G.R. No. 237428 - Separate Opinion

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018,
♦ Decision, Tijam, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Carpio, [J] Leonen, [J] Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Velasco, [J] Del Castillo, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, De Castro, [J] Bersamin, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Peralta, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Perlas Bernabe, [J] Martires, [J]

This quo warranto petition, filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeks to nullify the appointment of respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution, 1 for lack of proven integrity which is required under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution2 for appointment to a judicial post. Petitioner asserts that respondent's repeated failure to file her Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Networth (SALN) as required by law shows lack of integrity.

The qualifications of members of the Supreme Court are prescribed under Sections 7(1) and 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

When the position of the Chief Justice became vacant in 2012, upon the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) issued an announcement for the opening of the Chief Justice position. Included in the documents required to be submitted were the SALNs of the applicant: All previous SALNs (up to 31December2011) for those in the government or SALN as of 31 December 2011 for those from the private sector. 3 As an applicant for the Chief Justice position, respondent submitted to the JBC her SALNs only for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011, despite being in government service for 20 years (1986-2006) as a professor at the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law. The Ce1iification dated 8 December 2017 of Director Angela D. Escoto of the UP Human Resources Development Office (UP HRDO) stated that based on the 201 files of respondent under the custody of the UP HRDO, between the period of 2000 to 2009, the respondent's SALN on file is only as of 31 December 2002. Based on the records, it appears that while employed at the UP College of Law, respondent only submitted her SALNs for the years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998,4 and 2002. 5

No less than the Constitution mandates the filing of the SALN by all public officers and employees upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law. Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution expressly declares:

Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, likewise requires the filing of the SALN by every government employee not only upon assumption of office and every year thereafter, but also upon the expiration of his term of office or upon his resignation or separation from office. Section 7 of RA 3019 provides:

The importance of filing a SALN for all public officials and employees is furthermore emphasized in RA 6713,7 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the latest law on the matter and which has a more detailed provision of the SALN requirement. Section 8 of RA 6713 states:

Likewise highlighting the significance of the SALN, Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 explicitly declares as a general principle governing government employees the filing of the SALN, thus:

The Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Rules), 8 which was promulgated by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on 27 May 1989, clarified when the SALN should be filed. Section l(c) of Rule VII reads:

CSC Resolution No. 06-02319 dated 1 February 2006 further clarified the procedure for the filing of the SALN by amending Rule VIII of the Rules. CSC Resolution No. 06-0231 reads in part:

Upon receiving the SALN forms, the Chief/Head of the Personnel/Administrative Division or Unit/HRMO shall evaluate the same to determine whether said statements have been properly accomplished. A SALN is deemed properly accomplished when all applicable information or details required therein are provided by the filer. Items not applicable to the filer should be marked N/A (not applicable).

The Chief/Head of the Personnel/ Administrative Division or Unit/HRMO shall submit a list of employees in alphabetical order, who: a) filed their SALNs with complete data; b) filed their SALNs but with incomplete data; and c) did not file their SALNs, to the head of office, copy furnished the CSC, on or before May 15 of every month. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

The requirement of filing a SALN aims to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth which usually results from non-disclosure of such matters. 10 As held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho, 11 the rationale for requiring all public officers and employees to make a complete disclosure of their assets, liabilities and net worth is to suppress and avoid the unlawful acquisition of wealth, and is aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption in order to maintain a standard of honesty in the public service. Citing Carabeo v. Court of Appeals, 12 the Court elucidated:

In Casimiro v. Rigor, 13 the Court stated that the filing of SALN promotes transparency in the civil service and serves as an effective mechanism to verify undisclosed wealth, thus:

Considering that the requirement of filing a SALN within the period prescribed by law is enshrined in the Constitution, the non-filing of SALN within the prescribed period clearly constitutes a violation of an express constitutional mandate. The repeated non-filing of SALN therefore constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are grounds for impeachment under the Constitution.

Culpable violation of the Constitution must be understood to mean "willful and intentional violation of the Constitution and not violations committed unintentionally or involuntarily or in good faith or through an honest mistake of judgment." 14 The framers of the Constitution, particularly the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, "accepted the view that [culpable violation of the Constitution] implied 'deliberate intent, perhaps even a certain degree of perversity for it is not easy to imagine that individuals in the category of these officials would go so far as to defy knowingly what the Constitution commands."' 15

Betrayal of public trust, on the other hand, refers to acts "less than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment," as the Court held m Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, 16 thus:

Since the repeated failure to file the SALN constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, it is immaterial if the failure to file the SALN is committed before appointment to an impeachable office. However, it is up to Congress, which is the constitutional body vested with the exclusive authority to remove impeachable officers, to determine if the culpable violation of the Constitution or betrayal of public trust, committed before appointment as an impeachable officer, warrants removal from office considering the need to maintain public trust in public office. For instance, if an impeachable officer is discovered to have committed treason before his appointment, it is up to the impeachment court to determine if the continuance in office of the impeachable officer is detrimental to national security warranting removal from office.

Under Section 8 (C) (4) of RA 6713, the SALNs shall be available to the public in the custodian's office for 10 years from filing, after which period, the SALNs may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation. Since the government custodian is required to keep the SALNs for only 10 years, government employees cannot be required to keep their SALNs for more than 10 years. Thus, applicants for government positions, in particular judicial positions, should not be required to submit SALNs more than 10 years prior to the application. Incidentally, the vacancy for the Chief Justice post in 2012 was the first and only time that the JBC required applicants to submit all the SALNs they filed while in government service prior to the application. Thereafter, the JBC only required the submission of SALNs for two years prior to the application.

RA 3019 states that as an administrative offense, the failure to file the SALN "shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him." 17 RA 6713 provides a more specific penalty which is "a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months salary or suspension not exceeding one ( 1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense." Section 11 of RA 6713 reads:

The imposition of penalty for failure to file the SALN was clarified in CSC Resolution No. 06-0231:

On 24 January 2013, CSC Resolution No. 1300174 18 was promulgated amending Section 3

(first paragraph) and Section 4 of CSC Resolution No. 06-0231 to read as follows:

The offense of failure to file the SALN prescribes in 20 years, as provided under Section 1119 of RA 3019. However, Section 11 of RA 3019 should be read in conjunction with Section 2 of Act No. 332620 which specifically provides when prescription shall begin to run for offenses penalized by special laws, thus:

In the case of PCGG v. Desierto,21 the Court ruled that when it is impossible for the State to have known when the offense or violation took place, the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission. The Court held:

Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the "[b]urden of proof (onus probandi) is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. 23 In administrative cases, the burden of proof lies with the complainant, who is required to prove his case by substantial evidence. 24 Once the plaintiff or complainant has established his case, by prima facie evidence, the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant or respondent, who, in turn, has the burden to establish his defense.25

In cases involving the requirement of filing the SALN, a certification duly issued by the official custodian that no SALN of a gove1nment employee is on file in the custodian's office constitutes prima facie proof of non-filing of the SALN. Such certification satisfies the burden of proof, and shifts the burden of evidence to the government employee to prove otherwise. The government employee must present countervailing evidence to shift back the burden of evidence. In the absence of countervailing evidence, the government employee can be held liable for non-filing of the SALN on the basis of the certification by the official custodian that no SALN is on file.

In the present case, the burden of proof lies with the Republic which is the party that initiated the present quo warranto petition. Thus, the OSG, representing the Republic, must present evidence to prove its allegation that respondent repeatedly failed to comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement of filing the SALN.

There is no dispute that respondent was a faculty member of the UP College of Law from 1986 to 2006. 27 Being a government employee at the time, respondent was required to file the SALN annually.

The OSG claims that respondent "deliberately failed to file her SALN with her [government] employer, UP, eleven times in her twenty years as a law professor."28 To prove its claim, the OSG submitted a Certification29 from the UP HRDO which stated that "based on the 201 files of [respondent] under the custody of the Information Management Section of the [UP HRDO], it was found that between the period 2000-2009 the SALN submission on file is as of December 31, 2002." Further, in a Letter addressed to the OSG dated 6 March 2018, UP HRDO Director Escoto stated that only the SALNs of respondent for the years 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002 were found in the UP HRDO records. 30 The OSG likewise submitted a Certification from the Office of the Ombudsman Central Records Division which stated that "there is no SALN filed by MS. MARIA LOURDES A. SERENO for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998 xx x." 31

The submission by the OSG of the UP HRDO Certification and Letter and the Ombudsman Certification constitutes prima facie proof of respondent's non-filing of her SALNs for a certain number of years during her employment at the UP College of Law. In other words, the OSG successfully satisfied the burden of proof by submitting the UP HRDO and Ombudsman Certifications which constituted prima facie evidence that respondent did not file her SALNs for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, during which respondent was employed as a UP College of Law Professor. 32 Thus, if uncontradicted, this prima facie evidence is considered sufficient to sustain respondent's liability for non-filing of her SALNs. It is therefore incumbent upon respondent to rebut and overthrow the OSG's prima facie evidence by presenting her own evidence to the contrary. In short, the burden of evidence now shifted to respondent to disprove the OSG's evidence against her.

Based on this letter, respondent made it appear that she had filed her SALNs with the UP HRDO during her employment as a UP College of Law Professor but she could no longer find her personal copies of her SALNs. Respondent manifested to this Court in her Memorandum that she "religiously filed her SALNs."34 If indeed she had religiously filed her SALNs but her personal copies were lost, she could easily have secured a Certification from the UP HRDO that she had filed her SALNs. The requirement to submit SALNs was announced through advertisement in a newspaper by the JBC. Respondent never secured a certification from the UP HRDO as to her SALNs on file in that office. Her failure to secure such certification exposes as a misrepresentation her claim that she could not find her SALNs. For how could she find her personal copies of her SALNs when there is no record that she filed her SALNs for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 with the UP HRDO?

Clearly, respondent failed to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut and overthrow the OSG's prima facie evidence of her failure to file her SALNs for several years while she was teaching in the UP College of Law. Respondent conveniently alleges that she religiously filed her SALNs without presenting any evidence to prove such allegation. Suffice to state, mere allegation is not proof.35 This means that the OSG's prima facie evidence establishing respondent's repeated failure to file her SALNs remains uncontradicted, and thus, respondent can be held liable for her repeated non-filing of SALNs while she was employed as a UP College of Law Professor.

B. Effect of Respondent's Failure to File SALN within 30 days from Assuming Office

In her Memorandum, respondent manifested that the SALN she filed with the JBC when she was applying as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court was "not [the] required SALN as it is understood in law. x x x. Rather, it was a measuring tool which happened to be on a SALN form, requested by the JBC to test the veracity of her declarations in her ITRs." 36 Respondent testified during the Oral Arguments, thus:

True, the SALN form referred to by respondent when she applied for the Associate Justice post in 2010 is not the SALN form specified by and required under the law. It has been an accepted practice of the JBC to allow applicants for judicial positions from the private sector to accomplish and submit such SALN as part of the documentary requirements. Accordingly, there was nothing irregular attending respondent's submission to the JBC of her unsworn SALN on 27 July 2010 when she was applying for the Associate Justice position.

However, when respondent was appointed as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and assumed such position on 16 August 2010, respondent was duty-bound to submit a SALN in the prescribed form and within the period specifically required by the Constitution, law, and rules.

Since respondent took her oath and assumed her position as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on 16 August 2010, she was required to file under oath her SALN within thirty (30) days after assumption of office, or until 15 September 2010, and the statements must be reckoned as of her first day of service, pursuant to the relevant provisions on SALN filing.

However, respondent failed to file a SALN containing sworn statements reckoned as of her first day of service within thirty (30) days after assuming office. While she allegedly submitted an "entry SALN" on 16 September 2010,38 it was unsubscribed39 and the statements of her assets, liabilities and net worth were reckoned as of 31 December 2009, and not as of her first day of service, or as of 16 August 2010. This is clear from the following quoted portions of respondent's testimony during the Oral Arguments, to wit:

The Constitution, law, and rules clearly require that the sworn entry SALN "must be reckoned as of his/her first day of service" and must be filed "within thirty (30) days after assumption of office." Evidently, respondent failed to file under oath a SALN reckoned as of her first day of service, or as of 16 August 2010, within the prescribed period of thirty (30) days after her assumption of office. In other words, respondent failed to file the required SALN upon her assumption to office, which is a clear violation of Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution. In light of her previous failure to file her SALNs for several years while she was a UP College of Law Professor, her failure to file her SALN upon assuming office in 2010 as Associate Justice of this Court constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution, a violation committed while she was already serving as an impeachable officer.

Respondent harps on the case of Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr. 41 to justify her claim that she is not liable for non-filing of SALN since she religiously filed her SALNs while she was teaching in UP.

In Doblada, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) issued a certification that Doblada had no SALNs on file for certain years, including for 2000. Doblada claimed he filed all his SALNs through the Clerk of Court. Doblada presented a letter from the Clerk of Court certifying that the latter transmitted to the OCA Doblada's SALN for 2000. The Clerk of Court is tasked to forward all SALNs filed with his office to the OCA which is the custodian of SALNs for lower courts. The Clerk of Court merely collects for the OCA. The Court held that the OCA certification is not conclusive, and Doblada could not be held liable for non-filing of his SALNs.

In Doblada, the OCA certification satisfied the burden of proof that Doblada did not file his SALNs for a number of years, and thus, the burden of evidence shifted to Doblada. However, the Clerk of Court letter, a countervailing evidence submitted by Doblada, was sufficient to shift back the burden of evidence because the Clerk of Court letter cast doubt on the record keeping of the OCA insofar as Doblada's SALNs were concerned. In sh011, the OCA Certification did not constitute conclusive evidence that Doblada did not file his SALNs, precisely because it was discredited by the Clerk of Court letter, and thus, Doblada could not be held liable for nonfiling of his SALNs.

In the present case, the Doblada doctrine cannot apply because respondent did not file any countervailing evidence to cast doubt on the record keeping of the UP HRDO. Respondent should have presented a certification from the Secretary of the UP College of Law that she submitted all her SALNs with the College Secretary during her entire employment with the UP College of Law. The Secretary of the UP College of Law forwards to the UP HRDO whatever SALNs are submitted to the Secretary. What the UP HRDO has on file are only the 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002 SALNs of respondent. Respondent failed to shift the burden of evidence as to her failure to file her 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 SALNs.

To repeat, Doblada is inapplicable here since respondent failed to present any certification, which could attest clearly that she submitted her SALNs with the UP College of Law Secretary, who collects the SALNs and forwards the same to the UP HRDO.

According to the ponente, "the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers. x x x. To construe Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution as proscribing a quo warranto petition is to deprive the State of a remedy to correct a 'public wrong' arising from defective or void appointments."42

The ponente posits that "while impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue exercising his or her office, quo warranto involves matters that render him or her ineligible to hold the position to begin with. "43

Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution expressly provides the mode of removal from office of "the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman." Removal from office of these public officers shall only be by impeachment, and not through any other mode. In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held:

The provision mandating removal only by impeachment is "the Constitution's strongest guarantee of security of tenure. The guarantee effectively blocks the use of other legal ways of ousting an officer."45 Thus, in In re First Indorsement from Hon. Gonzalez , 46 the argument that a sitting member of this Court may be subjected to disbarment proceedings, which could possibly result in the sitting Justice being disbarred and thus not qualified for the position, was rejected by this Court, thus:

The Court explained the important underlying reason for this rule m the same case of In re First Indorsement from Hon. Gonzales, to wit:

A sitting impeachable officer can be removed from office only through impeachment by Congress. As I have stated in a Dissenting Opinion,48 the sole disciplining authority of all impeachable officers, including members of this Court, is Congress.

The House impeaches, and the Senate convicts. This is the only method allowed under the Constitution to remove a member of this Court. To allow any other method is to re-write the Constitution. To permit this quo warranto petition to remove an incumbent member of this Court is to violate the Constitution.

The grounds for impeachment are: culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, and betrayal of public trust.

The catch-all phrase "betrayal of public trust" covers every conceivable misconduct by an impeachable officer, whether committed while in government service before the appointment, at the time of application for the office, or after appointment to office. Any misrepresentation on material matters at the time of application for office is an integrity issue subsumed under the phrase "betrayal of public trust."

As I pointed out earlier, the repeated failure to file SALNs constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, grounds for removing an impeachable officer. While the failure to file SALN s may also raise questions on the integrity, and thus the qualification, of an applicant for Justice of the Supreme Court, the relevant applicable violation, for purposes of removing such impeachable officer once already in office, is culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. Only Congress, through the impeachment process, can remove an impeachable officer on these grounds.

If a court finds that an impeachable officer has committed an impeachable act, the court should refer the matter to Congress, for Congress to exercise its exclusive mandate to remove from office impeachable officers. No court, not even this Court, can assume the exclusive mandate of Congress to remove impeachable officers from office. As I have expressed in a Dissenting Opinion:49

Thus, this Court should treat the present quo warranto petition as an administrative investigation by this Court of one of its members. The resolution of this Court should be to refer its findings and recommendation against respondent to Congress.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to refer to the Congress of the Philippines for possible inclusion of the acts constituting culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, as found in the present case, in the ongoing impeachment proceedings against respondent Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno.

This Petition should have been dismissed outright and not given due course. It does not deserve space in judicial deliberation within our constitutional democratic space. Even if the Chief Justice has failed our expectations, quo warranto, as a process to oust an impeachable officer and a sitting member of the Supreme Court, is a legal abomination. It creates a precedent that gravely diminishes judicial independence and threatens the ability of this Court to assert the fundamental rights of our people. We render this Court subservient to an aggressive Solicitor General. We render those who present dissenting opinions unnecessarily vulnerable to powerful interests.

Granting this Petition installs doctrine that further empowers the privileged, the powerful, and the status quo.

A better reading of the Constitution requires us to read words and phrases in the context of the entire legal document. Thus, the general grant of original jurisdiction for quo warranto actions to this Court in Article VIII, Section 5(1) 1 should be read in the context of the provisions of Article XI, Sections 22 and 3,3 as well as the principles of judicial independence and integrity inherent in a constitutional order implied in Article VIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 134 of the Constitution.

The solution to address the problems relating to a Chief Justice is for this Court to call her out or for her to be tried using the impeachment process if any of her actions amounts to the grave offenses enumerated in the Constitution.

She also has the alternative to have the grace and humility to resign from her office to protect the institution from a leadership which may not have succeeded to address the divisiveness and the weaknesses within.

Granting a Petition for Quo Warranto against the Chief Justice-an impeachable officer-is not the right way to address her inability to gain the respect of the branch of government that she was entrusted to lead. This is clear from a deliberate, impartial, conscious, and contextual reading of the entirety of the text of the Constitution. This is the unclouded conclusion if this Court appreciates the true value of judicial independence.

Granting the Quo Warranto Petition as the majority proposes, is tantamount to empowering the Solicitor General, a repeat litigant representing the current political administration, far more than any other constitutional officer. The Solicitor General will be granted the competence to what amounts to a reconsideration of the determination of the Judicial and Bar Council and the President as to the qualifications of any appointed judge or justice.

The majority attempts to make a distinction between the determination of the qualifications of an applicant to a judicial position and his or her acts after his or her appointment. For acts in relation to the presentation of qualifications, the majority argues that quo warranto may be a remedy. For acts after his or her appointment, it is proposed that impeachment and conviction may be the vehicle for an impeachable officer's removal.

Quo warranto is, therefore, presented as not exclusive of impeachment. This is a distinction which cannot be found in the Constitution. It is likewise contrary to its principles.

Tecson v. Commission on Elections5 defined quo warranto proceedings as "an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office."

A petition for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is required to be brought under the name of the Republic of the Philippines through a verified petition. 6 It may be instituted by an individual claiming a right to an office in his or her own name7 or by the Solicitor General or public prosecutor. 8 The relevant provisions of the Rules of Court state:

Quo warranto, as used in this case, will amount to a "removal" of an impeachable public officer. Thus, Article VIII, Section 5(1) should be read alongside Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution. The distinction relating to when offenses were committed is not relevant for purposes of the process for removal. Concededly, actions prior to the assumption of office may amount to a crime. However, it is only upon the end of the tenure of the impeachable officer or after her removal may she be held to account.

The Constitutional design is to balance the accountability of an impeachable public officer with the necessity for a degree of immunity while in service that will assure the independence inherent in a republican government.

The gist of the present majority opinion is that respondent may be removed from her position as Chief Justice via quo warranto proceedings and that this Court can take cognizance of the present petition for quo warranto pursuant to Article VIII, Section 5(1 ), which provides:

Then it proceeds to a narrow version of verbal legis or plain reading of Article XI, Section 2 to propose that there is possibly no other interpretation other than the removal of the President, Vice President, Members of the Supreme Court, Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman by impeachment is merely permissive.

It is true that Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution uses the phrase "may be removed," thus:

Fundamentally, when construing the meaning of the Constitution, it is not only the literal meaning of words and phrases that should be taken into consideration.

Since it is the Constitution that we are reading, the context of the words and phrases (1) within the entire document, (2) in the light of the textual history as seen in past Constitutions ratified by our people, (3) within the meaning of precedents of this Court, and ( 4) in the light of contemporary circumstances, which may not have been in the contemplation of those who ratified the Constitution, as well as those who participated in the deliberation and decision of those who voted precedents in the light of their written opinions, must likewise be considered.

David also underscored that jurisprudence over the text under consideration must also be taken into account, as judicial decisions that interpret law and the Constitution become part of our legal system.14

The Constitution is not just an ordinary legal document. It frames our legal order. The changes in its phraseology reflect the historical adjustments of the values of the sovereign. While admittedly, large portions of the document are consistent with our colonial history, many of the words have already been interpreted in the light of our own indigenous wisdom. Likewise, many of the fundamental rights of individuals, groups, and identities find resonance with normative formulations in the international sphere, which provide this Court with persuasive guidance.

To focus on the dictionary meaning of the word "may" precludes the importance of the entire document. It provides a myopic and unhistorical view of the framework on which our legal order rests. It supplants sovereign intent to the linguistic whims of those who craft dictionaries.

Of course, no judicial interpretation, which is not supported by any textual anchor, should be allowed. Otherwise, we unreasonably endow ourselves with a power not ours. Instead of interpreting, we create new norms. This is a constitutional power not granted to this Court.

Definitely, the framers of the Constitution did not use the words "SHALL be removed." Clearly, this would not have been possible because it would have communicated the inference that removal through impeachment and conviction was mandatory. Thus, the word "may" should mean that it was an option to remove, in the sense that it was not mandatory to remove an impeachable officer. After all, most should be expected to serve out their term with "utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency," acting "with patriotism and justice" and leading "modest lives." 15

Neither did the framers use the phrase "may ALSO be removed from office ... " This would have clearly stated the intent that there were processes other than impeachment and conviction that would remove a sitting Chief Justice.

Admittedly, the framers also did not use the phrase "may ONLY be removed from office ... " However, the absence of the word "only" should not immediately lead to the conclusion that another process-like Quo Warranto-was possible. The context of the provision should be taken into consideration.

First, the process of removal through impeachment and conviction is reserved only for some officials, notably:

This list is exclusive. For all other public officers, the Constitution allows a process that may be provided by law-pot by impeachment.

The officers enumerated head significant Constitutional organs, hence, the need to be independent of other Constitutional organs.

In the same manner, the President enjoys immunity from suit so that he may be able to exercise his duties and functions without any hindrance or distraction, thereby giving his office and the country the undivided attention that they deserve. 17

A more complete picture will be seen if the process of removal of a member of the Senate or the House of Representatives is taken into consideration, thus, in Article VI:

This provision emphasizes the independence of Congress, which, under the provisions of our Constitution, impeaches and convicts the officers mentioned in Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Second, the process of removal is deliberately cumbersome. Article XI, Section 3 provides:

Clearly, the power to remove an impeachable official, while involving the interpretation of the Constitution, is not assigned to the Judiciary.1âwphi1 It is an exclusive function of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The House acts as prosecutor while the Senate will act as the body to try the case; that is, to receive evidence and vote for conviction or acquittal.

The votes needed are also specified. One-third of all the members of the House of Representatives is required to impeach, and thus, to file the Articles of Impeachment. Two-thirds of all the members of the Senate are required to convict.

There are also required timetables in the impeachment process. This includes a period of one (1) year after the last impeachment attempt before any new impeachment charge is brought.

The purpose of the one (1)-year time bar for impeachment is intended not only to avoid harassment suits against the impeachable officer, but also to prevent the disruption of public service. If numerous impeachment complaints are filed one after the other, impeachable officers would be unable to do their official functions and duties. Important legislative work would be delayed in order to be able to process the complaints. Gutierrez v. House of Representatives20 explains:

The numbers required from a collective body were clearly designed to ensure that the removal of the impeachable public officers requires a modicum of political will from the elected representatives in both Congressional chambers. This, again, was a process to shield the heads of the Constitutional departments, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman with an added layer of assurance against suits that could be maliciously filed by disgruntled parties, and therefore, diminish the independence and resolve of the impeachable officers.

The process of impeachment was designed as a measure of accountability for public officials who are not otherwise burdened by the pressures of maintaining electability. For this reason, the constitutional provisions on impeachment are placed under Article XI, on the Accountability of Public Officers, and not under Article VI on the Legislative Department,22 emphasizing that the process is not merely a check and balance of government branches but rather a process to hold the highest public officials accountable to the people.

Again, the list is exclusive. The process does not allow removal for any other crime or misdemeanor. It is not left wholly to the discretion of the members of Congress. The evidence must infer facts which amount to the offenses mentioned.

In excluding other crimes, the intent to shield the impeachable officers from malicious or bothersome suits is palpable. Clearly, mistakes will be made by public officials. But, while in office, it is indisputable that some level of immunity is given to the official.

Again, the rationale is plain. Difficult decisions will be made by the President, members of the Supreme Court, members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. In their decisions, there will be powerful perhaps even moneyed individuals who will be affected adversely. Certainly, the ideal should be that all the impeachable officers will decide on the basis of both principle and public good without fear of the detriment that will be felt by the losing parties. Structurally, the Constitution should be read as providing the incentive for them to do their duties. Thus, "may be removed" should be read in the light of this principle. That is, that impeachment and conviction is the only process. It simply signifies that there may be an attempt to impeach and it may be successful if the Senate convicts.

Granting this petition as a circumvention of the constitutionally mandated impeachment process will have the deleterious effect of allowing untrammeled incursions into our judicial independence. Without the mantle of judicial independence to protect us, the Judiciary will be substantially diminished with the courts subject to possi.ble harassment during, the performance of their duties.

Even assuming that this Court can take cognizance of the petition, an action for quo warranto is limited in time regardless of who institutes the action. It can only be instituted within one (1) year after the cause of action arises. 24

Rule 66, Section 11 of the Rules of Court is clear and leaves no room for interpretation:

It is in the public's best interest that questions regarding title to public office be resolved and laid to rest as soon as possible. This is the rationale behind the one (1)-year prescriptive period. Public service demands stability and consistency.

In the same manner, public officers cannot rest easy with the threat of being unseated at any time looming over their heads. The right of civil servants to occupy their seats must not be subjected to constant uncertainty. A public officer cannot afford to be distracted from his or her duties. When public officers cannot do their work effectively, it is not just the office that deteriorates. The nature of the office is such that it is the public that is inconvenienced and ultimately suffers.

It is, thus, imperative that a quo warranto petition be filed within the one (1)-year prescriptive period so as to establish immediately and with finality any nagging questions regarding title to public office.1âwphi1

In Villegas v. De la Cruz, 26 this Court stated that "it is not proper that the title to a public office be subjected to continued uncertainty for the people's interest requires that such right be determined as speedily as possible. "27

The public policy behind the prescriptive period for quo warranto proceedings was emphasized in Unabia v. City Mayor28 :

Unabia also emphasized the importance of protecting public funds, hence, the government cannot compensate an unqualified officer:

The importance of protecting public funds and maintaining stability in the government is reiterated in Pinullar v. President of Senate31 and De la Cerna v. Osmena. 32

An action for quo warranto should be promptly filed and persons who claim a right to the office occupied by a supposed usurper should do so within the provided period, lest they be deemed to have abandoned35 their right.

The majority refers to Article 1108(4) of the Civil Code to support their stand that the prescriptive period for filing the quo warranto petition has not yet prescribed and will never prescribe because prescription does not lie against the State.

However, Article 1108(4) refers to acqms1t1ve and extinctive prescription as regards the acquisition or ownership of real rights, and not prescription in general. Article 1108 can be found in Book III of the Civil Code which relates to the different modes of acquiring ownership.

The ownership referred to in Book III of the Civil Code is ownership of real property, personal property, and intellectual creations. It is preposterous to include the position of Chief Justice within the coverage of Book III of the Civil Code, since a public office is not a property right, hence, no proprietary title can attach to it. 37

Furthermore, a quick review of jurisprudence38 shows that the phrase "Prescription does not lie against the State" was limited to actions of reversion to the public domain of lands which were fraudulently granted to private individuals and not in all actions instituted by the State, as the majority has mistakenly concluded.

Republic v. Court of Appeals39 emphasized that the State's action to recover its own property is imprescriptible:

If we were to follow the majority's argument of altogether excusing the State from the limiting effects of time, then we would be encouraging and giving our imprimatur to indolence and mediocrity within government service. This must not be the case and we must always expect more from our public officers, especially the Solicitor General who holds the honor of representing the State.

The history of impeachment enlightens us on the balance of values which have been considered in the removal of the class of public officers mentioned in Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Impeachment as a mode of removal of public officers was introduced in this jurisdiction through the 1935 Constitution. It was carried over from the American Constitution, which in turn, was carried over from English practice.41 In 14^th century England, impeachment was used by Parliament to gain authority over the King's ministers who were thought to be above the law. The proceeding was widely used until the 19^th century, when the doctrine of ministerial responsibility was established and the Parliament, with a mere vote of no confidence, could oust an erring official.42

While it was virtually obsolete in England, the United Constitution adapted the proceeding as a "method of national inquest into the conduct of public men."43 The American Founding Fathers, however, were careful to distinguish their proceeding from that of the English.44 The English form of impeachment applied to any private citizen or commoner for treason or high crimes and to the high-born lords for any crime, and thus, was considered a criminal proceeding.45 The American form, however, narrowly restricted its applicability to only "the chief of state, members of the cabinet and those in the judiciary" and the impeachable offenses to "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." Hence, the proceeding was treated differently from any other proceeding. 46

This American form of impeachment was, thus, adopted by the framers of our 1935 Constitution, which provided:

Impeachment is characterized as a sui generis proceeding that is both legal and political in nature. It is legal in the sense that like criminal cases, it requires basic evidentiary rules and due process.47 As in administrative proceedings, it results in the removal and disqualification of the official.48 It is political in the sense that it is used as "a constitutional measure designed to protect the State from official delinquencies and malfeasance, the punishment of the offender being merely incidental."49 While the proceeding itself is nonpartisan, the powers to initiate impeachment and to conduct trial are exercised by Congress, a political body that may be susceptible to partisan influence. 50 The sanction also carries with it "the stigmatization of the offender. " 51

Impeachment is designed for occasional use, not to be invoked lightly, but reserved only for the most serious of offenses enumerated under the Constitution:

Due to its complex nature, "impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office."53 Factors that must be examined and considered include "the process required to initiate the proceeding; the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the limited grounds for impeachment; the defined instrumentality given the power to try impeachment cases; and the number of votes required for a finding of guilt."54 Proceedings stall legislative work, are costly to prosecute, and result in the divisiveness of the nation. 55 Thus, impeachment is limited "only to the officials occupying the highest echelons of responsibility in our government. "56

In recognition of the immense responsibility reposed upon the highest officers of the land, the Constitution has decreed that they may only be removed via impeachment providing them with a level of immunity while in office but accountable after retirement, resignation, or removal.

Impeachment was also reproduced in the succeeding Constitutions, with the 1975 Constitution providing:

An exception is provided for in the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. 57 Rule 16 provides:

To the majority, the existence of this rule does not preclude the availability of a petition for quo warranto to remove impeachable officers. 58 This ignores that among the impeachable officers, the President and the Vice President are the only ones elected by the public. The rest are appointed officials.

Due to the highly politicized nature of an impeachment proceeding, it may be more difficult to initiate proceedings against elective officials who are members of the ruling political party in Congress. This was alluded to in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission where a delegate suggested that the removal of the President should be by a nonpolitical judicial tribunal:

Another point to consider would be the vast difference in the qualifications required of each office. In order to be qualified to run as President or Vice President, the candidates must possess the following qualifications:

The Constitution does not provide any other qualifications. Thus, any person who fulfills these minimum requirements will be considered a candidate. Otherwise, former President Joseph E. Estrada, who was not a college graduate, and former President Corazon C. Aquino, who had no political experience,61 would not have even been allowed on the ballot.

Furthermore, the process of presenting a protest against the President and Vice President is uniquely provided by the Constitution. Thus in Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7:

In contrast, Members of the Supreme Court and the Ombudsman must not only possess the minimum requirements under the Constitution, but must also undergo a rigorous vetting process by the Judicial and Bar Council. 62

Members of Constitutional Commissions, on the other hand, are appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. 74 Under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution:

While the Commission on Appointments consists of members of Congress, it is considered to be a constitutional body independent of Congress. Pimentel v. Enrile75 explains:

All nominations or appointments submitted for approval to the Commission on Appointments must submit papers or documents containing a family background and curriculum vitae.77 In addition, the nominees or appointees must submit the following papers and documents:

A public hearing is conducted 30 days after the referral to the Commission.79 The Commission votes by viva voce unless a member requests that the votes should be nominal. 80

The Judicial and Bar Council has the sole constitutional mandate of preparing a short list of nominees for the President. The Commission on Appointments meanwhile has the sole constitutional mandate of acting upon nominations and appointments submitted to it. The Commission on Elections, however, exercises several functions, 81 its primary purpose being to ensure "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections."82 It is only expected to assess whether a person running for office fulfills the minimum requirements under the law.

Once a candidate has undergone the rigorous application process of the Judicial and Bar Council, the candidate is considered qualified for the position. To hold otherwise would be to render inutile the constitutional mandates of the Judicial and Bar Council and the Commission on Appointments. The removal of an impeachable officer was meant to be difficult and cumbersome since it will only be on the basis of impeachable offenses committed while in office, not any disqualification prior to appointment. The other constitutional organs such as the Judicial and Bar Council as well as the President can otherwise read the Constitution and discern its meaning.

Of the list of impeachable officers, only the Members of the Supreme Court, 83 the Ombudsman, 84 and a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections85 are required to be lawyers. The members of the Commission on Audit may either be certified public accountants or members of the Bar.86 Because of this, several disbarment attempts have been made on these impeachable officials, all of which were eventually dismissed.

In Cuenca v. Fernan, 87 an administrative case for disbarment was filed against then Justice Marcelo V. Fernan in relation to a case he had litigated prior to becoming a Justice of the Supreme Court. This Court stated in no uncertain terms that:

This Court again reiterated this principle in In re: Gonzalez, 89 a case filed by then Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales, requesting Justice Fernan to comment on the letter of Mr. Cuenco questioning the dismissal of his disbarment complaint against Justice Fernan. This Court stated:

The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:

The same rule was applied in Jarque v. Desierto,91 a disbarment case against former Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,92 however, this Court clarified that when it stated "[p ]recisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies"93 in Cuenco, it did not mean that a Deputy Ombudsman was an impeachable officer:

The principle applies to members of Constitutional Commissions that are also members of the Bar. In Duque, Jr. v. Brilliantes, Jr., 95 a disbarment case was filed against members of the Commission on Elections for the allegedly erroneous resolutions that they issued. This Court held:

If an impeachable officer is required to be a member of the Bar, disbarment would make the impeachable officer unqualified for the position and would result in his or her removal from office. This Court prohibited what would be a clear circumvention of the Constitution.

Thus, the rule is that impeachable officers are only removable by impeachment and no other proceeding. Even the majority concedes this point.97

This is not to say that this Court has never passed upon the issue on the discipline of impeachable officers. In Espejo-Ty v. San Diego,98 a disbarment case was filed against Lourdes P. San Diego, an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1970 for misconduct as a bar examiner and for falsifying a public document when she was still a trial court judge. At the time, the Judiciary Act of 1948 provided that a Justice of the Court of Appeals may only be removed from office through impeachment.99 This Court, in giving due course to the complaint, stated that it exercises the power to remove any unworthy member of the Bar, it is Congress alone that can remove from office the impeachable officer:

Espejo-Ty, however, has ceased to become good law with the promulgation of Cuenca v. Fernan. 101 In any case, Espejo-Ty was an unusual situation of disbarment against an impeachable officer who was under the disciplinary supervision of this Court. The charges against San Diego were eventually dismissed since this Court found no substantial evidence to support the allegations. Thus, there was no opportunity to discover whether San Diego's disbarment would have eventually led to her removal from the Court of Appeals, despite this Court stating that only Congress had the power to remove her.

The propositions advanced by the majority threaten and undermine judicial independence and stability.

Judicial accountability cannot be separated from the concept of judicial independence. They are, in the words of Retired United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "two sides of the same coin:"

Lower court judges who have failed to meet the ethical standards imposed on the judiciary may face administrative 103 and disciplinary sanction from this Court. They may be admonished, reprimanded, suspended, or even removed from service depending on the gravity of their offense. This Court is specifically empowered under Article VIII, Section 11 of the Constitution, to dismiss lower court judges "by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon."

The same is not true with regard to the members of this Court. Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Members of the Supreme Court, among others, may be removed from office through impeachment proceedings. 104 Liability of Members of the Supreme Court for the commission of a crime or a violation of judicial ethics can only be imposed after this process. 105 This rule is based on the principles of judicial independence and the doctrine of separation of powers.

The independence of the Supreme Court and of the Judiciary in general demands that the Members of this Court be removed from office only through the process of impeachment and no other.

Irving R. Kaufman (Kaufman), Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals, makes out a compelling case in arguing that a judicial mechanism for the removal of judges weakens rather than promotes judicial independence. He cautions that a "simpler process for judicial removal, even one under the control of judges themselves, would eviscerate the independence of the individuals on the bench." 108

Judges should be free to render unpopular decisions without fear that the same may threaten his or her term of office. 109 Removal from office through other lesser means may stifle the quality of judgments and judicial conduct.

Alexander Hamilton, one of the framers of the United States Constitution, shared a similar view. He proposed that the members of the judiciary, in order to be truly independent and to be able to fully discharge their functions, ought to be protected in terms of their tenure. 110

Another reason that he advanced for proposing permanency in tenure was to ensure that only the best suited would occupy judicial office. The judiciary should be shielded from the mediocre:

Courts are the sanctuaries of rights, and not the preserve of political majorities. They are not representative organs. They do not exist to mirror the outcomes of deliberations in forums where the representatives of the majority of our people supposedly prevail. Rather, courts clarify the content of governmental powers most especially in the context of our fundamental rights. They are the sanctuaries for law. Courts are the soul of the government.

The Judiciary is the final arbiter of conflicts between and among the branches and different instrumentalities of the government. It has the duty to determine the proper allocation of governmental power and to guarantee "that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority." 113 Moreover, the Judiciary acts as the guardian of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Bill of Rights. 114

The Constitution specifically vests courts with the ability to "settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" and, more importantly, to determine whether either of the other two (2) branches of the government gravely abused its discretion. 117

For courts to be able to discharge their functions, impartiality is required. Impartiality demands freedom from coercion. This requires judicial independence.

Judicial independence has been described as a "vital mechanism that empowers judges to make decisions that may be unpopular but nonetheless correct." 118 The Philippine judiciary's historical underpinnings highlight this concept. In Borromeo v. Mariano: 119

There are two (2) aspects of judicial independence, namely: decisional independence and institutional independence.

Decisional independence focuses on the autonomy of a judge and his or her ability "to render decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law." 121

The second aspect of judicial independence refers to institutional independence. As its name suggests, institutional independence puts more emphasis on the entire judiciary as an institution rather than the magistrate as an individual. It refers to the "collective independence of the judiciary as a body" 122 from the unlawful and wrongful interference of other government branches. 123

Retired United States Supreme Court Justice O'Connor enumerates measures by which individual judicial independence may be secured. The first approach protects judges from possible retaliation that may be directed against them while the second minimizes external pressure and political influence:

Considering that the Judiciary is publicly perceived "as the authority of what is proper and just," 125 and taking into account its vital role in protecting fundamental freedoms, both decisional independence and institutional independence must be preserved. 126 The Judiciary's independence becomes more critical in light of the expanding critical issues it may possibly face. 127

The 1987 Constitution sets up a framework that guarantees the Judiciary's institutional independence.

The Constitution vests the power to promulgate rules regarding pleading, practice, and procedure, and rules concerning admission to the Bar exclusively on the Supreme Court. This is in stark contrast with the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which granted Congress the authority to "repeal, alter or supplement" such rules. 128 The "power-sharing scheme" between the Judiciary and the Legislature was explicitly deleted under the present Constitution. 129

The grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary130 and the prohibition on Congress from diminishing the scope of the Supreme Court's constitutionally defined jurisdiction and from passing a law that would, in effect, undermine the security of tenure of its Members 131 are among the other constitutional guarantees of judicial independence.

Another innovation of the present Constitution is the grant of administrative supervision over lower courts and court personnel to this Court. This is a power exclusive to and zealously guarded by this Court.

The selection and appointment process to the Judiciary is an appropriate measure by which judicial independence may be advanced. 134

Aspiring members of the Judiciary are screened by an independent constitutional body known as the Judicial and Bar Council. It is primarily tasked to undertake the process of vetting candidates to vacant positions in the Judiciary. 135

In Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, 136 this Court explained the important role of the Judicial and Bar Council:

The previous Constitutions conferred the power to nominate and appoint members of the Judiciary to the Executive and Legislative branches. 138

Under the Malolos Constitution, the National Assembly, the President, and the Secretaries of Government shared the power to select the head of the Supreme Court:

The 1973 Constitution granted the President the exclusive power to select and appoint members of the Judiciary:

At present, appointment to the Judiciary entails a two (2)-step process. The Judicial and Bar Council submits to the President a list containing at least three (3) nominees. The President then selects a candidate from the list and appoints such candidate to the vacancy. 139

The Judicial and Bar Council's creation under the 1987 Constitution was revolutionary as it was seen as a way to "insulate the process of judicial appointments from partisan politics" 140 and "de-politicize" the entire Judiciary. 141

Aside from the goal of insulating the Judiciary from partisan politics, the Judicial and Bar Council was envisioned to guarantee that only those who are deserving and qualified may be considered for purposes of appointment. Applicants undergo a rigorous process of screening and selection based on the minimum standards required by the office or position to which they are applying and the criteria set by the Judicial and Bar Council.

Aspiring members of the Judiciary must not only have the basic qualifications under Article VIII, Sections 7(1) and (2) of the Constitution, they must also be persons of "proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence." 144 The members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission believed that neither the President nor the Commission on Appointments would have the time to undertake this vetting process. Thus, the Judicial and Bar Council was tasked to take on the meticulous process of studying the qualifications of every candidate, "especially with respect to their probity and sense of morality." 145

In Villanueva, the Judicial and Bar Council's policy of requiring first-level courts to have five ( 5) years of service as judges before they may qualify as applicants to second-level courts was challenged for being u constitutional. In dismissing the petition, this Court described the rigorous screening and selection procedure adopted by the Judicial and Bar Council s necessary to ensure that only the best suited applicants are considered for appointment.

The assailed policy required by the Judicial and Bar Council was declared constitutional. It was a reasonable requirement that would demonstrate an applicant's competence:

Ethical standards imposed on members of the Judiciary strengthen and promote judicial independence both in its individual and institutional aspects.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 148 indirectly secures the institutional independence of the entire Judiciary by ensuring that individual judges remain independent in the exercise of their functions. Upon appointment and during their tenure, judges are expected to comply with and adhere to high ethical standards. Members of the Judiciary are "visible representation[s] of the law." 149

Canon 1 directs judges in general to "uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects." More specifically, Canon 1, Section 1 mandates judges to exercise their functions "free from any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason."

Judges are made aware that personal or even professional relationships may undermine their independence. Canon 1, Sections 2, 4, and 5 direct magistrates not to allow personal ties or affiliations to influence their judgment, whether directly or indirectly:

Conversations with family members and other individuals regarding pending cases are deemed highly improper. 150 Associating with lawyers of litigants, though not wrong per se, may raise suspicion as to a judge's independence and integrity. Members of the Judiciary are enjoined from fraternizing with lawyers and litigants as such action may awaken the public's suspicion that a judge's personal relations would affect judicial conduct. For instance, a judge's act of having lunch with a lawyer who has a pending case before him was considered a ground for administrative sanction. 151

It has been consistently held that "the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety." 152 Acts that appear to be legal and not wrong per se may not necessarily be ethical.

Another mechanism against unfit members of the Judiciary, with respect to collegiate courts, is collective judicial decision making. Kaufman points out that "[n]o opinion, whether idiosyncratic or exquisitely sculpted from crystalline premises, can become law without the agreement of at least half of the author's colleagues." 153

There is another aspect of decisional independence. That is, the independence of a justice vis-a-vis another justice and even against the Court's majority.

Judicial independence transcends the doctrine of separation of powers. It is true that an independent judiciary demands the least amount of interference from the other two (2) branches save for certain instances. It is meant to be that way by Constitutional design. However, such a simplistic view severely glosses over what should be considered a more essential attribute of judicial independence:

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary guards the Judiciary not only against possible influence and interference from litigants, parties, and personal affiliations, but also from influence that may possibly be exerted by judicial colleagues. Thus, Canon 1, Section 1 requires judges "to be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently."

Independence from colleagues with respect to judicial conduct should be encouraged rather than suppressed, and all opportunities that would nurture it should be taken.

The personal standards of judges and their "individual sense of justice," for one, is essential for the development of law:

Kaufman warns against the often overlooked but seemingly apparent peer pressure among and between members of a court:

Allowing a judicial mechanism for investigating judicial colleagues suppresses candor and undermines the spirit and practice of collegiality that has been so entrenched in the Supreme Court. Such a mechanism for exacting accountability threatens and effectively erodes the principle of independence that the Constitution has protected. It may even stifle free speech.

The Supreme Court is a collegial body. As the final arbiter of the interpretation of laws and the Constitution, it will accommodate all points of view. Every legal provision given, the state of facts suggested by judicial notice or the evidence should be independently interpreted and evaluated by every member of the Court.· Deliberations should be arrived at rationally within all possible points of view considered. Dissents shape the majority opinion and jurisprudence is enriched for so long as each member is kept independent of the others.

Courts also allow even a lone dissent. By tradition, every dissent is given its space to lay, alongside the majority's majority opinion, its reasons for taking the other view. No space should be allowed for the dissent to be stifled by any member of the Court or by its majority in any form or manner.

Petitioner claims that respondent's failure to submit copies of her Statements of Assets and Liabilities to the Judicial and Bar Council ultimately meant that she failed "to pass the test of integrity." 158

I cannot agree to this blanket finding, which is based simply on the nonexistence of the Statements of Assets and Liabilities.

The qualifications to become a Member of the Supreme Court can be found in A1ticle VIII, Section 7 of the Constitution:

The responsibility of ensuring that Members of the Supreme Court, as well as members of all the other courts exercising judicial functions, meet the qualifications required under the law falls upon the Judicial and Bar Council.

The Judicial and Bar Council was created under the 1987 Constitution, and it was intended to be a fully independent constitutional body functioning as a check on the President's power of appointment. Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution provides:

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council 159 explains that the Judicial and Bar Council was created to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of political pressure and partisan activities. 160 The Judicial and Bar Council is a separate constitutional organ with the same autonomy as the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Angara v. The Electoral Commission 161 emphasizes that the Electoral Commission is "a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution." 162 The grant of power to the Electoral Commission is intended to be "complete and unimpaired." 163

The Judicial and Bar Council is tasked to screen applicants for judiciary positions, recommend appointees to the Judiciary, "and only those nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary." 164 In carrying out its main function, the Judicial and Bar Council is given the authority to set standards or criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, 165 as well as the discretion to determine how to best perform its constitutional mandate. 166

The Constitution provides the qualifications of the members of the Judiciary, but it also gives the Judicial and Bar Council the latitude to promulgate its own set of rules and procedures to effectively ensure its mandate to recommend only applicants of "proven competence, integrity, probity and independence." 167 The internal rules of the Judicial and Bar Council are necessary and incidental to the function conferred to it by the Constitution.

Rule 4 of JBC-009, the internal rules in place at the time respondent applied for the position of Chief Justice, provides the framework on how the Judicial and Bar Council will determine if an applicant is a person of integrity:

Petitioner is mistaken in its assertion that respondent's non-submission of her complete Statements of Assets and Liabilities is fatal to her application as Chief Justice. JBC-009 shows that the determination of integrity is so much more nuanced than merely submitting documents like Statements of Assets and Liabilities or clearances from government agencies.

The Judicial and Bar Council, in its sound discretion, is empowered to conduct background checks to ascertain an applicant's integrity and general fitness for the position. It is likewise authorized to conduct a hearing to give an applicant the opportunity to refute the testimony of an oppositor. Even an anonymous complaint, which is generally not given due course, can be acted upon by the Judicial and Bar Council by making it the subject of a discrete investigation or requiring the applicant to comment on the anonymous complaint.

It is true that in some cases, courts can put themselves in the shoes of representative branches to see how policy questions were weighed. But, this is only to provide them with context-not to supplant decisions. Furthermore, this is only valid to understand the milieu under which a power granted as a fundamental right guaranteed is present and must be understood. It is to sharpen the issues and the context of the ratio decidendi that will emerge

It is true that the submission of a Statement of Assets and Liabilities may be implied from Article XI, Section 17 168 of the Constitution, thus:

This finds its implementation in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

A closer reading of the provision, however, reveals that the constitutional requirement is for the submission of a Statement of Assets and Liabilities upon assumption of office. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6713 169 and Republic Act No. 3019 170 statutorily require government employees to submit their Statements of Assets and Liabilities on an annual basis.

Concededly, the Statement of Assets and Liabilities plays a critical function in eliminating corruption in the government and ensuring that public servants remain truthful and faithful in discharging their duties towards the public. As practiced however, the Judicial and Bar Council did not always require the submission of Statements of Assets and Liabilities as part of the documentary requirements for applicants or recommendees to the Judiciary.

It was only in the year 2009 that the Judicial and Bar Council first required candidates to the Judiciary to submit Statements of Assets and Liabilities as part of the documentary requirements. Even then, only candidates from the private sector, who were applying for a position in the appellate courts, were required to submit their Statements of Assets and Liabilities. 171

In the January 20, 2010 announcement172 for the opening of the position of Chief Justice following the retirement on May 17, 2010 of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, the Judicial and Bar Council required applicants or recommendees to submit six (6) copies of each of the following documents:

On June 24, 2010, with Chief Justice Renato C. Corona's appointment as Chief Justice, the Judicial and Bar Council put out an announcement 173 for applications or recommendations for the vacant position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. New applicants or recommendees were directed to submit the following documents:

The January 20, 2010 and June 24, 2010 announcements for vacancies in the Supreme Court, the first of which pertained to the position of Chief Justice, did not require the applicants and recommendees to submit their Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Despite the constitutional requirement that a member of the Judiciary should be of "proven competence, integrity, probity and independence," the Judicial and Bar Council, until recently, has not consistently required the submission of Statements of Assets and Liabilities for applicants to the Judiciary.

It was only starting January 7, 2013 onwards that applicants in gove1nment service were required to submit their Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the past two (2) years, while applicants in private practice were required to submit their Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the preceding year. Likewise, it was only during the vacancy left by Chief Justice Corona's impeachment that the Judicial and Bar Council required the submission of all previous Statements of Assets and Liabilities for applicants in government service. 174

Clearly, the Judicial and Bar Council recognized that the Statement of Assets and Liabilities is merely a tool in determining if an applicant possesses integrity and is not the actual measure of integrity.

The Judicial and Bar Council's own internal rules recognize that integrity is a collection of attributes that tend to show "the quality of a person's character," 175 and as such, the Judicial and Bar Council in its discretion has prescribed the submission of select documents and formulated other processes which may allow it to best determine if a candidate possesses the required integrity for the position.

This Court in Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho 178 stressed that the failure to disclose assets or the misdeclaration of assets in a Statement of Assets and Liabilities does not automatically translate to dishonesty. Rather, what the Statement of Assets and Liabilities law aims to guard against are accumulated wealth of public servants that are grossly disproportionate to their income or other sources of income, and which cannot be properly accounted for or explained:

It is within the discretion of the Judicial and Bar Council to decide that the mere failure to file a Statement of Assets and Liabilities or misdeclaration or omission of assets in a Statement of Assets and Liabilities, without any evidence of disproportionate or unexplained wealth, cannot be said to be reflective of one's lack of integrity. I find no transgression of the Constitution when the Judicial and Bar Council does so.

The Judicial and Bar Council, in the proper exercise of its constitutional mandate, considered respondent's application and after finding that she substantially complied with the requirements and possessed all of the qualifications :and none of the disqualifications for the position of Chief Justice, included her in the shortlist for the consideration of the President. That process is not being assailed in this quo warranto proceeding.

The validity of respondent's appointment was likewise recognized by the House of Representatives when it went through the process of considering the Complaint .filed against her and announced the Articles of Impeachment.

Under the guise of this Court's power of supervision over the Judicial and Bar Council, the majority wants to supplant their own finding of respondent's lack of integrity over that of the Judicial and Bar Council's determination of respondent as a person of proven integrity.

The Judicial and Bar Council is under the supervision of the Supreme Court 180 and may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. 181 This Court's supervision over the Judicial and Bar Council is further manifested by its composition, wherein the Chief Justice is its ex-officio Chair, 182 exercising overall administrative authority in the execution of the Council's mandate, 183 and wherein the Clerk of Court is its Secretary ex-officio. 184 The emoluments of the members of the Council and its budget are determined and provided by this Court. 185

Drilon v. Lim, 186 in differentiating between control and supervision, emphasized that supervision is the authority to ensure that the rules are followed, but without the power to lay down rules nor the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, the power of supervision involves the authority to order the work done or re-done. Supervising officials may not prescribe the manner by which an act is to be done. They have no judgment on that matter except to see that the rules are followed.

The Court goes beyond its constitutional role when its actions amount to control and not merely supervision. The varied composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is testament to its uniqueness with members that come not only from the Judiciary, but from the Executive and Legislative branches, the academe, and the private sector. While the Court possesses the power of control and supervision over members of the Judiciary and the legal profession, it does not have the same authority over the Secretary of Justice, a representative of Congress or a member of the private sector. 187

This Court's power of supervision over the Judicial and Bar Council cannot be read as authority to interfere with the Judicial and Bar Council's discretion in performing its constitutional mandate. At most, this Court's supervision is administrative in nature. 188

Justice Arturo Brion in his separate opinion in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council 189 expounded on the fully independent character of the Judicial and Bar Council:

The dissent in Jardeleza v. Sereno 191 then stressed that this Court should observe restraint in reviewing the Judicial and Bar Council's vetting process so as not to unnecessarily interfere with the nomination and appointment of its own Members:

The Concurring Opinion in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council 193 and Separate Opinion in Aguinaldo v. Aquino 194 emphasized that while this Court has the power of supervision over the Judicial and Bar Council, such power must only be exercised in cases when the Council commits grave abuse of discretion.

This expanded power of review, even of independent constitutional bodies, is expressly granted to this Court by the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution:

Nonetheless, the independent character of the Judicial and Bar Council as a constitutional body does not remove it from the Court's jurisdiction when its assailed acts involve grave abuse of discretion.

In order to come within the scope of judicial review, the Constitution requires not merely abuse of discretion but grave abuse of discretion. The constitutional transgression must be nothing less than "arbitrary, capricious and whimsical." 197 The extent of this Court's review of the nomination and appointment process must not be given such an expansive interpretation that it not only undermines the independence of the Judicial and Bar Council, but even undermines the President's constitutional power of appointment.

There must also be a time period within which to question any perceived grave abuse of the Judicial and Bar Council's discretion. In this particular instance, the act complained of was allegedly committed by the Council six (6) years ago. The appointee whose qualifications are now being questioned was appointed by the President of the previous administration six (6) years ago.

Allowing an agent of the current administration to now question the previous administration's appointee would set a dangerous precedent. The current administration can just as easily undo all judicial appointments made by a previous administration. This will not inspire public trust and confidence in our institutions. The security of tenure of magistrates insulate them from the changing political winds. Removing that security renders members of the Judiciary vulnerable to currying favor with whichever political entity is in power, if only to guarantee that they remain in office until retirement. The immeasurable repercussions of this will corrode the foundations of our institution, to the ultimate detriment of the people.

The independence of the Judiciary should be specially guarded. This is the duty not only of the Court but likewise by the legal profession which includes the Solicitor General.

The Executive and Legislative departments are constitutional departments, but they are also political. The Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman have fixed terms, and therefore, are subject to the choices of a political administration. On the other hand, the justices of the Supreme Court serve under good behavior and are to serve until the age of 70 years old.

Political departments respond to majorities. That is in their nature since they act with the next elections in mind. Congress specifically makes policy choices through the concurrence of the majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate. The minorities may provide their dissenting voices on record but they are recorded for posterity and not for winning policy.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court is not political in that way. By providing for a term until the age of70, the Constitution ensures that the vision of each member of the Court is for the longer term, and therefore, that decisions are made, not merely to address pragmatic needs, but long term principles as well. The Court is expected to be the last resort even in determining whether a political majority has transgressed its constitutional power or a fundamental right of the minority.

In doing so, the Court may be counter-majoritarian but pro-Constitution or pro-principle. Certainly, when it declares a law or an executive act as null and void because it is unconstitutional, it will arouse discomfort with those who are in political power. This Court, thus, protects not only the majority of the political present but the majority of the sovereign that ratified the Constitution.

Thus, even the majority of this Court must be shielded against the majority's power to remove. Their removal should also be done only through impeachment and conviction.

It cannot be denied that there are dire consequences in granting this Quo Warranto Petition.

First, the Solicitor General, who is not even a constitutional officer, is given awesome powers.

Second, since quo warranto is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, we will be ushering in the phenomena of a trial court judge

ousting a colleague from another branch or another judicial region or a Court of Appeals division ousting another justice belonging to another division or working in another region. The logical consequence is to diminish the concept of professional collegiality and independence also among lower courts.

Third, this Decision would inexorably empower appellate court judges to exercise discipline and control over lower courts through acting on Petitions for Quo Warranto against other lower court judges. This will take away this Court's sole constitutional domain to discipline lower court judges

Fourth, there will be no security of tenure for justices of this Court who will consistently dissent against the majority.

Fifth, this precedent opens the way to reviewing actions of the Judicial Bar Council and the President. It is an illicit motion for reconsideration against an appointment, even long after the exercise of judicial power.

Sixth, we have effectively included another requirement for the selection of judges and justices even though we are not constitutionally mandated to do so. Through the majority opinion, we now require the submission of all the Statements of Assets and Liabilities of a candidate.

This dissent, however, should not be read as a shield for the respondent to be accountable for her actions.

The Constitution is not a document that ensures that there be no dialogical interaction between its various organs. Certainly, there will be tension between the Supreme Court and the various political branches. This is not a flaw in the design of a democratic and republican state. Rather, it reveals the necessary inherent contradiction between those who are elected to represent the contemporary majority and the court that represents the concept that there are foundational principles which not even a present contemporary majority can ignore. Democracies do not do away with discomfort. Discomfort in a true democratic setting is an assurance that there are contending voices to be resolved through the constitutional process.

Unfortunately, in her efforts to save her tenure of public office she held as a privilege, this nuance relating to this Court's role in the constitutional democracy may have been lost on the respondent. She may have created too much of a political narrative which elided her own accountability and backgrounded her responsibilities as a member of this Court.

Ideally, a justice must be slow to make public statements, always careful that the facts before her may not be the entire reality. The conclusion that the initial effort to hold her to account for her acts was an attack on the entire judiciary itself should have been a judgment that should have been carefully weighed.

It was unfortunate that this seemed to have created the impression that she rallied those in political movements with their own agenda, tolerating attacks on her colleagues in social and traditional media. She may have broken the expectations we have had on parties to cases by speaking sub Judice on the merits of the Quo Warranto Petition and her predictions on its outcome. She may not have met the reasonable expectation of a magistrate and a Chief Justice that, whatever the reasons and even at the cost of her own personal discomfort, she-as the leader of this Court-should not be the first to cause public shame and humiliation of her colleagues and the institution she represents.

The claim that the present actions against her was because of her constant position against the administration is belied by her voting record in this Court.

In Lagman v. Medialdea, 198 respondent did not dissent on the constitutionality of the extension of the President's declaration of martial law. She only opined that it was valid within the limited area of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and Sulu.

In Padilla v. Congress, 199 respondent voted with the majority and concurred in the main opinion that a joint congressional session was unnecessary to affirm the President's declaration of Martial Law in Mindanao.

In Baguilat v. Alvarez,200 respondent again voted with the majority and concurred in the main opinion that this Court cannot interfere in the manner by which the House of Representatives chooses its minority leader, despite the absence of a genuine minority.

In SPARK v. Quezon City,201 respondent likewise voted with the majority and concurred in the main opm1on, which upheld the curfew ordinance in Quezon City on the ground that the ordinance, as crafted, did not violate the constitutional rights of minors.

Her view of the expanded powers of the President is further cemented by her vote in two (2) landmark cases. In Gonzalez v. Executive Secretary,202 she was one of the dissenters who opined that the Office of the President had the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman. Then, in Saguisag v. Ochoa, she delivered the main opinion of this Court holding that an executive issuance or the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) may have the same binding effect as a treaty ratified by the Senate.203

If true, the claim that the present status quo caused her difficulties due to her positions is, therefore, puzzling.

More troubling was the inaccuracies in the announcements made by her team of the agreements of the Court En Banc to suit her personal agenda.

On February 27, 2018, during the regular En Banc session, respondent agreed to go on an indefinite leave.

Respondent's letter of even date to Atty. Anna-Li Papa Gombio, the En Banc Deputy Clerk of Court, supports what was agreed upon during the En Banc session:

Strangely, the letter was not addressed to her colleagues. Neither were they given the courtesy of being furnished copies of her letter.

However, that same day, respondent's spokesperson announced a different version of events to the media by declaring that respondent will go on a wellness leave instead of an indefinite leave. This appeared to be an attempt to spin the events and sanitize the turn of events with the spokesperson' s declaration that the wellness leave had long been scheduled and that respondent was only availing of her wellness leave a few weeks ahead of schedule.

Respondent is well aware that wellness leaves of Members of the Supreme Court are subject to the approval of the En Banc, hence, her follow-up letter the following day to the En Banc asking for approval of her wellness leave:

Her follow-up letter highlighted the inaccuracies over what was agreed upon during the February 27, 2018 En Banc session. Her camp's propensity to spin facts into a story that would closely hew to their narrative of respondent as the righteous and steadfast defender of the Judiciary should have been kept in check. There is a difference between sober advocacy and reckless media spin.

Confusion was by then rampant as to whether or not respondent was going on an indefinite leave or merely a rescheduled wellness leave, as her camp insisted. Speculations were also rife that some Members of the Supreme Court had forced respondent to go on indefinite leave and that respondent's indefinite leave was a prelude to her resignation as Chief Justice.

On March 1, 2018, the En Banc, with the exception of Associate Justice Alfredo Caguioa, who was then on official leave, took the unprecedented move of authorizing Atty. Theodore 0. Te of the Public Information Office to release the following statement to clarify the confusion caused by respondent:

The Court's statement reveals what really happened during the En Banc session and confirms that contrary to her team's pronouncements to the media that it was her choice to go on leave, respondent was in truth asked by her peers to go on an indefinite leave. There was no reason for the En Banc to reveal such a delicate and sensitive matter which occurred within its chambers, but respondent's inaccurate statement meant that the En Banc had no choice but to correct her in order to preserve the Court's integrity.

In response to the En Banc's press release, respondent released a letter-explanation which read:

This explanation does not inspire belief. It was obviously meant to harmonize her first and second letters and lessen the impact of the inaccuracies.

While the Court's internal or administrative rules may not contain a provision on indefinite leaves, it does not mean that it is not recognized. There was no need to denominate or qualify the indefinite leave as a wellness leave or any one of the recognized leaves that Members of the Supreme Court are entitled to. The intention to go on an indefinite leave was already understood, and to insinuate that categorizing the indefinite leave as a wellness leave was merely in compliance with administrative rules is certainly not the truth.

Besides, during the deliberations of February 27, 2018, respondent indeed attempted to convince her colleagues to characterize her leave as a wellness leave. She, together with all the other Justices present, knows that it was not accepted.

Strangely, she appeared at the Court's steps on May 8, 2018 purportedly to end her leave, knowing fully well that it was part of a collegial decision with her peers. She was well aware that the Court was on an intensive decision writing break for the whole month, and hence, there was no special reason for her to report back without the approval of the Court. Her reporting for work did not appear to have any urgent motive except her desire to preside over the special session of the en bane where the main agenda was the deliberation of this case

The respondent knows fully well that she is a party to her case. For her to report to control the bureaucracy of the Court-such as the Clerk of Court and its process servers-when her case is for decision, and for her to put herself in a position to be engaged in ex parte communication with the sitting justices who will decide her case, border on the contumacious. At the very least, this appears to violate Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:

Canon l 3 - A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court.

Disappointments arising from losing one's motions and pleadings are understandable. Criticism of the Court that decides will always be forthcoming. But for a party to do everything in her power to undermine the Court for fear of an adverse result may breach not only judicial courtesy but also our professional responsibilities as a lawyer.

This Court has its faults, and I have on many occasions written impassioned dissents against my esteemed colleagues. But, there have always been just, legal, and right ways to do the right thing. As a Member of this Court, it should be reason that prevails. We should maintain the highest levels of ethics and professional courtesy even as we remain authentic to our convictions as to the right way of reading the law. Despite our most solid belief that we are right, we should still have the humility to be open to the possibility that others may not see it our way. As mature magistrates, we should be aware that many of the reforms we envision will take time.

False narratives designed to simplify and demonize an entire institution and the attribution of false motives is not the mark of responsible citizenship. Certainly, it is not what this country expects from any justice. Courts are sanctuaries of all rights. There are many cases pending in this Court where those who have much less grandeur than the respondent seek succor. Every judicial institution, every Justice of this Court, will have weaknesses as well as strengths. We should address the weaknesses tirelessly but with respect. We should likewise acknowledge the strengths which we intend to preserve. No court is perfect. All courts need reform.

It is reasonable to expect that the Chief Justice should have the broadest equanimity, to have an open mind, and to show leadership by being the first to defend her Court against underserved, speculative, callous, ad hominem, and irrelevant attacks on their personal reputation. She should be at the forefront to defend the Court against unfounded speculation and attacks. Unfortunately, in her campaign for victory in this case, her speeches may have goaded the public to do so and without remorse.

To succeed in discrediting the entire institution for some of its controversial decisions may contribute to weakening the legitimacy of its other opinions to grant succor to those oppressed and to those who suffer injustice.

This is not the end for those who fight for judicial independence. This is not the end for those who articulate a vision of social justice against the unjustness of the politically dominant. There are still many among us in the Judiciary.

Those who choose to make personal sacrifices leave the most important lesson that can etch into our history that can be emulated by present and future Justices of this Court: having a soul where the genuine humility of servant leadership truly resides.

Today, perhaps, a torch may just have been passed so that those who are left may shine more brightly. Perhaps, an old torch will be finally rekindled: one which will light the way for a more vigilant citizenry that is sober, analytical, and organized enough to demand decency and a true passion for justice from all of government.

It is with all conviction that I vote to dismiss this Quo Warranto Petition. In my view, it should not even have been given due course. I am convinced that the majority opinion will weaken the role of the Judiciary to deliver social justice and assert our fundamental rights.