[ G.R. No. 248682. October 06, 2021 ]
SILVERIO REMOLANO Y CALUSCUSAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DISSENTING OPINION
LOPEZ, J.:
An indictment is not objectionable as ambiguous or obscure, if it be clear enough according to reasonable intendment or construction, though not worded with absolute precision. "And if there is no necessary ambiguity in the construction of an indictment, xxx, "we are not bound to create one, by reading the indictment in the only way which will make it unintelligible."1
The ponencia reversed the conviction of the accused for Direct Bribery on the ground that the constitutive elements of the crime were not sufficiently alleged in the information. The ponencia explained that the indictment failed to stated whether the complainant made a "voluntary offer" to the accused or that the parties reached an "agreement". Moreover, the information did not recite that the accused "accept and offer or a promise or receives a gift or present." Lastly the ponencia pointed out that the indictment alleged "intimidation", "fear", and "compelled to give" which are inconsistent with direct bribery, thus:
Did the Information here sufficiently allege the second element "the offender accepts an offer or a promise or receives a gift or present"?
It did not.1âшphi1
There was no allegation in the Information that SPO1 Cardines voluntarily offered or gave the [P]200.00 to Remolano as a consideration for the latter not to issue a traffic violation ticket against him. Neither was it averred that there was an agreement between the parties to exchange Remolano's performance of his official duties for payment of money. In truth, the Information simply alleged that Remolano "by means of intimidation extorted/demanded from the complainant the amount of [P]200.00, in exchange for non[-] issuance of traffic violation receipt, thus creating fear in the mind of the complainant who was compelled to give to the accused the amount of [P]200.00 xxx."
Clearly, even if the Court were to disregard the caption and the prefatory clause of the Information, its allegation[s] do not at all make out a case for direct bribery. To be sure, "intimidation", "fear", and "compelled to give" are anathema to the crime of direct bribery.2 (Emphases supplied.)
I dissent.
The crime of Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code requires the confluence of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.3 Here, the information against the accused recited facts sufficient to constitute the crime of Direct Bribery, to wit:
That on or about the 20th day of September 2013, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, both taking advantage of their official position as Metro Manila Aide III, assigned along E. delos Santos Avenue corner New York Street, Cubao, Quezon City, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each another, with intent to gain and by means of intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob/extort SPO1 Nomer V. Cardines in the following manner, to wit: while complainant was driving a Toyota Avanza along aforesaid location accused flagged down complainant for swerving violation and confiscated his driver's license and by means of intimidation extorted/demanded from the complainant the amount of [P]200.00, in exchange for non[-]issuance of traffic violation receipt thus creating fear in the mind of the complainant who was compelled to give to the accused the amount of [P]200.00, in marked money, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount aforementioned.
Contrary to law. (Emphases supplied.)
In several cases, the Court held the accused responsible for Direct Bribery even if it was not alleged that the complainant made a "voluntary offer" to the accused or that the parties reached an "agreement". This is clear from the Decisions in Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,4 Marifosque v. People,5 Acejas III v. People,6 Balderama v. People,7 and Mangulabnan v. People.8
In Soriano, Jr., the Court ruled that the accused cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him given that the following allegations in the information make out a case of Bribery,9 viz.:
That on or about the 21st day or March 1983, at Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then and still is an Assistant City Fiscal of the Quezon City Fiscal's Office, detailed as the Investigating Fiscal in the case of [MARIANNE Z. LACAMBRA versus THOMAS N. TAN], docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964, for Qualified Theft, taking advantage of his official position and with grave abuse of authority, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and request from Thomas N. Tan the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) Philippine Currency, and actually received from said Thomas N. Tan the amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) Philippine Currency, in consideration for a favorable resolution by dismissing the abovementioned case, wherein said accused has to intervene in his official capacity as such Investigating Fiscal.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10 (Emphases supplied.)
In Marifosque, the Court likewise convicted the accused for Direct Bribery based on the following allegations,11 to wit:
That on or about October 13, 1990 in Lcgazpi City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused a public officer being a qualified member of the Police Force of Legazpi City, now under the Philippine National Police, taking advantage of his official/public position and committing the crime herein charged in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously demand, obtain and/or receive directly from Yu Su Pong and Hian Hian Sy the total amount of FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P5,800.00) Philippine Currency in consideration for his recovery from alleged robbers, eighteen Shellane gas[-]filled cylinder/s tanks, to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victims in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphases supplied.)
In Acejas III, the Court held the accused liable for Direct Bribery under the following information,12 thus:
That on or about January 12, 1994, or sometime prior thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ and VICTOR CONANAN, being them employed both as Immigration officers of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, Intramuros, Manila, hence are public officers, taking advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in relation to office, conspiring and confederating with Senior Police Officer 3 EXPEDITO S. PERLAS of the Western Police District Command, Manila, together with co-accused Atty. FRANCISCO SB. ACEJAS III, of the LUCENARIO, MARGATE, MOGPO, TIONGCO & ACEJAS LAW OFFICES, and co-accused JOSE P. VICTORIANO, a private individual, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand, ask, and/or extort One Million (P1,000,000.00) PESOS from the spouses BETHEL GRACE PELINGON and Japanese TAKAO AOYAGI and FILOMENO PELINGON, JR., in exchange for the return of the passport of said Japanese Takao Aoyagi confiscated earlier by co-accused Vladimir S. Hernandez and out of said demand, the complainants Bethel Grace Pelingon, Takao Aoyagi and Filomeno Pelingon, Jr. produced, gave and delivered the sum of Twenty[-] Five Thousand ([P]25,000.00) Pesos in marked money to above-named accused at a designated place at the Coffee Shop, Ground Floor, Diamond Hotel, Ermita, Manila, causing damage to the said complainants in the aforesaid amount of [P]25,000.00, and to the prejudice of government service. (Emphases supplied.)
In Balderama, the Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's findings that the prosecution sufficiently established the elements of Direct Bribery based on the following allegations in the information,13 viz.:
That on or about February 15, 1992 or for sometime [sic] prior thereto in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accussed all public officers, being all employees of the Land [T]ransportation Office assigned with the Field Enforcement Division, Law Enforcement Services, committing the offense in relation to their office and taking advantage of their position, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously solicit, demand and received from Juan Armamento, a taxicab operator, the amount of [P]300.00 in consideration for the said accused refraining from performing their official duty of concluding inspections on the taxicab units being operated by said Juan Armamento to determine any possible violation of LTO rules and regulations, thereby causing Juan Armamento and the public service damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphases supplied.)
Lastly, in Mangulabnan, the Court convicted the accused with the crime of Direct Bribery under the following information,14 to wit:
That on or about March 1998 or for sometime [sic] subsequent thereto, in the City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, accused RODRIGO R. FLORES, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, City of San Fernando, Pampanga, with Salary Grade 27, thus, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, together with CANDELARIA MANGULABNAN, Court Interpreter and specially assigned as Chairman of the Revision Committee of the same MTCC of San Fernando City, Pampanga, while in the performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation to their office, taking advantage of their respective official positions, and with grave abuse of authority, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demanded and request the amount of [P]20,000.00 from Dario Manalastas, a party to an election protest case filed by Alberto Guinto against Dario Manalastas where accused Rodrigo R. Flores and Candelaria Mangulabnan have to intervene in their official capacities since such case is pending before the Court where accused Rodrigo R. Flores is the Presiding Judge and Candelaria Mangulabnan actually received for accused Rodrigo R. Flores in consideration of a decision in the case favorable to Dario Manalastas which is unjust, since the decision should be based on the merits of the case and not the monetary consideration, the damage and prejudice pf Dario Manalastas and Public Service.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphases supplied.)
In this case, the recital of facts in the charge of Direct Bribery against the accused is similar with those alleged in the information in Soriano, Jr., Marifosque v. People, Acejas III, Balderama, and Mangulabnan. To be sure, they shared the common allegations of "taking advantage of official position", "demanded and extort", "give and delivered", and "incosideration or in exchange" of the performance of a crime or unjust act or refraining from doing something which is the accused's official duty to do. The above-mentioned cases sustained a judgment of conviction even without any allegation that the complainant made a "voluntary offer" to the accused or that the parties reached an "agreement". Similarly, the element of Direct Bribery which pertains to the acceptance of gift, present, offer or promise is implicit from the averments in the information that the accused "demanded" and that the complaint "give" the amount of [P]200.00 "in exchange for non[-]issuance of a traffic violation receipt." It is settled that the information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the Court to render judgment properly.15
Verily, the information against the accused charges all the essential elements of Direct Bribery. The ponencia cannot capitalize on the alleged intimidation, fear, and compulsion which may be regarded as surplusage and not as fatal variance. Indeed, convictions generally have been sustained as long as the proof upon which they are based corresponds to an offense that was clearly set out in the information. A part of the indictment unnecessary to and independent of the allegations of the offense proved may normally be treated as a useless averment that may be ignored.16 Here, the prosecution proved all the elements of Direct Bribery as sufficient alleged in the information. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed:
Be that as it may, well-settled is the rule that the real nature of the criminal charge is not determined from the caption or preamble of the information or from the mere reference to a particular provision of law alleged to have been violated because they are conclusions of law, but on the recital of facts alleged in the body of the information. A reading of the information shows that it is sufficient for the charge of direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, xxx.
xxx
It is clearly established from the records that accused-appelant is a public officer who in consideration of [P]200.00, which he has solicited and received, refrained from issuing a traffic violation ticket to SPO1 Cardenas, which act is clearly his duty as a Traffic Aide. In view of the foregoing, it is with pristine clarity that [the] accused-appellant's voluntary acceptance of the [P]200.00 bribe in connection with his [sic] nonperformance of his duty to issue a traffic violation ticket makes him liable for the crime of direct bribery under the third paragraph of Article 210.
In sum, it can hardly be said that the accused was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Quite the contrary, the accused was fully apprised of the crime of Direct Bribery to suitably prepare his defense. To reiterate, there is no rule that we are perforce to read the expressions of an indictment so as to make nonsense of it.17
FOR THESE REASONS, I vote to DENY the petition.
Footnotes
1 The Principles of Criminal Pleading by Franklin Fiske Heard, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, (1879), pp. 105-106; citing Regina v. Stokes, 1 Denison C. C. 307; 2 C. & K. 536. Commonwealth v. Butler, 1 Allen, 4. Per Lord Denman on O'Connell v. The Queen, 11 Clark & Finnelly, 380, 381,: Wright v. The King, A Ad. & El. 448; and Regina v. King, 7 Q.B. 795.
2 G.R. No. 248682, Remolano v. People.
3 Merencillo v. People, 549 Phil. 544, 558-559 (2007); Tad-y v. People, 504 Phil. 51, 67-68 (2005).
4 216 Phil. 177, 180-181 (1984).
5 479 Phil. 219, 227-228 (2004 ).
6 526 Phil. 262, 278-279 (2006).
7 566 Phil. 412, 419 - 420 (2008).
8 G.R. No. 236848, June 8, 2020.
9 "The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of [B]ribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of [B]ribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed."Supra note 3 at 181.
10 Rollo, p. 13.
11 "There is no question that petitioner was a public officer within the contemplation of Article 203 of the Revise Penal Code, xxx. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a police sergeant assigned to the Legazpi City Police Station. He directly received the bribe money from Yu So Pong and his daughter Hian Hian Yu Sy in exchange for the recovery of the stolen cylinder tanks, which was an act not constituting a crime within the meaning of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The act of receiving money was connected with his duty as a police officer."
12 "In sum, we find that prosecution proved the elements of direct bribery. First, there is no question that the offense was committed by a public officer. BID Agent Hernandez extorted money from the Aoyagi spouses for the return of the passport and the promise of assistance in procuring a visa. Petitioner Acejas was his co-conspirator. Second, the offenders received the money as payoff, which Acejas received for the group and then gave to Perlas. Third, the money was given in consideration of the return of the passport, an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation and return of the passport were made in the exercises of official duties."
13 "The Sandiganbayan found the above elements of direct bribery present. It was duly established that the accused demanded and received P300.00 as protection money from respondent on several dates. As against the prosecution's evidence, all that the accused could proffer was alibi and denial, the weakest of defenses.
14 "[T]he elements constituting Direct Bribery have been sufficiently established considering that: (a) Mangulabnan and Judge Flores were indisputably public officers, xxx; (b) she acted as Judge Flores middleman in committing the crime, specifically by receiving Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) from Manalastas and delivering it to Judge Flores; (c) the amount was given in exchange for the rendition of a judgment favorable to Manalastas, as may be inferred from Mangulabnan's own admission that Judge Flores ordered the release of the decision only after receiving the Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00); and (d) the rendition of judgment relates to the functions of Judge Flores.
15 People v. Puig, 585 Phil. 555, 562 (2008); citing People v. Lab-eo, 424 Phil. 482, 497 (2002).
16 United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130 (1985).
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