Manila
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212362. March 14, 2018 ]
JOSE T. ONG BUN, PETITIONER, VS. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated May 22,2014, of petitioner Jose T. Ong Bun, that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated September 25, 2012 and Resolution2 dated March 19, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02715 dismissing petitioner's complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI).
The facts follow:
In 1989, Ma. Lourdes Ong, the wife of petitioner, purchased the following three (3) silver custodian certificates (CC) in the Spouses' name from the Far East Bank & Trust Company (FEBTC):
a) CC No. 131157 dated June 9, 1989 in the name of Jose Ong Bun or Ma. Lourdes Ong for One Hundred Thousand Pesos;
b) CC No. 131200 dated July 25, 1989 in the name of Jose Ong Bun or Ma. Lourdes Ong for Five Hundred Thousand Pesos; and
c) CC No. 224826 dated November 8, 1989 in the name of Jose or Ma. Lourdes Ong Bun for One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos.(awÞhi(
The three CCs have the following common provisions:
This instrument is transferable only in the books of the Custodian by the holder, or in the event of transfer, by the transferee or buyer thereof in person or by a duly authorized attorney-in-fact upon surrender of this instrument together with an acceptable deed of assignment.
The Holder hereof or transferee can withdraw at anytime during office hours his/her Silver Certificate of Deposit herein held in custody.
This instrument shall not be valid unless duly signed by the authorized signatories of the Bank, and shall cease to have force and effect upon payment under the terms hereof.
Thereafter, FEBTC merged with BPI after about eleven years since the said CCs were purchased. After the death of Ma. Lourdes Ong in December 2002, petitioner discovered that the three CCs bought from FEBTC were still in the safety vault of his deceased wife and were not surrendered to FEBTC. As such, petitioner sent a letter dated August 12, 2003 to BPI, through the manager of its Trust Department Asset Management, to advise him on the procedure for the claim of the said certificates. BPI replied to petitioner and informed the latter that upon its merger with FEBTC in 2000, there were no Silver Certificates of Deposit outstanding, which meant that the certificates were fully paid on their respective participation's maturity dates which did not go beyond 1991. There were further exchanges of written communications between petitioner and BPI, but the latter still refused to pay petitioner's claim because his certificates were no longer outstanding in its records. Thus, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, made a final demand in writing for the payment of the certificates, to no avail.
After about.three years from his discovery of the certificates, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against BPI on March 7, 2006 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33, Iloilo City (Civil Case No. 06-28822) praying that BPI be ordered to pay him ₱750,000.00 for the three CCs, legal interest, 175,000.00 for attorney's fees, ₱100,000.00 for moral damages, and an unspecified amount for exemplary damages as well as cost of suit.
BPI, in its Answer, insists that as early as 1991, all the Silver Certificates of Deposits, including those issued to petitioner and his wife, were already paid. It claimed that the CCs had terms of only 25 months and that by the year 2000, when it merged with FEBTC and when the Trust and Investments Group of FEBTC was no longer in existence, there were .no longer any outstanding CCs in its books. It had checked and double-checked its records as well as those of FEBTC. It also claimed that FEBTC had funy paid all of its silver certificates of time deposit on their maturity dates. According to BPI, contrary to petitioner's assertion, the presentation or surrender of the certificates is not a condition precedent for its payment by FEBTC. It also argued that petitioner filed his claim for the first time only on August 12, 2003, or 12 years after the maturity of the CCs and under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions based on a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the right accrues. In this case, according to BPI, petitioner's right accrued upon the maturity of the CCs in 1991, and the same has prescribed by the time he filed his claim. As a counterclaim, BPI prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay it ₱75,000.00 as attorney's fees, ₱2,000.00 per court appearance, at least ₱20,000.00 for litigation expenses, and ₱1,000,000.00 for exemplary damages. It further prayed that the complaint be dismissed and that petitioner be ordered to pay for the cost of the suit.
After trial on the merits, the RTC found in favor of petitioner and disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) for the Custodian Certificate dated June 9, 1989 bearing Serial CC No. 13115; the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) for the Custodian Certificate dated July 25, 1989 bearing Serial CC No. 131200; and the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱150,000.00) for the Custodian Certificate dated November 8, 1989 bearing Serial CC No. 224826, including their respective interests for twenty-five (25) months under the terms and conditions of the Silver Certificate of Deposit - entrusted for custody to defendant by plaintiff - that the said Custodian Certificates represent; plus legal interest thereon as regular savings deposit of the investments and their accrued interests from .the time of their respective maturity up to the time of payment.
(b) Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff ₱100,000.00 for moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay P75,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.3
As a consequence, BPI elevated the case to the CA wherein the latter granted the appeal of the former. The dispositive portion of the CA's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The 5 JUNE 2008 Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 06-28822 by Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the complaint filed in the said case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
The CA ruled that petitioner failed to prove that the deposits, which he claims to be unpaid, are still outstanding. According to the appellate court, the custodian certificates, standing alone, do not prove an outstanding deposit with the bank, but merely certify that FEBTC had in its custody for and in behalf of either petitioner or his late wife the corresponding Silver Certificates of Deposit and nothing more. The CA further ruled that the surrender of the custodian certificates is not required for the withdrawal of the certificates of deposits themselves or for the payment of the Silver Certificates of Deposit, hence, even if the holder has in his possession the said custodian certificates, this does not ipso facto mean that he is an unpaid depositor of the bank.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner insists that the CCs are evidence that the Silver Certificates of Deposit in his name in varying amounts are in the possession of the Trust Investments Group of FEBTC and constitute an outstanding obligation of respondent with whom FEBTC merged. He adds that since it has been proved that the CCs remained in the possession o.f the petitioner and has not been contn verted or shown to be non-existing, the said CCs remain incontrovertible and unrebutted evidence of indebtedness of the respond nt because said CCs all openly admit that the Silver Certificates of Deposit in varying amounts owned by the petitioner are in its possession and has not been discharged by payment. Hence, according to petitioner, the CA erred in its conclusion that the CCs in his possession do not prove an outstanding deposit with the respondent simply because the CCs are not the Certificates of Deposit themselves.
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45.5 This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt"6 when supported by substantial evidence.7 Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court.8
In Chessman v. Intermediate Appellate Court,9 this Court distinguished questions oflaw from questions of fact, thus:
As distinguished from a question of law which exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" - "there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or when the "query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation."10
However, these rules do admit of exceptions.11 Over time, the exceptions to these rules have expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Assistor, Jr.:12
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based. on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellate; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.13
In the present case, the findings of facts of the RTC and the CA are apparently in contrast, hence, this Court deems it proper to rule on the issues raised in the petition.
After careful consideration, this Court finds the petition to be meritorious.
It is undisputed that petitioner is in possession of three (3) CCs from FEBTC in the following amounts: (a) Custodian Certificate of Silver Certificate of Deposit No. 131157 issued on June 9, 1989 in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00); (b) Custodian Certificate of Silver Certificate of .Oeposit No. 131200 issued on July 25, 1989, in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00); (c) Custodian Certificate of Silver Certificate of Deposit No. 224826 issued on November 8, 1989 in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱150,000.00).
Simply put, the said CCs are proof that Silver Certificates of Deposits are in the custody of a custodian, which is, in this case, FEBTC. The CA therefore, erred in suggesting that the possession of petitioner of the same CCs does not prove an outstanding deposit because the latter are not the certificates of deposit themselves. What proves the deposits of the petitioner are the Silver Certificates of Deposits that have been admitted by the Trust Investments Group of the FEBTC to be in its custody as clearly shown by the wordings used in the subject CCs. Custodian Certificate of Silver Certificate of Deposit No. 131200 reads, in part:
This is to certify that the TRUSTS INVESTMENTS GROUP of FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (Custodian) has in its custody for and in behalf of ***** JOSE ONG BUN OR MA. LOURDES ONG ***** (Holder) the Silver Certificate of Deposit in the amount of PESOS: Php500,000.00.
This instrument is transferable only in the books of the Custodian by the holder, or in the event of transfer, by the transferee or buyer thereof in person or by a duly authorized attorney-in-fact upon surrender of this instrument together with an acceptable deed of assignment.
The Holder hereof or transferee can withdraw at anytime during office hours his/her Silver Certificate of Deposit herein held in custody.
This instrument shall not be valid unless duly signed by the authorized signa;ories of the Bank, and shall c ase to have force and effect upon payment under the terms hereof.14
The other two custodian certificates are of the same tenor.
In its Comment, respondent argued that upon its merger with FEBTC, there were no longer any outstanding Silver Certificates of Deposits, thus:
As previously discussed, the nature of the Silver Custodian Certificates of Time Deposit was issued by then FEBTC on the occasion of its 25th year anniversary in the year 1989. Consequently, these certificates had a term/maturity of twenty-five (25) months from its issuance or in the year 1991. Further, these certificates should be accompanied by a Confirmation of Participation which provides for the details of each participant would have. Upon the merger of FEBTC and BPI sometime in the year 2000, there were no outstanding Silver Certificates of Deposit in its books of accounts; neither did the petitioner present the Confirmation of Participation which should have been attached to his Custodian Certificates.15
Such an argument does not prove that petitioner has already been paid or that his deposits have already been returned. Likewise, there was no proof .or evidence that petitioner or his late wife withdrew the said Silver Certificates of Deposit. When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the burden of proving that it has been extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such defense to the claim of the creditor.16 Even where it is the plaintiff ([petitioner] herein) who alleges nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant ([respondent] herein) to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.17 Verily, an obligation may be extinguished by payment.18 However, two requisites must concur: (1) identity of the prestation, and (2) its integrjty. The first means that the very thing due must be delivered or released; and the second, that the prestation be fulfilled completely.19 In t.his case, no acknowledgment nor proof of full payment was presented by respondent but merely a pronouncement that there are no longer ap.y outstanding Silver Certificates of Deposits in its books of accounts. Thus, the RTC did not err in.the following findings:
A promise had been obtained by plaintiff from defendant bank that the custodian certificates would be paid upon maturity. Hence, the latter reneged on its promise when it refused payment thereof after demands were made by plaintiff for such payment considering that in 1989, his wife Ma. Lourdes Ong Bun acquired in their names three (3) certificates of deposits from FEBTC in various amounts, to wit: (a) Custodian Certificate of Silver Certificate of Deposit No. 131157 issued on June 9, 1989 in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), (Exhibit "A"); (b) Custodian Certificate of Silver Certificate of Deposit No. 131200 issued on July 25, 1989 in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) (Exhibit "B"); (c) Custodian Certificate of Silver Certificate ofDeposit No. 224826 issued on November 8, 1989 in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00), (Exhibit "C"). His wife kept these certificates of deposits. The claim of defendant bank, through the Manager of its Trust Department Asset Management, that the aforementioned certificates had been paid, is not supported by credible evidence and, therefore, unsubstantiated. Its position that the Silver
Certificates of Time Deposits in question and in the names of Jose Ong Bun or Ma. Lourdes Ong had been paid by the Far East Bank and Trust Company as early as the year 1991, when the same matured considering that at the time of the merger between Far East Bank and Trust Company and the Bank of Philippine Islands, no such Silver Certificates of Time Deposits were outstanding on the books of Far East Bank and Trust Company, is simply unconvincing.
The fact that the plaintiff still has [a] copy of the Custodian Certificate of the Silver Certificates of Time Deposit is material, contrary to the stance of defendant, as it is inconceivable that the bank would make payment without requiring the surrender thereof.20
Hence, the conclusion that the Silver Certificates of Deposit may have been withdrawn by the petitioner or his wife although they failed to surrender the custodian certificates is speculative and replete of any proof or evidence.
The CA further ruled that the surrender of the CCs is not required for the withdrawal of he certificates of deposit themselves or for the payment of the Silver Certificates of Deposit, hence, even if the holder has in his possession the said custodian certificates, this does not ipso facto mean that he is an unpaid depositor of the bank. Such conclusion is illogical because the very wordings contained in the CCs would suggest otherwise, thus:
This instrument is transferable only in the books of the Custodian by the holder, or in the event of transfer, by the transferee or buyer thereof in person or by a duly authorized attorney-in-fact upon surrender of this instrument together with an acceptable deed of assignment.
The Holder hereof or transferee can withdraw at anytime during office hours his/her Silver Certificate of Deposit herein held in custody.
This instrument shall not be valid unless duly signed by the authorized signatories of the Bank, and shall cease to have force and effect upon payment under the terms hereof.21
Furthermore, the surrender of such certificates would have promoted the protection of the bank and would have been more in line with the high standards expected of any banking institution. Banks, their business being impressed with public interest, are expected to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their dealings.22 The Court is not unmindful of the fact that a bank owes great fidelity to the public it deals with, its operation being essentially imbued with public interest x x x.23
As to the issues of prescription and laches raised by the respondent in its Comment, the same were not passed upon by the CA and cannot be raised before this Court unless an appeal was filed by the same respondent raising such issues.
The award of moral and exemplary damages, however, must be deleted for failure of petitioner to show that respondent was in bad faith or acted in any wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner in its dealings with petitioner. "The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably such action must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive."24 Also, in contracts and quasi-contracts, the Court has the discretion to award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.25 In this case, it appears that respondent had an honest belief that before its merger with FEBTC, the subject CCs were already paid and cleared from its books, hence, belying any claim that it acted in any manner that would warrant the grant of moral and exemplary damages to the petitioner.
The award of attorney's fees must also be omitted. We have consistently held that an award of attorney's fees under Article 220826 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification to avoid speculation and conjecture surrounding the grant thereof.27 Due to the special nature of the award of attorney's fees, a rigid standard is imposed on the courts before these fees could be granted. Hence, it is imperative that they clearly and distinctly set forth in their decisions the basis for the award thereof. It is not enough that they merely state the amount of the grant in the dispositive portion of their decisions.28 It bears reiteration that the award of attorney's fees is an exception rather than the general rule; thus, there must be compelling legal reason to bring the case within the exceptions provided under Article 2208 of the Civil Code to justify the award.29 In this case, the RTC merely justified the grant of attorney's fees on the reasoning that petitioner was forced to litigate. Thus, the present case does not fall within the exception provided under Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated May 22, 2014, of petitioner Jose T. Ong Bun, is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated September 25, 2012 and Resolution dated March 19,2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02715 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated June 5, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Iloilo City is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees be OMITTED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,* Acting C. J., (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.1a⍵⍴h!1
Footnotes
* Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles, with the concurrence of then Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Melchor Q. C. Sadang; rollo, pp. 26-35.
2 Rollo, pp. 47-49.
3 Rollo, p. 82.
4 Id. at 35.
5 Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 1.
6 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phil), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546 (1999).
7 Siasat v. Court of Appeals, 425 Phil. 139, 145 (2002); Tabaco v. Court of Appeals, 239 Phil. 485, 490 (1994) and Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 241 Phil. 776, 781 (1988).
8 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, 461 Phil. 461,469 (2003).
9 271 Phil. 89 (1991).
10 Id. at 97-98.
11 Pascual v. Burgos, et al., 777 Phil. 167, 182 (2016).
12 269 Phil. 225 (1990).
13 Id. at 232.
14 Rollo, p. 62.
15 Id. at 107-108.
16 See BPI v. Sps. Royeca, 581 Phil. 188 (2008).
17 See Cham v. Atty. Paita-Moya, 578 Phil. 566 (2008); BPI v. Sps. Royeca, supra.
18 Article 1231 of The Civil Code; CKH Industrial and Dev't. Corp v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 837, 852 (1997).
19 Alonzo, et al. v. Jaime and Perlita San Juan, 491 Phil. 232, 245 (2005), citing Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1991 Ed., p. 275.
20 Rollo, p. 80.
21 Id. at 62.
22 Consolidated Rural Bank, Inc. v. CA, 489 Phil. 320, 337 (2005).
23 Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank v. Cabrera, 494 Phil. 735, 745 (2005).
24 Francisco, et al. v. Ferrer, Jr., 405 Phil. 741, 749 (2001), citing Ace Haulers Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 393 Phil. 220, 230 (2000).
25 Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Sesante, G.R. No. 172682, July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 459, 485, citing Article 2232, Civil Code.
26 Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; and
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
27 Philippine National Construction Corporation v. APAC Marketing Corporation, 710 Phil. 389, 396 (2013), citing Delos Santos v. Papa, 605 Phil. 460, 473 (2009).
28 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 443 Phil. 351, 368 (2003), citing Pimentel v. Court of Appeals, 366 Phil. 494, 502 (1999).
29 Espino v. Spouses Bulut, 664 Phil. 702, 711 (2011).
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