[ G.R. No. 236618, August 27, 2020 ]
JCLV REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. PHIL GALICIA MANGALI, RESPONDENT.
CONCURRING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
The respondent, Phil Mangali (Mangali), and Jerry Alba (Alba), were charged with robbery committed against petitioner, JCLV Realty & Development Corporation (JCLV Realty). Mangali and Alba allegedly removed JCLV Realty's electric facilities with intent to gain and intimidation against persons. After the prosecution rested its case, Mangali filed a demurrer to evidence. The trial court granted the demurrer and dismissed the criminal case against Mangali on the ground of lack of evidence.
JCLV Realty elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a special civil action for certiorari, challenging the grant of the demurrer by the trial court. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that JCLV Realty has no personality to challenge the criminal aspect of the case because the authority to represent the State in criminal proceedings lies solely in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and that it availed the wrong judicial remedy to question the civil aspect of the case. JCLV Realty sought reconsideration but was denied.
JCLV Realty is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the CA's outright dismissal of its petition.
The ponencia affirms the ruling of the CA. The Rule 65 petition filed by JCLV Realty before the CA prays for reliefs that pertain to the criminal aspect of the case, ultimately seeking the reinstatement of the criminal case against Mangali. JCLV Realty does not have the requisite legal standing to do so as only the OSG may bring or defend actions on behalf of the State before the CA and the Supreme Court. The ponencia adds that the acquittal of an accused or the dismissal of a criminal case can be done through a Rule 65 petition on the grounds of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process rendering the judgment void. In this case, the ponencia finds that JCLV Realty was not denied due process since it was able to participate in the proceedings and present evidence. Finally, double jeopardy had set in as all the elements of double jeopardy are present in this case. Thus, there is no reason for the Court to reinstate the criminal case against Mangali.1
I concur with the ponencia that the petition should be denied. The acquittal by the trial court of Mangali for the crime charged may not be assailed without violating his constitutional right against double jeopardy. I submit this separate concurring opinion only to emphasize (1) that JCLV Realty had no legal personality to question Mangali's acquittal before the CA, and 2) that the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in judgments of acquittal is a very very narrow exception which does not arise in the present case.
First, only the OSG, in behalf of the State, and not the private offended party, has the authority to question the acquittal of an accused in a criminal case. Therefore, JCLV Realty had no legal personality to file the petition for certiorari with the CA.
In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.2 The Court explained this in Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan:3
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (I), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the Government.
x x x x
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever feasible, only by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.4
The rationale behind this rule is that in criminal cases, it is the State that is the offended party.5 It is the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action, and not the private complainant.6 Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution.7
Since the petition filed by JCLV Realty before the CA essentially assailed the criminal aspect of the case, it should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Thus, the CA was correct when it dismissed the petition filed by JCLV Realty for lack of legal personality.
Second, the remedy of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 against the acquittal of an accused is a very very limited exception to the finality-of-acquittal rule, and one which does not arise in the present case.
As early as 1915, the Court already recognized that a dismissal of a criminal case for lack of evidence is equivalent to an acquittal. In United States v. Kilayko,8 the accused was charged with a violation of the penal provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. After stipulating on the facts of the case, counsel for the accused filed a demurrer to the information — which was granted by the trial court. The provincial fiscal appealed the case to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld the acquittal of the accused, despite the fact that the decision of the trial court was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, thus:
In dismissing the complaint the trial judge refers to the motion of counsel for the accused as a "so-called demurrer;" but it does not clearly appear whether he regarded the entry of his order dismissing the complaint as a decision of the case on the merits, or a ruling sustaining a demurrer.
We are of opinion, however, that the ruling of the trial judge on the motion of counsel for the accused was in truth and in effect a final judgment on the merits from which no appeal lav on behalf of the Government. The accused had been arraigned and pleaded "not guilty," and the judgment of the court was entered upon an agreed statement of facts. The agreed statement of facts disclosed everything which the prosecution and the accused were prepared to prove by the testimony of their respective witnesses. After the submission of the agreed statement of facts, the trial was regularly terminated, and it only remained for the trial judge to enter his judgment convicting and sentencing the accused, or acquitting him and dismissing the information upon which the proceedings had been instituted. Manifestly, the accused was in jeopardy of conviction from the moment the case was submitted on the agreed statement of facts until judgment was entered dismissing the information. Indeed, there can be no doubt that but for the erroneous view of the trial judge as to the nature and effect of the penal provision of section 12 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, a judgment of conviction would have been lawfully entered upon the agreed statement of facts, followed by the imposition of the prescribed penalty.
The judgment entered in the court below was not a mere order sustaining, a demurrer, but a final judgment disposing of the case on the merits; so that were we to reverse the judgment and direct the court below to proceed with the trial, the accused would be entitled to have the information dismissed on the plea of double jeopardy.9
The right against double jeopardy is a constitutional right deeply rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. Double jeopardy, therefore, provides three related protections: (1) against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) against multiple punishments for the same offense.10
The constitutional mandate is a rule of finality. A single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment, enables him to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-consuming and expense- producing for the State as well. The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not whenever it pleases the state to do so.11
The inviolability of the right of the accused against double jeopardy is reflected in the skeptical attitude taken by the Supreme Court towards petitions for certiorari disputing decisions acquitting an accused. In People v. Velasco,12 the Court traced the development of the said right in common law until it was introduced in the Philippines and took on a life of its own in the context of our own legal tradition and historical experience. In Velasco, the Supreme Court discussed the strictly limited situation when double jeopardy does not apply:
In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan. Condemning the trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, which resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, this Court minced no words in declaring that '[i]t is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process x x x. [T]he sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbavan and Tanodbavan to rig the trial, and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and absolution as innocent of all the respondent-accused. x x x Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian president to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal, such as that in the case at bar, is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is 'a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw.' It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. 'To paraphrase Brandeis: If the authoritarian head of government becomes the lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law; he invites every man to become a law unto himself; he invites anarchy.' The contention of respondent-accused that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ended the case and could not be appealed or reopened without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People v. Court of Appeals:
x x x That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Court's Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. AH acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
x x x x
Private respondents invoke 'justice for the innocent.' For justice to prevail the scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the society which they have wronged, must also be equally considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is due.
Thus, the doctrine that 'double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial' may apply only when the Court finds that the 'criminal trial was a sham' because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process x x x.
xxx The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State."13
The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan14 presents the very limited and extremely narrow exception to the application of the right against double jeopardy. The unique facts surrounding Galman — and other similar scenarios where the denial of due process on the part of the prosecution was so gross and palpable — is the very limited area where an acquittal may be revisited through a petition for certiorari.
Thus, in People v. Tria-Tirona,15 the Court held:
x x x In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan. Only when there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as represented by the prosecution, were denied due process.
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.16
Further, in People v. Court of Appeals, Fourth Division,17 the Court explained that:
xxx [F]or an acquittal to be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that the prosecution's right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham.
Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.ᇈWᑭHIL For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. (Citations omitted)
The petition is bereft of any allegation, much less, evidence that the prosecution's right to due process was violated or the proceedings before the CA were a mockery such that Ando's acquittal was a foregone conclusion. Accordingly, notwithstanding the alleged errors in the interpretation of the applicable law or appreciation of evidence that the CA may have committed in ordering Ando's acquittal, absent any showing that the CA acted with caprice or without regard to the rudiments of due process, the CA's findings can no longer be reversed, disturbed and set aside without violating the rule against double jeopardy.18
Hence, not every error in the trial or evaluation of the evidence by the court in question that led to the acquittal of the accused would be reviewable by certiorari. The writ of certiorari — being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that courts have no power or authority in law to perform) — is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error committed by a lower court.19 Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which fall outside the scope of a writ of certiorari.
In the case at bar, although JCLV Realty filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before this Court, the ponencia nonetheless made a finding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the demurrer to evidence on a ground not raised therein — that of the failure of the prosecution to positively identify Mangali. As discussed, it is immaterial whether the trial court was correct in acquitting Mangali. The fact remains that Mangali's right against double jeopardy already attached when the trial court granted his demurrer to evidence and ordered his acquittal. No amount of error of judgment will ripen into an error of jurisdiction such that the acquittal would be reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari. Absent any manifest denial of due process tantamount to making the proceedings before the court a quo a sham trial, there is no basis whatsoever to reinstate the criminal case against Mangali and place him twice in jeopardy.
In light of the foregoing considerations, I vote to DENY the petition.
Footnotes
1 See ponencia, pp. 6-8
2 Bautista v. Cuneia-Pangilinan, G R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 521, 535.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 534-537.
5 Cu v. Ventura, G.R No. 224567, September 26, 2018, 881 SCRA 118, 128.
6 Chiok v. People, G.R. No. 179814, December 7, 2015, 776 SCRA 120, 135.
7 People v. Santiago, 255 Phil 851, 861-862 (1989).
8 32 Phil. 619 (1915).
9 Id. at 622-623. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
10 People v. Dela Torre, G.R. Nos. 137953-58, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 596, 605-606.
11 Tan v. Barrios, G.R. Nos. 85481-82, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 686, 702-703.
12 G.R. No. 127444. September 13, 2000, 340 SCRA 207.
13 Id. at 238-240. Emphasis and underscoring supplied. Citations omitted.
14 G.R. No. L-72670, September 12, 1986, 144 SCRA 43.
15 G.R. No. 130106, July 15. 2005, 463 SCRA 462.
16 Id. at 469. Emphasis supplied.
17 G.R. No. 198589, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 575.
18 Id. at 579-580. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
19 Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 153852, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 410, 420.
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