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We are not, however, unaware of Liggayu and of the like cases of Office of the Ombudsman v. Magno, et al. 50 and Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison51 that seemingly depart from the doctrine established in Samaniego. Be that as it may, we still hold Samaniego controlling for the foregoing reasons: First. Liggayu, Magno and Sison were all cases decided by a Division of the Court. 52 Hence, none of these cases, under Section 4(3), Article VIII of the Constitution, 53 has sufficient doctrinal force to modify, much less overturn, the pronouncement in Samaniego. 54 Second. Cases more recent than Liggayu, Magno and Sison have all reaffirmed Samaniego. In the 2013 case of Office of the Ombudsman v. De Chavez, et al., 55 the 2015 case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Quimbo, et al., 56 and the 2017 case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Gutierrez, 57 we demonstrated our firm commitment to uphold the Samaniego pronouncement and its place in our jurisprudence. Thus, in Office of the Ombudsman v. De Chavez, et al., 58 we declared:
Then, in the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Quimbo, et al., 59 we held:
And, finally, in the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Gutierrez: 60
We add here our concurrence with Samaniego. With the standing of the Ombudsman to file its appeal now placed beyond cavil, we shall now venture to the resolution of the substantial issues. II The common question posed by the present appeals is whether the CA erred in setting aside the Order in OMB-M-A-11-390-I and directing the consolidation of that case with OMB-M-A-16-0151. The CA, it can be remembered, declared the Order in OMB-M-A-11-390-I to be premature on account of the pendency of OMB-M-A-16-0151. The Ombudsman and Galon, however, dispute such declaration by reason of the fact that OMB-MA-11-390-1 and OMB-M-A-16-0151 are distinct cases and, thus, could be decided independently of each other. We side with the Ombudsman and Galon. Order in OMB-M-A-11-390-1 is Not Premature; We take exception to the CA's characterization of the Order in OMBM-A-11-390-I as "premature." To consider the said order as premature would imply that the necessary conditions required for its valid rendition were not fulfilled or had yet to take place at the time of its issuance. Such, however, cannot be said of the Order in OMB-M-A-11-390-I. To be sure, the issuance of the Order in OMB-M-A-11-390-I appears to be perfectly apt. The order was only meant to settle the pending motions for reconsideration filed by the respondents and Galon after the decision in OMB-M-A-11-390-I had been duly promulgated. Under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (RPOO), 61 the issuance of an order disposing of such motions is merely something that the Ombudsman is expected, nay authorized, to do given the circumstances. The mere filing by Galon of a second complaint-affidavit (consequently docketed as OMB-M-A-16-0151) does not, by itself, strip the Ombudsman of the authority to resolve OMB-M-A-11-390-I on its own. The consolidation of the two cases does not happen automatically or as a matter of course just because they happen to share the same underlying facts and implicate the same parties; that still requires an exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman. 62 Consolidation, in the context of legal proceedings., is a procedural tool that permits individual cases that involve common questions of fact or law to be jointly heard and resolved by a court or tribunal. 63 It bears stressing, however, that the RPOO does not contain a direct provision on the consolidation of related administrative cases pending with the Ombudsman. Be that as it may, a guide for the application of the tool may be derived from Section I, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court which, by virtue of Section 18(2) of R.A. No. 6770,64 in relation to Section 3, Rule V of the RPOO, 65 has suppletory application to proceedings before the Ombudsman. Section I, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court reads:
What is apparent from the above is that the consolidation of two or several erstwhile similar cases is, at least as a rule, not considered as mandatory or automatic, but merely discretionary. 66 This can be gleaned from the provision's use of the permissive term may in describing the court's or, as applied to this case, the Ombudsman's authority to order the consolidation of cases. Verily, it can be said that the matter of consolidating OMB-M-A-16- 0151 and OMB-M-A-11-390-I still lies within the discretion of the Ombudsman. In issuing the Order disposing of the pending motions for reconsideration in OMB-M-A-11-390-I-despite the pendency of OMB-MA-16-0151-it is clear that the Ombudsman merely opted not to push through with the consolidation of the two cases. Unless this choice is shown to be patently erroneous for some reason, however, the Ombudsman's Order in OMB-M-A-11-390-1 cannot at all be considered as premature. The question that comes to the fore then is whether the Ombudsman erred when it chose not to consolidate OMB-M-A-16-0151 and OMB-M-A11-390-I. The Ombudsman Did Not Err in Opting Not to Consolidate OMB-M-A-16-0151 and OMB-M-A- 11-390-I The CA, in its Decision, answered the foregoing question in the affirmative. It viewed the consolidation of OMB-M-A-16-0151 and OMBM-A-11-390-I as necessary in order to arrive at a judicious determination of the administrative liabilities of the respondents. 67 We disagree. At first blush, the CA's view seems to find justification in the perception created by Galon's second complaint-affidavit that there are "newly-discovered evidence" that will be introduced therein that had not been presented or made available in OMB-M-A-11-390-I. These pieces of evidence comprise of the following documents culled from Ayunting's application to become a state witness in a criminal case pending before the Sandiganbayan, viz.: 68 1. Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid, signed by Chipoco in his capacity as BAC chairman; 2. Purchase Request dated January 7, 2011, signed by Go, Salais and Chipoco; 3. Letter addressed to Go dated January 10, 2011, signed by Paz G. Tawi, owner of Oro Cars Display Center; 4. Price Quotations of Catmon Car Sales and Oro Cars Display Center; 5. Abstract of Bids dated January 19, 2011; 6. Minutes of the Meeting of the BAC held on January 19, 2011; 7. Notice of Award dated January 20, 2011 in favor of the winning bidder, Oro Cars Display Center; 8. Purchase Order dated January 20, 2011 in favor of Oro Cars Display Center; 9. Acceptance and Inspection Report dated January 20, 2011; 10.Requisition and Issue Slip (R!S) No. 0001-11 dated January 24, 201 1 signed by Go, Salais and one Gemma A. Berni do; 11. Obligation Request dated January 21, 2011; and 12.Disbursement Voucher No. 100-11-01-212 in favor of Oro Cars Display Center. A review of the records, however, will quickly discredit such perception. The records of OMB-M-A-11-390-I reveal the undeniable fact that the "newly-discovered evidence" introduced in OMB-M-A-16-0151 is not entirely novel insofar as the former case is concerned. In truth, much of the said evidence had already been submitted in OMB-M-A-11-390-I through the respondents' motion for reconsideration of the decision in the said case. By our count, eight (8) of the twelve (l 2) relevant documents cited in OMB-MA-16-0151, as newly discovered, have already been annexed to respondents' motion for reconsideration in OMB-M-A-11-390-I. Only document numbers 1 (Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid), 2 (Purchase Request dated January 7, 2011), 3 (Letter addressed to Go dated January 10, 2011), and 10 (RIS No. 0001-11 dated January 24, 2011), listed above, were not presented in OMB-M-A-11-390-1. And, as we shall expound in the discussion that follows, none of these documents are particularly critical in altering or changing the administrative liabilities of the respondents as determined by the Ombudsman in its Order in OMB-M-A-11-390-I. In fine, we see no adequate reason to conclude that the consolidation of OMB-M-A-16-0151 and OMB-M-A-11-390-I is absolutely necessary for a judicious determination of the administrative liabilities of the respondents. Indeed, given the marginal difference between the two cases from an evidentiary standpoint, we even find that the choice not to consolidate the two actions to be the prudent course of action to take under the circumstances. We have to consider that OMB-M-A-11-390-I was already nearing its final stages at the time OMB-M-A-16-0151 was filed. A decision was already promulgated in OMB-M-A-11-390-I, and the only matters left pending therein are the motions for reconsideration of the respondents and Galon. In this scenario, opting to consolidate such motions with OMB-M-A-16-0151- for no substantial or critical reason-would actually only waste resources, create more delay and, thus, ultimately subvert the very objectives of consolidating cases in the first place.69 When confronted with this situation, it is certainly more efficient and economical on the part of the Ombudsman to just resolve the pending matters in OMB-M-A-11-390-1 on their own and then simply order the exclusion of the respondents in OMB-M-A-16-0151. OMB-M-A-16-0151 can then proceed with respect to those individuals not included in OMB-M-A-11-390-I. III Rather than directing the remand of this case to the CA for the purpose of reviewing the respondents' appeal from the Order in OMB-M-A-11-390-I on the merits, we opt to undertake such review ourselves. We do this in the interest of avoiding further protraction of the instant controversy, and also in consideration of the fact that all evidence necessary to undertake such review is, just the same, already attached to the instant appeal. In their appeal to the CA, 70 respondents argued that the Ombudsman erred in finding them guilty of Grave Misconduct.1âшphi1 They claimed that they had nothing to do with the scheme of Balais to have the municipality purchase his vehicle, and maintained that their only participation in the said purchase was through the bidding process for a Nissan Patrol vehicle which, as to them, appeared to be in order and regular. 71 They insisted that they had no influence in the municipality entering into a contract with Ayunting, as the very disbursement voucher that they signed clearly indicated a certain Oro Cars Display Center as the winning bidder. We are not convinced. The respondents' claim of innocence largely depends on the regularity or legitimacy of the competitive bidding for the purchase of the Nissan Patrol vehicle that they-as part of the BAC and BAC TWG for the municipality of Labason-supposedly oversaw and undertook. It can be recalled that, at the time of the contested purchase, Chipoco served both as the BAC chairman and municipal treasurer, while Buganutan headed the BAC TWG, aside from being the municipal accountant. The records, however, disclose that there have been patent lapses in the manner in which such bidding was undertaken: 1. As already found by the Ombudsman, 72 the Price Quotations prepared by the BAC were non-compliant with the procurement law. The "Items & Description" portion of the quotations specifically identified "Nissan Patrol Year 200 l Model" as the vehicle subject of bidding. The use of brand names to identify the property to be purchased in any bidding document is expressly proscribed under Section 18 of R.A. No. 9184. 73 2. As aptly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General,74 there is no document on record which shows that the purchase of the Nissan Patrol vehicle was included in the municipality's approved Annual Procurement Plan (APP). This, in turn, violates Section 7 of R.A. No. 9184. 75 3. It also does not appear from the records that the BAC or BAC TWG had conducted any post qualification proceedings before awarding the contract to Oro Cars Display Center. The conduct of such proceedings is required under Section 34 of R.A. No. 9184. 76 4. The foregoing lapses indicate that the conduct of the competitive bidding-if it even can be said that one was undertaken-had been marred with inexcusable laxity on the part of the BAC and BAC TWG. Taken together, the lapses thus betray a sham bidding rashly put together solely to facilitate the sale of Balais' vehicle to the municipality. First. The specific identification of "Nissan Patrol Year 2001 Model" as the object of bidding in the Price Quotation is in itself suspicious.ℒαwρhi৷ The interest of the municipality in that particular vehicle model was never explained in the records. In the absence of such explanation, the specificity of the Price Quotation gives the impression that the bidding was skewed to favor Balais-who conveniently owns a vehicle of the same exact make, model and year of release as the vehicle indicated in the quotation. Second. The non-inclusion of the procurement of the Nissan Patrol vehicle in the APP, on one hand, and the absence of post qualification proceedings, on the other hand, show unjustified rashness in the conduct of the supposed competitive bidding. Of the two, though, the latter is especially blameworthy. Post qualification proceedings, as contemplated under R.A. No. 9184, refer to that stage in the procurement process where the statements and documents submitted by the bidder with the lowest calculated bid are supposed to be verified, validated and ascertained by the BAC or BAC TWG. 77 In this case, post qualification proceedings would have afforded the BAC and BAC TWG the opportunity to verify the statements made by the winning bidder, Oro Cars Display Center, in its bidding documents-including the latter's title or rights over the Nissan Patrol vehicle it proposed to supply the municipality. Had this been done, the BAC or BAC TWG could have easily determined that the very vehicle that Oro Cars Display Center is proposing to sell to the municipality is not its own-but rather belongs to Balais. The 2007 certificate of registration covering the Nissan Patrol vehicle unequivocally named Balais, not Oro Cars Display Center, as the owner of the said vehicle. 78 As heads of the BAC and BAC TWG, respectively, respondents Chipoco and Buganutan can certainly be held administratively liable for their involvement in conducting a sham bidding. The BAC and BAC TWG, it must be emphasized, are duty bound to ensure that every government procurement abides by the standards and procedure set forth under R.A. No. 9184 and its implementing rules and regulations. 79 They exist precisely to preserve the sanctity of the competitive bidding process and protect their mother agency or local government unit against the possibility of entering into anomalous or disadvantageous contracts or agreements. By the aforementioned lapses, however, it is evident that respondents had been remiss in their duties. The respondents may then be faulted too, in their capacities as municipal treasurer and accountant, for their act of signing the disbursement voucher in favor of Oro Cars Display Center despite their knowledge that a bona fide public bidding-one that is fully compliant with procurement law-had not been undertaken. The Ombudsman was, therefore, right in holding the respondents liable for Grave Misconduct. There is said to be Grave Misconduct when the transgression of some established and definite rule is coupled with the element of willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. 80 This definition perfectly fits the lapses of the respondents. The lapses committed by the respondents, as can be seen, were far from innocent. They pertain to basic and uncontroversial requirements of the procurement law. They are also numerous and, when appreciated alongside each other, reveal a latent intent on the part of the actors to accomplish something anomalous and illegal. Hence, we find no quibble about the liabilities of the respondents. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated appeals are GRANTED. The Decision dated March 23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07524 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated May 27, 2016 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-M-A-11-390-I is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. Leonen, A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Inting, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Both appeals were filed as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 2 Rollo, G.R. No. 231345, pp. 52-56. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Rafael Antonio M. Santos and Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas. 3 Id. at 112-118. 4 Id. at 142. With the following specifics: (a) Model: 2001; (b) Plate Number: KCL 533; (c) Engine Number: ZD30-057279A; (d) Chassis Number: TWSSLFFY61-Y00506; and (e) Color: White. 5 Id. 6 Id. at 121-139. 7 Namely: Riza T. Melicor, Shane C, Galon, Alfie L. Roleda, Clark C. Borromeo, Lucio S. Panos, Armony Delos Reyes, Allan B. Digamon, Severino Bangcaya, Ma. Michelle M. Chipoco and Rey V. Josue. 8 Rollo, G.R. No. 231345, pp. 121-139. 9 Id. at 141. Under a Deed of Sale of Motor Vehicle. 10 Id. at 102-111. 11 Id. at 106-111. 12 Id. at 109. 13 Id. 14 Id. at 108. 15 CA rollo,Volume 1, pp. 127-147. Dated February 26, 2013. 16 Id. at 227-228. The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. SB 15 CRM 0120. 17 Entitled, "Partial Motion for Reconsideration," dated January 10, 2016. 18 Rollo, G.R. No. 231345, pp. 185-199. Dated January 14, 2016. 19 Id. at 191. 20 CA rollo. Volume 1, p. 166. 21 Id. at 167. 22 Id. at 170. 23 Id. at 173. 24 CA rollo, pp. 168-169, 171 -172, 174 and 176. 25 Id. at 177. 26 Id. at 178. 27 Id. at 179. 28 Id. at 180. 29 Id. at 181. 30 Id. at 165. 31 Id. at 164. 32 Id. at 183-205. 33 Id. 34 Id. at 204. 35 Id. at 274-283. 36 Rollo, G.R. No. 231345, pp. 112-118. 37 Id. at 115. 38 Id. 39 Id. 40 CA rollo, Volume 1, pp. 2-33. 41 Rollo, G.R. No. 23 1345, pp. 54-55. 42 Id. at 382-397. 43 Id. at 383-386. 44 Id. 45 688 Phil. 443 (2012). 46 586 Phil. 497 (2008). 47 Id. at 510-511. 48 Id. at 512. 49 Id. 50 592 Phil. 636 (2008). 51 626 Phil. 598 (2010). 52 Liggayu, Magno and Sison were all promulgated by the Court's Third Division. 53 Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the 1987 Constitution provides: "(3) Cases or matters heard by a 120. division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en bane: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc." (Emphasis supplied.) 54 Notably, the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Gutierrez (811 Phil. 389 [2017]) offers an 121. alternative appreciation of Liggayu, Magno and Sison. Gutierrez points out that Liggayu, Magno and Sison were all confronted with motions for intervention that were only filed by the Ombudsman after the CA had rendered its decision in the petition for review. In this light, Liggayu, Magno and Sison may still maintain their relevance as jurisprudential bases for denying belated motions for intervention filed by the Ombudsman. 55 713 Phil. 211, 218 (2013). 56 755 Phil. 41, 52 (2015). 57 811 Phil. 389 (2017). 58 Supra note 55, at 218-219 (citation omitted). 59 Supra note 56, at 52 (citations omitted). 60 Supra note 57, at 407. 61 Under the RPOO, a motion for reconsideration of a decision in an administrative case is first resolved by a hearing officer (see Section 8, Rule III of the RPOO, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, s. of 2003) and then submitted to either the Ombudsman or the appropriate approving authority for review and approval. 62 A contrary view, aside from having no basis in law or the RPOO, would be damaging to the Ombudsman's ability to act on and decide administrative cases. Any order or decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case would certainly hold less weight, even none at all, if its finality or execution can easily be frustrated by the mere filing of a second complaint invoking the same facts and parties as the first. Such an outcome certainly cannot be countenanced. 63 See Neri v. Sandiganbayan, 716 Phil. 186 (2013). 64 Section 18. Rules of Procedure. - x x x x (2) The rules of procedure shall include a provision whereby the Rules of Court are made suppletory. 65 Section 3. Rules of Court, application. - In all matters not provided in these rules, the Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character, or by analogy whenever practicable and convenient. 66 Regalado, Florenz, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume I, Seventh Revised Edition (1999), p. 348. 67 Rollo, G.R. No. 231345, p. 55. 68 Id. at 205-207. 69 See Sps. de Vera v. Hon. Agloro, 489 Phil. 185, 198 (2005). 70 CA rollo, pp. 2-33. 71 Id. at 20. 72 Rollo, G.R. No. 231345, p. 115. 73 SEC. 18. Reference to Brand Names. - Specifications for the Procurement of Goods shall be based on relevant characteristics and/or performance requirements. Reference to brand names shall not be allowed. 74 Rollo, G.R. No. 231345, pp. 42-43 and 410-411. In their comment to the petition in G.R. No. 231345, respondents even implicitly admitted to committing the shortcomings pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, but stated that the same were only due to the fact they only underwent training on the updates on the Government Procurement Law, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations in 2012. They further explained that "[w]hatever shortcoming in competence there was, if at all, in the handling of procurement for the LGU of Labason prior to their training could not he said to be intentional as to amount to malice and bad faith." 75 SEC. 7. Procurement Planning and Budgeting Linkage. - All procurement should be within the approved budget of the Procuring Entity and should be meticulously and judiciously planned by the Procuring Entity concerned. Consistent with government fiscal discipline measures, only those considered crucial to the efficient discharge of governmental functions shall be included in the Annual Procurement Plan to be specified in the IRR. No government Procurement shall be undertaken unless it is in accordance with the approved Annual Procurement Plan of the Procuring Entity. The Annual Procurement Plan shall be approved by the Head of the Procuring Entity and must be consistent with its duly approved yearly budget. The Annual Procurement Plan shall be formulated and revised only in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the IRR. In the case of Infrastructure Projects, the Plan shall include engineering design and acquisition of right-of-way. (Emphasis supplied.) 76 SEC. 34. Objective and Process of Post-qualification. - Post-qualification is the stage where the bidder with the Lowest Calculated Bid, in the case of Goods and Infrastructure Projects, or the Highest Rated Bid, in the case of Consulting Services, undergoes verification and validation whether he has passed all the requirements and conditions as specified in the Bidding Documents. If the bidder with the Lowest Calculated Bid or Highest Rated Bid passes all the criteria for post-qualification, his Bid shall be considered the "Lowest Calculated Responsive Bid," in the case of Goods and Infrastructure or the "Highest Rated Responsive Bid," in the case of Consulting Services. However, if a bidder fails to meet any of the requirements or conditions, he shall be "post-disqualified" and the BAC shall conduct the post-qualification on the bidder with the second Lowest Calculated Bid or Highest Rated Bid. If the bidder with the second Lowest Calculated Bid or Highest Rated Bid is post-disqualified, the same procedure shall be repeated until the Lowest Calculated Responsive Bid or Highest Rated Responsive Bid is finally determined. In all cases, the contract shall be awarded only to the bidder with the Lowest Calculated Responsive Bid or Highest Rated Responsive Bid. 77 Nacor, Florante B., The Philippine Government Procurement Reform Act (R.A. No. 9184) and the Revised IRR, Annotated (2011), p. 432. 78 Rollo, G.R. No. 231345, p. 145. 79 See Section 12 of R.A. No. 9184. 80 Fajardo v. Corral, 813 Phil. 149, 158 (2017). The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation 
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