[ G.R. No. 248985*. October 05, 2021 ]
PHILIP HERNANDEZ PICCIO, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND ROSANNA VERGARA VERGARA, RESPONDENTS.
CONCURRING OPINION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
Facts
In November 2006, respondent applied with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for the re-acquisition of her Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (RA 9225) and its implementing rules. She was then a naturalized citizen of the United States of America.
By end of November 2006, BI finished its investigation of respondent's application. BI reported its favorable action on her application in its Memorandum dated November 28, 2006 and Order dated November 30, 2006. She then took her Oath of Allegiance. BI issued to her Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 dated November 30, 2006.
In support of respondent's Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 dated November 30, 2006, which was the final outcome of her application, she had her petition under RA 9225 and its implementing rules, BI's Memorandum dated November 28, 2006 and Order dated November 30, 2006, and her Oath of Allegiance.
Nine (9) years later, in 2015, she filed her certificate of candidacy for Representative of the third congressional district of Nueva Ecija for the 2016 elections. She also submitted her Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
Not long after, to prevent respondent from running in the 2016 elections and ever again, only then did petitioner initiate a barrage of complaints against respondent questioning her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
As stressed by the learned ponente, Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, quoting the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), these complaints are borne in the following proceedings, thus:
Fifth, the rulings and decisions of other quasi-judicial bodies and government agencies resolving the same issue in the present case regarding the compliance of Vergara with RA 9225 and the collateral issues of tampering, forgery and irregularities in the processing of her RA 9225 petition. These were brought to the fore by the HRET, thus:
First, the said issue was already determined by the [BI] – the government agency tasked to implement RA 9225 – in favor of [Vergara] when it issued the Order on November 30, 2006 or more than thirteen (13) years ago, granting her Petition for the issuance of Identification Certificate to reacquire Filipino citizenship.
x x x x
Second, when [Piccio] opposed the candidacy of [Vergara], he raised the same issue that the latter did not comply with RA 9225. However, the COMELEC First Division, in its Resolution dated June 7, 2016, DISMISSED for lack of merit [Piccio's] petition x x x. It found that [Vergara] had complied with the requirements of RA 9225.
Third, [Piccio] also filed xxx a deportation complaint against [Vergara] for allegedly tampering with her RA No. 9225 records. The complaint x x x was dismissed for lack of merit by Order dated October 7, 2016 issued by BI Commissioner [Morente]. It affirmed the Investigation Committee's findings that, "based on the Bureau's available records, and considering the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties," it appears that [Vergara's] petition xxx was duly processed and approved by the [BI]."
Fourth, the Joint Resolution dated June 16, 2017 and the Resolution dated November 7, 2017 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila in NPS No. XV-07-INC-17C dismissing the complaints for falsification filed by [Piccio] against [Vergara], x x x involving the same documents in the instant case x x x. The City Prosecutor found no probable cause for the imputations against [Vergara].
As shown, aside from HRET itself, the COMELEC, the BI, and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, one after another, consistently affirmed respondent's valid reacquisition of her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 and invariably dismissed petitioner's complaints.
The Dissent
The dissenters would like to reverse the ruling of HRET because –
One. The presumption of regularity in the issuance of respondent's Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 dated November 30, 2006 and this certificate itself as the process' confirmative ready-to-hand document can be overcome by a mere suggestion of "a deviation from the standard conduct of official duty required by law."1
Two. Despite the issuance of an identification certificate under RA 9225 and its implementing rules, which is the final document issued as proof of one's reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under the RA 9225 process, the burden of proof to show strict compliance with the procedure for the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship lies with the person claiming such privilege.2
Three. Respondent's Oath of Allegiance is seriously doubtful as to its authenticity or genuineness, notarization, and status as a public document, because of the certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court for the Regional Trial Court in Manila City that it could not issue a certified true copy of her Oath of Allegiance, acknowledged before Notary Public Atty. Cinco on November 26, 2006 with Cod. No. 115, Page No. 42, Book No. IV, Series of 2006, since Book No. IV was not among those submitted to this office.
Four. A comparison by the dissent of the signature of Notary Public Atty. Cinco in respondent's Oath of Allegiance with his signatures inscribed on his notarial commission and oath of office as notary public showed that they were "demonstrably dissimilar."
Further, the dissent also noted that a handwriting expert was not needed to notice that "there [was] evidently a missing portion of Atty. Cinco's admittedly genuine signature on Vergara's Oath of Allegiance."
The dissent cited Basilio v. Court of Appeals3 to support the comparison it had made and its conclusion from such comparison, thus –
In Basilio v. Court of Appeals, the Court conducted its own visual analysis of the questioned document and after doing so, was convinced that the purported signature of the petitioner in the Deed of Absolute Sale was patently dissimilar from his admittedly genuine signatures.
Five. The November 28, 2006 BI Memorandum recommending approval of respondent's RA 9225 petition, the November 30, 2006 BI Order granting respondent's RA 9225 petition, her Oath of Allegiance, and her Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 are all public documents under Section 19 (a) and (b) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence (1989).
Unfortunately, respondent failed to prove the existence, due execution, and authenticity of these public documents in the manner specified by Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence (1989), i.e., by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and by an attestation stating in substance that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
Six. Because BI has only photocopies of the November 28, 2006 BI Memorandum recommending approval of respondent's RA 9225 petition, the November 30, 2006 BI Order granting respondent's RA 9225 petition, her Oath of Allegiance, and her Identification Certificate No. 06-12955, it follows that "no originals [thereof] exist on file."4
My Reflections (from the brain)
The following commentaries are intended for our cerebral concerns.
First. According to the dissent, the presumption that public officers performed their official duties regularly and legally and in compliance with applicable laws, in good faith, and in the exercise of sound judgment "only works when nothing on record suggests that there was a deviation from the standard conduct of official duty required by law."
With due respect, the correct standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. The dissent itself affirmed this doctrine in Arakor Construction and Development Corporation v. Sta. Maria5 – the presumption of regularity may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Arakor also stressed that "forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the party alleging the same."
In Republic v. Apex Mining Corporation,6 in the context of administrative agencies rendering decisions and performing other quasi- judicial functions, the Court held:
It bears stressing that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency. In their evaluation of evidence and exercise of adjudicative functions, administrative agencies are given wide latitude, which includes the authority to take judicial notice of the facts within their special competence.
Additionally, administrative agencies like the DENR enjoy a strong presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties; they are vested with quasi-judicial powers in enforcing the laws affecting their respective fields of activity, the proper regulation of which requires of them such technical mastery of all relevant conditions obtaining in the nation. Unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption becomes conclusive.
This presumption of regularity includes the public officer's official actuations in all the phases of their7 work.8 It is so well entrenched as a legal doctrine so that "every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness."9
In every case to nullify a government action, a petitioner invariably stands against this presumption of regularity. Regardless of the appearance or non-appearance of the respondent agency, regardless of the absence of any testimonial, documentary or object evidence on its behalf, the presumption stands as an obstacle to the petitioner's ultimate prayer. There is no other way of surmounting this legal barrier but by the petitioner successfully discharging his or her burden of proving the contrary by clear and convincing evidence.
Clear and convincing evidence is the quantum of proof that requires more than preponderance of evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.10
In preponderance of evidence, the parties' opposing evidence are matched against each other, and the standard is met if the evidence is able to prove that the proposition is more likely to be true than not true or more probable than improbable, and more likely to be true or more probable than what the opposing pieces of evidence prove, that is, the proof generated by the evidence is any value greater than fifty percent chance that the proposition is true as against what the opposing evidence sought to establish.11
On the other hand, clear and convincing evidence means that the evidence presented by a party during the trial must be highly and substantially more probable to be true than not and the trier of fact must have a firm belief or conviction in its factuality.12 In this standard, under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be substantially greater than a 50% likelihood of being true.
No matter how we examine petitioner's pieces of evidence, they can never amount to proof substantially greater than a 50% likelihood of being true. There is no clear and convincing evidence refuting the presumption of regularity in the issuance of respondent's Identification Certificate No. 06-12955. More on this below.
Second. With due respect, the dissent has imprecisely assigned the allocation of the burden of proof here. The identification certificate under RA 9225 and its implementing rules is the final document issued as proof of one's reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.13 It is accepted by various government agencies as such proof.14
The identification certificate is the end of the RA 9225 process. It is preceded by the Order of Approval, which under BI Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01 (March 10, 2004)15 indicates compliance with all the requisites of RA 9225 and its implementing rules.
Hence, since respondent has been issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12955, she has in her favor the presumption of regularity in all the phases leading to its issuance. Therefore, the burden of proof lies upon petitioner to contradict this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. It is erroneous to allocate the burden of proof upon respondent when she has the presumption in her favor.
For example, we do not presume that a driver's license, passport, government employee ID, or a PhilHealth/GSIS/SSS card is invalid and then assign the burden of proving its validity upon its holder. If the rule were to be as the dissent proposed it, government transactions will halt and the rule of law (which is built to a large extent on the presumption of regularity) will come to a standstill.
Consider this: If I were traversing the intersection of Padre Faura Street and Taft Avenue, and directed by a Traffic Enforcer to stop to give way to vehicles from the opposite side, I cannot disobey this public officer on my belief that his work ID is fake and thus invalid and has no mandate to give such traffic direction order. Law and order demands that I presume the Traffic Enforcer's government ID as valid and all the actions taken by the authority of such ID (as a symbol of the Traffic Enforcer's mandate) as binding. Otherwise, traffic at that busy corner will result in a gridlock.
The burden of proof does not rest upon respondent to prove her compliance with RA 9225 and its implementing rules because she has in her favor Identification Certificate No. 06-12955. As this document itself already indicates, compliance with the requisites, as presumed by both the evidentiary presumption in Section 3 (m) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence (1989) and Section 11 of BI Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01 (March 10, 2004), the burden is upon petitioner to disprove such compliance by clear and convincing evidence.
Third. I discuss here the first of four pieces of evidence upon which the dissent concluded that respondent had not validly reacquired her Filipino citizenship. I refer to respondent's Oath of Allegiance which the dissent pronounced is not genuine, has not been notarized, and is not a public document simply because the Notary Public Atty. Cinco's Book IV was not submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) in Manila City.
As a matter of logic though, the fact that Book IV was not submitted does not mean that all the notarized documents recorded therein were fake, not duly or even actually notarized, and therefore are not public documents. What the non-submission signified was simply that Book IV was not submitted and is not in the records of the OCC and that as a result, it would not be possible for the OCC to issue certified true copies of the documents registered in Book IV, including respondent's Oath of Allegiance.
As a matter of law, the non-submission of one of a Notary Public's notarial books does not make the documents recorded in that notarial book fake, unnotarized and unpublic documents. There is no law, jurisprudence, or rule, to that effect.
The dissent cited Dizon v. Matti Jr.,16 which is based on DECS v. Del Rosario,17 which in turn cited Bernardo v. Ramos.18
Dizon v. Matti Jr. boldly (or respectfully, recklessly) enunciated a rule of presumption –
... the Certification... issued by the notarial records section of the Office of the Clerk of Court... certifying that the alleged notarized Deed... does not exist in the notarial records of the said office... casts very serious doubt on respondent['s]... claim that the notarization of the Deed... was completely in order. In this connection, it is apropos to mention that if there is no copy of the instrument in the notarial records, there arises a presumption that the document was not notarized and is not a public document.
I say boldly and recklessly because –
(i) The alleged reference of this rule, DECS v. Del Rosario, did not lay down the above-quoted presumption. The complete and correct statement of the rule of presumption in DECS consists of two (2) premises, not a single one as reduced in Dizon – the subject instrument must both be not recorded in the notarial register and not included in the notarial records. Thus, DECS held:
If the instrument is not recorded in the notarial register and there is no copy in the notarial records, the presumption arises that the document was not notarized and is not a public document.
(ii) The OCC certification in Dizon is different from the certification in the present case.
The certification in Dizon certified that "the alleged notarized Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist in the notarial records of the said office."
On the other hand, the wording of the certification here is that Book IV was not among the submissions by Atty. Cinco to the OCC in Manila City.
(iii) DECS cited Bernardo v. Ramos. But Bernardo did not lay down a presumption as the one made in DECS, much less, the one laid down in Dizon. To be precise, Bernardo held:
If the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt is engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a public document and cannot bolster any claim made based on this document. Considering the evidentiary value given to notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in his notarial registry is tantamount to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized when in fact it was not.
The rule in Bernardo is consistent with our holding in Spouses Santiago v. Court of Appeals19 that -
And surely, the parties to a notarized document are not the persons obligated to furnish a copy thereof to the Records Management and Archives Division, such task being that of the notary. The failure of the notary public to so furnish a copy of the deed to the proper office is a ground for disciplining him, but certainly not for invalidating the document or for setting aside the transaction therein involved.
The doubt that Bernardo said was engendered by the faulty notarization of the document should be qualified more leniently (and not harshly) by the above-quoted rule in Spouses Santiago that the non-submission of one of the notary books is not a ground for invalidating the document or the transaction it memorializes. What is important, following Spouses Santiago, is that the notary public who had notarized respondent's Oath of Allegiance was duly and legally commissioned when he notarized respondent's Oath of Allegiance.
Clearly, there is no basis in law for the claim made by the dissent as well as those in Dizon and DECS that a presumption arises if the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein. There is no rule of presumption enunciated in the alleged ultimate source of this rule – Bernardo v. Ramos, and its antecedent, Spouses Santiago.
What Bernardo simply laid down was that such twin facts, and not just one, could (not should) create a doubt but not a presumption.
It is important to distinguish a doubt from a presumption since a doubt in a civil case may be rebutted by preponderant evidence while a presumption requires clear and convincing evidence to refute.
At any rate, here, neither doubt nor presumption arose because the OCC only certified that Book IV was not submitted by the Notary Public. There is no certification that respondent's Oath of Allegiance was not recorded, much less, does not exist in the notarial records of the OCC.
Assuming that the certifications in Dizon and in the present case amount to the same thing, neither doubt nor presumption will still arise because the Oath of Allegiance was in fact recorded on November 26, 2006 in "Cod. No. 115, Page No. 42, Book No. IV, Series of 2006" of Notary Public Atty. Cinco. Evidently, the two premises to generate the presumption in Dizon will not apply to the certification here since only one of these premises is actually present.
Singly or in connection with the three (3) other pieces of evidence canvassed by the dissent, the OCC Certification obtained by petitioner does not amount to clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumptive validity of respondent's Identification Certificate and the probative value of the evidence offered in the present case supporting this presumption.
Fourth. The comparison between the original specimens of Atty. Cinco's signatures in his notarial commission and oath of office and the copy of his signature on respondent's Oath of Allegiance is not an acceptable procedure for a handwriting examination.
Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman20 stressed that the use of a mere photocopy of the alleged forged signature to establish forgery is not reliable:
Besides, the Ombudsman aptly observed that Azores and Pagui admittedly used mere photocopies of the PDAF documents in their handwriting analyses. In Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that "[w]ithout the original document containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery," and that"[a] comparison based on a mere [photo] copy or reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable results."
Loyola Life Plans v. Lumiqued21 underscored the same ruling:
Noticeably, the language used by Atty. Pagui in his findings is not definitive and cannot be considered a reliable examination of the genuineness of Dwight's signature. While it concludes that the questioned and standard signatures could not have been affixed by one and the same person, this conclusion is made on the assumption that the standard signatures provided by ATR are authentic copies of the originals. Moreover, only the carbon-original copy of Dwight's questioned document was examined, not the original questioned document bearing his signature. Atty. Pagui admitted that the original copy of the document where the questioned signature appears is "preferably the most desired to be examined." Even Mely Feliciano Sora, Chief of the Questioned Document Examination Division of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, opined that it is impossible to conduct a reliable handwriting· examination of Dwight's signature appearing on the Timeplan Application. According [to] her, the Application is a mere carbon original wherein the minute details are not clear.... Given the unreliable quality of the available sample signatures of Dwight in the records, the Court is inclined to refuse conducting an independent examination of the genuineness of his signature in the disputed Timeplan application.
In Republic v. Harp,22 alterations or forgeries cannot be reliably established when the questioned writing is just a photocopy:
From Senate Committee Report No. 256 dated 7 August 2003, it appears that the supposed discovery of alterations was based on a mere photocopy of Manuel's Certificate of Live Birth. Since the original document was not inspected, the committees could not make any categorical finding of purported alterations. They were only able to conclude that Manuel's birth certificate appeared to be "simulated, if not, highly suspicious." The Court cannot rely on this inconclusive finding. In the same way that forgery cannot be determined on the basis of a comparison of photocopied instruments, the conclusion that a document has been altered cannot be made if the original is not examined.
Another. While the dissent based its conclusion of forgery on alleged "evidently missing portion" of the Notary Public's signature in the Oath of Allegiance, the dissent did not explain what this omission was. This is unfair because it deprives respondent the ability to meet the supposed deficiency, especially when the supposedly forged signature appeared only as a copy of the original.
The analysis in the dissent is contrary to what was done in Civil Service Commission v. Dampilag, where the Court painstakingly itemized the stark differences between the genuine signature and the forged one –
Here, the evidence presented includes certified true copy of the PSP and the PDS. After a careful comparison, we noted stark differences in the structure, strokes, form and general appearance of Dampilag's signatures and handwriting in the PDS and in the PSP. The letters "M," "J," and "N" were written differently and the strokes of the signatures were not similar. It cannot also escape our attention that the purported examinee wrote his name as "HILARIO D. DAMPILAG" in the PSP and not "HILARIO J. DAMPILAG." In the circumstances and based on the evidence on record, there is no doubt that the person who took the December 1, 1996 CSPE is not Dampilag. Someone impersonated Dampilag and took the examination in behalf of him.
Lastly, the dissent's reference to Basilio v. Court of Appeals23 is most inappropriate since the handwriting examination done by the Court was merely cumulative of the overwhelming evidence adduced that the questioned deed of sale was forged. It is very much unlike the present case where the Court's evidence of forgery was only the dissent's examination of the signature's copy that was compared to the other signatures of the Notary Public:
In this case, petitioners presented handwriting experts and other persons familiar with the handwriting of Dionisio Z. Basilio in order to show that the signature contained in the questioned deed of sale was forged.
According to the report of the handwriting experts of the National Bureau of Investigation, there were "fundamental, significant differences in writing characteristics between the questioned and the standard/sample specimen signatures," particularly, the "movement and manner of execution strokes," "structural pattern of letters/elements," and "minute/inconspicuous identifying details."
Evelyn Basilio, daughter of Dionisio Z. Basilio, confirmed that the signature on the questioned deed of sale was forged, stating that she knew the authentic signature of her father because he used to sign her school report card periodically.
Carmelita Basilio, wife of Dionisio Z. Basilio, stayed beside her husband from the time of his illness until his death. She was certain that from the time of his illness in 1987 until his death in 1988, Dionisio did not have the strength to sign a document much less personally appear before a notary public in the latter's office to acknowledge the execution of a deed of sale.
Moreover, our own analytical study of the questioned document showed that the signature of Dionisio Z. Basilio on the deed of sale dated March 19, 1987 was forged. We have examined the signature of Dionisio Z. Basilio on the deed of sale dated March 19, 1987, compared with other documents with his admittedly genuine signature. We find the signatures to be patently dissimilar.
Thus, again, singly or in connection with the three other pieces of evidence identified in the dissent, the questionable and unreliable signature examination done by the dissent cannot constitute clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumptive validity of respondent's Identification Certificate and the probative value of the pieces of evidence adduced in this case that corroborate this presumption.
Fifth. The dissent inaccurately referred to Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132, Revised Rules of Evidence (1989) as one of respondent's inadequacies in proving her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 and its implementing rules.
This is because the present case has nothing to do with the contents of the requisite documents. Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 are relevant only if the documents' proponent is obliged to produce the original, and this is the case only if the contents of the documents are in issue.
But here, the issue is the existence, genuineness, and due execution of the November 28, 2006 BI Memorandum recommending approval of respondent's RA 9225 petition, the November 30, 2006 BI Order granting respondent's RA 9225 petition, her Oath of Allegiance, and her Identification Certificate No. 06-12955. For this purpose, any probative secondary evidence may be offered by respondent.
As held in Heirs of Prodon v. Heirs of Alvarez,24 the range of secondary evidence that may be offered to prove the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the requisite documents is wide. Good trial tactics would surely call attention to adducing the original document itself. But this does not mean that if the originals are missing, all is already lost for the proponent. Far from it. As Heirs of Prodon clarified –
.... Her inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its existence and due execution by other means that could only be secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.
Secondary evidence may be offered to prove the existence, due execution, and genuineness of documents. The manner of proving these matters is not as stringent as proving the terms of a writing, the process for which is laid down in Sections 5, 6, 7 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence (1989). The less stringent manner of proving the existence, due execution, and genuineness of documents will go through the ordinary procedure for adducing testimonial, object, or documentary evidence.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan25 spelled out when the originals are necessary and when they are not.
Under the Best Evidence Rule, the original document must be produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry. The rule is encapsulated in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court....
Why the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are the subject of inquiry are suitably explained in Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez:
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought before the court, considering that (a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally. The rule further acts as an insurance against fraud. Verily, if a party is in the possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and default. Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writings.
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original.
Although the application of the Best Evidence Rule may be simple, determining whether the contents or terms of a writing are the subject of the inquiry, or whether a piece of evidence (other than the original document) intends to prove the contents of a writing, is more difficult than it seems. In Railroad Management Company LLC v. CFS Louisiana Midstream Co., the US Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit), which was faced with the complex task of determining whether to admit in evidence the affidavits of certain witnesses that had been submitted in evidence supposedly to prove the existence of an assignment agreement, acknowledged the difficulty in applying the Best Evidence Rule particularly because the party proffering the affidavits had contended that they were not intended to "prove the content" of the document (agreement), but only their "existence." It held that the affidavits were in fact submitted to prove the contents of the agreement, and observed as follows:
The purpose, flexibility, and fact-intensive nature of the application of the best evidence rule persuade us that the following factors are appropriately considered when distinguishing between whether it is the content of the document or merely its existence that a witness intends to testify concerning:
(a) the relative importance of content in the case, (b) the simplicity or complexity of content and consequent risk of error in admitting a testimonial account, (c) the strength of the proffered evidence and the presence or absence of bias or self-interest on the part of the witnesses, (d) the breadth of the margin for error within which mistake in a testimonial account would not undermine the point to be proved, (e) the presence or absence of the actual dispute as to content, (f) the ease or difficulty of producing the writing, and (g) the reasons why the proponent of other proof of its content does not have or offer the writing itself.
Indeed, when the terms or contents of a writing must be proved to make a case or put up a defense, the Best Evidence Rule is controlling. But when the terms or contents are not in issue, and the matter to be proved exists independently of the writing and can be satisfactorily established by parol evidence (or other secondary evidence), the latter is equally primary.
Given the foregoing guidelines, the Best Evidence Rule is not controlling in the case before the Sandiganbayan. None of the issues presented there would be resolved only upon a consideration of the contents of any of the affected exhibits. Specifically, the exhibits (including the letters and memoranda) were presented to establish that either the Marcoses had extended undue and unwarranted influence, advantage and concessions to the respondents, or that the Marcoses had held a close relationship – financial or otherwise – with their alleged cronies. But considering that such facts were matters that could be competently inferred from the mere existence and execution of the documents themselves, the Republic did not need to present the documents to prove the particular transactions or incidents detailed in the documents. Hence, the production in court of the originals of the exhibits was neither crucial nor decisive.
When what is sought to be proved is an external or collateral matter, the original of the exhibit need not be produced in court in order to ensure its trustworthiness for purposes of the case. Such trustworthiness is already safeguarded by the rules on authentication and proof of documents embodied in Section 19 to Section 33 of Rule 132, Rules of Court. The court may safely rely on the documents thus authenticated and proved even without producing their originals, for it was not their terms or contents that were the subject of the inquiry.
Clearly, the original does not have to be produced when a party is simply trying to prove an event or fact that is memorialized in a writing, recording, or piece of photographic evidence, such as the requisite documents for a petition under RA 9225.
For example, a witness may testify about the fact of payment. Oral testimony to this effect may be offered to prove payment. Additionally, the witness may enter the receipt into evidence, but since the contents of the receipt is not in issue, the original copy of the receipt does not have to be offered. But when a party is attempting to prove payment does not recall the experience of making the payment, but has a receipt and wants to testify as to what the receipt shows, the Original Evidence Rule will apply since it is the contents of the receipt that are being offered. The best evidence of what the receipt says is the receipt itself and the original receipt should be entered into evidence.
Here, respondent vividly recalls the execution and submission to BI of the requisite documents. So does BI itself. They therefore do not have to produce the originals of these documents themselves to prove their existence, due execution, and genuineness. Any secondary evidence probative of these facts will do.
More, the factors mentioned in Republic v. Sandiganbayan militate against the application of the original document rule as well the rule on proof of the originals of public documents stated in Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132. Thus:
(a) the relative importance of contents in the case – The contents are not important here. The requisite documents under RA 9225 and its implementing rules are pro-forma documents and their contents are already stipulated by law.
(b) the simplicity or complexity of content and consequent risk of error in admitting a testimonial account – The contents are pro-forma and therefore identical across the board and thus very simple to be testified on by a witness
(c) the strength of the proffered evidence and the presence or absence of bias or self-interest on the part of the witnesses – The proffered evidence are copies themselves of the requisite documents that are in the possession of BI itself as the official repository of these documents; the copies are both in hard copies and electronic entries in BI's database. We also have testimonies of BI officials on the existence, due execution (i.e., absence of fraud and correctness of form and procedure) and authenticity. These witnesses are public officers who pursuant to the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees must exhibit neutrality, professionalism, and trustworthiness at all times.
(d) the breadth of the margin for error within which mistake in a testimonial account would not undermine the point to be proved – There is a very small margin of error that the above-mentioned secondary evidence, the hard and electronic copies and testimonies, would undermine proof of the existence, genuineness and due execution of the requisite documents.
(e) the presence or absence of the actual dispute as to contents – There is no issue as to the contents of the requisite documents.
(f) the ease or difficulty of producing the writing – Pursuant to the implementing rules of RA 9225, the original copies of the requisite documents were submitted to BI. Hence, the production or non-production of the originals of these documents depends upon the security of BI's filing system and not upon respondent's vested interest.
(g) the reasons why the proponent of other proof of its content does not have or offer the writing itself – This is because BI had custody of the original copies of the RA 9225 requisite documents.
Taking into account all these factors, the original document rule does not apply to the present case. The contents of the requisite documents are not in issue here. Rather, it is their existence, due execution, and genuineness that must be prove. Proof of these matters does not depend on the production of the original since secondary evidence could competently and reliably account for them.
Consequently, respondent's non-compliance with Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 is a non-issue since she has in her favor the presumption of regularity, and in any event, she called secondary evidence to prove the existence, due execution and genuineness of her documents.
Singly or in connection with the three other pieces of evidence mentioned in the dissent, such non-compliance cannot constitute clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumptive validity of her Identification Certificate and the probative value of the evidence adduced before HRET.
Sixth. The dissent itself is ambivalent on what the BI certification that it only had copies of respondent's requisite documents really meant. Expressly, the dissent concluded the obvious – having only copies of these documents, BI did not have the originals thereof in its files. This of course is logical.
It appears, however, that in relying heavily upon BI's certification that only photocopies of the requisite document were in BI's files at the time BI was asked for a certification, the dissent had to proffer that giant leap and jump in conclusion that no originals of the requisite documents had ever existed. I respectfully submit that this conclusion has no basis both in logic and in law.
Logically, it is fallacious to conclude that because only photocopies were ready-to-hand in year 2016, there were no originals thereof in 2006 when respondent reacquired Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. The conclusion does not follow from the premises. It is non-sequitur.
Legally, a certification of the type BI issued does not mean that no originals ever existed.
Diaz-Salgado v. Anson,26 Kho v. Republic,27 Cariño v. Cariño,28 among others, held that a certification of no record of marriage license or certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance or non-existence of this license.
But in Vitangcol v. People,29 a bigamy case, this holding was qualified – the above holding is true only if the certification was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion. If there was any circumstance of suspicion accompanying the certification, Vitangcol held that this certification would not categorically prove that there was no marriage license. This is because a certification that the local civil registrar had no record of the marriage license is not the same as another certification categorically stating that this marriage license did not exist.
Vitangcol explained:
The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.
The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.
A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.
Here, the applicable rule is not the rule enunciated in Diaz-Salgado, Kho, and Cariño,30 among others. This is my conclusion for two reasons.
First, it is not the case here that there are no records of respondent's requisite documents in BI's custody. There are.
For one, hard copies of these documents have long existed in BI's files.
Further, there are electronic entries positively indicating the existence of the originals of these requisite documents. As will be discussed below, there is affirmative evidence confirming the reliability and trustworthiness of BI's physical and electronic filing systems to warrant the conclusion that respondent validly went through the process for reacquiring Filipino citizenship in 2006.
Second, following Vitangcol, the probative value of BI's certification that it has only copies of the requisite documents must also be qualified by such factors as the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence.
The BI Certification cannot and does not support petitioner's claim that respondent did not validly reacquire Filipino citizenship. This is because the BI Certification must co-related with the other evidence and circumstances attendant to this case.
As Justice Caguioa painstakingly clarified in his ponencia, the BI Certification is merely a piece but an integral one in the overall conclusion of BI that respondent's "petition had been duly received, processed and approved by the BI and that she had been issued [Identification Certificate] no. 06-12955."
The brilliant ponencia mentioned the other pieces of evidence that supported this BI conclusion:
The ponente is baffled by how Acting Chief Canta and Commissioner Morente arrived at the conclusion that Vergara's RA 9225 petition had been duly received, processed and approved by the BI considering the total absence of the petition with the BI and that it only has photocopies of the supporting documents. The ponente emphasizes that the "only basis" for the conclusion of the BI Investigation Report dated August 28, 2016 that Vergara's RA 9225 petition was duly received, processed and approved, "were mere photocopies of Vergara's documents in support of her RA 9225 petition and the presumption that the original documents are in the possession of the Bureau considering that the BI required these submissions."
Respectfully, this, again, is a wrong postulation. Contrary to the ponente's ruling, the Investigation Report is based, not only on the photocopies of Vergara's documents and the presumption of regularity, but likewise on the entries on the BI's electronic database, formal hearings conducted by the Investigation Committee, and the comments and reports the Committee required from the concerned BI officials. That the Investigation Report was based on all these sources is clear from the testimonies of the BI officials before the HRET which I discussed in my Reflections, thus:
Fourth, the testimonies before the HRET of the following BI officials:
1) Atty. Arvin Cesar G. Santos (Santos), Chief, BI Legal Division and Chairman, Investigation Committee, who testified that: a) an investigation was conducted on the alleged tampering of Vergara's RA 9225 records and the Investigation Report concluded that the files therein were duly received and processed, resulting to the documents for Vergara's petition.
Atty. Santos likewise confirmed under oath that because the original documents are required to be submitted, the presumption is that these original documents are in the custody of the BI.
2) Atty. Estanislao R. Canta, member of the Board of Special Inquiry, BI, who testified that: a) there were entries in the electronic database of the dual citizenship office which indicate the processing of Vergara's documents; b) that Vergara's documents have been implemented with Transaction Number/ Entry Reference no. 10552;34 c) the BI database records all transactions including the processing of documents; and d) tampering (of the BI electronic database) is highly unlikely (and will not go unnoticed) because any change will be reflected and all entries would be affected.
It is in this context that the Court gave weight to the BI Certification that BI has only photocopies of respondent's requisite documents.
This certification did not mean that no originals ever existed much less that respondent's application for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship was not validly processed.
Rather, what the certification clarifies is that BI has records both physical and electronic of respondent's requisite documents and processed in accordance with RA 9225 and its implementing rules respondent's application for citizenship reacquisition.
Therefore, the conclusion that these documents never existed or were never issued is downright false and fallacious.
Clearly, whether singly or in conjunction with the other pieces of evidence, the BI Certification does not make for clear and convincing evidence of irregularities to rebut the presumption of regularity and the probative value of the evidence corroborating this presumption before HRET.
A last point. A suspicious circumstance should caution us in considering the BI Certification against respondent's claim of Filipino citizenship.
Respondent reacquired her Filipino citizenship in 2006. Yet, petitioner took all of nine long years, in 2015, to start the barrage of complaints against her reacquisition of citizenship.
Thus, the issue raised against respondent is a mere after-thought, that is, after petitioner's realization that she was intent on running in the 2016 elections. Certainly, this after-thought is a tell-tale sign of a hatchet job against respondent.
In the words of Loyola Life Plans v. Lumiqued:31
The Court also agrees with the observation of the lower courts that the allegation of forgery is a mere afterthought. It was only on September 22, 2001, or almost 18 months after the death of Dwight, that ATR belatedly assailed for the first time the genuineness of his signature. ATR's timing in raising the allegation of forgery is suspicious and questionable. Thus, the Court is convinced that the signature of Dwight appearing in his Timeplan application is genuine.
My Reflections (from the inner gut)
The following commentaries are not addressed to our cerebral core but to our passion for truth and justice, and equally important, practical sense. At times, the inner gut is a lot more truthful and sensible mechanism than brain cells.
FIRST. Like a child's legitimacy, a challenge to another's citizenship must be done through a direct action. Vazquez v. Kho32 confirms this doctrine –
We have constantly ruled that an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. A disbarment case is definitely not the proper venue to attack someone's citizenship. For the lack of any ruling from a competent court on respondent's citizenship, this disbarment case loses its only leg to stand on and, hence, must be dismissed.
How different is a disbarment case from a quo warranto proceeding?
Both deliberate on one's qualifications to engage in noble callings – the former as a lawyer to engage in the practice of law, the latter is not far different, as a Congress Representative who legislates laws. In both cases, a requirement is Filipino citizenship.
If disbarment is not the proper case to dispute a lawyer's Filipino citizenship absent a court case divesting the lawyer of Filipino citizenship, then a quo warranto proceeding should not also be a proper case for assailing the Filipino citizenship of a Congress Representative prior to the holding and conclusion of a direct action to contest the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
A quo warranto proceeding before HRET, admittedly, is plenary in scope.33 It, nonetheless, still constitutes a collateral attack upon a person's citizenship, if this is the ground alleged for the quo warranto to proceed.
The purpose of a quo warranto case is to oust a respondent's title to the office, but not to declare their34 loss, lack or retention of Filipino citizenship. This is obvious from the proposed dispositive portion of the dissent –
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The May 23, 2019 Decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 16-025 (QW) dismissing the Petition for quo warranto and declaring Rosanna V. Vergara not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the Third District of Nueva Ecija, as well as its June 27, 2019 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondent Rosanna V. Vergara is hereby found DISQUALIFIED from HOLDING and EXERCISING the Office of a Member of the House of Representatives. The said elective position is hereby DECLARED VACANT. The Commission on Elections and the House of Representatives shall proceed to FILL the VACANCY pursuant to Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6645.
SO ORDERED.
The irony of the present case is that we debated about respondent's Filipino citizenship as reacquired pursuant to RA 9225 and its implementing rules, reverse HRET's ruling (which for all intents and purposes is the decision of some of our senior colleagues), disqualify respondent from being a legislator (as she is allegedly not a Filipino citizen), yet mention nothing in the dispositive portion that she is no longer a Filipino.
To repeat, the dissent declares nothing about respondent's citizenship. This of course is understandable because a quo warranto proceeding is only a collateral attack upon respondent's citizenship.
As a rule, a collateral attack upon citizenship is allowed where the grant, or here, the re-acquisition, of citizenship is void on its face.35 But here, the supporting documents for respondent's re-acquisition of citizenship are not void on its face. It appears to have been regularly issued. The only perceived prima facie indicator of fraud, if at all, is the fact that the documents in BI's custody are photocopies and entries in its reliable database. These are not indicators of a void on its face reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
To repeat, we should not allow a quo warranto petition, such as the present one, to proceed merely because the BI only has photocopies and electronic entries in its reliable database of the documents on respondent's re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship, since this fact does not make her reacquisition void on its face.
Notably, a collateral attack most especially under the present circumstances is not the proper remedy because –
(i) A collateral attack of one's citizenship is simply unfair and unjust.
It is unjust because it leaves the assailed party's citizenship in limbo. The collateral attack deprives the person the right or privilege subject of the attack, yet, it does not cancel their citizenship or the documents proving their citizenship. The party becomes absolutely marginalized because this individual can claim no protection as a citizen as this status will be constantly under attack.
A collateral attack is also unfair since it denies the individual of being heard by the government agency that knows all the relevant facts and circumstances.
Here, it is BI and the Department of Justice. These government agencies know much better the state of their internal procedures and inadequacies, especially its records management system. These agencies know better institutional history of their capacities and inabilities that occur as a result of lack of resources and at times competent management skills that should not prejudice the agencies' respective clienteles.
We should know because the offices under the Supreme Court at times would have missing records or files. This does not mean anything fraudulent. Far from it. These circumstances merely highlight the need for a more efficient organizational management and provision of adequate resources.
It also bears stressing that the admissibility and relevance of secondary evidence to prove the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the original documents which form the basis of respondent's Identification Certificate and the entirety of her re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship, necessarily suggest that the direct action is the more competent forum for this purpose.
The direct action is more competent to delve into matters why, as stated in the dissent, "[respondent's] RA 9225 petition was duly received, processed and approved based on the available records, in particular, the photocopies of Vergara's supporting documents as well as the record on the data system...."
This direct action could very well unearth how then Commissioner Geron could have attested that in 2006, more than ten years ago, BI then did not receive respondent's verified petition but allowed her to re-acquire Filipino citizenship just the same. How did he allegedly come to know of such a fact when BI electronic system had data of respondent's re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship? Indeed, a direct action is more favorable to an accurate and categorical response to this and other queries.
Too, a direct action is more competent in investigating matters that happen more than ten years back in 2006 when respondent processed her application under RA 9225.
Additionally, under both BI Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 and Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 91, Series of 2004 and BI Memorandum Circular No. MCL-08-005 (2008 Revised Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 and Administrative Order (A.O.) NO. 91, Series of 2004), the oath of allegiance and the Order of Approval are forwarded to the Philippine Statistics Administration (PSA), for recording in the civil registry.
Unfortunately, there is nothing in the dissent to suggest that the PSA has been asked about respondent's re-acquisition of citizenship. A direct action could very well subpoena PSA representatives to shed light on PSA's records if these documents have indeed been forwarded to it.
Clearly, the quo warranto proceeding is a collateral attack that is inappropriate in adjudicating citizenship and should be dismissed to give way to the direct action for challenging RA 9225 citizenship re-acquisition. This direct action is found in Section 1936 of BI Memorandum Circular No. MCL-08-005 (2008 Revised Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 and Administrative Order (A.O.) NO. 91, Series of 2004).
(ii) At present, and this rule governs the present case already, under the 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Evidence, photocopies are already considered original copies.
Photocopies are now accorded as much probative value as the originals absent any cogent reason to suspect their reliability and accuracy. As discussed above, there is no cogent reason to deny any probative value to respondent's and BI's photocopies, given the extensive corroboration of these photocopies' weight by the other evidence adduced before HRET.
The 2019 Amendments states:
SECTION 4. Original of Document. —
(a) An "original" of a document is the document itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data is stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original."
(b) A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original.
(c) A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original, or (2) in the circumstances, it is unjust or inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. (4a)37
This rule applies here because rules of procedure applies to proceedings already pending at the time the rules of procedure took effect.38
(iii) As discussed above, the demand for original copies of documents is relevant only if the contents of the documents are at issue. Here, it is not the contents that are at issue but their existence, due execution and authenticity. The originals alone do nots prove the existence, due execution and authenticity of documents; their absence alone does not disprove these matters.39
The lack of originals is not dispositive of respondent's claims. Neither is it determinative of fraud. It is not the end-all and be-all of the validity or invalidity of respondent's re-acquisition of citizenship. The reason is that secondary evidence is admissible and relevant to prove the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the originals upon which respondent's photocopies were based.
This is especially true when respondent's requisite documents and data have long been entered into BI's reliable electronic data-base, and BI officials themselves testified to confirm categorically the validity of both the process leading to the issuance of respondent's Identification Certificate and her Identification Certificate itself
SECOND. I must stress two things.
One, not only did petitioner fail to discharge his burden of proof by means of clear and convincing evidence, but also respondent has in her favor the corroboration by those pieces of evidence presented at HRET. This is important if only to stress what the ponente has been vigorously pointing to all along that respondent's case is not just about the presumption of regularity which is well and good to establish her Filipino citizenship,· but also the several pieces of evidence above-mentioned supporting her cause.
Two, at the risk of being too annoying because of being too repetitive, petitioner took nine years to complain against respondent's reacquisition of citizenship. His complaint is an after-thought whose bona fide is questionable.
Hence, following the admonition in Vitangcol about weighing the probative value of evidence in relation to the parties' respective circumstances, this after-thought should be carefully weighed vis-à-vis the evidence (especially the copies of her requisite documents) presented both for and against her.
And when petitioner did complain, he was rebuffed not once, not twice, but four times, on basically the same arguments and the same set of evidence. I certainly cannot point to any deficit in the capabilities, intelligence, and sense of regularity of these four government agencies including some senior colleagues in the Court which otherwise could easily move us now to reverse and set aside their decisions. This is especially true in the case of HRET because some of its members who ruled for respondent are senior Justices of the Court. I really cannot see ourselves being now convinced by petitioner on the same arguments and evidence that these four government agencies have already rejected.
THIRD. From the circumstances surrounding respondent's processing of her re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship in 2006, especially the utter absence of motive then to manipulate the process, as she would not have gained anything then from doing so, she indubitably acted in good faith. In any event, her good faith in availing of and resorting to the process is presumed.
It thus behoves the Court to ask, given the equities implicated here, who should bear the consequences of the allegedly missing original documents? Who should bear the consequences of the allegedly discrepant signature of the notary public in the Oath of Allegiance?
The process in the re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 and its implementing rules is heavily dependent upon the good faith of and diligent and efficient performance by government agencies of their respective tasks. The individual petitioner has no power over the process after submitting the documents required of them.40
Here, BI is responsible for processing the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, confirming and recognizing the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, and keeping the requisite documents. BI is also responsible for transmitting the Oath of Allegiance and Order of Approval to the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) for recording in the civil registry. PSA is then responsible for accepting these documents, keeping them in custody, and recording them and the relevant data contained in them in the civil registry. The Office of the Executive Judge and the Office of the Clerk of Court of the second level court in the territorial jurisdiction are responsible for policing the ranks of notaries public and accepting and keeping their filings as required by the relevant rule.
Why then should the lowly applicant, here, respondent, be penalized for the alleged negligence or even supposed fraudulent conduct of these responsible government agencies, to which she was not even a party or proven to be a party?
I have found no rule of law that would unjustly allocate the burden to respondent for any of this alleged malfeasance or misfeasance if any. I also have to stress that BI itself has not repudiated her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship and has in fact confirmed over and over again the validity of her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
Notably, neither the dissent nor petitioner questions the fact that the notary public of the Oath of Allegiance was duly and legally commissioned as such at time he notarized this document.
To quote again Spouses Santiago v. Court of Appeals:41
It is axiomatic that good faith is always presumed. There being absent any direct evidence of bad faith, there is need to examine what respondent Court of Appeals said are indices of bad faith on the part of petitioners.
....
And surely, the parties to a notarized document are not the persons obligated to furnish a copy thereof to the Records Management and Archives Division, such task being that of the notary. The failure of the notary public to so furnish a copy of the deed to the proper office is a ground for disciplining him, but certainly not for invalidating the document or for setting aside the transaction therein involved.
FOURTH. The scenario depicted by the dissent is very dangerous not only for public officers but most especially for our ordinary citizens.
To illustrate:
Juan X, an employee at the Supreme Court, brings his son to hospital for treatment. His child is sick with pneumonia. He brings with him his PhilHealth card hoping to get the discounts he is entitled to.
Juan spends three weeks in and out of the hospital to attend and care for his child. As he is about to discharge his child from the hospital, he goes to the billing and cashier section leaving his frail child at a semi-private room.
He patiently stands in a long queue waiting for his turn. Meantime, his frail child awaits his return at the child's semi-private room for the discharge slip.
After a long and patient holdback at the queue, Juan finally reaches the billing and cashier clerk. He presents his PhilHealth card. He is met by a frown on the clerk's forehead and is told by her:
"Sir, pasensya na po, pero yung card nyo bale wala, kasi po, sabi ng PhilHealth, wala daw po kayong application form, nawawala daw po yung original, pati mga payment history ninyo at ng employer niyo, hindi mahanap. Sabi po ni Attorney, ayon sa Piccio v. HRET, pag wala daw original, bale wala po yung card nyo."
Exasperated, Juan replies trying to control his emotions:
"Ang tagal ko na po nag-work sa government, sa Supreme Court. Imposible naman na wala akong originals sa mga documents ko, kasi nga po, nabigyan naman po ako ng PhilHealth Card."
The clerk retorted:
"Yun naman po pala. Taga Supreme Court po pala kayo. Dapat alam nyo po yung kaso ng Piccio v. HRET. Sabi po doon, kesa hodang matagal na kayo, basta walang original sa mga documents nyo sa PhilHealth, walang kwenta po yang PhilHealth card nyo. Kausapin nyo po mga kasamahan nyo sa Supreme Court para ipaliwanag sa inyo ang batas.... Magbayad na lang po kayo ng buo .... Pasensya na po."
And the clerk closes the blinds of the glass divider and leaves behind a despondent Juan gasping for the last breath he could.
Epilogue
This is the take-away we have from the petition and the dissent – respondent has been a Filipino citizen for more than ten years, then all of a sudden, because the originals from which her identification certificate and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship had originated cannot be found more than ten years after, she is no longer a Filipino. The reason – the government agency in charge of these documents could not find the originals of respondent's documents, though it has the photocopies and the entries in the electronic database of these same documents.
We could replicate this holding a hundred times over in similar scenarios – a passport, a driver's license, a GSIS card, etc. If the custodian government agency has none of the originals from which these cards were issued, the validity and efficacy of these cards are forever lost. This will be the unfortunate even if unintended repercussion of the dissent in the instant case.
In 2006, respondent was not eyeing to be a candidate in any elections to motivate her to falsify the RA 9225 process. Her petition was lodged and processed in 2006 but ran only in the elections of 2016. Common sense should comfortably dictate an affirmance of the HRET ruling.
Grave abuse of discretion is not to be lightly ascribed. In Justice Leonen's words42 –
The invocation of this court's power under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" in relation to the Judicial and Bar Council's discretion should be read in context. It should not be read too expansively so as to undermine the constitutional limits of our relation to the Council.
A showing of grave abuse of discretion should refer to a demonstrably clear breach of a constitutional duty that is "arbitrary, capricious and whimsical." Our constitutional duty and power of review is not to accept the arguments of petitioner because it is plausible. Judicial review is also not a license to impose our own plausible interpretation of the rules of the Council over their own. Judicial review requires as an absolute predicate, a showing that the Council's interpretation and application of its rules is so bereft of reason and so implausible. We do not analyze the cogency of the arguments of petitioner or the interpretation that we would have put had we been in the Council. Rather, the mode of analysis in our exercise of judicial review is to scrutinize whether there are no viable reasonable bases for the interpretation, application, and actions of the Judicial and Bar Council.
In other words, the error we need to discover before nullifying a discretionary act of another constitutional organ is not whether there could have been a more reasonable interpretation and application of its rules; rather, it should be that we clearly find that their interpretation and application cannot stand on any legal justification. It is not about which of the arguments posed by petitioner and respondents are better in relation to each other. Rather, judicial review requires an absolute finding that the actions of respondents being reviewed are arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical.
I cannot concede that my senior colleagues at the HRET were so seriously bereft of reason and so implausible in dismissing petitioner's claims that we should now reverse them. I am aware that this is an argumentum ad verecundiam or argument from respect, but it is what it is because they each deserve the respect they have painstakingly earned.
Magistrates of this Court do not come unprepared – especially not in important cases as this one. For the HRET members, especially those from the Court, I do not think they left practical sense at the door step when they ruled to dismiss the quo warranto petition.
ACCORDINGLY, I join the majority and vote to dismiss the petition and affirm in full the Decision dated May 23, 2019, and Resolution, dated June 27, 2019, in HRET Case No. 16-025.1âшphi1
Footnotes
1 The dissent states: "Thus, the presumption of regularity cannot be applied here because such presumption only works when nothing on the record suggests that there was a deviation from the standard conduct of official duty required by law."
2 The dissent states: "At this juncture, it is worth pointing out that the burden to show that the procedure in the retention of Philippine citizenship were strictly followed lies with the person claiming that he or she has complied with it."
3 400 Phil. 120, 126 (2000).
4 The dissent states: "... It is plain from the testimony of Atty. Santos that the original attachments in support of Vergara's RA 9225 petition do not exist in the Records Section of the BI. To reiterate, what the Bureau have are mere photocopies of Vergara's supporting documents. Consequently, the BI cannot issue a copy of the said documents with an attestation that the same are correct copies of the original as required by the rules, simply because no originals exist on file."
5 G.R. No. 215006, January 11, 2021.
6 G.R. No. 220828, October 7, 2020.
7 I use "their" here and elsewhere in this Reflections to stress gender neutrality, indeterminacy or non-affiliation.
8 De Chavez v. Ombudsman, 543 Phil. 600, 616 (2007).
9 Bustillo v. People, 634 Phil. 547, 556 (2010).
10 G.R. No. 196359, May 10, 2021.
11 Miller v. Minister of Pensions 1947 2 All ER 372.
12 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
13 BI Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01 (March 10, 2004): Section 11. Approval Procedures - If the petition is found to be sufficient in form and in substance, the evaluating officer shall submit the findings and recommendation to the Commissioner of Immigration or Consul-General, as the case may be, within five (5) days from date of assignment. For applications filed under Sections 2 and 4 of these Rules, the Commissioner of Immigration shall issue, within five (5) days from receipt thereof, an Order of Approval indicating that the petition complies with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 and its IRR, and further direct the Chief of the Alien Registration Division (ARD) to cancel the subject ACR and/or to issue the corresponding IC to the applicant; BI Memorandum Circular No. MCL-07-005 (December 27, 2007): "SECTION 12. Procedures in the Processing of Applications for Recognition as Filipino Citizen. – Applications for recognition as Filipino citizen shall observe the following procedures, to wit: ... 11. Assignment to registration officer, updating of records and preparation of Filipino Identification Certificate; 12. Issuance of Filipino Identification Certificate, picture and fingerprint impression taking; 13. Signing by the Commissioner of the Identification Certificate; 14. Releasing of the Identification Certificate; and 15. Document archiving.
14 See also e.g., Overseas Voting Act of 2013, the identification certificate or the BI's order of approval is the prima facie evidence of one's reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. "Applicants who availed themselves of the 'Citizen Retention and Reacquisition Act' (Republic Act No. 9225) shall present the original or certified true copy of the order of approval of their application to retain or reacquire their Filipino citizenship issued by the post or their identification certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration;" Revised Implementing Rules of "An Act Providing for a Comprehensive Law on Firearms and Ammunition and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof," accepting the identification certificate as proof of reacquired Filipino citizenship.
15 As amended in 2008 by BI Memorandum Circular No. MCL-08-005. Section 11 states:
SECTION 11. Approval Procedures. — If the petition is found to be sufficient in form and in substance, the evaluating officer shall submit the findings and recommendation to the Commissioner of Immigration or Consul-General, as the case may be, within five (5) days from date of assignment. For applications filed under Sections 2 and 4 of these Rules, the Commissioner of Immigration shall issue, within five (5) days from receipt thereof, an Order of Approval indicating that the petition complies with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 and its IRR, and further direct the Chief of the Alien Registration Division (ARD) to cancel the subject ACR and/or to issue the corresponding IC to the applicant. Each cancelled ACR shall, however, be attached to the Order of Approval to form part of the records of the applicant...."
16 G.R. No. 215614, March 27, 2019.
17 490 Phil. 193, 208 (2005).
18 433 Phil. 8, (2002).
19 317 Phil. 400, 409 (1995).
20 802 Phil. 190, 220-221 (2016).
21 G.R. No. 228402, August 26, 2020.
22 787 Phil. 33, 51 (2016).
23 Supra note 1.
24 717 Phil. 54, 70-71 (2013).
25 733 Phil. 196, 245-248 (2014).
26 791 Phil. 481 (2016).
27 786 Phil. 43 (2016).
28 403 Phil. 861 (2001).
29 778 Phil. 326, 338 (2016).
30 Supra note 28.
31 G.R. No. 228402, August 26, 2020.
32 789 Phil. 368, 373-374 (2016).
33 Republic v. Sereno, 833 Phil. 449, 476 (2018).
34 To stress, I purposely used "their" to indicate gender neutrality, indeterminacy or non-affiliation.
35 Manlan v. Beltran, G.R. No. 222530, October 16, 2019.
36 Exemption from Administrative Review. - Retention/Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under these Rules shall not be subject to the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to DOJ Policy Directive of 7 September 1970 and DOJ Opinion No. 108 (series of 1996). However, the Order of Approval issued under these Rules may be revoked by the Department of Justice upon a substantive finding of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment on the part of the applicant and after an administrative hearing initiated by an aggrieved party or by the BI. Notwithstanding the exemption from administrative review as provided herein, nothing in these rules shall be construed as to diminish the administrative supervision of the Secretary of Justice over the BI. Consistent with this, the BI shall submit a monthly report to the DOJ of approved petitions for retention/reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
37 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Evidence, Rule 130.
38 Recto-Sambajon v. Public Attorney's Office, 890 Phil. 879, 890 (2017).
39 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 25, citing Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez, supra note 24.
40 I also use "them" to indicate gender neutrality, indeterminacy or non-affiliation with traditional gender labels.
41 Supra note 19.
42 Dissenting Opinion, 741 Phil. 460 (2014).
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