G.R. No. 184535

G.R. No. 184535, September 3, 2019,
♦ Resolution, Per Curiam
♦ Separate Opinion, Peralta, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Jardeleza, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Reyes, [J]

SISTER PILAR VERSOZA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ, PEDRO AGUIRRE, AND DR. MARISSA PASCUAL, RESPONDENTS.

A petitioner's demise extinguishes his or her legal capacity, which would warrant the dismissal of any of his or her pleadings pending in court. Moreover, when one acts as a private complainant to a criminal action, his or her role is confined to being a mere witness whose interest is limited only to the civil liability. The criminal aspect can only be undertaken by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General or any other person specifically authorized by law. Without any action on their part, the criminal action cannot prosper.

This case involves a man with cognitive disability1 who, at 24 years old, was made by his legal guardians to undergo bilateral vasectomy without his consent. Aware of the special circumstances of this case, this Court is called upon to draw the line between a valid exercise of parental authority over a person with disability, and the commission of child abuse as contemplated and penalized by Republic Act No. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act. This case also seeks to establish whether the cause of action and attribution of criminal liability survive the death of petitioner Sister Pilar Versoza (Sister Versoza), pending resolution of her Petition.

This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari2 filed by Sister Versoza, assailing the Decision3 and Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the Information for violation of Republic Act No. 7610 filed against Pedro Aguirre (Pedro), Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz (Michelina), and Dr. Marissa Pascual (Dr. Pascual).5 Sister Versoza further prays for the issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court "to proceed with the indictment and prosecution of the accused-respondents"6 and to allow "petitioner through private prosecutor, to prosecute said case under the direction, supervision and control of the public prosecutor."7

Both this case and the 2008 case of Aguirre v. Secretary of the Department of Justice8 originated from the same set of facts.

Laureano "Larry" Aguirre (Larry) was a ward of the Heart of Mary Villa, a child-caring agency under the Good Shepherd Sisters and licensed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.9 On June 19, 1980, Larry, then two (2) years and nine (9) months old, was taken in as a ward by Pedro and his wife, Lourdes (the Aguirre Spouses).10 The Heart of Mary Villa, through Sister Mary Concepta Bellosillo, executed an Affidavit of Consent to Legal Guardianship in favor of the Aguirre Spouses.11 Sister Versoza was the nursery supervisor at that time.12

On June 19, 1986, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan appointed the Aguirre Spouses to be the legal guardians of Larry and of his properties.13

While no explanation was provided in Dr. Marissa Pascual's (Dr. Pascual) psychiatric report, medical journals have discussed perinatal insults as having the effect of altering brain development.15

Using this assessment as basis, and upon the instruction and written consent of Pedro, Dr. Juvido Agatep (Dr. Agatep) performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry on January 31, 2002.16

In Aguirre, Pedro's eldest daughter, Gloria Aguirre (Gloria), filed a criminal case on June 11, 2002 against her father and the doctors who cleared and conducted the procedure on Larry. She alleged that they violated Article 172 for falsification and Article 262 for mutilation, both under the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Sections 3 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7610.17

By way of defense, Pedro argued that the decision was a valid exercise of his parental authority as Larry's legal guardian. Moreover, assuming that Larry could make a decision regarding his vasectomy, Pedro argued that Gloria had no legal personality to file the criminal case, "for only Larry would have the right to do so."18

In a January 8, 2003 Resolution, the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended that Gloria's Complaint be dismissed for lack of probable cause and for insufficiency of evidence.19

On February 18, 2003, Gloria filed before the Department of Justice a Petition for Review.20 However, in a February 11, 2004 Resolution, her Petition was dismissed.21 Her subsequent Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.22

Undeterred, Gloria filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, praying that the Resolutions of the Department of Justice be reversed.23

When the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for lack of merit, Gloria brought her case before this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 170723,24 In its March 3, 2008 Decision, this Court later denied the Petition for lack of merit.25

When she learned about the procedure done on her former ward, Sister Versoza filed a criminal case against Pedro, Dr. Pascual, Dr. Agatep, and Michelina, one (1) of the Aguirre Spouses' children with whom Larry grew up.26 Sister Versoza, like Gloria, charged them of falsification under Article 172 and mutilation under Article 262, both under the Revised Penal Code and child abuse under Sections 3 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7610.27

In its January 8, 2003 Resolution, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed Sister Versoza's Complaint.28

Thus, she moved for reconsideration, praying that an information for violation of Republic Act No. 7610 be filed instead.29 However, in an August 26, 2003 Resolution, the Office of the City Prosecutor also denied the Motion.30

On May 13, 2005, while Gloria's Rule 65 Petition in Aguirre was pending before the Court of Appeals, the Office of the City Prosecutor granted a Motion for Reconsideration filed by one "Gloria Pilar S. Versoza," which questioned the City Prosecutor's January 8, 2003 Resolution.31 In granting the Motion, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for violation of Sections 3 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7610.32

Accordingly, an Information was filed against Pedro, Michelina, and Dr. Pascual for violation of Republic Act No. 7610. The case was subsequently raffled off to Branch 102 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Warrants of arrest were issued against the accused, who then posted their respective bail bonds.33

Pedro and Michelina respectively moved for the dismissal of the case and for the re-determination of probable cause. Dr. Pascual filed several motions seeking the quashal of the information and warrant of arrest and the disqualification of the private prosecutor. In addition, Pedro and Michelina filed a motion requesting a stipulation from the trial prosecutor if she intended to prosecute the case under Republic Act No. 7610 considering that the matter had been previously decided by the Department of Justice and was under the review of the Court of Appeals.34

On November 8, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order35 dismissing the case as there was "no probable cause ... to hold the accused for trial for violation[s] of Sections 3 and 10 of [Republic Act No.] 7610[.]"36 In the Order, the Quezon City Regional Trial Court declared:

Sister Versoza moved for reconsideration, but her Motion was denied in the Regional Trial Court's January 31, 2006 Order.39 The trial court again emphasized her lack of legal capacity to sue:

In its May 16, 2009 Decision,42 the Court of Appeals denied her appeal and upheld the dismissal of the Information against Pedro, Michelina, and Dr. Pascual. It stated:

Affirming the trial court's finding that Sister Versoza had "no personality to prosecute the [criminal] complaint[,]"44 the Court of Appeals declared that her being part of Heart of Mary Villa did not authorize her to appear as a private complainant. It found that she was not Larry's parent, adopter, or legal guardian, and was at most only a witness who "was not actually or directly injured by the punishable act or omission complained of."45 Citing Article 189 of the Family Code, the Court of Appeals also noted that the ties between Larry and Heart of Mary Villa were severed after adoption, when the parental authority or legal guardianship had been transferred to Larry's adopters.46

Sister Versoza moved for reconsideration, but her Motion was denied in the Court of Appeals' September 17, 2008 Resolution.47 Hence, she filed this Petition.48

Petitioner asserts that as the nursery supervisor of the child-caring agency where Larry was a former ward, she had the duty to continuously be concerned about his welfare. She argues that, as an officer of a licensed child-caring agency, she qualifies under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7610, which enumerates those who may" file a complaint for unlawful acts committed against children.49

Petitioner also argues that this Court's ruling in Aguirre—that bilateral vasectomy was not mutilation under Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code—does not apply to this case. She posits that mutilation and child abuse are two (2) distinct criminal offenses. Although bilateral vasectomy does not constitute mutilation, it is still punishable as child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610. She asserts that vasectomy is an act of cruelty, especially if it is performed on a child who cannot by himself give consent, such as Larry.50

Though chronologically, Larry was a 24-year-old man when the procedure was conducted, petitioner claims that he was "comparable to a 7-8 year old[.]"51 Legally, he should have been considered a child, and the forced commission of the bilateral vasectomy robbed him of his worth and dignity.52 Petitioner says that tampering with Larry's anatomy, without his consent, "debases, degrades[,] or demeans [his] intrinsic worth and dignity . . . as a human being."53 It is prejudicial to Larry's overall development.54

Respondents Michelina and Pedro counter that according merit to petitioner's line of reasoning would result in a situation where "any person from any licensed child caring agency can file a case for child abuse without need of showing one's private interest or personal knowledge on the circumstances of the alleged abuse[,] thus flooding the Court's dockets with baseless complaints."55 They further assert that petitioner's failure to file the Petition with the conformity of the Office of the Solicitor General renders her case procedurally defective.56

Respondents Michelina and Pedro also argue that vasectomy is a legal, safe, and widely-accepted procedure with "little or no known side effects"57 and has even been promoted by the government as a safe and effective family planning method.58 Hence, they say that it can neither be considered a form of cruelty or an act that debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a person.59

Respondent Dr. Pascual also argues that Republic Act No. 7610 does not expressly categorize vasectomy as an act of child abuse.60 She then points out that the issue being raised is one of morality, which is not cognizable by courts.61

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the Philippines, argues that petitioner neither has legal interest nor the authority to file the complaint.62 First, petitioner is not the offended party.63

Second, she is not covered under Rule 110, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as she was not a peace officer or public officer charged with enforcement of the law violated.64

The Office of the Solicitor General further argues that the right and duty to assume care and custody of Larry belong to the Aguirre Spouses' under Rule 96, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.65 It posits that the Aguirre. Spouses' appointment "as Larry's legal guardians severed the ties between the child-caring agency and Larry."66 In supporting this claim, it quoted a portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which read:

On November 6, 2012, respondents Michelina and Pedro moved to dismiss the Petition due to petitioner's untimely demise on September 9, 2012.68 They posit that petitioner's death extinguished her alleged cause of action against them, if any. As such, they claim that whether she had legal standing has become a moot issue. They also reiterate that petitioner failed to explain why she may be allowed to appear as a private complainant, stressing that she was not Larry's guardian and had no private interest in the case.69

On November 20, 2012, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Jose C. Sison (Atty. Sison), filed an Opposition70 underscoring that the principal party in this case is respondent People of the Philippines. He argued that the main this case is respondent People of the Philippines. He argued that the main issue to be resolved is whether the bilateral vasectomy performed on Larry constitutes child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610.71 Consequently, petitioner's death did not render the case moot and the criminal case can still proceed "should this Court resolve the issue in the affirmative."72

Atty. Sison also categorized the issue as one of "transcendent importance[,]" which survives petitioner's death.73

First, whether or not the death of petitioner Sister Pilar Versoza warrants the case's dismissal;

Second, whether or not petitioner has the legal personality to institute the criminal case against respondents Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Pedro Aguirre, and Dr. Marissa Pascual; and

Finally, whether or not respondents committed a violation of Republic Act No. 7610.

This Court has consistently held that "[t]he authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the [Court of Appeals] is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General[,]"74 with the private complainant's role as only that of a witness.75 In Chiok v. People:76

As a private complainant to the criminal action, petitioner's role is confined to being a mere witness, her interest in the case limited to only the civil liability. Only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, can appeal the criminal aspect of the case. Thus, absent any action on the part of the Office of the Solicitor General, the appeal cannot prosper.

Moreover, considering that petitioner died during the pendency of this case, she no longer has the legal capacity to pursue the appeal.

The prosecution of criminal offenses begins with the filing of a complaint or an information. Ordinarily, a complaint is "subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated."78 On the other hand, an information is subscribed by a prosecutor.79 It is usually the offended party or a law enforcer who commences the case's prosecution. This is the traditional concept of the prosecution of criminal offenses.

However, the rule is different in cases involving private crimes and those punishable under special laws. The crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness,80 and defamation81 cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of certain persons. Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates crimes that require the intervention of specific individuals before criminal proceedings can be had:

As to offenses punished under special laws, their prosecution would be governed by the relevant provisions of the special law violated.82

In cases concerning violations of Republic Act No. 7610, Section 27 enumerates seven (7) classes of persons who may initiate criminal proceedings, namely:

The literal meaning of a statute must prevail if the text is clear. In Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission:83

Here, petitioner hinged her legal standing on being a representative of a licensed child-caring institution under Section 27(d) of Republic Act No. 7610.85 She brought this case as an officer or representative of the Heart of Mary Villa, the foster home that had custody of Larry before his guardianship was passed to the Aguirre Spouses.

Respondents Michelina and Pedro oppose this and claim that the Aguirre Spouses' appointment as Larry's legal guardians divested petitioner of the authority to file a criminal case for child abuse. They further argue that the parental authority and responsibility over Larry were transferred to the Aguirre Spouses, to the exclusion of all others, including the child-caring agency that took in Larry as a ward.86

By itself, respondents' position of an almost jealous monopoly of parental authority may seem to have basis. Guardianship, similar to adoption, is one (1) of the instances under the Family Code where parental authority may be legally transferred:

However, these provisions do not exist independently of other Family Code provisions pertaining to parental authority. In particular, Article 220 enumerates the rights and duties that parents and those exercising parental authority have to their children or wards:

ARTICLE 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:

Taken together, the exercise of parental authority should be understood more as "a sum of duties"87 to be exercised in favor of the child's best interest. The nature of parental authority was explained in Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals:88

The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter's needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children s physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor. "89 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The authority granted to the Aguirre Spouses to raise Larry as their ward is a responsibility that went beyond the mere transfer of the child's physical custody. When they were granted guardianship, the Aguirre Spouses committed themselves to protect and uphold Larry's best interests. The State entrusted Larry's growth and development to the Aguirre Spouses, so that when the time comes, he may be an empowered citizen of the country, capable of making his own choices and fully undertaking his own responsibilities.

Granted, family affairs cannot always be subject to the State's inquiry, especially if no one comes forward to shed light on ongoing abuses, or worse still, if the abused merely sees the acts as matters of fact. Indeed, in child abuse cases, the parents or guardians may be the abusers themselves. Those entrusted with the care and protection of the child could very well be complicit in the abuse, if not its perpetrators. In these situations, allowing another person to represent the abused becomes apparent and more urgent, which is why barangay chairs, social workers, and concerned responsible citizens are enjoined to file a complaint.90 When the abuse happens, no one else will protect them from such harm.

Thus, the argument that the transfer of parental authority has severed all ties between Larry and Heart of Mary Villa does not hold water. To tolerate this line of reasoning would be to allow the persistence of abuses against children. Under no circumstances must child abuse be allowed to hide behind a shroud of secrecy, even more so if it is committed under the guise of parental authority. The title of a parent or guardian is not a magic word to be wielded with immunity.ℒαwρhi৷ With it comes the ultimate responsibility of raising the child or ward under the best conditions, allowing him or her to mature into an empowered individual.

The protection afforded under Republic Act No. 7610 recognizes persons with mental or intellectual impairments that prevent them from fully engaging in the community. Our laws accord a high level of protection to those with cognitive disability.

The provision recognizes a distinction between a person's chronological age and mental age, such that someone with cognitive disability, regardless of his or her chronological age, would automatically be entitled to the protective mantle of the law.

A person's mental age and chronological age were differentiated in People v. Quintos,91 a case involving the rape of a person with intellectual disability. This Court defined "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code as either the chronological age of a child or the mental age if a person has intellectual disability:

We are aware that the terms, "mental retardation" or "intellectual disability," had been classified under "deprived of reason." The terms, "deprived of reason" and "demented," however, should be differentiated from the term, "mentally retarded" or "intellectually disabled." An intellectually disabled person is not necessarily deprived of reason or demented. This court had even ruled that they may be credible witnesses. However, his or her maturity is not there despite the physical age. He or she is deficient in general mental abilities and has an impaired conceptual, social, and practical functioning relative to his or her age, gender, and peers. Because of such impairment, he or she does not meet the "socio-cultural standards of personal independence and social responsibility."

Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is as capable of making decisions and giving consent as a person with a chronological age of 35 and a mental age of 7. Both are considered incapable of giving rational consent because both are not yet considered to have reached the level of maturity that gives them the capability to make rational decisions, especially on matters involving sexuality. Decision-making is a function of the mind. Hence, a person's capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age. Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A (1) (d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is established.92 (Emphasis supplied)

In light of this interpretation, and based on the distinction set forth in Section 3(a), a person who has a cognitive disability would be considered a child under Republic Act No. 7610 based on his or her mental age, not chronological age.

In this case, it is without question that, despite his chronological age, Larry is a child under the law. He has a mild mental deficiency rendering him incapable of making crucial decisions on his own, let alone fend for himself. At the time of the vasectomy, he had a mental age of an 8-year-old.

While the case before us presents a novel issue, this Court reached the consensus that the action must be denied for lack of a party, on account of petitioner's death, and for lack of an appeal from the Office of the Solicitor General. Therefore, the substantive issue of whether there was a violation of Republic Act No. 7610 will not be tackled here. However, in light of the ramifications and gravity of the issue involved, the ponente submits his own opinion separate from the opinion of this Court En Banc.

Carpio, Perlas-Bernabe, Gesmundo, Reyes, J., Jr., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.

Bersamin, C.J., Joins the separate opinion of J. Peralta, J. Jardeleza and J. Caguioa.

Peralta, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, and Reyes, A., Jr., JJ., see separate opinion.

Please take notice that on September 3, 2019 a Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on December 2, 2019 at 2:00 p.m.