G.R. No. 227467, August 3, 2021,
♦ Decision, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]


EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 227467. August 03, 2021 ]

ATTY. JOAQUIN DELOS SANTOS, ENGR. EVELYN M. HATULAN AND CORNELIO V. TAMAYO, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

ZALAMEDA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari (Petition)1 assailing the Commission on Audit (COA) Decision No. 2015-2232 dated 13 April 2015 and Notice3 dated 12 July 2016, which affirmed the Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2007-036-101 (04)4 (subject ND) dated 19 November 2007.

Antecedents

In a memorandum dated 28 September 2004, issued by Engineer Alexander D. Paltao of the Technical Services COA Regional Office No. IV, and in an audit observation memorandum (AOM) dated 14 October 2004 issued by the Audit Team Leader of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna, Mayor Proceso Aguillo (Mayor Aguillo), municipal accountant Atty. Felix L. Galang, Jr. (Atty. Galang), municipal treasurer Elena A. Estalilla (Estalilla), municipal treasurer, building official Engineer Manolito Barundia (Barundia), and all the members of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) were requested to submit certain documents to facilitate the COA's investigation, viz.: the approved detailed plan, "approved" statement of work accomplished, copies of contracts and bidding documents. The requested documents pertain to anomalous projects entered into by the municipal government of Cabuyao, Laguna with Golden Deer Enterprises and RDC Construction Development Corporation.5

On 26 February 2007, Notice of Suspension (NS) No. 2007-002-101 (2004)6 was issued, suspending in audit the aforesaid transactions of the municipal government in the total amount of P42,594,037.7

On 19 November 2007, COA Regional Cluster Director Eden T. Rafanan issued the subject ND, holding Mayor Aguillo, Atty. Galang, Estalilla, Barundia, liable for the disallowed amount. Members of the BAC, including petitioners Atty. Joaquin Delos Santos (Atty. Delos Santos), as the Chairman, Evelyn Hatulan (Hatulan), Cornelio Tamayo (Tamayo; collectively, petitioners), Pastor Canceran (Canceran) and Barundia, as members thereof, as well as Golden Deer Enterprises and RDC Construction were also held liable in the subject ND. Petitioners appeared to have received the ND on 08 January 2008.8

Subsequently, COA Regional Director Luz Loreto-Tolentino (Director Loreto-Tolentino) issued a corresponding Notice of Finality of Decision9 (NFD) and COA Order of Execution10 (COE) both dated 03 September 2012, holding petitioners, among others, liable for the disallowed amount. Petitioners immediately wrote a Letter11 dated 21 February 2013 to Director Loreto-Tolentino requesting for review of the disallowance, and that they be furnished copies of the documents material to the case. On 04 April 2013, COA Regional Director Nilda Blanco replied to the petitioners' counsel declaring the NFD and COE to be final and executory, and that the Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts and the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA are both silent on the power of the regional directors to review the NFD and COE.12

Thus, on 17 September 2013, petitioners filed with the COA Proper an urgent motion for the issuance of order to set aside NFD and COE, and to release documents pertinent to ND No. 200-036-101 (04), and to admit appeal (Omnibus Motion).13 They claimed that they did not receive the subject ND.14

In a Decision15 dated 13 April 2015, the COA denied petitioners' Omnibus Motion and declared the subject ND to be final and executory. The COA ruled that petitioners received the subject ND based on their signatures appearing thereon.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 claiming that the ND is defective because it failed to specify the projects and contracts disallowed, and only made references to the AOM and NS previously issued. Additionally, they claim that they are uncertain whether there was a BAC constituted during the term of Mayor Aguillo.17

The COA En Banc denied the motion for reconsideration, finding that the subject ND had long become final and executory.18

Hence this Petition, where petitioners insist they were deprived of their right to due process because they were held liable for the subject ND which they did not receive. They also reiterate their objection to the failure of the ND to specify the projects and contracts it seeks to investigate. They assert that had they truly received the subject ND, they would have immediately reacted to it given the amount disallowed therein.19

Petitioners allege that their signatures in the subject ND are fake and not their real signatures, and as proof thereof, they have attached documents supposedly containing their true signatures. They surmise that their names were being used to conceal the real perpetrators and maintain that Atty. Delos Santos cannot recall whether there was a duly composed BAC during the term of then Mayor Aguillo. According to petitioners, the municipal government of Cabuyao had no records of documents pertaining to the time pertinent to the case. Hence, they conclude that no such BAC was constituted and they were not members of any such committee.20

Finally, petitioners assert they should not be held liable because under the AOM and NS, which were the bases of the subject ND, it is the municipal accountant, Atty. Galang, who is required to submit documents pertaining to transactions entered into by the municipal government during Mayor Aguillo's term.21

COA's Arguments

COA maintains that petitioners are liable for the subject ND since it has long become final and executory. The COA argues that petitioners have been given various opportunities to comply with its directives when they received the AOM, NS and ND. Having failed to promptly question the adverse findings, petitioners are now barred from appealing the same through the instant Petition.22

Issue

This Court is tasked to determine whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the subject ND.

Ruling of the Court

The Petition is meritorious.

Owing to its mandate as an independent constitutional commission, this Court's review of decisions of the COA is generally limited to questions of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the COA is guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.23 "A finding of grave abuse of discretion against the COA means that the audit commission is guilty of evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law, such as when the assailed decision or resolution rendered is not based on law and the evidence, but on caprice, whim and despotism. As the party alleging grave abuse of discretion, petitioners had the burden to prove that the COA had acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner."24

Relatedly, "it is also a well-entrenched rule that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of the right must strictly comply with the requirements set forth under the pertinent law or rules." Indeed, the Court has been strict in enforcing statutory requirements of appeal to ensure that cases are promptly and orderly adjudicated.25 Pursuant thereto, this Court does not generally entertain petitions under Rule 64 which originated from the COA's denial of a late appeal.26 Nevertheless, this Court, in certain cases, does not also hesitate to relax the aforesaid procedural rules on the basis of exceptional grounds, and in order to avoid commission of injustice.

In this case, in view of several grounds, this Court finds that petitioners should be allowed another opportunity to fully ventilate their defenses before the COA.ℒαwρhi৷

Petitioners failed to establish that their signatures were forged.

"Forgery is the 'counterfeiting' of any writing, consisting in the signing of another's name with intent to defraud.27 Since it is not presumed, forgery 'must be proved with clear, positive and convincing evidence'28 by the party alleging it."29 There are various factors which may have the effect of varying the signature of a person, such as his position while signing, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used. The presence of any of these circumstances may cause changes in one's signature and does not necessarily mean that his signature was forged.30

Proving forgery entails a showing of the extent, kind and significance of the variation in the genuine and disputed signatures of the signee. It must be established that the difference in the signatures is due to the operation of a different personality and not merely an expected and inevitable variation found in the genuine writing of the same writer. It must be shown that the resemblance is a result of a more or less skillful imitation and not merely a habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally appears in a genuine writing.31

In this case, after comparison of petitioners' specimen signatures and those contained in the subject ND, this Court finds that petitioners failed to establish forgery.

For Hatulan, this Court notes that her signature in the subject ND is the same as her specimen signature in her PDS32 dated 2 May 2001, the document which was closest in time to the subject ND.33 Further, even in later documents, particularly those in the attachments34 to the petition, Hatulan's signatures are strikingly similar to that appearing in the subject ND. The same conclusion applies to Tamayo. His specimen signature in his Panunumpa sa Tungkulin35 dated 13 January 2005 does not appear to be substantially different from that in the subject ND.

As to Atty. Delos Santos, although his signature in the subject ND is different from his specimen signatures, this Court finds the same insufficient to prove forgery. He did not present supporting evidence to clearly show that the difference in the appearance of the signature was caused by another individual and not merely a variation of his own handwriting. "Mere variance of the signatures in different documents cannot be considered as conclusive proof that one is forged."36 Although resort to experts is not mandatory in the examination of alleged forged documents, the opinions of handwriting experts would have been helpful in the court's determination of a document's authenticity.37 These handwriting experts can help determine fundamental, significant differences in writing characteristics between the questioned and the standard or sample specimen signatures, as well as the movement and manner of execution strokes.38

Interestingly, aside from the supposed differences in the signatures in the subject ND and their alleged specimen signatures, petitioners failed to elucidate the circumstances of the forgery, such as how and who may have been responsible for imitating all of their signatures. For the dearth of such clear and convincing evidence establishing forgery, this Court is constrained to take the document as what it appears to be—showing petitioners' receipt thereof. Nevertheless, despite petitioners' receipt of the subject ND, this Court finds that it did not sufficiently apprise them of the basis for the disallowance.

The subject ND is an insufficient notice of petitioners' liability.

The 1997 Rules of Procedure of the COA provide that the auditor's findings must clearly state the basis for its findings, viz.:

SECTION 4. Report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, Notice of Disallowances and Charges, Order or Decision of the Auditor. — The result of the audit work of the Auditor may be in the form of a report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, notice of disallowances and charges, audit observation, order or decision which shall clearly and distinctly state his findings of fact, conclusions, recommendations and dispositions. The factual findings shall be adequately established by evidence and the conclusions, recommendations or dispositions shall be supported by applicable laws, regulations, jurisprudence and the generally accepted accounting and auditing principles on which the report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, notice of disallowances and charges and order or decision are based. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, jurisprudence is consistent in holding that the constitutional rule requiring a clear and distinct statement of factual and legal basis of a resolution/decision is an indispensable component of the litigant's right to due process. Failure to state clear basis for its decision constitutes grave abuse of discretion.39

In Fontanilla v. Commissioner Proper,40 this Court found that the COA violated the tenets of due process when the Adjudication and Settlement Board of the COA National Office held the supervising officer liable with the erring employee for the stolen cash, without including him as respondent in the proceedings before the audit team leader and subsequently, the appeal before the COA Regional Office. This Court stressed that due process is, at its core, giving a person an opportunity to be heard. There is denial of due process if a person is held liable for a charge, and his liability is confirmed on appeal without having been notified of the accusation, and given the opportunity to explain his case or have the ruling reconsidered. The Court added that therein respondent's subsequent submission of a motion for reconsideration did not cure the COA's denial of due process. Thus, the Court set aside the COA's Decision insofar as it found therein petitioner Fontanilla solidarily liable with his subordinate. However, it directed Fontanilla to file his memorandum containing his evidence, or to call for oral arguments that would allow him to present his evidence, so that the COA can validly rule on the issue of his liability for the stolen money.

In Ablong v. Commission on Audit (Ablong),41 this Court ruled that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion, and ordered a remand of the case due to its non-observance of due process. This Court noted that the COA failed to give actual notice to the parties liable under the ND because it only gave copies thereof to the accountant who did not inform them of the disallowance of their Economic Relief Allowance. This Court likewise gave credence to therein petitioners' allegation that even the supervising auditor refused their request to be furnished copies of the NDs. In failing to give petitioners copies of the ND, this Court found that the COA not only failed to follow its own rules,42 but also denied petitioners' right to due process. A remand was therefore ordered to resolve petitioners' appeal from the subject notices of disallowance on the merits.

Further, as in Ablong, the COA Proper cursorily denied petitioners' request for documents on the ground of their receipt of the ND. Such reasoning is mistaken. Given the circumstances of this case, it is the service of the NS No. 2007-002-101(2004) dated 26 February 2007, or the earlier AOM No. 2004-009191 dated 14 October 2004, which would have given petitioners a real opportunity to prove the regularity of the municipality's transactions. In other words, since petitioners were being held liable for their failure to submit documents, logic and due process require that there must be actual notice of the documents needed for the lifting of the suspension and reversal of the disallowance.

In the instant case, the subject ND merely stated that the reason for its disallowance is because of "suspension maturing into disallowance."43 It likewise failed to enumerate the documents subject of the NS and petitioners' direct responsibility for such documents. Evidently, petitioners were left to speculate on the basis of suspension, or the specific documents necessary in order to explain the municipal government's transactions with the aforesaid contractors. Moreover, the assailed Decision No. 2015-223 dated 13 April 2015 did not contain any supporting evidentiary or substantive basis for its denial of petitioners' appeal. Thus, following the rulings in the above-cited case, this Court finds that remand is justified.

The case presents an exception to the rule on immutability of judgments.

Certainly, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1445 and the COA's Rules of Procedure are clear on the reglementary periods to contest an adverse ruling of the COA Auditor. Section 48 of PD 144544 lays down the procedure to appeal notices of disallowance issued by agency auditors, viz:

Appeal from decision of auditors. — Any person aggrieved by the decision of an auditor of any government agency in the settlement of an account or claim may within six months from receipt of a copy of the decision appeal in writing to the Commission. (Emphasis ours)

Further, under then applicable 1997 Rules of Procedure of the COA, it is provided that:

RULE IV
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE AUDITOR

SECTION 6. Finality of the Report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, Order or Decision. — Unless a request for reconsideration in filed or an appeal is taken, the report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, order or decision of the Auditor shall become final upon the expiration of six (6) months after notice thereof to the parties concerned.

RULE V
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DIRECTOR

SECTION 2. How Appeal Taken. — An appeal from an order, decision or ruling by the Auditor may be taken to the Director within six (6) months after notification to the party of the report, notice of disallowance and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, order or decision complained of, by filing with the Auditor a Notice of Appeal.

x x x x

SECTION 6. Power of Director on Appeal. — The Director may reverse, modify, alter, or affirm the decision or ruling of the Auditor. However, should the Director render a decision reversing, modifying or altering the decision or ruling of the Auditor, the Director shall, within ten (10) days, certify the case and elevate the entire record to the Commission Proper for review and approval.

x x x x

SECTION 9. Interruption of Time to Appeal. — The receipt by the Auditor of the Notice of Appeal and/or Motion for Reconsideration shall stop the running of the period of appeal to the Commission Proper (6 months) and shall resume to run upon receipt by the appellant of the Director's final decision.

RULE VI
APPEAL FROM DIRECTOR TO COMMISSION PROPER

SECTION 3. Period of Appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within the time remaining of the six (6) months period under Section 2, Rule V, taking into account the suspension of the running thereof under Section 9 of the same Rule.

RULE XII
Enforcement and Monitoring

Section 1. Execution of Decision- Execution shall issue upon a decision that finally disposes of the case. Such execution shall issue as a matter of right upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been fully perfected.

Strictly applying the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgment, it would appear that this Court may no longer modify the subject ND. Verily, since petitioners received the subject ND on 8 January 2008, it is apparent that when they filed their omnibus motion on 17 September 2013 with the COA Proper, the six-month period to appeal has already lapsed.

Nonetheless, like most procedural rules, the doctrine of immutability of judgment has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. Similarly, while it is doctrinally entrenched that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, the Court has allowed the resort to a petition for certiorari despite the existence of or prior availability of an appeal, such as: (1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy; (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction; (3) for certain special considerations, as public welfare or public policy; (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy; (5) where the order is a patent nullity; and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations.45 In view of the most exceptional circumstances, courts may still review the COA's decisions, particularly if the judgment would cause manifest injustice to the parties.

In Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit,46 the Court considered as exceptional circumstance the enactment of a remedial legislation reclassifying PhilHealth personnel as public health workers in setting aside an already final decision of the COA. Meanwhile in Estalilla v. Commission on Audit (Estalilla),47 special considerations were given to the glaring disparity between the petitioner's measly salary as municipal treasurer and the amount of P35,591,200.00 she was being required to return. This Court held that a finding of liability in that case would greatly and negatively impact the employee's and her family's life and livelihood.

Likewise, in Bugna, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,48 after finding that petitioners were the same petitioners in Madera v. Commission on Audit,49 who were found to have acted in good faith when they performed their respective functions in relation to the prohibited allowances, this Court exempted the concerned local officials from personal liability on the disallowed amounts.

In this case, aside from the defective notice of disallowance, this Court finds that there are special circumstances similar to Estalilla that should have precluded the COA from barring petitioners' appeal and strictly applying the principle on immutability of judgments.

Compelling and equitable circumstances justify a relaxation of the principle of immutability of judgment.

In Estalilla, this Court excluded the municipal treasurer from liability under the notice of disallowance in the amount of P35,591,200.00 for a wrongful charging of an expense against a different budget allocation. Noting the disparity between the disallowed amount and her salary, the Court opined that holding Estalilla liable would lead to disastrous consequences to her and to her family. The same scenario applies in the instant case. The serious and dire consequences to petitioners' lives and property should have prompted the COA to review the correctness of the allowance instead of stringently insisting that the disallowance has already become final and executory.

Firstly, considering that the disallowance is not based on a supposed positive act of petitioners, but arose from their failure to submit documents, and given the enormous amount of disallowance, this Court finds that the COA should have been circumspect in upholding the subject ND. The circumstances of this case should have impelled it to, at least, grant petitioners, who are also colleagues of Elena Estalilla in the aforesaid case, access to relevant documents concerning the disallowance, such as, but not limited to, the AOM dated 14 October 2004, and NS No. 2007-002-101 (2004) dated 26 February 2007. We should point out, that COA's denial of access to documents was also a pivotal issue in Estalilla that compelled the Court to rule that COA committed due process violations against the petitioner therein. We found no reason to have a different conclusion here.

Further, the Court ruled in Estalilla:

To begin with, Estalilla's case affected her right to life and property. Judicial notice is taken of the size of her salary as a municipal treasurer in comparison with the disallowed amount of [Php]35,591,200.00. The huge disparity between her salary and the liability was glaring enough. To charge her with the solidary liability would produce very serious and dire consequences on her precious right to life and property. The consequences could impact negatively as well on the rest of her family. What makes the liability even harsher was that she had not personally derived any direct or personal benefit from the disallowed disbursements.50

Here, the salaries of Hatulan and Tamayo are made of record51 and thus recognized by the Court.1a⍵⍴h!1 Indeed, to hold petitioners, especially Hatulan and Tamayo, solidarily liable for the larger amount of P42,594,037 given their measly salary would undoubtedly result to their financial ruin.

The COA should conduct an exhaustive investigation on the transactions covered by the subject ND.

A notice of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which could otherwise have been settled except for some requirements, like lack of supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also issued on transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of which the auditor doubts but which he may later allow after satisfactory or valid justification is submitted by the parties concerned. Under Section 8252 of PD 1445, the suspension shall become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is "not satisfactorily explained within ninety days after receipt or notice by the accountable officer concerned."53

In this case, the COA held petitioners liable for their supposed failure to submit the following documents: (1) approved detailed plan; (2) approved detailed estimate; (3) approved statement of work accomplished; (4) copy of contract; and (5) bidding documents (invitation to bid, notice of award and notice to proceed). After this Court's review of the pertinent rules on procurement, this Court finds that aside from re-investigating petitioners who were members of the BAC, the COA should also conduct a thorough examination on all the other parties to the procurement process, specifically the procuring entity and contractors identified in the subject ND.

Among the factors to consider in determining the liability of public officers in returning disallowed amounts are said officers' duties and responsibilities and the extent of their participation in the disallowed transaction. Thus:

Section 351 of the Local Government Code provides that expenditures of funds or use of property in violation of law shall be the personal liability of the official or employee responsible therefor. In that regard, in Section 16 of Circular No. 2009-006, the COA has listed the factors to be considered in determining the liability of public officers for disallowances, namely: (1) the nature of the disallowance/charge; (2) the duties and responsibilities of officers/employees concerned; (3) the extent of their participation in the disallowed/charged transaction; and (4) the amount of damage suffered by or loss to the Government.54 (Citation omitted)

The BAC is responsible for vetting and recommending the contractor to the procuring entity. The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) Part A of Republic Act No. (RA) 9184 (IRR-A), succinctly provides for the BAC's role in the procurement process, viz:

Section 12. Functions of the BAC.

12.1. The BAC shall have the following functions: advertise and/or post the invitation to bid, conduct pre-procurement and pre-bid conferences, determine the eligibility of prospective bidders, receive bids, conduct the evaluation of bids, undertake post-qualification proceedings, resolve motions for reconsideration, recommend award of contracts to the head of the procuring entity or his duly authorized representative: Provided, however, That in the event the head of the procuring entity shall disapprove such recommendation, such disapproval shall be based only on valid, reasonable and justifiable grounds to be expressed in writing, copy furnished the BAC; recommend the imposition of sanctions in accordance with Rule XXIII, and perform such other related functions as may be necessary, including the creation of a Technical Working Group (TWG) from a pool of technical, financial and/or legal experts to assist in the procurement process, particularly in the eligibility screening, evaluation of bids and post-qualification. In proper cases, the BAC shall also recommend to the head of the procuring entity the use of Alternative Methods of Procurement as provided for in Rule XVI hereof.

12.2. The BAC shall be responsible for ensuring that the procuring entity abides by the standards set forth by the Act and this IRR-A, and it shall prepare a procurement monitoring report that shall be approved and submitted by the head of the procuring entity to the GPPB on a semestral basis. The procurement monitoring report shall cover all procurement activities specified in the APP, whether ongoing and completed, costing fifty million pesos ([P]50,000,000) and above for goods and infrastructure projects, and five million pesos ([P]5,000,000) and above for consulting services. The report shall cover major activities from the holding of the pre-procurement conference to the issuance of notice of award and the approval of the contract, including the standard and actual time for each major procurement activity. It shall be submitted in printed and electronic format within ten (10) working days after the end of each semester. (Emphasis supplied)

In Joson III v. Commission on Audit,55 this Court explained that the role of the BAC is determine the eligibility of the prospective bidders based on their compliance with the eligibility requirements set forth in the Invitation to Bid and their submission of the legal, technical and financial documents required under Section 23.6, Rule VIII of the IRR of RA 9184.

Indeed, under the IRR-A of RA 9184, the requirements for eligibility to bid, contract documents, and those pertaining to its implementation, fall within the responsibilities of the procuring entity, viz.:

Section 21. Advertising and Contents of the Invitation to Bid. —

21.1. Contents of the Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid

The Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid shall provide prospective bidders the following information among others:

1. For the procurement of:

a) Goods, the name of the contract to be bid and a brief description of the goods to be procured;

b) Infrastructure projects, the name and location of the contract to be bid, the project background and other relevant information regarding the proposed contract works, including a brief description of the type, size, major items, and other important or relevant features of the works; and

c) Consulting services, the name of the contract to be bid, a general description of the project and other important or relevant information;

2. A general statement on the criteria to be used by the procuring entity for the eligibility check, the short listing of prospective bidders, in the case of the procurement of consulting services, the examination and evaluation of bids, and post-qualification;

3. The date, time and place of the deadline for the submission and receipt of the eligibility requirements, the pre-bid conference if any, the submission and receipt of bids, and the opening of bids;

4. The approved budget for the contract to be bid;

5. The source of funding;

6. The period of availability of the bidding documents, the place where the bidding documents may be secured and, where applicable, the price of the bidding documents;

7. The contract duration or delivery schedule;

8. The name, address, telephone number, facsimile number, e-mail and website addresses of the concerned procuring entity, as well as its designated contact person; and

9. Such other necessary information deemed relevant by the procuring entity.

37.2. Contract Award

37.2.1. Within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) calendar days from the determination and declaration by the BAC of the Lowest Calculated Responsive Bid or Highest Rated Responsive Bid, and the recommendation of the award, the head of the procuring entity or his duly authorized representative shall approve or disapprove the said recommendation. In case of approval, the head of the procuring entity or his duly authorized representative shall immediately issue the Notice of Award to the bidder with the Lowest Calculated Responsive Bid or Highest Rated Responsive Bid. In the case of GOCCs and GFIs, the period provided herein shall be thirty (30) calendar days. Within the same period provided herein, the BAC shall notify all losing bidders of its decision.

x x x x

37.5. Notice to Proceed

The concerned procuring entity shall then issue the Notice to Proceed together with a copy or copies of the approved contract to the successful bidder within seven (7) calendar days from the date of approval of the contract by the appropriate government approving authority. All notices called for by the terms of the contract shall be effective only at the time of receipt thereof by the successful bidder. If an effectivity date is provided in the Notice to Proceed by the procuring entity concerned, all notices called for by the terms of the approved contract shall be effective only from such effectivity date. (Emphasis supplied)

Based from the foregoing, it may be inferred that the documents specified in the subject ND relate to the preparatory, contract award and implementation stages of procurement, which properly pertain to the end-user or procuring entity. As the party requesting procurement, it establishes the technical specifications and standards for the supplies and services it wishes to avail, and ultimately, agrees and awards a contract to the contractor selected by the BAC. Nonetheless, this Court also acknowledges that petitioners are also members of the municipal government of Cabuyao who may shed light on the procurement process involving Golden Deer Enterprises and RDC Construction. Further, as stated above, the subject ND involves a substantial amount of government funds, specifically P42,594,037. Thus, in keeping with the broader interests of justice, and to make sure that both public funds and petitioners' rights are safeguarded, this Court orders the remand of the instant case to the COA for the conduct of an exhaustive investigation on the matter.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision No. 2015-223 dated 13 April 2015 and Notice dated 12 July 2016 rendered by the Commission on Audit is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the Commission on Audit for disposition on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., see separate opinion.

Caguioa, J., please see concurring opinion.


NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on August 3, 2021 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on April 18, 2022 at 11:30 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MARIFE M. LOMIBAO-CUEVAS
Clerk of Court



Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 3-41.

2 Id. at 60-62; penned by Commissioner Heidi L. Mendoza, and concurred in by Commissioner Jose A. Favia.

3 Id. at 71.

4 Id. at 46-48.

5 Id. at 60-61.

6 Id. at 72-73.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 46-48.

9 Id. at 49-50.

10 Id. at 51-52.

11 Id. at 53.

12 Id. at 55-56.

13 Id. at 57-59.

14 Id. at 58.

15 Id. at 60-62.

16 Id. at 64-68.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 71.

19 Id. at 22-40.

20 Id. at 24-29.

21 Id. at 32-36.

22 Id. at 134-138.

23 Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, 752 Phil. 97 (2015).

24 See National Power Corp. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 242342, 10 March 2020.

25 See Bugna, Jr. v. Commission on Audit (Resolution), UDK No. 16666, 19 January 2021.

26 Id.

27 Philippine Savings Bank v. Sakata, G.R. No. 229450, 17 June 2020, citing BPI v. Casa Montessori Internationale, 474 Phil. 298, 309 (2004).

28 Id., citing Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato, 750 Phil. 846, 855 (2015).

29 Id.

30 See Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, United Presbyterian Church, USA, 432 Phil. 895, 908 (2002).

31 Coro v. Nasayao, G.R. No. 235361, 16 October 2019.

32 Rollo, p. 101-101-A.

33 See Heirs of Amado Celestial v. Heirs of Editha Celestial, 455 Phil. 704 (2003).

34 Rollo, pp. 45-114.

35 Id. at 110.

36 Enrile v. People (Joint Resolution), 766 Phil. 75, 284 (2015).

37 See Rivera v. Sps. Chua, 750 Phil. 663, 676 (2015).

38 Tortona v. Gregorio, 823 Phil. 980, 994 (2018), citing Sps. Ulep v. Court of Appeals, 509 Phil. 227, 240 (2005).

39 See Zamboanga City Water District v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 218374, 01 December 2020.

40 787 Phil. 713 (2016).

41 G.R. No. 233308, 18 August 2020.

42 The Court found that Commission on Audit failed to observe Section 10.2 of COA Circular No. 2009-006 which provides that:

10.2 The ND shall be addressed to the agency head and the accountant; served on the persons liable; and shall indicate the transactions and amount disallowed, reasons for the disallowance, the laws/rules/regulations violated, and persons liable. It shall be signed by both the Audit Team Leader and the Supervising Auditor. x x x

43 Rollo, p. 46.

44 Entitled "Ordaining and Instituting a Government Auditing Code of the Philippines," approved on 11 June 1978.

45 Philippine Health Insurance Corp. v. Commission on Audit (Resolution), G.R. No. 222710, 10 September 2019.

46 Id.

47 G.R. No. 217448, 10 September 2019.

48 Supra note 25.

49 G.R. No. 244128, 08 September 2020.

50 Supra note 47.

51 Rollo, p. 107; In her Personal Data Sheet dated 2 May 2001, Hatulan stated that her monthly salary as Municipal Engineer is P19,831, rollo, p. 101; while Tamayo indicated his monthly salary in 2003 and 2004 as Administrative Officer are in the amounts of Php14,914 and Php16,237, respectively.

52 Section 82. Auditor's notice to accountable officer of balance shown upon settlement. The auditor concerned shall, at convenient intervals, send a written notice under a certificate of settlement to each officer whose accounts have been audited and settled in whole or in part by him, stating the balances found due thereon and certified, and the charges or differences arising from the settlement by reason of disallowances, charges, or suspensions. The certificate shall be properly itemized and shall state the reasons for disallowance, charge, or suspension of credit. A charge of suspension which is not satisfactorily explained within ninety days after receipt of the certificate or notice by the accountable officer concerned shall become a disallowance, unless the Commission or auditor concerned shall, in writing and for good cause shown, extend the time for answer beyond ninety days. (Emphasis supplied)

53 See Rodrigo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 362 Phil. 646 (1999).

54 Estalilla v. Commission on Audit, supra note 47.

55 Joson III v. Commission on Audit, 820 Phil. 485 (2017); see Commission on Audit v. Link Worth International, Inc., 600 Phil. 547, 556 (2009).


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