignee is not included among those who are entitled to the issuance of a certificate of sale and deed of conveyance, unlike in the old Rules of Court. The COC-RTC Muntinlupa's act of issuing the said Final Certificate of Sale will therefore no longer be ministerial as it will involve contentious matters, which is beyond the scope of its duties. This prompted Legarda to file the mandamus petition before the Regional Trial Court, claiming that since he had already been subrogated to all of Calawagan's rights and interests over the subject property by virtue of the Deed of Assignment, then the issuance of the Final Certificate of Sale in his favor is a ministerial act on the part of the COC-RTC Muntinlupa.14

In defense, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), acting on behalf of the COC-RTC Muntinlupa, maintained that mandamus does not lie against the COC-RTC Muntinlupa as one of the requisites of mandamus is that the officer must have unlawfully neglected the performance of a ministerial act or an act specifically enjoined by law. The OSG reasoned that Legarda has no legal right to the Final Certificate of Sale as the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the same shall only be issued to the purchaser at the auction sale. The OSG added that while the term "assignee" was included in Rule 39, Section 35 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure removed such term in Rule 39, Section 33 thereof. Since the new Rules provide that the Final Certificate of Sale shall be issued only to the purchaser at the auction sale, Legarda, as a mere assignee, had no legal right to the issuance of the same in his favor.15

The RTC Ruling

In its Order16 dated January 15, 2014, the RTC granted the Petition for Mandamus and accordingly, directed the COC-RTC Muntinlupa to issue the Final Certificate of Sale in Legarda's favor.17

In so ruling, the RTC held that although Rule 39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure only mentioned purchaser as the one entitled to the conveyance and possession of property in case no redemption was made, there was no showing in said provision that a Final Certificate of Sale shall be issued exclusively to the purchaser. Since Calawagan, through a Deed of Assignment, transferred his rights and interest over the subject property in favor of Legarda, the latter can now exercise all of Calawagan's rights over the same as a "mere continuation" of the assignor's personality. This makes the issuance of a Final Certificate of Sale by the COC-RTC Muntinlupa in favor of Legarda a ministerial duty.18

Aggrieved, the COC-RTC Muntinlupa, through the OSG, appealed19 to the Court of Appeals.

The CA Ruling

In its Decision20 dated September 4, 2014, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling and accordingly, dismissed Legarda's Petition for Mandamus for lack of merit.21

Contrary to the RTC's ruling position, the CA held that mandamus cannot lie as Legarda failed to show the existence of a clear, unclouded, and established right to the issuance of the said Final Certificate of Sale. According to the CA, Rule 39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not, in any way, authorize an assignee of a purchaser to be issued a Final Certificate of Sale, considering that: (a) Section 33 has removed the term "assignee" from its provision when compared to its previous wording as found in Section 35 of the old Rules; and (b) the current phraseology of the provision now clearly provides that only a "purchaser" or "redemptioner" may be entitled to such issuance. The CA ratiocinated that an assignee is not the same as purchaser or redemptioner, as the latter acquires his status by the mere fact of purchase or redemption, respectively. On the other hand, an assignee steps into the shoes of the purchaser or redemptioner by virtue of a contract, which the validity thereof can be contested; thus, an assignee's authority over the issuance of a Final Certificate of Sale is not free from doubt or risk of doubt. In such case, the COC-RTC Muntinlupa could be placed in a position wherein its office may be required to assess the authenticity of the assignment. The removal of the word "assignee" serves to limit the issuance of the Final Certificate of Sale only to the purchaser or redemptioner, whom the COC-RTC Muntinlupa can identify without need to refer or evaluate documents extraneous to the foreclosure, such as in this case, the Deed of Assignment.22

Dissatisfied, Legarda moved for reconsideration,23 but the same was denied in a Resolution24 dated January 26, 2015; hence, this Petition.25

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether the CA correctly ruled that mandamus cannot lie against the COC-RTC Muntinlupa for the issuance of a Final Certificate of Sale in favor of Legarda.

Legarda contends that by virtue of the Deed of Assignment, he had succeeded to Calawagan's right to the issuance of a Final Certificate of Sale and any other remedy that the latter had. Granting that there may be a possibility that someone might contest the Deed of Assignment, the annotation thereof on TCT No. 210835 already serves as a notice to Calawagan, or any party who may have had interest, or cause to annul the same. However, no one ever came forward to contest the Deed of Assignment; thus, its validity must be upheld. Accordingly, Legarda has stepped into Calawagan's shoes, who had a clear, unclouded, and established right to the issuance of the said deed in his favor. Legarda avers that while it may be true that the term "assignee," which was found in the old Rules of Court was removed in the present wording of Rule 39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it did not mean that the issuance of a deed of conveyance in favor of an assignee is disallowed. If the drafters of the new Rules meant to disallow the same, they could have easily said so and not left the matter open to interpretation. Legarda further posits that the drafters of the new Rules deemed the addition of "assignee" as superfluity in view of its subrogation in the rights of the assignor; hence, they decided to remove it.26

In its Comment27 filed on July 3, 2015, the OSG maintains that even if a subrogee or assignee succeeds to the rights of the purchaser, the former is not entitled to the issuance of the Final Certificate of Sale in their name. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the clerk of court's duty is to issue a final certificate of sale only to the purchaser in the public auction sale and no one else. The deletion of the term "assignee" in Rule 39, Section 33 of the said Rules was not due to its superfluity but because it was in consonance with the ministerial function of the clerk of court in issuing a final certificate of sale to the purchaser or highest bidder after the payment of all the required fees. This is because the clerk of court cannot possibly assure the validity of any assignment and the consequent subrogation of rights and interests after the public auction. The procedure outlined in the rules guarantees the integrity of the judicial confirmation of title in the name of the purchaser in a public auction sale. The procedural shortcut that Legarda invokes is without basis in law and jurisprudence.28 Moreover, mandamus will not lie as Legarda is not without adequate remedy under the law. After the confirmation of title in Calawagan's name through the issuance of a Final Certificate of Sale, Legarda has a cause of action against the former as his assignor and may demand the issuance of certificate of title in Legarda's name, upon compliance with the conditions under the law, such as Section 58(E)29 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8424,30 otherwise known as the "Tax Reform Act of 1997."31

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is without merit.

Rule 65, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

In order for a writ of mandamus to be issued, the following requisites must be present: (1) the petitioner has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (2) it must be the duty of the respondent to perform the act because it is mandated by law; (3) the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law [or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled]; (4) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (5) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.32

The petitioner may be considered to have a clear legal right if said right is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law.33 Mandamus will not be issued to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists.34 On the other hand, in order for mandamus to be issued against a respondent, they should have an imperative duty to perform that which is demanded of them.35

"The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue."36

Moreover, the writ of mandamus would only be issued to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, one in which an office or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.37

Lastly, an important principle for the issuance of mandamus is that there should be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law or that the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are unable to afford the relief sought.38

It then begs the question of whether Legarda's right over the issuance of the Final Certificate of Sale by virtue of the Deed of Assignment is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law, such that the COC-RTC Muntinlupa has the imperative duty to issue the same. Moreover, is the issuance of the final certificate of sale ministerial on the part of COC-RTC Muntinlupa, thereby not involving an exercise of judgment on its validity. Lastly, is Legarda left without any alternative to enforce his right over the subject property, such that mandamus is the only recourse for him to secure any relief.

The Court rules all questions in the negative.

To recapitulate, on April 8, 2008, before the end of the redemption period on October 1, 2008, Calawagan and Legarda entered into a Deed of Assignment wherein Calawagan, for the amount of PHP 3,000,000.00, has agreed to "assign, transfer, convey and subrogate" to Legarda all of his rights and interests under the Certificate of Sale dated July 25, 2007 and annotated on TCT No. 210835 on October 1, 2007. The Deed of Assignment between Calawagan and Legarda was annotated on TCT No. 210835 on April 10, 2008.39

On the other hand, in refusing to issue the Final Certificate of Sale, the COC-RTC Muntinlupa contends that the word "assignee" has already been deleted in Rule 39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as compared to Rule 39, Section 35 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which provides that "if no redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property," and "[u]pon the execution and delivery of said deed, the purchaser, or redemptioner, or his assignee, shall be substituted to and acquire all the right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to the property as of the time of the levy." The COC-RTC Muntinlupa further argues that in light of such deletion, the issuance of the Final Certificate of Sale cannot be issued to any person other than Calagawan as the purchaser; and that the issuance of the same to Legarda as the assignee is no longer part of the COC-RTC Muntinlupa's ministerial duty as it would already involve contentious matters.40

An assignment, in its most general and comprehensive sense, is "a transfer or making over to another of the whole of any property, real or personal, in possession or in action, or of any estate or right therein. It includes transfers of all kinds of property, and is peculiarly applicable to intangible personal property and, accordingly, it is ordinarily employed to describe the transfer of non-negotiable choses in action and of rights in or connected with property as distinguished from the particular item or property."41 "Unquestionably, rights may be assigned as they are intangible personal properties. The term "interests," on the other hand, is broader and more comprehensive than the word "title" and its definition in a narrow sense by lexicographers as any right in the nature of property less than title, indicates that the terms are not considered synonymous. It is practically synonymous, however, with the word "estate" which is the totality of interest which a person has from absolute ownership down to naked possession."42 Otherwise stated, the assignee "steps into the shoes" of the assignor insofar as the property or rights subject of an assignment is concerned.43 Applying the foregoing to this case, Calawagan, through the Deed of Assignment, totally transferred or relinquished his rights and interests over the subject property to Legarda under the Certificate of Sale.

However, does the Deed of Assignment, which makes Legarda an assignee of Calawagan's rights over the subject property, indubitably entitles the former to the issuance of a Final Certificate of Sale after the expiration of the one-year redemption period, or is the same inferable as a matter of law such that it is imperative for the COC-RTC Muntinlupa to issue said Final Certificate of Sale in Legarda's favor.

A reading of the present provision of Rule 39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and its comparison with its former version, as provided in Rule 39, Section 35 of the 1964 Rules of Court suggests that it does not.

First, Rule 39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure only provides for the purchaser and last redemptioner as the ones who are entitled to the conveyance and possession of the subject property if no redemption was made after the sale, or if the subject property is so redeemed, respectively, to wit:

Section 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given. — If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed it. [Emphasis supplied]

Second, this is bolstered by the deletion of the word "assignee," which was explicitly included in Rule 39, Section 35 of the 1964 Rules of Court, from the present provision of Rule 39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as one of those who are entitled to the conveyance and possession of the subject property in lieu of the purchaser if no redemption was made after the sale, or in lieu of the redemptioner if the subject property is so redeemed.

For reference, Rule 39, Section 35 of the 1964 Rules of Court and Rule 39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (which stands as the amended version of the former) are reproduced below:

Rule 39, Section 35 of the 1964 Rules of Court Rule 39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Sec. 35. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period. By whom executed or given. — If no redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner, or his assignee, is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment debtor shall have the entire period of twelve (12) months from the date of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed it. Upon the execution and delivery of said deed the purchaser, or redemptioner, or his assignee, shall be substituted to and acquire all the right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to the property as of the time of the levy, except as against the judgment debtor in possession, in which case the substitution shall be effective as of the date of the deed. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor. (Emphasis supplied) Section 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given. — If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed it.

Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. (Emphasis supplied)

In Manila Electric Co. v. N.E. Magno Construction, Inc.,44 the Court, through Associate Justice Jose P. Perez, held that "[a]s a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its amendment."45

Based on the foregoing, it is therefore clear that the word "assignee" was deleted not because it was a mere superfluity or unnecessary in relation to a purchaser or redemptioner, rather its deletion was to give the provision a different construction, one which served to limit the issuance of the final certificate of sale only to the purchaser or last redemptioner.

Moreover, it appears that Rule 39, Section 35 of the 1964 Rules of Court had been revised to its present formulation in Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to make it conform with Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. Similar to Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 63 of the Property Registration Decree recognizes that a final deed of sale may only be issued to the purchaser of [the] real property sold at public auction in foreclosure proceedings, thus:

Section 63. Foreclosure of Mortgage. — (a) If the mortgage was foreclosed judicially, a certified copy of the final order of the court confirming the sale shall be registered with the Register of Deeds. If no right of redemption exists, the certificate of title of the mortgagor shall be cancelled, and a new certificate issued in the name of the purchaser.

Where the right of redemption exists, the certificate of title of the mortgagor shall not be cancelled, but the certificate of sale and the order confirming the sale shall be registered by a brief memorandum thereof made by the Register of Deeds upon the certificate of title. In the event the property is redeemed, the certificate or deed of redemption shall be filed with the Register of Deeds, and a brief memorandum thereof shall be made by the Register of Deeds on the certificate of title of the mortgagor.

If the property is not redeemed, the final deed of sale executed by the sheriff in favor of the purchaser at a foreclosure sale shall be registered with the Register of Deeds; whereupon the title of the mortgagor shall be cancelled, and a new certificate issued in the name of the purchaser.

(b) If the mortgage was foreclosed extrajudicially, a certificate of sale executed by the officer who conducted the sale shall be filed with the Register of Deeds who shall make a brief memorandum thereof on the certificate of title.

In the event of redemption by the mortgagor, the same rule provided for in the second paragraph of this section shall apply.

In case of non-redemption, the purchaser at foreclosure sale shall file with the Register of Deeds, either a final deed of sale executed by the person authorized by virtue of the power of attorney embodied in the deed of mortgage, or his sworn statement attesting to the fact of non-redemption; whereupon, the Register of Deeds shall issue a new certificate in favor of the purchaser after the owner's duplicate of the certificate has been previously delivered and cancelled.

Since the subject property was sold at public auction under Foreclosure No. 07-016, the Property Registration Decree may therefore be applied in determining whether a final certificate of sale may be issued to Legarda.

Neither may it be inferred as a matter of law that an assignee is one of those who are entitled to the conveyance and possession of the subject property. An assignee is different from a purchaser and a redemptioner. A purchaser is the buyer of the property subject of the foreclosure sale who becomes the absolute owner thereof if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of sale.46 On the other hand, a "redemptioner" is a creditor with a lien on the property subject of the foreclosure sale subsequent to the judgment, which was the basis of the execution sale, who is given the prerogative to redeem property sold in a foreclosure sale after its registration.47 An assignee is neither a privy to the foreclosure sale nor does he/she has a lien on the property subject of the foreclosure sale with a prerogative to redeem the same. Legarda merely steps into Calawagan's rights and interest as a purchaser by virtue of the Deed of Assignment.

The expiration of the one-year redemption period foreclosed any right to redeem the subject property and the sale to the purchaser thereby became absolute.48 The issuance of the final certificate of sale to a purchaser is therefore merely ministerial as the same is only a formality and a confirmation of the title that is already vested upon the purchaser.49 As aptly underscored by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo during the deliberations of this case, the ministerial character of the issuance of a final certificate of sale in favor of a purchaser if no redemption was made within the one-year period had been recognized by the Court in as early as the 1957 case of Manuel v. PNB50 and was subsequently reiterated in Calacala v. Republic,51 Delos Reyes v. Ramnani,52 and Akiapat v. Summit Bank (Rural Bank of Tublay [Benguet], Inc.),53 among others.1aшphi154

Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo expounds that the ministerial character of the issuance of the Final Certificate of Sale is grounded on the fact that the trial court is privy to the transactions preceding it—the auction sale in which the purchaser acquires the subject property,55 as well as the redemption by the redemptioner, and the failure of redemption within the one year period;56 thus, the trial court may easily verify whether the sale is valid and whether the subject property has not been redeemed within the one year period.57 There is therefore no need for the trial court to receive evidence to inquire into these matters.58 Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo further explains that in contrast, the assignment by the purchaser to another person occurs outside the confines of the proceedings of the trial court; thus, there is a need to receive evidence to determine the rights and obligations of each party under such assignment.59 Said reception and determination cannot be considered as merely ministerial as it would involve discretion which cannot be exercised by the clerk of court or the sheriff. Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo resolves that only the courts properly vested with the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy would be able to render a binding pronouncement on the validity of such assignment.60

According to Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, the above perspective finds support in the amendment introduced to Rule 15 by the 2019 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure concerning litigious and non-litigious motions. Rule 15,61 Section 4 of the 2019 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure particularly provides that a motion for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute a final certificate of sale is non-litigious. Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo elucidates that:

The Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Sub-Committee for the Revision of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure held on May 28, 2019 reveals the following discussion concerning litigious and non-litigious motions:

. . . Only litigious motions, as enumerated below, will be heard, subject to the discretion of the judge who shall issue a notice of hearing. Such motions shall be resolved within 15 calendar days from receipt of the opposition thereto. Likewise enumerated below are non-litigious motions and prohibited motions, which shall not be heard.

. . .

The proposed new provision enumerates the non-litigious motions which, according to Justice Peralta, shall not be heard, but must be resolved within 7 calendar days.

There is no dispute that a motion for the issuance of an alias summons, a motion for the issuance of a writ or an alias writ of execution, a motion for extension to file answer and a motion to issue a writ of possession are non-litigious.

Further, the records of the Sub-Committee for the Revision of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure demonstrate that the following footnote accompanied Rule 15, Sec. 4 during the discussions:

This new provision defines non-litigious motions and gives some examples. These motions shall not be set for hearing but must be resolved by the court within 5 calendar days. The adverse party is also not required to file an opposition or comment thereto because his or her rights are not prejudiced by the non-litigious nature of said motions. There is no dispute that a motion for the issuance of an alias summons, a motion for the issuance of a writ or an alias writ of execution, a motion for extension to file answer, and a motion to issue a writ of possession are non-litigious. Anent the phrase "other similar motions," it is a catch-all provision.

The footnote to Rule 15, Sec. 5, of the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in the records of the discussion of the Sub-Committee for the Revision of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is also illuminating as it provides the rationale behind the classification of motions as litigious:

This new provision that deals with litigious motions, which shall be resolved only after receipt of the opposition or the expiration of the period to file opposition. . . A "motion to amend after a responsive pleading has been filed" is also a litigious motion because amendment at this juncture is a matter of discretion on the part of the court.

By inference, the converse is true for a motion for issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale. As discussed, it is well-established that its issuance to a purchaser or redemptioner is ministerial. Accordingly, it is a non-litigious motion and no opposition is necessary for the court to resolve the same.

The same cannot be said for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale in favor of an assignee. It cannot be considered as non-litigious in nature, [as there should be] an opportunity to file an opposition necessary to afford due process to the relevant parties. This is because the trial court is not privy to the assignment; reception of evidence is necessary to determine the assignment's validity and applicability.62

Accordingly, the issuance of the Final Certificate of Sale other than to the purchaser, and in this case to Legarda, is beyond ministerial as it would involve more than confirming the title already vested to Calawagan as the purchaser. It entails going past the proceedings of the foreclosure sale and looking into the propriety of the assignment to Legarda, which the COC-RTC Muntinlupa was not privy to.

Lastly, Legarda is not left without any remedy to claim his rights and interests over the subject property. After the confirmation of the title in Calawagan's name through the issuance of a Final Certificate of Sale in his favor, Legarda may then seek to enforce his rights over the subject property through an appropriate deed of conveyance other than insisting to substitute Calawagan in the issuance of the Final Certificate of Sale. If Calawagan refuses to honor said assignment, Legarda may then resort to the courts by filing a complaint for specific performance.63

In sum, Legarda failed to sufficiently demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to the issuance of the Final Certificate of Sale nor was it the duty under the law or ministerial for the COC-RTC Muntinlupa to issue the same. Likewise, Legarda failed to establish that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to be entitled to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, much more substantiate his entitlement thereto. Mandamus, therefore, may not lie against the COC-RTC Muntinlupa.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 4, 2014 and the Resolution dated January 26, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 135217 are hereby AFFIRMED. Consequently, the Petition for Mandamus filed by petitioner Jaime Manuel N. Legarda against respondents Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City and Benjamin Calawagan is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, and Singh, JJ., concur.

Gesmundo, C.J., see separate concurring opinion.

Leonen, SAJ., joined Justice Caguioa's concurring.

Caguioa, J., see concurring opinion.

Zalameda* and Dimaampao, JJ., on official leave.

Marquez,** J., on official business.

Footnotes

* On official leave.

** On official business.

1 Rollo, pp. 28-13.

2 Id. at 19-29. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang (now a retired Member of the Court) and Edwin D. Sorongon of the Fourth Division Court of Appeals, Manila.

3 Id. at 16-17. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang (now a retired Member of the Court) and Edwin D. Sorongon of the Former Fourth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

4 Id. at 54-56. Penned by Presiding Judge Leandro C. Catalo of Branch 256, Regional Trial Court, Muntinlupa City.

5 Id. at 49-53.

6 The terms "Final Deed of Sale" and "Final Certificate of Sale" were used interchangeably in the records of this case. For purposes of uniformity, the term "Final Certificate of Sale" will be used in this Decision; see id. at 20-21.

7 Not attached to the rollo.

8 Rollo, p. 43.

9 Id. at 43-44.

10 Id. at 20.

11 Id. at 83-84.

12 Id. at 20.

13 Id. at 46-48.

14 Id. at 20-21 & 51-52.

15 Id. at 21-22.

16 Id. at 54-56.

17 Id. at 56.

18 Id. at 55.

19 Id. at 5.

20 Id. at 19-29.

21 Id. at 28.

22 Id. at 24-28.

23 Id. at 30-41.

24 Id. at 16-17.

25 Id. at 28-13.

26 Id. at 7-11.

27 Id. at 94-107.

28 Id. at 99-104.

29 Section 58(E) of RA 8424 provides:

Registration with Register of Deeds. - No registration of any document transferring real property shall be effected by the Register of Deeds unless the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative has certified that such transfer has been reported, and the capital gains or creditable withholding tax, if any, has been paid: Provided, however, That the information as may be required by rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner, shall be annotated by the Register of Deeds in the Transfer Certificate of Title or Condominium Certificate of Title: Provided, further, That in cases of transfer of property to a corporation, pursuant to a merger, consolidation or reorganization, and where the law allows deferred recognition of income in accordance with Section 40, the information as may be required by rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner, shall be annotated by the Register of Deeds at the back of the Transfer Certificate of Title or Condominium Certificate of Title of the real property involved: Provided, finally, That any violation of this provision by the Register of Deeds shall be subject to the penalties imposed under Section 269 of this Code.

30 Entitled "AN ACT AMENDING THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, As AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on December 11, 1997.

31 Rollo, pp. 104-105.

32 See Independent Electricity Market Operator of the Philippines, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 254440, March 23, 2022 [Per J. Zalameda, Second Division]. This citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

33 Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc., 508 Phil. 354, 371 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

34 Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, 624 Phil. 200, 207 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

35 Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc., 508 Phil. 354, 371 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

36 Id. at 371.

37 Franco v. Energy Regulatory Commission, 783 Phil. 740, 749 (2016) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].

38 Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, 624 Phil. 200, 207 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

39 Rollo, p. 20.

40 Id. at 48.

41 Philippine National Bank v. CA, 338 Phil. 795, 817-818 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division], citing Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., p. 75.

42 Philippine National Bank v. CA, id., at 818-819.

43 Grandholdings Investments (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. CA, 854 Phil. 297, 309 (2019) [Per J. J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].

44 794 Phil. 228 (2016) [Per J. Perez, Third Division].

45 Id. at 238, citing Laguna Metts Corp. v. CA, 611 Phil. 530, 536 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division].

46 Chailease Finance Corp. v. Spouses Ma, 456 Phil. 498, 504 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

47 Cayton v. Zeonnix Trading Corp., 618 Phil. 136, 148 (2009) [PerJ. Nachura, Third Division].

48 Delos Reyes v. Ramnani, 635 Phil. 242, 247 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].

49 Id.

50 101 Phil. 968 (1957) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].

51 502 Phil. 681 (2005) [Per J. Garcia, Third Division].

52 635 Phil. 242 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].

53 G.R. Nos. 222505 & 222776, June 28, 2021 [Per J. Inting, Third Division].

54 C.J. Gesmundo, Concurring Opinion, p. 5.

55 Rule 39, Sec. 19. How property sold on execution; who may direct manner and order of sale. - All sales of property under execution must be made at public auction, to the highest bidder, to start at the exact time fixed in the notice. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution, no more shall be sold and any excess property or proceeds of the sale shall be promptly delivered to the judgment obligor or his authorized representative, unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court. When the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots, they must be sold separately; or, when a portion of such real property is claimed by a third person, he may require it to be sold separately. When the sale is of personal property capable of manual delivery, it must be sold within view of those attending the same and in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price. The judgment obligor, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such property consists of several known lots or parcels which can be sold to advantage separately. Neither the officer conducting the execution sale, nor his deputies, can become a purchaser, nor be interested directly or indirectly in any purchase at such sale. [Emphasis supplied]

56 Rule 39, Sec. 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions; notice to be given and filed. - The judgment obligor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last named amount at the same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with interest.

Property so redeemed may again be redeemed within sixty (60) days after the last redemption upon payment of the sum paid on the last redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amount of any assessments or taxes which the last redemptioner may have paid thereon after redemption by him, with interest on such last-named amount, and in addition, the amount of any liens held by said last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. The property may be again, and as often as a redemptioner is so disposed, redeemed from any previous redemptioner within sixty (60) days after the last redemption, on paying the sum paid on the last previous redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amounts of any assessments or taxes which the last previous redemptioner paid after the redemption thereon, with interest thereon, and the amount of any Iiens held by the last redemptioner prior to his own with interest.

Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registry of deeds of the place, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other than that upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given to the officer and tiled with the registry of deeds; if such notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such assessments, taxes, or liens. [Emphasis supplied)

57 C.J. Gesmundo, Concurring Opinion, p. 7.

58 Id.

59 Id.

60 Id.

61 Section 4. Non-litigious motions. — Motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of adverse parties are non-litigious motions. These motions include:

a) Motion for the issuance of an alias summons;

b) Motion for extension to file answer;

c) Motion for postponement;

d) Motion for the issuance of a writ of execution;

e) Motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution;

f) Motion for the issuance of a writ of possession;

g) Motion for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale; and

h) Other similar motions.

These motions shall not be set for hearing and shall be resolved by the court within five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof. [Emphasis supplied]

62 C.J. Gesmundo, Concurring Opinion, p. 8-10.

63 Id. at 10.

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