G.R. No. 242257




G.R. No. 242257, October 15, 2019, ♦ Decision, Leonen, [J] ♦ Concurring Opinion, Hernando, [J] EN BANC [ G.R. No. 242257, October 15, 2019 ] IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO OF VIVIAN A. SANCHEZ. VIVIAN A. SANCHEZ, PETITIONER, VS. PSUPT. MARC ANTHONY D. DARROCA, CHIEF OF POLICE, SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL POLICE STATION; PSSUPT. LEO IRWIN D. AGPANGAN, PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR, PNP-ANTIQUE; PCSUPT. JOHN C. BULALACAO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, PNP-REGION VI, AND MEMBERS OF THE PNP UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS. DECISION LEONEN, J.: In determining whether a petition for a writ of amparo should be granted, judges, as impartial inquisitors, must assure themselves that there is no actual or future threat to the petitioner's life, security, or liberty. Indeed, pursuing rebels is a legitimate law enforcement objective, but the zeal with which our law enforcement officers clamp down on persons of interest or their loved ones must be bound by the fundamental rights of persons. This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Vivian A. Sanchez (Sanchez), assailing the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, which denied her Petition for a writ of amparo. On August 16, 2018, Sanchez learned that her estranged husband, Eldie Labinghisa (Labinghisa), was among the seven (7) alleged members of the New People's Army who were gunned down by the Philippine National Police in Barangay Atabay, San Jose, Antique.3 Upon discovering that the corpses were sent to St. Peter's Funeral Home, Sanchez went there to verify the news of her husband's death. At the funeral home, however, the police officers stationed there took photos of her without her permission. Fearing what the officers had done, she left without being able to see or identify her husband's body.4 A few hours after Sanchez had returned from the funeral home, Police Officer 2 Nerissa A. De la Cruz (PO2 Dela Cruz), a close friend of hers, informed her that her photo was being circulated at the police station. The officer urged her to tell the investigating officers her husband's name, otherwise, they would go after her.5 PO2 De la Cruz also warned her to voluntarily cooperate with the investigating officers, or they might suspect her and put her under surveillance.6 The following day, Sanchez went back to the funeral home, where she was confronted by three (3) police officers who threatened to apprehend and charge her with obstruction of justice if she refused to answer their questions. Again fearing for her safety, Sanchez hurried home without confirming the identity of her husband's body.7 Later that day, two (2) police officers went to Sanchez's house and showed her a photo of a cadaver. She confirmed the dead body as Labinghisa.8 In the following days, Sanchez noticed the frequent drive-bys of a police car in front of her house and a vehicle that tailed her and her family when they went to Iloilo to attend her husband's wake.9 She also noticed someone shadowing her when she was outside her house, causing her to fear for her and her children's safety.10 This fear was shared by her 15-year-old daughter, Scarlet Labinghisa, who attested that the constant police presence caused her anxiety as she worried for her mother's security: ... (On that same night, after dinner and while we were watching TV, I saw a patrol car pass by our house twice that me and my younger sister was puzzled and I began to feel nervous. We hurriedly closed our gate and doors. Starting that night, I already had trouble sleeping); .... ... (On August 17, 2018, around 3:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, I woke up feeling tired and nervous, but I continued preparing for school when I saw a vehicle passing our house several times but I just did not mind it. Around 6:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, while were (sic) waiting for our ride to school, a patrol car passed in front of us, we hurriedly went inside our house and observed what they will do); .... ... (While we were on our way to Dalipe, I saw a vehicle following our ride but we continuedon (sic), then when we were already on our way to Iloilo, the same vehicle was still following us); .... ... (From that time, I always feel anxious for our security particularly that of my mother because what will happen to me and my sister if she will be gone, so my mother decided to seek help to ensure our security)[.]11 On August 24, 2018, Sanchez filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Antique a Petition for Writ of Amparo12 against Police Superintendent Marc Anthony D. Darroca (Police Superintendent Darroca), Police Senior Superintendent Leo Irwin D. Agpangan, Police Chief Superintendent John C. Bulalacao, and the police officers under their authority. Sanchez alleged that the police officers' constant surveillance of her and her family made them fear for their safety and prevented them from going out of their house.13 She pointed out that if the conduct of surveillance and monitoring was for her and her family's safety, then the police should have informed them of it beforehand.14 In an August 28, 2018 Order,15 the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of amparo and a temporary protection order. It also directed members of the Philippine National Police to file a verified written return. The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Order read: WHEREFORE, in consonance with Section 6 of A.M. No. 07-9-12- SC, also known as The Rule on the Writ of Amparo, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued, as follows: 1) ORDERING the RESPONDENTS to file their verified written RETURN within seventy-two (72) hours after the service of this writ, together with supporting affidavits, which shall, among other things, contain the following: a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission; b) The steps or action taken by the respondents to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission; c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondents pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; 2) ORDERING the holding of a SUMMARY HEARING of the petition on September 04, 2018 [Tuesday] at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon in the Session Hall of RTC Branch 12, Office of the Executive Judge, Hall of Justice, San Jose, Antique, and DIRECTING the parties to personally appear thereat; and 3) GRANTING a TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER prohibiting the respondents from going within a radius of one kilometer from the petitioner and her children, and to REFRAIN the respondents from the conduct of surveillance to the petitioner and her children. RELATIVE TO THE FOREGOING, Mr. ELMER B. ESCAÑO, Branch Sheriff, under the supervision of ATTY. MA. B.G. CANDIDA D. RIVERO, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of this Court, is hereby directed to PERSONALLY SERVE with DISPATCH this WRIT to the respondents herein mentioned, together with a copy of the Petition and its annexes. Let copies of this WRIT be forthwith furnished to Branch Sheriff Elmer B. Escaño, Atty. Ma. BG Rivero, Atty. LV Jo T. Escartin and Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara and petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez, and let a separate copy hereof together with a copy of the verified petition be served personally upon all the respondents. SO ORDERED.16 (Emphasis in the original) In their Verified Return,17 the police officers denied violating or threatening to violate Sanchez and her family's right to life, liberty, and security.18 They stressed that Sanchez's allegations were grounded on "baseless assumptions, hearsay, mistaken belief, speculations, impressions[,] and feelings[.]"19 On September 4, 2018, a summary hearing was conducted.20 In a September 13, 2018 Decision,21 the Regional Trial Court dismissed the Petition for a writ of amparo. The Regional Trial Court held that Sanchez failed to substantiate her assertion that she became a person of interest to the police after she had identified her husband's dead body. This was because she was unable to specifically allege the police officers' acts or the acts they sanctioned which threatened her security and liberty.22 The Regional Trial Court stated: Furthermore, there was scarcity of any specific allegations that the public respondents had participated, authorized or at least sanctioned the perceived threat to the petitioner's right to life, liberty and security, and the evidence adduced thus far, does not inspire a sensible and judicious conclusion that a privilege of the Writ of Amparo is justified. The petition consists merely of the petitioner and her daughter's bare allegation of monitoring and surveillance made by the police, sans any corroborative evidence to support that she was purposely singled out with the intention to inflict harm, injury or damage, which thereby threatened her security or a possible allusion to or insinuation of extra-legal killing or enforced disappearance. The court, at this point, cannot make an enlightened deduction that it was really the respondents who are responsible for the alleged monitoring and surveillance, as no tangible evidence was presented to prove such fact. Assuming arguendo, that she and her daughters were indeed tailed and monitored by the PNP, the petitioner failed to offer any justification for the said act, except her relationship with the deceased Eldie Labinghisa and the latter's involvement with the New People's Army, which rationale, at the very least, is likely a mistaken belief.23 The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Decision read: DISPOSING THEREBY, the petitioner has not sufficiently proven her instant Petition by substantial evidence. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Privilege of the Writ of Amparo is hereby DENIED. Necessarily, the Temporary Protection Order previously issued is LIFTED. Let copies of this Decision be separately furnished to Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, Atty. LV Jo. T. Escartin, Atty. Connie T. Alian, Atty. Troy Warren A. Cayanan, petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez, and respondents PSupt. Mark Anthony D. Darroca, PSSupt. Leo Irwin D. Agpangan and PCSupt. John C. Bulalacao. SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis in the original) Thus, Sanchez filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari.25 Before this Court, petitioner contends that she was able to prove with substantial evidence that she and her children were under constant police surveillance and monitoring, which constitutes a clear violation of their right to life, liberty, and security. She also insists that the police officers' unauthorized taking and distribution of her photo was likewise a violation of her right to privacy, which has caused her great fear and anxiety.26 Respondents were directed to comment27 on the Petition. In their Comment,28 respondents reiterate that petitioner failed to prove that she was entitled to the grant of the privilege of a writ of amparo, as her allegations against them were unsubstantiated and merely speculative.29 They insist that as the wife of a member of the National People's Army, she was a proper interview subject. They also claim that taking her photo was merely part of the regular investigation process.30 Nonetheless, respondents denied that petitioner and her children were under surveillance, or that they were tailed by members of the police force.31 Petitioner was directed32 to reply to respondents' Comment. However, she manifested33 that she would not file a reply, as respondents merely refuted the arguments she raised in her Petition and did not raise any new issues.34 The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez was able to prove with substantial evidence her entitlement to the privilege of a writ of amparo. The Petition is meritorious. I The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued by this Court as an exercise of its power to "promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights[.]"35 Section 1 defines a petition for a writ of amparo as "a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty[,] and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity." The writ of amparo is, thus, an equitable and extraordinary remedy primarily meant to address concerns such as, but not limited to, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.36 Section 1737 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo specifies substantial evidence as the degree of proof required of both parties to a petition. Section 18 further reinforces the requirement of substantial evidence for the petitioner to establish his or her allegations to warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo: SECTION 18. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied) In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,38 this Court explains that the remedy of a writ of amparo, being a summary proceeding, requires only substantial evidence to provide rapid judicial relief to the petitioner.39 More than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might determine as adequate to support a conclusion.40 In Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations,41 this Court further defines substantial evidence as "such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred."42 Additionally, hearsay evidence, which is generally considered inadmissible under the rules of evidence, may be considered in a writ of amparo proceeding if required by the unique circumstances of the case.43 This Court in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis44 concluded that the "totality of the obtaining situation"45 must be taken into consideration to determine if a petitioner is entitled to a writ of amparo: At this point, we need not go into another full discussion of the justifications supporting an evidentiary standard specific to the Writ of Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the other available evidence in the case.46 (Emphasis in the original) The totality of petitioner's evidence undoubtedly showed that she became a person of interest after she had first visited the funeral home, where her photo was taken. PO2 De la Cruz tried to downplay the situation by claiming that petitioner's photo was not "posted" in the police station, but she likewise did not deny telling petitioner that she saw petitioner's photo at the police station.47 Whether petitioner's photo was actually posted and distributed at the police station or was just taken for future reference, the taking of the photo bolsters petitioner's claims that she was being monitored by the police. Respondents try to paint petitioner's claims as the ramblings of a paranoid and overly suspicious person, but even her daughter confirmed the numerous times the police drove by their house and being tailed whenever they set foot outside their house. This shows that petitioner was not merely imagining the threats against her and her family. The totality of obtaining circumstances likewise shows that petitioner and her children were the subject of surveillance because of their relationship with a suspected member of the New People's Army, creating a real threat to their life, liberty, or security. Being Labinghisa's widow, despite being separated in fact from him for more than a decade, puts her at a precarious position in light of the current administration's aggressive efforts to stamp out the communist struggle in the country, which is seen as the "scourge of society[.]"48 Her apprehension at being targeted as a suspected member of the New People's Army was, thus, palpable and understandable, causing her to "act suspiciously" as claimed by respondents, who subjected her to threats and accusations. Respondent Police Superintendent Darroca claims that petitioner was only placed under general investigation because they wanted to know the identity of the last unclaimed cadaver.49 However, the drive-bys and tailings intensified after petitioner had identified her husband, belying his assertions that their investigation was innocuous. Further, petitioner's relationship with her husband insulates her from any inquiries regarding Labinghisa's purported membership in the New People's Army. Whatever information respondents may hope to extract from her or her children are protected by spousal and filial privileges, which continue to exist even after Labinghisa's death. II Marriage50 is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family51 which, in turn, is the foundation of the nation.52 In recognition of the significance of marriage to Philippine society, testimonial privilege53 and communication privilege54 have been granted to spouses. This is to preserve their harmonious relationship and to prevent any party, including a spouse, to take advantage of the free communication between the spouses or of information learned within the union. This Court, in People v. Francisco,55 explained the reasons behind marital disqualification: The rule contained in section 26 (d) of Rule 123 is an old one. Courts and text-writers on the subject have assigned as reasons therefor the following: First, identity of interest; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and, fourth, because where a want of domestic [tranquility] exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. This has been said in the case of Cargill vs. State (220 Pac., 61, 6a; 25 Okl. Cr., 314; 35 A. L. R., 133), thus: "The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and, fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquillity exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. (70 C. J., 119.)"56 Therefore, the overriding consideration in the State's support of marriage is the recognition of its status as an inviolable social institution, with the State implicitly acknowledging the importance of unfettered communication between the spouses. The family and its members likewise enjoy a similar privilege. No one can be compelled to testify against his or her direct descendants or direct ascendants.57 Nonetheless, exceptions do exist to the general rule of marital privilege or disqualification. Among these is when a spouse commits an offense that "directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation[.]"58 This Court expounded in Francisco that when there is no more spousal harmony to be preserved because of strained domestic relations, the identity of interests and the danger of perjury disappear, and the law's aim of protecting the security of private life also ceases to exist.59 None of the exceptions to marital privilege exist here. Petitioner admits to being separated in fact from Labinghisa for more than a decade. Yet, this does not suffice as an exception, as separation is not tantamount to strained marital relations. Further, neither spouse committed an offense that impaired their conjugal union. Labinghisa's supposed membership in the New People's Army is not an offense envisioned by jurisprudence which would create an exception to the general rule of marital disqualification. Wives and children are not ordinary witnesses, as evidenced by the privileges they enjoy against State incursion into their relationships. Hence, respondents' surveillance of petitioner and her children as witting or unwitting witnesses against her husband or his activities is correctible by a writ of amparo. III Similar to marital privilege, the right to privacy is also a basic, fundamental right. The Constitution recognizes every person's right to physical privacy, hence the explicit limitations on unwarranted State intrusion into personal affairs. To safeguard against the enormous powers wielded by the State and nip any potential abuse and interference into the private sphere, the Constitution guarantees, among others, every person's right to due process,60 to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures,61 and to the privacy of their communication and correspondence.62 The Civil Code,63 in turn, punishes with damages those who meddle and pry into another person's private affairs. This is why respondent Police Superintendent Darroca's lack of contrition over his police officers' act of taking petitioner's photo without her permission-and then placing it on display at the police station-is disturbing. It appears as though he sees nothing wrong in flagrantly and inexcusably violating petitioner's right to privacy. Petitioner was not a person of interest when she went to the funeral parlor to identify her husband's body. Certainly, the police officers stationed there did not know who she was. Yet, they took her photo against her wishes and badgered her into admitting her relationship with her husband, a suspected member of the New People's Army. Respondent Police Superintendent Darroca excused the police officers' discourteous and threatening actions toward a civilian by saying that such was merely part of the investigation process and that the police officers acted in good faith. This Court is not convinced. The Philippine National Police's Ethical Doctrine Manual64 enjoins its police officers to respect human dignity and human rights,65 and to judiciously use their authority in the performance of duty.66 The police officers' brusque treatment of petitioner, threatening her with imprisonment and displaying her photo at the police station, does not reflect the professional and courteous image that the Philippine National Police wishes to convey as an institution. What they did was clearly not part of the usual investigation protocol. The police officers could not be said to have acted in good faith when they ganged up on and accosted a defenseless civilian. Even the surreptitious surveillance of petitioner and her family is an abuse of the Philippine National Police's authority. If respondents wanted to interview petitioner and her children, they should have done so formally: informing them of their rights, holding the interview in an environment free of intimidation, and making sure that they had access to and were assisted by legal counsel or legal assistance groups. Further, when a minor is being interviewed, the interviewer should be specially trained to handle children. Moreover, the Regional Trial Court erred in failing to consider the gender and power issues at play here, and how they affected the dynamics between the parties. Male police officers were investigating and surveilling the widow and daughter of an alleged communist, creating two (2) tiers of power: (1) law enforcer-civilian; and (2) male-female. The Philippine National Police Manual wishes to craft the institution's image as a valiant peacekeeper dedicated to ensuring public safety and community participation,67 but the bleak reality is that most people keep their guards up when faced with a member of the police force. In a patriarchal society where women have had to calibrate their responses toward men, the additional layer of power presented by a man in uniform would lead even an innocent civilian, especially a woman, to act jittery and nervously, trying to find a way to protect herself from her perceived vulnerabilities. The gross imbalance in power dynamics makes it understandable for petitioner to initially hesitate to reveal her relationship with Labinghisa. As it turned out, she was correct to do so, as the moment the police officers found out who she was, she and her daughters became the subject of surveillance. In inferring conclusions involving power deficits in relationships, judges must be careful not to be gender-blind. In denying the Petition for the writ of amparo, the Regional Trial Court echoed respondents' statement that the taking of petitioner's photo and the threats of obstruction of justice thrown at her were part of "the conduct of a logical investigation."68 It could not see, or it refused to see that these actions, together with the surveillance done, were actual or imminent threats against petitioner and her children. In rendering judgment, judges must not impose a standpoint viewed from their implicit status in society. They must look beyond their status as well-connected people who can assert themselves against men in uniform and who have no filial relation to one tagged as a communist. By advertently or inadvertently ignoring petitioner's not so unique predicament as the spouse of a labeled communist, the Regional Trial Court created standards that would deny protection to those who need it most. Petitioner's apprehension over the threat to her security was duly supported by substantial evidence. It was further corroborated by her daughter who also witnessed the constant police drive-bys and the tailings done by an unmarked vehicle. Thus, petitioner and her children deserve the protection of a writ of amparo. IV Respondents' claim that the police officers reported and asked for the investigation of the plate number of the car that did the surveillance69 should not have been enough for the trial court. The trial court should have required a full report from respondents. As compared with petitioner, they had better, if not exclusive access to the information from the Land Transportation Office. In his Affidavit70 attached to the Verified Return,71 respondent Police Superintendent Darroca denied putting petitioner and her children under surveillance or ordering his officers to follow them: 10. As regards the tinted vehicle with plate number ALL 5385 who the petitioner alleged to have followed her and her daughters to Iloilo City, I categorically state that I have no knowledge about it; Moreover, I have no knowledge about the alleged call the petitioner received on August 22, 2018 nor I did (sic) order any of my men to follow her or her children[.]72 However, his denial is not the lawful defense required in a Verified Return, but a merely general denial, which is proscribed in Section 973 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Further, he failed to show that he observed extraordinary diligence in performing his duty, a required by Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo: SECTION 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner and her daughter categorically stated that police cars have driven by their house with alarming regularity after petitioner had identified her husband's body. To this, respondent Police Superintendent Darroca only issued a blanket denial that he did not direct his officers to tail or monitor petitioner and her family. He did not present affidavits from his police officers to support his claim. Further, petitioner's report of being tailed by a vehicle only merited a perfunctory request from the police to the Land Transportation Office. The police, which had better resources to perform the investigation, should have done more to follow up her request. Their failure to exert the extraordinary diligence expected of them hints at a motive against petitioner and her family. In granting the Petition for the writ of amparo, this Court in Republic v. Cayanan74 pointed out that the State, in submitting its passive certificates, failed to comply with the extraordinary diligence required of it by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo: In its return, the CIDG only attached passive certificates issued by its operating divisions to the effect that Pablo was not being detained by any of them. Said certifications were severely inadequate. It is almost needless to characterize the certifications as non-compliant with the requirement for a detailed return. As such, the certifications amounted to a general denial on the part of the CIDG. The quoted rule requires the verified written return of the CIDG to be accompanied by supporting affidavits. Such affidavits, which could be those of the persons tasked by the CIDG and other agencies like the NBI and probably the Land Transportation Office (LTO) to collaborate in the investigation of the abduction of Pablo, would have specified and described the efforts expended in the search for Pablo, if such search was really conducted, and would have reported the progress of the investigation of the definite leads given in the Perez's sinumpaang salaysay on the abduction itself.75 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted) The proceedings for the issuance of writs of amparo are extraordinary. They are significant not only in terms of final relief. In determining whether the petition must be granted, judges act as impartial inquisitors seeking to assure themselves that there is no actual or future threat to the life or liberty of petitioners. In a way, courts hearing writs of amparo assist in ferreting out the truth by providing an antidote to the naturally intimidating atmosphere of police investigations, especially involving communist and other rebels against the government. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was crafted in an era when extrajudicial killings and involuntary disappearances were on the rise allegedly due to the government's efforts to defeat an insurgency. The Rule was, in part, this Court's statement that the insurgents' narrative that fundamental rights were not durable and universal at all times was false. It was an affirmation of the belief that, perhaps unlike the rebels, our Constitution protected civility and human rights, and that this protection was what differentiated the government from the insurgents. It was, and still is, a rule that underscores our humanity and our civility. While pursuing rebels is a legitimate law enforcement objective, the zeal of our police must be bound by the fundamental rights of persons, especially the loved ones of persons of interest. After all, the values we have in our Constitution are what differentiate us from lawless elements. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. A PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER is issued prohibiting members of the Philippine National Police from monitoring or surveilling petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez and her children, Scarlet Sanchez Labinghisa and Star Sanchez Labinghisa. The respondent police officers are reminded to uphold the rights of citizens as contained in the Constitution as well as conduct investigations in accordance with their promulgated manuals including the Ethical Doctrine Manual. SO ORDERED. Bersamin, C. J., Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, and Inting, JJ., concur. A. Reyes, Jr., J., I join the Dissent of J. R. Hernando. Gesmundo, J., I join Justice Hernando dissent. J. Reyes, Jr., J., on leave. Hernando, J., I dissent. Please see Dissenting Opinion. Carandang, J., I joint the dissent of J. Hernando. Zalameda, J., I join J. Hernandos' dissent. NOTICE OF JUDGMENT Sirs/Mesdames: Please take notice that on October 15, 2019 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on February 20, 2020 at 10:20 a.m. Very truly yours, (SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA Clerk of Court Footnotes 1 Rollo, pp. 10-34. 2 Id. at 169-187. The Decision, in Spl. Pro. No. 2018-08-1070 and promulgated on September 13, 2018, was penned by Executive Judge Francisco S. Guzman. 3 Id. at 36. 4 Id. 5 Id. at 36, 86, and 89. 6 Id. at 90 and 155-156. 7 Id. at 36-37. 8 Id. at 37. 9 Id. at 42. 10 Id. at 37 and 42. 11 Id. at 45-46. 12 Id. at 35-40. Irwin was sometimes spelled as Erwin. 13 Id. at 37. 14 Id. 15 Id. at 52-55. The Regional Trial Court Order was penned by Executive Judge Francisco S. Guzman. 16 Id. at 54-55. 17 Id. at 56-78. 18 Id. at 60-61. 19 Id. at 60. 20 Id. at 170, RTC Decision. 21 Id. at 169-187. 22 Id. at 185-186. 23 Id. at 186-187. 24 Id. at 187. 25 Id. at 10-34. 26 Id. at 23-24. 27 Id. at 191. 28 Id. at 199-212. 29 Id. at 205-206. 30 Id. at 207-208. 31 Id. at 208-209. 32 Id. at 216. 33 Id. at 218-220. 34 Id. at 218. 35 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 provides: SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: .... (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. 36 De Lima v. Gatdula, 704 Phil. 235, 243 (2013) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. 37 RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO, sec. 17 provides: SECTION 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. 38 589 Phil. 1 (2008) [Per C.J. Puno, En Banc]. 39 Id. at 41. 40 Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. 41 179 Phil. 109 (1979) [Per J. Antonio, Second Division]. 42 Id. at 114. 43 Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 626 Phil. 581, 592 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]. 44 626 Phil. 581 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]. 45 Id. at 592. 46 Id. 47 Rollo, pp. 155-156. 48 Chito Chavez, DILG: Revival of Anti-Subversion Law urgent, critical, inevitable, MANILA BULLETIN, August 15, 2019, (last accessed on August 21, 2019). 49 Rollo, pp. 107-108. 50 FAMILY CODE, art. 1 provides: ARTICLE 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. 51 CONST., art. XV, sec. 2 provides: SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 52 CONST., art. XV, sec. 1, provides: SECTION 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. 53 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 22, provides: SECTION 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. - During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. 54 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 24(a), provides: SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: (a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants[.] 55 78 Phil. 693 (1947) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc]. 56 Id. at 703. 57 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 25 provides: SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege. - No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. 58 Ordoño v. Daquigan, 159 Phil. 323, 326 (1975) [Per J. Aquino, En Banc] citing Cargill v. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314. 59 People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 693, 704 (1947) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc]. 60 CONST., art. III, sec. 1 provides: SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. 61 CONST., art. III, sec. 2 provides: SECTION. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 62 CONST., art. III, sec. 3(1) provides: SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 63 CIVIL CODE, art. 26 provides: ARTICLE 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition. 64 Philippine National Police Manual: Ethical Doctrine Manual, (last accessed on August 30, 2019). 65 Philippine National Police Manual: Ethical Doctrine Manual, ch. III, sec. 2.9 provides: 2.9 Respect for Human Rights - In the performance of duty, PNP members shall respect and protect human dignity and uphold the human rights of all persons. No member shall inflict, instigate or tolerate extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and shall not invoke superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as a state-of-war, a threat to national security, internal political instability or any public emergency as a justification for committing such human rights violations. 66 Philippine National Police Manual: Ethical Doctrine Manual, ch. III, sec. 3.2 provides: 3.2 Judicious Use of Authority - PNP members shall exercise proper and legitimate use of authority in the performance of duty. 67 Philippine National Police Manual: Ethical Doctrine Manual, ch. I, sec. 2 provides: Section 2. Declaration of Policy All members of the Philippine National Police shall abide, adhere to and internalize the provisions of this Ethical Doctrine. Towards this end, a truly professionalized and dedicated law enforcer shall be developed in promoting peace and order, ensuring public safety and enhancing community participation guided by the principle that a public office is a public trust and that all public servants must, at all times, be accountable to the people. They shall serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, morality, loyalty and efficiency with due respect to human rights and dignity as hallmark of a democratic society. They shall, at all times, support and uphold the Constitution, bear faithful allegiance to the Constitution, bear faithful allegiance to the legitimate government, respect the duly constituted authority and be loyal to the police service. 68 Rollo, p. 184, RTC Decision. 69 Rollo, p. 63. 70 Id. at 107-111. 71 Id. at 56-78. 72 Id. at 109. 73 RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO, sec. 9 provides: SECTION 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following: (a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission; (b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission; (c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and (d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be taken: 1. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; 2. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible; 3. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance; 4. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; 5. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and 6. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case. A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. 74 G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017, 844 SCRA 183 [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]. 75 Id. at 203-204. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation