G.R. No. 239168 - Separate Opinion

G.R. No. 239168, September 15, 2020,
♦ Decision, Reyes, Jr., [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Zalameda, [J]

ALFREDO J. NON, GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP-TARUC, JOSEFINA PATRICIA A. MAGPALE-ASIRIT AND GERONIMO D. STA. ANA, PETITIONERS, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND ALYANSA PARA SA BAGONG PILIPINAS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

A petition for certiorari is the appropriate remedy if the prosecution's finding of probable cause was made with grave abuse of discretion. However, before determining if there was any grave abuse of discretion, this Court must first determine if the petition was the "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[.]"1 Once probable cause has been judicially determined, any petition questioning the executive determination of probable cause ceases to be the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.

The controversy in this case arose from the Department of Energy's issuance of Circular No. DC2015-06-0008. This Circular provided that all distribution utilities shall procure power supply agreements only through a competitive selection process, conducted through a third party recognized by the Department of Energy and the Energy Regulatory Commission.2 In view of this Circular, on November 4, 2015, the Energy Regulation Commission issued Resolution No. 13, Series of 2015, requiring a successful, transparent, and competitive selection process as a precondition to an award of a supply agreement. Direct negotiation was allowed only when the competitive selection process fails twice.3

The Resolution likewise exempted all power supply agreements already filed and pending review with the Energy Regulatory Commission by November 6, 2015, the date the Resolution would take effect.4

Manila Electric Company (Meralco) was among the stakeholders that requested to be exempted from the requirement of competitive selection process. This request was denied.5

On March 15, 2016, the Energy Regulatory Commission issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 2016, which extended the effectivity date of Resolution No. 13 from November 6, 2015 to April 30, 2016. The extension was allegedly meant to be a transition period for the full implementation of Resolution No. 13.6

Meralco allegedly entered into seven power supply agreements on April 26, 2016, and filed them all with the Energy Regulatory Commission on April 29, 2016, a day before the new effectivity date.7

Thus, before the Office of the Ombudsman, Alyansa Para sa Bagong Pilipinas, Inc. (Alyansa) filed a verified Complaint against the Chair and Commissioners of the Energy Regulatory Commission for violating Section 3(e)8 of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It alleged that the extension of Resolution No. 13's effectivity date was meant to allow Meralco to acquire lucrative power supply agreements without undergoing the competition selection process. It alleged that the agreements Meralco entered into and pending approval from the Energy Regulatory Commission would prejudice the public in the next 20 years due to overpriced power charges.9

Alyansa simultaneously filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 227670.10 It prayed that Resolution No. 1 be voided for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

In the meantime, the Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to investigate the Complaint filed before it. In a September 29, 2017 Resolution, it found probable cause to charge Energy Regulatory Commission Chair Jose Vicente Salazar, as with Commissioners Gloria Victoria C. Yap-Taruc, Alfredo J. Non, Josephina Patricia A. Magpale-Asirit, and Geronimo D. Sta. Ana (collectively, the Commissioners), for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.11

The beleaguered Chair and Commissioners filed their Joint Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, but these were denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in an April 20, 2018 Order.12 Subsequently, on June 7, 2018, an Information was filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.13 They were later arraigned on November 21, 2018.14

Aggrieved, the Commissioners15 filed this Petition for Certiorari, assailing the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause for allegedly being tainted with grave abuse of discretion. They claim that the finding was not supported by substantial evidence and that the constitutionality of Resolution No. 1 had yet to be determined in G.R. No. 227670, which had still been pending at the time this Petition was filed.16

On May 3, 2019, a ruling in G.R. No. 227670 was rendered. Granting Alyansa's Petition, this Court declared, among others, that Resolution No. 1 was void for being tainted with grave abuse of discretion.17

Here, the majority resolved to grant the Commissioners' Petition. In so ruling, it opined that while this Court generally exercises a policy of noninterference with the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, it can still review such finding if it is alleged to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion.18 The majority then explained that while G.R. No. 227670 later nullified Resolution No. 1, this is not enough basis to find probable cause to charge petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.19

While I agree that a petition for certiorari is appropriate when the finding of probable cause is made with grave abuse of discretion, this Court must first determine if the petition filed was procedurally sound. It must be, under the Rules of Court, the "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[.]"20

Here, petitioners had been charged21 and arraigned.22 The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City has already assumed jurisdiction over the case. Any question on the finding of probable cause should have been addressed to its sound discretion. Filing the present Petition for Certiorari before this Court, therefore, was not the "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" contemplated by the Rules.

The Constitution grants the Office of the Ombudsman a wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against government officers and employees.23 Republic Act No. 6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, was enacted as a statutory reinforcement of its mandate as the protectors of the people. The Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body "beholden to no one," and "acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service."24 Giving "respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman[,]"25 this Court has adopted, as a general rule, a policy of noninterference with its prosecutorial discretion.

Another reason for this Court's policy of non-interference is that the determination of probable cause is highly factual in nature.26 It requires the examination of the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he [or she] was prosecuted."27 In Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman:28

The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman.29 (Citation omitted)

Deference to the factual findings of prosecutorial bodies also serves a practical purpose:

[T]he functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complaint.30

This policy of non-interference, however, is a general rule. This Court will generally defer to the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, except when the findings were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion.31 Conversely, mere errors of judgment are not sufficient. A petitioner must show that the Office of the Ombudsman acted in an "arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or personal hostility."32 In Reyes v. Office of the Ombudsman:33

[D]isagreement with the Ombudsman's findings is not enough to constitute grave abuse of discretion. It is settled:

An act of a court or tribunal may constitute grave abuse of discretion when the same is performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or personal hostility.

Thus, for this Petition to prosper, petitioner would have to show this Court that the Ombudsman conducted the preliminary investigation in such a way that amounted to a virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law.34

Here, the Office of the Ombudsman's assailed Resolution does not indicate any capricious or arbitrary exercise of power, and nor does it show a virtual refusal to perform a duty. On the contrary, its findings appear to have been arrived at objectively, with due regard to the evidence on hand:

[R]espondents acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence when they suspended the implementation of the required CSP, to accommodate the PSAs/PSCs of DUs and GenCos, particularly of Meralco, thereby exempting them from the CSP mandated requirement.

The manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence of respondents can be gleaned from the following documented chronological events:

The justifications given by respondents in not implementing the CSP requirement are untenable. The requirement for CSP as mandated by EPIRA, DOE and ERC, cannot be reasonably stopped by the requests for clarification, exception and/or exemption from CSP from numerous industry participants, especially when the stakeholders were already heard in extensive consultations conducted by the ERC. Respondents themselves bared in the "WHEREAS CLAUSES" of the 2015 CSP Resolution that stakeholders have been informed, heard and consulted about the CSP, thus:

Furthermore, the CSP is an acknowledged mechanism to make the cost of PSAs more reasonable. Hence, accommodating companies' request to be exempted from CSP was a deviation from respondents' duty to promote public interest through the CSP requirement. The gross inexcusable negligence of respondents benefitted 38 more companies who were able to enter into PSAs and file them with ERC without complying with the CSP requirement.

Respondents, in their exercise of their official regulatory functions, have given unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to MERALCO and other companies. Under the CSP Resolution, said companies were not qualified to file their PSAs for being non-compliant with the CSP requirement. But respondents' failure to recognize the effects of the suspension of the implementation of CSP gave said companies the concession to file their PSAs and PSCs without having to comply with the CSP policy.35

These findings are evidentiary. Any error requires the review of evidence, something that is usually done during trial. In Drilon v. Court of Appeals:36

Probable cause should be determined in a summary but scrupulous manner to prevent material damage to a potential accused's constitutional right of liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play. The preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime. The validity and merits of a party's defense and accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.37

Thus, the finding of probable cause may only be reviewed when there is reason to believe that it was arrived at in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, and despotic manner. The mere exercise of prosecutorial discretion, when done within the bounds of law and the rules of procedure, should not be subject to this Court's review. Excessive interference in matters that are distinctly prosecutorial may result in contradictory rulings based on the same set of facts, as what happened in this case. The majority here stated that Resolution No. 1 was issued with "sound judgment":

The issuance of the subject resolution was in the exercise of ERC's sound judgment as a regulator and pursuant to its mandate under the EPIRA to protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and services of electric utilities and other providers of electric power. Thus, it cannot be classified as arbitrary, whimsical or capricious. The transition period, together with the clarifications provided in Resolution No. 1, constitute a reasonable response to the various concerns posed by DUs, GenCos and electric cooperatives.38

This is in direct contradiction to the ruling in G.R. No. 227670, Alyansa Para sa Bagong Pilipinas v. Energy Regulatory Commission,39 where this Court found that Resolution No. 1 was issued with grave abuse of discretion:

The issuance of the ERC Clarificatory Resolution was attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for the following reasons:

(1) Postponing the effectivity of CSP from 30 June 2015 to 7 November 2015, and again postponing the effectivity of CSP from 7 November 2015 to 30 April 2016, or a total of 305 days, allowed DUs nationwide to avoid the mandatory CSP;

(2) Postponing the effectivity of CSP effectively freezes for at least 20 years the DOE-mandated CSP to the great prejudice of the public. The purpose of CSP is to compel DUs to purchase their electric power at a transparent, reasonable, and least-cost basis, since this cost is entirely passed on to consumers. The ERC's postponement unconscionably placed this public purpose in deep freeze for at least 20 years.

Indisputably, the ERC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the ERC postponed the effectivity of CSP. The postponement effectively prevented for at least 20 years the enforcement of a mechanism intended to ensure "transparent and reasonable prices in a regime of free and fair competition," as mandated by law under EPIRA, a mechanism implemented in the 2015 DOE Circular which took effect on 30 June 2015.40

I agree with the majority that a finding of grave abuse of discretion does not equate to a finding of probable cause. However, at the very least, this Court should remain consistent. The majority's statement makes it appear as if there could have been no probable cause to charge petitioners since the assailed Resolution was not issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Incidentally, Justice Alfred Caguioa (Justice Caguioa) concurs with the majority and points out that "the Court cannot, under the guise of non interference, abdicate its solemn duty 'to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government,' including the Ombudsman."41

This Court does not have the exclusive jurisdiction to determine grave abuse of discretion on findings of probable cause. This jurisdiction, by reason of judicial efficiency and the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, is concurrent with other courts. People v. Cuaresma42 explains:

This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, w1restrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard - resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" - was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.43 (Citations omitted)

Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections44 further refines this concept and discusses:

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.45 (Citation omitted)

We must be careful to distinguish between special civil actions filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and those special civil actions which invoke this Court's power of judicial review under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution. These are two different remedies.

A petition under Rule 65 is limited only to the review of judicial and quasi-judicial acts.46 Meanwhile, the action under Article VIII, Section 1-the one that Justice Caguioa cites-involves constitutional questions and generally refers to another constitutional organ's actions. It requires prima facie showing that a government branch or instrumentality has gravely abused its discretion. This Court, by its constitutional power to relax its own rules of procedure and by reason of efficiency, allowed Rule 65 to be used in petitions that invoke this expanded jurisdiction.47

This Court is not a trier of facts. Its finding of grave abuse of discretion made in its original jurisdiction should only be in cases where the materials facts are not contested.48 This is antithetical to the inherently factual nature of determining probable cause. Thus, the policy of noninterference requires this Court to intervene only in situations where the material facts are not contested and there has been a capricious, whimsical, and arbitrary refusal to perform one's duty according to the law.

Where the trial court has found probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest and has arraigned the accused, any question as to the propriety of the trial court's acts should be addressed to its sound discretion. Owing to the trial court's concurrent jurisdiction, actions under Rule 65 may still be properly filed before the trial courts, which may have better competence than this Court to address the factual issues. These questions can likewise be properly raised as defenses before the trial court that arraigned the accused. "[T]he trial court must consider that trial is always available after arraignment and is a forum for the accused as much as it is for the prosecution to carefully examine the merits of the case."49

In any case, the finding of probable cause does not require a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It merely requires:

... the existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation. Being based merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction.50 (Citations omitted)

Considering that probable cause merely requires a probability of guilt, and not the absolute certainty of it, a review of its determination requires no less than a showing of grave abuse of discretion. This is usually done through a petition for certiorari under Rule 6551 of the Rules of Court. Parties are always too quick to assume that their petitions will be entertained once they state the litany of acts alleged to be grave abuse of discretion. These parties forget that before delving into the substantial requirements of the petition, they must first prove that "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[.]"52

Once probable cause has been judicially determined, any petition that questions the executive determination of probable cause ceases to be the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to the parties.

It is settled that there are two stages in the determination of probable cause: first, an executive determination, done by the prosecutor m a preliminary investigation; and second, a judicial determination.53

The statutory basis for the executive determination of probable cause is found in the Rules of Court,54 Republic Act No. 6770,55 and various issuances by the Department of Justice.56 Meanwhile, the judicial determination of probable cause is guided by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution:

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.57

Although they may rely on the same evidence and case records, the prosecutor's finding of probable cause is not the same as the trial court's finding of probable cause. People v. Castillo58 explains:

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.59

The trial court arrives at a finding independently of the prosecutor's findings. It cannot just blindly accept the prosecutor's conclusions that there was probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. In Ho v. People:60

Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.

Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.

Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.61

If the prosecutor finds probable cause, an information is filed in court. Once the information has been filed, the court acquires full jurisdiction over the case.62 Any question on the finding of probable cause, therefore, must be addressed to its sound discretion. In Crespo v. Mogul:63

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the san1e. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.64

Even after the information is filed, a slew of other remedies is still available to the accused prior to arraignment. The accused may file a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice assailing the prosecutor's resolution finding probable cause. If the Secretary of Justice reverses the prosecutor's findings, they can move to dismiss the information.65 The trial court then has the discretion whether to dismiss the information or to proceed with the case. Its refusal to dismiss the case may also be subject to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Meanwhile, filing the petition for review before the Secretary of Justice also effectively suspends the arraignment.66 If the trial court refuses to suspend the arraignment despite the pendency of the petition for review, the accused may also file a certiorari action under Rule 65.

The accused may also move to quash the information based on the grounds stated under Rule 117, Section 367 of the Rules of Court. The denial of a motion to quash, however, is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject to a certiorari petition under Rule 65. The arguments in the motion to quash, however, can still be raised as defenses during trial. Should there be intervening actions by higher courts, as in this case, the accused may also file, apart from the motion to quash, a motion to dismiss based on the tenor of the intervening decision. Also, after evidence has been offered by the prosecution, it can likewise file a demurrer to evidence.

When properly filed, these remedies may in effect dismiss the information, the same relief that is often brought before this Court in certiorari actions questioning the determination of probable cause. Thus, to satisfy the requirement that there should be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, the petitioners should show that the reliefs they seek from this Court are the same ones previously denied by the lower courts.1âшphi1

In this case, the trial court arraigned petitioners on November 21, 2018,68 which means that it had already found probable cause to issue the warrants of arrest against them. Probable cause has already been judicially determined. The prudent course of action was to proceed to trial.

In De Lima v. Reyes,69 this Court dismissed a petition for review on certiorari questioning the Secretary of Justice's finding of probable cause against the accused for being moot, as probable cause had already been judicially determined:

Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by the First Panel or the Second Panel, that probable cause exists to cause the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent. Probable cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has transferred to the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in any other venue has been rendered moot by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.

The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed before them when the trial court issued its warrant of arrest. Since the trial court has already acquired jurisdiction over the case and the existence of probable cause has been judicially determined, a petition for certiorari questioning the conduct of the preliminary investigation ceases to be the "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" provided by law. Since this Petition for Review is an appeal from a moot Petition for Certiorari, it must also be rendered moot.

The prudent course of action at this stage would be to proceed to trial. Respondent, however, is not without remedies. He may still file any appropriate action before the trial court or question any alleged irregularity in the preliminary investigation during pre-trial.70

I understand that there is some hesitation with such a drastic pronouncement, since "[t]he purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect [them] from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials."71 This Court, however, should be mindful enough to distinguish between fishing expeditions and legitimate investigations done to protect the public trust.

A judicial determination of probable cause does not always result in a warrant of arrest. A complaint may very well be dismissed outright if it does not show sufficient evidence to engender a reasonable belief that a crime had probably been committed. Entertaining these kinds of petitions only shows how little trust this Court has in the trial courts' and the Sandiganbayan's abilities to determine if a criminal suit was malicious or oppressive.

We should refrain from making our own determination of probable cause whenever petitions of this nature are filed before us. Preliminary investigations are evidentiary in nature. We should not delve into intricate factual matters and make our own factual assumptions at our level. This Court's determination should be purely procedural-whether the petition before us was the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy provided by law.

The policy of non-interference in exclusively prosecutorial matters is grounded on sound reasoning. This Court should have enough confidence in our lower courts to weed out unnecessary prosecutions and useless trials. A petition for certiorari before this Court is not always the proper remedy to question the finding of probable cause. The petitioner must prove that the finding of probable cause was done in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, and despotic manner. Anything less than grave abuse of discretion should be dismissed.