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Philippine Airlines received a copy of the October 2, 2009 Resolution denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the July 22, 2008 Decision on October 20, 2009.27 By operation of law, the October 2, 2009 Resolution became final and executory on November 4, 2009, 15 days after Philippine Airlines received a copy of the October 2, 2009 Resolution. Though leave to file a Second Motion for Reconsideration was granted on January 20, 2010, the grant of leave only means that the Second Motion for Reconsideration is no longer prohibited under the Rules of Court. The grant of leave to file the Second Motion for Reconsideration did not, in any way, prevent the judgment on this case from becoming final and executory on November 4, 2009. Contrary to the majority opinion, the grant of leave to file a second motion for reconsideration does not "deceive the movants by allowing them to revel in some hollow victory."28 It does not follow that when leave to file is granted, the second motion for reconsideration shall likewise be granted. Litigants have no right to such expectation. The Court's pronouncement in Belviz v. Buenaventura,29 cited by the majority opinion, does not apply in this case. Belviz dealt with a second motion for reconsideration already granted by this court. Here, all that was granted was the leave to file. The second motion for reconsideration, however, was already denied on September 7, 2011. To contend "[t]hat a second motion for reconsideration based on an allowable ground suspends the running of the period for appeal from the date of the filing of the motion until such time that the same was acted upon and granted"30 is unavailing. Therefore, on January 20, 2010, the Court’s action granting leave for the Second Motion for Reconsideration was irregular.
That the records of this case do not contain any notation that the October 2, 2009 Resolution had been entered in the book of entries of judgment is inconsequential. A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law, with the date of finality of the judgment considered as the date of its entry.31 The October 2, 2009 Resolution is already final, with November 4, 2009 being the date of its entry. III
With the judgment having become final and executory as early as November 4, 2009, the validity of the October 4, 2011 En Banc Resolution recalling the Second Division’s Resolution that denied Philippine Airlines’ Second Motion for Reconsideration should no longer be at issue. Much issue has been made on who, under this Court’s issuances on its internal procedures, is the Justice to have properly taken charge of resolving Philippine Airlines’ Second Motion for Reconsideration on the first instance when this issue is not even jurisdictional. Under the Constitution, this case has been long been decided with finality by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The Court En Banc, as if an appellate court in relation to the Division that rendered judgment here, has no jurisdiction to resolve Philippine Airlines' Second Motion for Reconsideration/or the second time. Article VIII, Section 4 of the Constitution provides:
4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en bane, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the courtin a decision rendered en bane or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. Article VIII, Section 4 was especially relevant in Fortich v. Corona.32 The case involved the Sumilao farmers who staged a hunger strike in protest of the Office of the President's March 29, 1996 Decision that converted 144 hectares of land in Bukidnon from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. In its Order dated June 23, 1997, the Office of the President declared its March 29, 1996 Decision final and executory because none of the parties seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. However, in a November 7, 1997 Resolution or the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution, the Office of the President modified its March 29, 1996 Decision. Forty-four hectares of the former 144 were declared converted to agro-industrial/institutional area and the remaining 100 hectares were, instead, ordered distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries. This prompted petitioners, led by then Bukidnon Governor Carlos O. Fortich, to file a petition for certiorari before this Court. In the Decision33 dated April 24, 1998, this Court granted Governor Fortich, et al.’s petition for certiorari and voided the "Win/Win" Resolution.34 This Court held that the Office of the President had already lost jurisdiction to modify its March 29, 1996 Decision because it was already final and executory.35
The April 24, 1998 Decision in Fortich was unanimously voted by Members of the Second Division of the Court. Justice Antonio M. Martinez wrote36 the Decision in which Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, and Vicente V. Mendoza concurred.37 The farmer-beneficiaries filed motions for reconsideration of the April 24, 1998 Decision, arguing that the "Win/Win" Resolution was correctly issued so as to modify the erroneous March 29, 1996 Decision of the Office of the President. In addition, they prayed that their motions for reconsideration be elevated to the Court En Banc because of the supposedly novel issue involved in the case. In the November 17, 1998 Opinion38 still penned by Justice Martinez,39 the Court’s Second Division denied the motions for reconsideration with finality.40 The Court maintained that the March 29, 1996 Decision of the Office of the President was already final and executory, hence, unalterable even by this Court.41 Concurring in the November 17, 1998 Opinion was Justice Mendoza.42 Justice Puno dissented and was joined by Justice Melo.43 When the Second Division resolved the farmer-beneficiaries' first motions for reconsideration of the April 24, 1998 Decision, Justice Regalado had already retired.44 Thus, only four (4) of the five (5) Justices who deliberated on the issues in the case and voted on the April 24, 1998 Decision voted on the first motions for reconsideration. The vote was two-two. The farmer-beneficiaries filed motions for reconsideration of the November 17, 1998 Opinion, effectively the second motions for reconsideration filed in Fortieh. Citing Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution, the farmer-beneficiaries argued that the two-two vote in the first motions for reconsideration fell short of the minimum of three (3) votes required to carry a decision or resolution of the Court. Since the required number of votes was not obtained, the case, insisted by the farmer-beneficiaries, should be elevated to the en banc. In the Resolution45 dated August 19, 1999, the Court in Fortich rejected the farmer-beneficiaries' argument and denied the second motions for reconsideration. Examining the word choices in and syntax of Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution, the Court held that only "cases" that have not obtained the required number of votes may be elevated to and "decided" by the Court en banc. Using the statutory construction rule of reddendo singula singulis,46 the Court said that "decided" in the firstsentence of Section 4(3 ), Article VIII corresponded to ‘cases," and "resolved" corresponded to "matters." The word "matters," however, no longer appeared in the second sentence of Article VIII, Section 4(3). According to the Court, this omission was expressly made so that only a "case" that has not obtained the required number of votes in the Division, not "matters" such as motions for reconsideration, may be elevated to and "decided" by the Court En Banc. When a "matter" such as a motion for reconsideration does not obtain the required number of votes, it means that the motion for reconsideration must be denied for lack of the necessary votes, not elevated to the Court En Banc for resolution. The assailed decision previously rendered by the Division must, therefore, stand. In this Court's own words:
The reason for the rule, said this Court, is "simple."48 Continued this Court:
Voting two-two on the first motion for reconsideration, the Members of the Second Division failed to muster the minimum number of votes required to reconsider the April 24, 1998 Decision in Fortich. Therefore, the first motions for reconsideration were deemed denied for failure to obtain the required number of votes, and the case was not elevated en bane. 50 The April 24, 1998 Decision in Fortich, unanimously voted by the Members of the Second Division, was deemed affirmed.51 Fortich highlighted how a decision by any of the Divisions of this Court is a decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The Court En Banc is not an appellate court to which decisions of a Division of this Court may be appealed.52 Fortich, thus, affirmed Supreme Court Circular No. 2- 89 on the Guidelines and Rules in the Referral to the Court En Banc of Cases Assigned to a Division, the relevant portions of which provide:
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 would continue outlining the guidelines for referring a Division case to the Court En Banc:
At present, Rule 2, Section 355 of the Internal Rules enumerates the cases and matters cognizable by Court En Banc:
The Court En Banc assumed jurisdiction over this case based on Section 3(m), then Rule 2, Section 3(n) of the Internal Rules.
The enumeration in Rule 2, Section 3 of the Internal Rules on Court en bane matters and cases is an "amalgamation of,"57 hence based, on Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 as amended by the Resolution datedNovember 18, 199358 and Resolution dated January 18, 2000 in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC.59 The Resolution dated November 18, 1993 is cited as basis for adding "all other cases as the Court en bane by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention," now found in Rule 2, Section 3(m) of the Internal Rules, in the enumeration of cases cognizable by the en banc.60 The Resolution dated November 18, 1993 wholly provide: B.M. No. 20961 AMENDMENTS TO SECTIONS 15 AND 16, RULE 136 OF THE
As reflected above, the Resolution dated November 18, 1993 amended Bar Matter No. 209 which further amended Rule 136, Sections 15 and 16 of the Rules of Court then in effect, i.e., the 1964 Rules of Court. Rule 136 was entitled "Court Record and General Duties of Clerks and Stenographer" and Sections 15 and 16 dealt with "unprinted papers" and "printed papers." As the Resolution dated November 18, 1993 expressly stated, it amended the Resolution dated February 9, 1993 still on the form of unprinted papers and printed papers. In issuing the Resolution dated November 18, 1993 to amend a bar matter that dealt with the form of unprinted and printed papers, the Court could not have intended to "lay down new guidelines or rules for referral to the court en bane of cases assigned to a Division."62 The Resolution dated November 18, 1993 explicitly stated that the enumeration of en banc cases is only "for [the] said purpose" of determining the number of copies to file in the Court. The basis of the supposed residual power63 of the Court En Banc to, on its own, take cognizance of Division cases is, therefore, suspect. Even assuming that the Court intended to amend Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 through the Resolution dated November 18, 1993, there must be, at the very least, a consulta from the Division to which the case was assigned before the Court En Banc assumes jurisdiction over the Division case. This is consistent with Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the Constitution: a decision of the Division is a decision of the Supreme Court. Therefore, the current Rule 2, Section 3(m) of the Internal Rules must be read with section 3(1). The Court En Banc, on its own, cannot take cognizance of a Division case unless at least three (3) Members of the Division to which the case is assigned vote to refer the case to the Court En Banc. The Court En Banc has no residual power to assume jurisdiction over a Division case just because it deems it "of sufficient importance or interest." To summarize, a case is considered decided and a decision rendered by the Supreme Court of the Philippines when a majority of the Members of the Division who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case voted to concur in the decision. In no case shall the concurrence be less than three (3). When a Division already rendered a final decision or resolution in a case, the Court En Banc cannot set this final decision orresolution aside, even if it deems the case "of sufficient importance to merit its attention." The Court En Banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions rendered by a Division are appealed. Hence, when a decision or resolution of a Division is already final, the matter of referring the case to the Court En Banc must be favorably voted by at least three (3) Members of the Division who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case. Applying the foregoing here, the Court En Banc has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present case. The July 22, 2008 Decision of the Third Division, unanimously voted by the Members of the Third Division, is a Decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The October 2, 2009 Resolution was likewise unanimously voted by the Members of the Special Third Division. The judgment in this case attained finality on November 4, 2009, 15 days from Philippine Airlines' receipt of the October 2, 2009 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the July 22, 2008 Decision. Philippine Airlines' Second Motion for Reconsideration, the filing of which did not prevent the judgment in this case from attaining finality on November 4, 2009, was likewise unanimously denied by the Members of the Second Division in its September 7, 2011 Resolution. The judgment here having attained finality, the Court En Banc-as if an appellate court reviewing a case that the Supreme Court has already reviewed three (3) times-cannot now take cognizance of the case and review it for the fourth time because, suddenly, the case became of sufficient importance to merit the En Banc’s attention. In the October 4, 2011 Resolution issued in A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC, the Court En Banc took cognizance of the case supposedly on the ground that the Members of the Second Division that resolved Philippine Airlines' Second Motion for Reconsideration deemed the case appropriate for transfer to the Court En Banc. 64 However, despite the meetings called to discuss "the implications of the successive retirements, transfers, and inhibitions"65 affecting the membership of the Division to resolve Philippine Airlines' Motion to Vacate the September 7, 2011 Resolution that denied the Second Motion for Reconsideration, still, the required mode of referral to the En Banc is through a resolution.66 No resolution by the Second Division can befound in the records of this case. As further declared by the Court En Banc in A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC, it "acted on its own"67 and assumed jurisdiction over this case by recalling the September 7, 2011 Resolution issued by the Second Division. This cannot be done. To reiterate, the judgment assailed in this case is already final and executory by operation of law. The First Motion for Reconsideration was already denied with finality with the concurrence of all the Members of the Special Third Division of this Court. The Second Motion for Reconsideration, despite the grant of leave to file, was likewise denied by the Second Division. Not being an appellate court in relation to the Divisions, the Court En Banc has no authority to recall the Division's September 7, 2011 Resolution, assume jurisdiction over this case, then resolve anew Philippine Airlines' Second Motion for Reconsideration. A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC was a matter docketed as an administrative matter. It could not be another means to resurrect a case. To do so is highly irregular, suspect, and violative of due process of law. To mask this as being in the interest of justice is to mask its intention to rob labor of a case decided three (3) times in its favor. IV Further, with the current ponencia, this Court will be resolving Philippine Airlines' Second Motion for Reconsideration/or the second time. The Court En Banc effectively admitted a third motion for reconsideration from the same party, in violation of its own Rules. In my view, a unanimous vote of this Court sitting en banc must be required to grant Philippine Airlines’ third motion for reconsideration. Any vote less than unanimous must lead to a denial with finality of Philippines Airlines’ motion. A third motion for reconsideration is a disrespect to us and our rules of procedure. A third motion for reconsideration stifles the execution of a final and executory judgment of this Court. To truly prohibit the filing of further pleadings after the finality of our judgments, second and subsequent motions for reconsideration must be denied outright or, if they must be acted upon, they should be resolved with a standard stricter than that required in resolving first motions for reconsideration. It is in this Court’s interest to grant third and subsequent motions for reconsideration only with a unanimous vote. A unanimous court would debate and deliberate more fully compared with a non-unanimous court because unanimity makes the grant of third and subsequent motions for reconsideration more difficult. Greater debate must be required to allow a motion not sanctioned by our Rules.68 Unanimity prevents flip-flopping. It will shield this Court from parties who perceive themselves above the justice system. There is no violation of due process69 in requiring a unanimous vote instead of the majority vote required under the Constitution70 or the two- thirds (2/3) vote required under our Internal Rules.71 A third motion for reconsideration is not a remedy under our existing rules of procedure. Under law or equity, a party has no vested right to file, much more, to a grant of a third or any subsequent motion for reconsideration by a mere majority vote.72 Then, applying Fortich by analogy, a third motion for reconsideration that fails to muster a unanimous vote must be deemed denied. The decision, the resolution on the first motion for reconsideration, and the resolution on the second motion for reconsideration must be deemed affirmed. The Chief Justice is on leave while Justices Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, and Del Castillo inhibited themselves from participating in the deliberations and voting in this case. This leaves ten (10) Justices to deliberate and vote anew on Philippine Airlines' Second Motion for Reconsideration. It is in this Court's interest to require ten (10) votes to grant Philippine Airlines' second, effectively its third, motion for reconsideration. Any less than a unanimous vote will erode the reliability and credibility of this Court. V
Even on the merits, this case is not of sufficient importance to have merited the Court En Banc’s attention. There is no "higher interest of justice" to be satisfied in resolving Philippine Airlines' Second Motion for Reconsideration/or the second time. The then Article 28373 of the Labor Code on retrenchment provides: Article 283. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. - The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closuresor cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (112) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year. In contrast with the "just causes" for terminating employment brought about by an employee's acts, "authorized causes" such as retrenchment are undertaken by the employer. Retrenchment or "lay-off" is the cessation of employment commenced by the employer, devoid of any fault on the part of the workers and without prejudice to them.74 It is "resorted to by management during periods of business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new production program or the introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery, or of automation."75 Since retrenchment is commenced by the employer, the burden of proving that the termination was founded on an authorized cause necessarily rests with the employer.76 The employer has the duty to clearly and satisfactorily prove the elements of a valid retrenchment, which, as established in Lopez Sugar Corp. v. Federation of Free Workers,77 are the following:
These "four standards of retrenchment"79 -that the losses be substantial and not de minimis; that the substantial loss be imminent; that the retrenchment be reasonably necessary and would likely and effectively prevent the substantial loss; and that the loss, if already incurred, be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence-are reiterated in Central Azucarera De La Carlota v. National Labor Relations Commission, 80 Polymart Paper Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,81 F.F. Marine Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission,82 and Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Dawal. 83 It is doctrine that the employer proves substantial losses by offering in evidence audited financial statements showing that it has been operating at a loss for a period of time sufficient for the employer "to [have] perceived objectively and in good faith"84 that the business' financial standing is unlikely to improve in the future. "No evidence can best attest to a company['s] economic status other than its financial statement"85 because "[t]he audit of financial reports by independent external auditors are strictly governed by the national and international standards and regulations for the accounting profession."86 Auditing of financial statements prevents "manipulation of the figures ... to suit the company's needs."87 In LVN Pictures Employees and Workers Association (NLU) v. LVN Pictures, Inc., 88 decided in 1970, respondent corporation presented financial statements to prove a progressive pattern of loss from 1957 to 1961. By the time the corporation ceased from doing business, it incurred an aggregate loss of ₱1,560,985.14. This Court held that L VN had suffered serious business losses.89 In North Davao Mining Corporation v. NLRC,90 decided in 1996, petitioner corporation presented financial statements to prove a progressive pattern of loss from 1988 until its closure in 1992. The company suffered net losses averaging ₱3,000,000,000.00 a year, with an aggregate loss of ₱20,000,000,000.00 by the time of its closure. This Court held that North Davao experienced serious business losses.91 In Manatad v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation,92 decided in 2008, respondent corporation presented financial statements proving a progressive pattern of loss from 1995 to 1999. By the year 2000, the corporation had already incurred an aggregate loss of ₱2,169,000,000.00, constraining it to retrench some of its workers. This Court held that the employer was "fully justified in implementing a retrenchment program since it was undergoing business reverses, not only for a single fiscal year, but for several years prior to and even after the program."93 Unlike the employers in LVN Pictures Employees and Workers Association, North Davao Mining Corporation, and Manatad, Philippine Airlines plainly and miserably failed to discharge its burden of proving that it had suffered substantial losses for a period of time sufficient for it to have perceived objectively and in good faith that its business standing would unlikely improve in the future. Philippine Airlines did not submit any audited financial statements before the Labor Arbiter.94 The belatedly95 submitted audited financial statements for the years 2002 to 2004, copies of which were annexed to Philippine Airlines' Comment on FASAP’s Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, are irrelevant because they do not cover the years leading to Philippine Airlines’ supposedly dire financial situation in 1998. The financial statement for the year ending March 1998 attached to Philippine Airlines' First Motion for Reconsideration before this Court was, again, belatedly filed and cannot be accepted on appeal.96 That FASAP failed to question Philippine Airlines' financial status during the retrenchment and in its pleadings before the Labor Arbiter, National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of Appeals97 does notexcuse Philippine Airlines’ failure to present the relevant financial statements. Regardless of FASAP’s supposed recognition of Philippine Airlines’ grave financial condition as Justice Caguioa outlined in his Concurring Opinion,98 the members of F ASAP have no professional training to determine their employer's financial standing. The burden is not on them to prove that Philippine Airlines was suffering from legitimate business reverses warranting retrenchment. Further, contrary to Philippine Airlines’99 and Justice Caguioa’s100 points of view, this Court did not take judicial notice of Philippine Airlines' supposedly dire financial status in Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 101 Philippine Airlines v. Kurangking, 102 Philippine Airlines v. PALEA, 103 Philippine Airlines v. NLRC104 and Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Zamora. 105 In these cases, the courts merely recognized that Philippine Airlines was under corporate rehabilitation leading to the suspension of proceedings involving money claims against it. Justice Caguioa cites Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission106 where this Court considered the company’s receivership status as proof of losses. The present case, however, is different from Clarion. For one, the employer in Clarion presented evidence before the Labor Arbiter and National Labor Relations Commission that it was placed under receivership, further proving its sustained business losses.107 The company in Clarion was even liquidated and dissolved.108 The employer in Clarion did not engage in any act that negated its claim of serious business losses as a ground for retrenchment. Therefore, the fact that it was on receivership sufficed to substantiate its claim of business reverses. In this case, however, Philippine Airlines only made a "litany of woes"109 before the Labor Arbiter and National Labor Relations Commission "without offering any evidence to show that [those woes] translated into specific and substantial losses."110 Philippine Airlines even submitted a "stand-alone" rehabilitation plan to the Securities and Exchange Commission, undertaking recovery on its own, and thus, belying its claim of dire financial condition.111 Philippine Airlines eventually exited rehabilitation.112 Clarion, therefore, has no application in this case. Contrary to Emco Plywood Corp. v. Abelgas, 113 Philippine Airlines did not even prove that retrenching its employees was the only remaining way to lessen its purported business losses. Though not explicitly required under the Labor Code as pointed out by Philippines Airlines,114 retrenchment must and should remain a means of last resort of terminating employment,115 consistent with the constitutional policy of full protection to labor.116 An employee dismissed, even for an authorized cause, loses his or her means of livelihood.117 Therefore, employers must show that they utilized other less drastic measures that proved ineffective for their business to financially recover.118 The July 22, 2008 Decision underscored that there was no evidence on record confirming that Philippine Airlines resorted in cost-cutting measures apart from lessening its fleet and the retrenchment of its employees.119 This Court said:
Although, as pointed out by Justice Caguioa, an employer may resort to retrenchment on the basis of anticipated losses,121 the employer must nevertheless present convincing evidence which, as jurisprudentially established, consists of the audited financial statements. Here, there was no basis for Philippine Airlines to claim that it was financially crippled by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the massive strikes staged by its workers.122 Assuming that Philippine Airlines sustained business losses due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it should have nevertheless corroborated its claim by showing how this occurrence affected its financial status. To readily accept this assertion, as stated in the ponencia, 123 provides a dangerous precedent. "Any employer desirous of ridding itself of its employees could ... easily do so without need to adduce proof in support of its action."124 Security of tenure is a constitutionally mandated right. It should not be "denied on the basis of mere speculation."125 That Philippine Airlines was placed under receivership did not excuse it from submitting to the labor authorities copies of its audited financial statements to prove the urgency, necessity, and extent of its retrenchment program."126 "Employees almost always have no possession of thecompany's financial statements."127 Hence, it is the "companies such as [Philippine Airlines] [that] are required by law to file their audited financial statements before the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Securities and Exchange Commission."128 Considering that Philippine Airlines had the "heavy burden of proving the validity of retrenchment" and the immediate access to its own documents,129 it should have presented the audited financial statements as to put to rest any doubt on the stated reason behind the disputed retrenchment. I do not share the view that "to require a distressed corporation placed under rehabilitation or receivership to still submit its audited financial statements may become unnecessary or superfluous."130 To dispense with the audited financial statements and immediately accept sheer assertions of business losses is far from the stringent substantiation requirement mandated to employers by law and jurisprudence. It is undisputed that Philippine Airlines initially executed Plan 14 to lessen its operating losses "in the exercise of its management prerogative and sound business judgment."131 From formerly flying 54 planes in its fleet, it then operated with 14 planes to save itself from a total breakdown.132 Consequently, it had to allegedly reduce its manpower causing the retrenchment of 5,000 employees which included the 1,400 cabin crews who were also members of F ASAP.133 Subsequently, however, Philippine Airlines admittedly abandoned Plan 14 and implemented Plan 22 after it had experienced "a degree of relief as a result of the suspension of payment and rehabilitation proceedings in the [Securities and Exchange Commission] and the suspension of the [Collective Bargaining Agreement]."134 Allegedly, the choice of abandoning Plan 14 was a "business judgment . . . made in good faith and upon the advice of foreign airline industry experts."135 I disagree.
Implementing and executing Plan 22, when Plan 14 was already made known to the employees of Philippine Airlines, constitutes bad faith retrenchment.136 The illegal retrenchment program was founded on a wrong premise. The supposed implementation of Plan 14, which subsequently turned out to be Plan 22, caused the retrenchment of more workers than what was necessary.137 As this Court observed:
Additionally, the retrenchment program was based on unreasonable standards without any regard to each cabin crew's corresponding service record, thus discounting "seniority and loyalty in the evaluation of overall employee performance."139
There is no question that employers have the management prerogative to resort to retrenchment in times of legitimate business reverses. However, the "right to retrench" must be differentiated from the "actual retrenchment program."140 The manner and exercise of this privilege "must be made without abuse of discretion" and must not be "oppressive and abusive since it affects one's person and property."141 Philippine Airlines' failure to strictly comply with the substantive requirements of a valid retrenchment casts doubt on the true reason behind it. "[T]hat a retrenchment is anchored on serious, actual, and real losses or reverses is to say that [it was] done in good faith and not merely as a veneer to disguise the illicit termination of employees. Equally significant is anemployer’s basis for determining who among its employees shall be retrenched."142 That the retrenchment affected ten (10) out of twelve (12) FASAP officers-seven (7) of them were dismissed while three (3) were demoted143 -appears to be more than merely coincidental. As observed by the Labor Arbiter, the dismissal of the F ASAP officers "virtually busted [F ASAP] and rendered [it] ineffective to conduct its affairs."144 This constitutes unfair labor practice by interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.145
Philippine Airlines having exercised its right to retrench in bad faith, the quitclaims executed by the retrenched employees should be set aside. The reason for retrenchment was not "sufficiently and convincingly established."146 The quitclaims should be deemed involuntarily entered into, with the employees' consent obtained through fraud or mistake.147 This Court is aware of the corporate sector’s important function in our "country’s economic and social progress."148 Embedded in its business success "is the ethos of business autonomy which allows freedom of business determination with minimal government intrusion to ensure economic independence and development in terms defined by businessmen."149 Management choices, however, cannot be an unrestrained privilege which can outweigh the constitutionally mandated protection given to labor.150 Employment is one's way of livelihood.151 One "cannot be deprived of his labor or work without due process of law."152 VI
Third motions for reconsideration must not be favored for they go against the public policy of immutability of final judgments. Final judgments must remain unalterable, regardless of perceived errors,153 forreasons of economy and stability. Litigation must end at some point and prevailing parties should be allowed to enjoy the fruits of their victory.154
The actions of the majority of this Court En Banc in a separate administrative matter, reviving a second motion for reconsideration already decided upon and reversing a decision decided in favor of the union three (3) times, creates an ominous cloud that will besmirch our legitimacy. The majority has created an exception to our canonical rules on immutability of judgments. It is certainly not justice that this Court has done. For these reasons, I dissent. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to: (a)DENY WITH FINALITY Philippine Airlines, Inc.’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of October 2, 2009 and Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008; (b) GRANT the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines’ Motion for Reconsideration dated October 17, 2011 and REINSTATE the Second Division’s Resolution dated September 7, 2011; and (c) AFFIRM this Court’s Decision dated July 22, 2008 and Resolution dated October 2, 2009. MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN Footnotes 1 See Revelation 20, Revised Standard Version of the Bible. 2 Rollo (G.R. No. 178083), pp. 10-58. 3 617 Phil. 687 (2009) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Special Third Division]. 4 581 Phil. 228 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division]. 5 Id. at 271-272. 6 617 Phil. 687 (2009) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Special Third Division]. 7 Id. at 723. 8 Rollo (G.R. No. 178083), p. 2220, Philippine Airlines' Second Motion for Reconsideration. 9 Id. at 3568-3571. 10 Id. at 3569-3570. 11 Rollo (A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC), pp. 16-17. 12 684 Phil. 55 (2012) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]. 13 Ponencia as of July 28, 2017, p. 13. 14 City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 281Phil.408, 413 (1991) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc]. 15 Commissioner on Internal Revenue v. Visayan Electric Company, 125 Phil. 1125, 1127 (1967) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc]. 16 RULES OF COURT, Rule 52, sec. 1. 17 S. CT. INT. RULES,, Rule 15, secs. 1 and 2. 18 Commissioner on Internal Revenue v. Visayan Electric Company, 125 Phil. 1125, 1127 (1967) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc]. 19 324 Phil. 483 (1996) [Per CJ. Narvasa, Third Division]. 20 Id. at 489--490. 21 Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Judge Velasco, 324 Phil. 483, 489 (1996) [Per C.J. Narvasa, Third Division]; See McBurnie v. Ganzon, 719 Phil. 680 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc]. 22 . s. CT. INT. RULES,' Rule 15, sec. 3. 23 See McBurnie v. Ganzon, 719 Phil. 680 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc]. 24 See Munoz v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 809 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]. 25 665 Phil. 542 (2011) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division]. 26 Id. 27 Rollo (G.R. No. 178083), p. 2220, Philippine Airlines' Second Motion for Reconsideration. 28 Ponencia, p. 19 29 83 Phil. 337 (1949) [Per J. Paras, First Division]. 30 Ponencia, p. 19. 31 RULES OF COURT, Rule 51, sec. 10. 32 352 Phil. 461 (1998) [Per J. Martinez, Second Division]; 359 Phil. 210 (1998) [Per J. Martinez, Second Division]; 371 Phil. 672 (1999) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Special Second Division]. 33 352 Phil. 461 (1998) [Per J. Martinez, Second Division]. 34 Id. at 486. 35 Id. at 485. 36 Id. at 464. 37 Id. at 487. 38 359 Phil. 210 (1998) [Per J. Martinez, Second Division]. 39 Id. at 214. 40 Id. at 230. 41 Id. at 221-222. 42 Id. at 230. 43 Id. at pp. 230-238. Reviewing the records of the case, Justice Puno found that six (6) months past the issuance of the March 29, 1996 Decision of the Office of the President, then President Fidel V. Ramos constituted a Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force "to conduct a comprehensive review of the proper land use of the 144-hectare Sumilao property." President Ramos, according to Justice Puno, continued to treat the farmer-beneficiaries' case before the Office of the President as "still open," a power allegedly subsumed in the President's power of control over the executive branch. In effect, Justice Puno was of the opinion that the Office of the President may still resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by the farmer-beneficiaries, this despite the Office of the President's Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring its own March 29, 1996 Decision final and executory. 44 Justice Regalado retired on October 13, 1998. The Resolution denying the first motions for reconsideration was issued on November 17, 1998. 45 371 Phil. 672 (1999) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Special Second Division]. 46 Reddendo singula singulis is Latin for "referring each for each" and, as a rule of statutory construction, means that "words in different parts of statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise." See People v. Tamani, 154 Phil. 142, 147 (1974) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division] and City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 336 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]. 47 Fortich v. Corona, 371 Phil. 672, 679 (1999) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Special Second Division]. 48 Id. 49 Id. at 679-680. 50 Id. at 683. 51 Id. at 680. 52 See Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. New India Assurance Company, Ltd, 557 Phil. 679, 683 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]. 53 SC Circ. No. 2-89 (1989). 54 Id. 55 S. CT. INT. RULES, Rule 2, sec. 3 as amended. 56 Id. 57 Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr. et al., 658 Phil. 156, 175 (2011) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]. 58 Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 810, 816 (2000) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc]. 59 Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr. et al., 658 Phil. 156, 175 (2011) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]. 60 Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 810, 816 (2000) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc]. 61 SC Bar Matter No. 209 (1993). 62 J. Gonzaga-Reyes' Dissenting Opinion in Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 810, 825 (2000) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc]. 63 Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 810, 818 (2000) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc]. 64 Rollo, p. 16. The Court cited as bases Sections 3(m) and (n), now 3(1) and (m) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. 65 Ponencia, p. 24-25. 66 See Sections 3(1) and (m) in relation to section 11 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, thus:
67 In Re: Letters of Atty. Mendoza re: G.R. No. 178083-FASAP v. PAL, Inc. et al., 684 Phil. 55, 92 (2012) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]. 68 See J. Douglas' Dissenting Opinion in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 383 (1972) [Per J. White, United States Supreme Court]. The issue in Johnson was whether a less than unanimous vote of the jury is sufficient to convict an accused under the Sixth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative with Justice Douglas, among other Justices, dissenting. Justice Douglas was of the view that unanimity should be required for convictions because they involve the right to liberty the deprivation of which should be based on the same strict standard required for depriving the right to property, i.e., unanimous vote of a jury. Justice Douglas explained the reasons why a mere plurality vote "diminishes the reliability of a jury":
69 CONST., art. III, sec. 1 provides:
70 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 4(2) provides:
71 INTERNAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT, Rule 15, sec. 3. 72 Concepcion v. Garcia, 54 Phil. 81, 83 (1929) [Per J. Street, En Banc]. 73 Now Article 289 of the Labor Code pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 442 (2015). 74 Polymart Paper Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 355 Phil. 592, 599 (1998) [Per J. Martinez, Second Division]. 75 Id. 76 See Sanoh Fulton Phils., Inc. v. Bernardo, 716 Phil. 378 (2013) [Per J. Perez, Second Division]. 77 267 Phil. 2 I 2 (1990) [Per J. Feliciano, Third Division]. 78 Id. at 221-222. 79 Central Azucarera De La Carlota v. National Labor Relations Commission, 321 Phil. 989, 995 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division]. 80 321 Phil. 989, 996 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division]. 81 355 Phil. 592, 600-601 (1998) [Per J. Martinez, Second Division]. 82 495 Phil. 140, 152-153 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. 83 G.R. Nos. 173921 & 173952, February 24, 2016 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]. 84 Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing & Redrying Corp. v. NLRC, 360 Phil. 218, 236-237 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division], citing Somerville Stainless Steel Corporation v. NLRC, 350 Phil. 859, 869 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division]. 85 Manatad v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corp., 571 Phil. 494, 508 (2008) [Per J. ChicoNazario, Third Division]. 86 Hyatt Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc. v. Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt, 606 Phil. 490, 507 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]. 87 Id. at 510 88 146 Phil. 153 (1970) [Per J. Ruiz Castro, En Banc]. 89 Id. at 157 and 166. 90 325 Phil. 202 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc]. 91 Id. at 212. 92 571 Phil. 494 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]. 93 Id. at 509. 94 Rollo (G.R. No. 178083), p. 1534, Decision dated July 22, 2008. 95 Id. at 1537. 96 Id. at 2046, Resolution dated October 2, 2009. 97 Id. at 1552-1553, Motion for Reconsideration of July 22, 2008 Decision. 98 J. Caguioa's Concurring Opinion, p. 10, citing Alfelor v. Halasan, 520 Phil. 982 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division]. 99 See Rollo (G.R. No. 178083), p. 2240, PAL's Second MR 100 Justice Caguioa's Concurring Opinion, p. 13. 101 558 Phil. 328 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]. This Court ruled that Philippine Airlines was justified in not reinstating the employees pending the appeal before the NLRC due to the fact that it was under corporate rehabilitation. 102 438 Phil. 375 (2002) [Per J. Vitug, First Division]. The money claims for the missing luggage of respondent Spouses Kurangking and Spouses Dianalan were held to be "a financial demand that the law requires to be suspended during rehabilitation proceedings." 103 552 Phil. 118 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]. This Court suspended the proceedings involving the award of 13th month pay to PALEA members because PAL was under corporate rehabilitation. 104 648 Phil. 238 (2010) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]. The proceedings involving the dismissal of respondent Quijano and her claim for separation pay was suspended because PAL was under corporate rehabilitation. 105 543 Phil. 546 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]. The proceedings involving the dismissal of respondent Zamora and his money claims was suspended because PAL was under corporate rehabilitation. 106 500 Phil. 61 (2005) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division]. 107 Id. at 69. 108 Id. at 80. 109 FASAP v. PAL, 581 Phil. 228, 258 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division]. 110 Id. 111 Id. at 262. 112 Id. at 245. 113 471 Phil. 460, 476 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division]. 114 Rollo (G.R. No. 178083), p. 2281. 115 Emco Plywood Corp. v. Abe/gas, 471Phil.460, 476 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division] 116 CONST., art., XIII, sec. 3 provides:
117 Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 244 Phil. 280, 284 (1988) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division] 118 Emco Plywood Corp. v. Abe/gas, 471 Phil. 460, 476 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division] 119 Rollo (G.R. No. 178083), p. 1536, Decision dated July 22, 2008. 120 Id. 121 J. Caguioa's Concurring Opinion, p. 12, citing Blue Eagle Management v. Naval, G.R. No. 192488, April 19, 2016, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/april2016/192488.pdf> [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]. 122 Rollo (G.R. No. 178083), p. 1557, Motion for Reconsideration of July 22, 2008 Decision. 123 Ponencia as of July 28, 2017, p. 25 states: Besides, we take notice of the fact that airline operations are capital intensive earnings are volatile because of their vulnerability to economic recession, among others. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 had wrought havoc among the Asian air carriers, PAL included. The peculiarities existing in the airlines business made it easier to believe that at the time of the Asian Financial crisis, PAL incurred liabilities amounting to P 90,642, 933,919.00, which were way beyond the value of its assets that only stood at P85, 109,075, 351. 124 Indino v. National Labor Relations Commission, 258 Phil. 792, 800 (1989) [Per J. Sarmiento, Second Division]. 125 Id. 126 Rollo (G.R. No. 178083), p. 1535, Decision dated July 22, 2008. 127 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Dawal, G.R. Nos. 173921 & 173952, February 24, 2016, < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/february2016/173921.pdt> 21 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] 128 Id. at 22. 130 Ponencia as of July 28, 2017, p. 27. 131 Rollo (G.R. No. 178083), p. 1569, Motion for Reconsideration of July 22, 2008 Decision. 132 Id. 133 Id. 134 Id. at 1571-1572.
135 Id. at 1572. 136 Id. at 1540, Decision dated July 22, 2008. 137 Id. at 1544. 138 Id. at 1540-1541. 139 Id. at 513, Labor Arbiter's Decision. 140 Id. at 1539, Decision dated July 22, 2008. 141 Remerco Garments Manufacturing v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 219 Phil. 681, 689 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second Division]. 142 Am-Phil Food Concepts, Inc. v. Padilla, 744 Phil. 674, 690(2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] 143 Rollo, G.R. No. 178083, p. 510, Labor Arbiter's Decision. 144 Id. 145 LABOR CODE, art. 248(a) (renumbered as art. 258). See Lopez Sugar Corp. v. Franco, 497 Phil. 806 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division] 146 F.F. Marine Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 495 Phil. 140, 158 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division] 141 Id. 148 Id. at 151. 149 Id. 150 Id. 151 Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 244 Phil. 280, 284 (1988) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division] 152 Id. 153 Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 64 7 Phil. 251, 288 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]. 154 See Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, 472 Phil. 652 (2004) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division]. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation 
CONCURRING OPINION CAGUIOA, J.: I concur with the ponencia. More often than not, judicial decisions, in determining compliance with legal requirements, fall prey to the technicalities created by statutory text and jurisprudential pronouncements, often denying recognition to even the most reasonable and most commonplace of exceptions.1âwphi1 This is precisely what the case at bar presents, as the Court is yet again faced with the dilemma of whether or not requirements historically perpetuated as indispensable could reasonably be put aside in light of the factual circumstances surrounding the controversy. Yet, before one delves into the factual circumstances and the merit of the Second Motion for Reconsideration (2nd MR) filed by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), it is but necessary that the procedural issues raised by the Petitioner and J. Leonen’s dissent be sufficiently addressed. Procedural Issues As summarized by the ponencia, Petitioner argues that the October 4, 2011 Resolution of the Court is void for failure to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. More importantly, Petitioner submits that PA’s 2nd MR is a prohibited pleading considering that the July 22, 2008 Decision (2008 Decision) of the Court has already attained finality.
In a similar vein, the dissent posits that (a) the judgment in this case has become final and executory as early as November 4, 2009;1 (b) "[t]he judgment here having attained finality, the Court En Banc - as if an appellate court reviewing a case that the Supreme Court has already reviewed three (3) times - cannot now take cognizance of the case and review it for the fourth time because, suddenly, the case became of sufficient importance to merit the Bane's attention[;]"2 and (c) the Court en bane effectively admitted a third motion for reconsideration from the same party and hence a unanimous vote of this Court sitting en bane must be required to grant PAL’s third motion for reconsideration.3
At the outset, and to address Petitioner’s preliminary procedural issue, I express my concurrence with the conclusion of the ponencia that the October 4, 2011 Resolution of the Court is a valid issuance and is not violative of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. As the ponencia explained "any doubt on the validity of the recall order was removed because the Court upheld its issuance through the March 13, 2012 resolution"4 of the Court en banc. a. Timeline The specific dates and incidents that led to the Court en bane assuming jurisdiction over this case are narrated and clarified in the Resolution5 dated March 13, 2012 (March 2012 Resolution) of the Court en bane in A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC. These dates and incidents are no longer in dispute as they have already been settled and discussed by the Court en bane through its March 2012 Resolution, which highlighted the following incidents:
(1) On July 22, 2008, the Court’s Third Division ruled to grant the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), finding PAL guilty of illegal dismissal (July 2008 Decision). PAL subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) seeking to reverse the July 2008 Decision rendered by the Court's Third Division.6
(2) Due to the inhibition and retirement of several justices, PAL’s MR was handled by the Court's Special Third Division which, in turn, denied the MR with finality in a Resolution dated October 2, 2009 (October 2009 Resolution).7 (3) On November 3, 2009, PAL filed a Motion for Leave to File and Admit Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 2 October 2009 and 2nd Motion for Reconsideration of Decision dated 22 July 2008 (Motion for Leave).8 (4) On January 20, 2010, PAL’s Motion for Leave was granted by a newly constituted regular Third Division.9 As noted by the Court's March 2012 Resolution, "[t]his grant [by the regular Third Division] opened both the [July 2008] Decision and the [October 2009] Resolution x x x for review [and] effectively opened the whole case for review on the merits."10
(5) After the inhibition of Justice Velasco on January 17, 2011, the case was raffled to the Second Division. As narrated in the March 2012 Resolution, "[ o ]n September 7, 2011, the Court - through its Second Division as then constituted - resolved to deny with finality PAL’s 2nd MR through an unsigned resolution."11
(6) Because of the series of changes and movement from one division to the other, PAL’s counsel, Atty. Estelito Mendoza, wrote four letters addressed to the Clerk of Court specifically inquiring about which division acted on PAL’s 2nd MR, the identity of the ponente and the rationale/basis for the designation of the ponente and the handling division - in view of the retirement of the previous ponente and the members of the Second Division and Special Second Division.12
(7) The legal considerations and issues raised as a result of Atty. Mendoza’s letter are, to reiterate, extensively discussed in the March 2012 Resolution. As the Court en banc noted therein, the "unresolved questions were even further compounded in the course of the deliberations of the Members of the ruling Division when they were informed that the parties received the ruling on September 19, 2011, and this ruling would lapse to finality after the 15th day, or after October 4, 2011."13 Thus, out of prudence, the Members of the ruling Division on September 30, 2011 recommended to the Chief Justice that (a) the September 7, 2011 Resolution (September 2011 Resolution) be recalled; and (b) the case be referred to the Court en banc. 14
(8) On October 4, 2011, the Court en banc issued a Resolution (October 2011 Resolution) recalling the September 2011 Resolution and ordering the re-raffle of the case. As explained by the Court en bane in the March 2012 Resolution:
With the foregoing narration serving as the backdrop and context, it is easier now to see that the procedural issues raised by J. Leonen in his dissent have all been amply addressed by the March 2012 Resolution of the Court en banc. b. Nature of the March 2012 Resolution in A.M No. 11-10-1-SC One of the preliminary objections that has been raised with respect to the March 2012 Resolution is that this was docketed as an administrative matter. Being an administrative matter, it is somewhat argued that such cannot affect and override whatever disposition the Court may have in a regular case. This argument, however, is belied by the March 2012 Resolution itself.
To be sure, while the March 2012 Resolution was docketed as an administrative matter, the whole intent behind it - as established through its narration and discussion - was precisely to extensively explain the circumstances under which the Court en banc (a) recalled the September 2011 Resolution; and (b) assumed jurisdiction over the case through the issuance of the October 2011 Resolution. And, in connection with the latter, it should be emphasized that this October 2011 Resolution was promulgated in relation to this present case or under G.R. No. 178083 - and not through a resolution of an administrative matter. Stated otherwise, it is inaccurate to assert that the Court en bane assumed jurisdiction over the case via a disposition made in an administrative matter. To the contrary, the Court en bane already assumed jurisdiction through the October 2011 Resolution that was promulgated in G.R. No. 178083 and which recalled the September 2011 Resolution denying PAL’s 2nd MR. Thus, there is no mystery nor was it anomalous for the Court en banc to issue its March 2012 Resolution as this administrative matter was but an avenue to explain the Court en banc’s actions in the present case. This is patently evident from the dispositive portion of the March 2012 Resolution, which provides:
Clearly, based on the March 2012 Resolution and its detailed narration of the events that transpired within the Court, the Court’s disposition in A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC did not override, but merely clarified, the Court en banc’s actions and issuances in the present case (i.e., G.R. No. 178083).
c. Finality of the 2008 Decision and 2009 Resolution The primordial procedural concern, however, appears to be whether or not PAL’s 2nd MR should be entertained considering that the Court’s 2008 Decision and 2009 Resolution already attained finality (as insisted by the Petitioner and the dissent) and hence can no longer be entertained, modified, annulled or vacated by the Court en bane. This concern has been clearly addressed by the foregoing Timeline - meaning, that the Court en banc had already unequivocally declared and confirmed in the March 2012 Resolution that it had "assumed jurisdiction over the resolution of the merits of the motions for reconsideration of Philippine Airlines, Inc., addressing our July 22, 2008 Decision and October 2, 2009 Resolution; and that the September 7, 2011 ruling of the Second Division has been effectively recalled."17
As admitted by the dissenting opinion, "[a]s an exception, by leave of court, a party may file a second motion for reconsideration of the decision. The second motion for reconsideration may be subsequently granted ‘in the higher interest of justice"18 This has long been affirmed by the Supreme Court in a long line of cases as exemplified by the Court en banc’s pronouncement in McBurnie v. Ganzon19
In this instance, PAL received a copy of the October 2009 Resolution denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the 2008 Decision on October 20, 2009. On November 3, 2009, PAL asked for leave of court to file (a) an MR of the October 2009 Resolution; and (b) a 2nd MR of the 2008 Decision. On January 20, 2010, the Court, through the Third Division, granted PAL’s Motion for Leave. The fact that the Court granted PAL’s motion for leave to file its 2nd MR means exactly that - that the 2nd MR is no longer prohibited and may be granted "in the higher interest of substantial justice" and for "extraordinarily persuasive reasons." Thus, with the Court admitting the 2nd MR, this meant that the 2008 Decision and the 2009 Resolution were not rendered executory and could not have been implemented. To hold otherwise would be to render nugatory and illusory the Court en banc’s action of allowing and accepting the 2nd MR.
I am not unaware that there has been an instance where the Court has declared that the "grant of leave to file the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration x x x did not prevent [a] Resolution from becoming final and executory."21 I do not share the same view and believe that this declaration runs counter to the logic and very rationale of the Court’s action of allowing the filing of a 2nd MR. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Court in the same case admits that a second motion for reconsideration may still be granted and an entry of judgment lifted notwithstanding that the resolution has been deemed final and executory.22 Thus, the lone fact that a decision and/or a resolution has attained finality does not negate the Court’s power, in the higher interest of substantial justice, to entertain and grant subsequent motions for reconsideration filed by the parties. In fact, as this Court, in an en banc Resolution, lengthily explained:
Thus, the power of the Court to entertain PAL’s 2nd MR (and even a Third Motion for Reconsideration) and to grant such motion should the interest of substantial justice so warrant is undoubtedly clear and unequivocal. Accordingly, even on the assumption that this is PAL’s Third Motion for Reconsideration (which, as explained, it is not), the power of the Court to grant PAL’s motion is not negated.
d. Jurisdiction of the Court en banc to assume jurisdiction of the case The next crucial issue that needs to be addressed is whether or not the Court en bane has the jurisdiction to resolve PAL’s 2nd MR. Again, the answer has already been answered and explained in the March 2012 Resolution to be in the affirmative.
In this case, the dissent questions the transfer of this case to the Court en bane considering that no formal resolution was issued by the Second Division referring PAL’s 2nd MR to the Court en bane pursuant to the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC). However, as already stated, this issue regarding the Court en bane's jurisdiction was already directly traversed by the Court en bane in its March 2012 Resolution in A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC.
First, as highlighted in the March 2012 Resolution, the Court en banc may act on matters and cases that it deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention as provided in Section 3(m), Rule 2 of the IRSC. PAL’s 2nd MR and the interpretation of the conflicting provisions of the IRSC appears tohave been considered by the Court en bane to be of sufficient importance - such that the Court en bane assumed jurisdiction over the case.
In assailing Section 3(m), Rule 2 of the IRSC, the dissent relies on the dissenting opinion of J. Gonzaga-Reyes in Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals,24 in concluding that the residual power of the Court en bane to, on its own, take cognizance of Division cases is suspect. However, and with all due respect to J. Leonen, the dissenting opinion of J. Gonzaga-Reyes finds no application here. In Firestone, the Court en bane relied on a Resolution dated November 18, 1993 which, as pointed out by J. Gonzaga-Reyes, is an amendment to Sections 15 and 16, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which deals with the form ("unglazed paper," margins, number of copies, etc.) of unprinted and printed papers to be filed with this Court. Thus, as concluded by J. Gonzaga-Reyes, the Resolution dated November 18, 1993 was clearly not intended to lay down new guidelines or rules for referral to the court en banc of cases assigned to a Division.25
However, in the case at hand, Section 3, Rule 2 of the IRSC was clearly meant to lay down and establish the instances when a Court en bane may act on any case or matter - unlike in Firestone where the Resolution relied upon essentially deals with the format of the pleadings filed before the Supreme Court. As explicitly provided in Section 3(m), Rule 2, the Court en bane may act on cases that it deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention. And at the risk of belaboring the point, the March 2012 Resolution - rendered six (6) years ago - clearly established that the Court en banc had made a judicious determination at that time that PAL and FASAP’s case was of sufficient importance for it to assume jurisdiction. More importantly, the March 2012 Resolution likewise establishes that it was the members of the Division (which rendered the recalled September 7, 2011 Resolution26 ) that referred the matter to the Court en banc - albeit no formal resolution was issued. As explicitly narrated in the March 2012 Resolution, since there was "[ n ]o unanimity among the Members of the ruling Division x x x on the unresolved legal questions[,] they concluded that the matter is best determined by the Court en banc."27 It should be noted that the members of the Second Division, which issued the recalled September 7, 2011 ruling, unanimously concurred in the March 2012 Resolution and did not dispute the categorical declaration that they referred the matter on hand to the Court en banc. Such referral by the members of the Ruling Division coupled with the Court en bane's decision to exercise its power to assume jurisdiction of a case withsufficient importance should be sufficient legal basis for the Court en banc of today to decide the merits of the case now.
Finally, it should be stressed anew that the Court en banc already assumed jurisdiction through the October 2011 Resolution that was promulgated in G.R. No. 178083 (i.e., recalling the September 2011 Resolution denying PAL’s 2nd MR). This was "confirmed" by the Court en banc’s March 2012 Resolution, the dispositive portion of which is again quoted below:
Thus, for the Court of today, or more specifically, the dissent, to question what has clearly and already been resolved at least six (6) years ago, is to second guess the wisdom of what, for all intents and purposes, is already a final disposition of this issue. In this sense, it can be rightly said that the October 2011 Resolution and March 2012 Resolution have become immutable.
e. Unanimous vote of the Court en banc Anent the assertion that the unanimous vote of the Court sitting en bane must be required to grant PAL's motion for reconsideration (whether second or third), there is absolutely no legal or jurisprudential basis for such. Moreover, even applying Fortich v. Corona29 by analogy as the dissent suggests30 will not lead one to the conclusion that a unanimous vote is required. As the dissent itself narrated, it was only because the voting for the motion for reconsideration amounted to a tie (two-two) that the Decision of the Division was deemed upheld. Nowhere in Fortich did the Court even allude to requiring a unanimous vote.
Considering the foregoing, I agree with the ponencia that PAL’s 2nd MR is not a prohibited pleading. Moreover, and as underscored by him, PAL’s arguments in its 2nd MR sufficiently show that the assailed decision might have contravened established jurisprudence - clearly highlighting that the higher interests of substantial justice will be served if the 2008 Decision and the 2009 Resolution were to be revisited.
Substantial Issue: PAL’s financial losses There appears to be a question on the sufficiency of PAL’s compliance with the substantiation requirements imposed by law for a valid retrenchment. To recall, PAL invoked substantial business losses as the reason behind its decision to downsize. To this end, it presented its petition for suspension of payments, as well as the June 23, 1998 Order of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approving the said petition for suspension of payments as proof of the same.
I agree with the ponencia when he points out that Petitioner’s categorical admission of PAL’s dire financial condition had discharged the burden to prove financial losses. As has been consistently held by this Court, a judicial admission no longer requires proof. An admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission, and is conclusive as to such party. As succinctly explained by the Court in Alfelor v. Halasan31:
The records amply show that Petitioner had categorically admitted PAL’s grave financial condition during this time, as follows:
The foregoing express, positive and categorical statements of Petitioner in its pleadings as regards the severe losses incurred by PAL qualify as judicial admissions, which dispense with proof or evidence.
In any event, I submit that PAL has sufficiently shown and established the financial losses that it incurred which resulted in the implementation of the retrenchment program.
I am aware of decisions which state that in cases where retrenchment is premised on substantial business losses, proof of such losses becomes the determining factor in proving the legitimacy of retrenchment;39 and that the presentation of financial statements audited by independent auditors is required, as they best attest to a company's economic status and stand as the most authentic proof of losses.40 However, I submit that these financial statements cannot be recognized as the sole proof of financial distress. This has been amply discussed in the case of Blue Eagle Management, Inc. v. Naval,41 citing Revidad v. National Labor Relations Commission, 42 where it was declared that "proof of actual financial losses incurred by the company is not a condition sine qua non for retrenchment," and retrenchment may be undertaken by the employer to prevent even future losses. Said the Court:
Given the foregoing, it would truly be derisive of this Court to maintain the necessity of presenting financial statements showing actual loss prior to a valid exercise of retrenchment.
Inasmuch as financial statements paint a clear picture of a company's finances, other clear indicators of substantial losses - if not more compelling evidence thereof - exist. Verily, as clearly as financial statements demonstrate financial distress, a company's submission to corporate rehabilitation and receivership equally attests to, if not represents a more tangible manifestation of, financial reverses.
The Court has, in fact, recognized corporate receivership and rehabilitation as a veritable indicator of substantial business losses that justifies retrenchment of employees. In Clarion Printing House Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 44 for instance, the Petitioners therein argued that when a company is under receivership and a receiver is appointed to take control of its management and corporate affairs, one of the evident reasons is to prevent further losses of said company and protect its remaining assets from being dissipated; and that the submission of financial reports/statements prepared by independent auditors had been rendered moot and academic, the company having shut down its operations and having been placed under receivership by the SEC due to its inability to pay or comply with its obligations.45
The Court, in deciding the issue of whether undergoing receivership suffices as acceptable proof of financial losses, ruled as follows:
In finding that receivership suffices as proof of severe financial reverses, it was therefore decided that retrenchment was justified and that there was no illegal dismissal despite Clarion's failure to present the necessary financial statements before the Labor Arbiter.
Given the foregoing, it is therefore clear that proof of losses is not exclusively limited to the presentation of financial statements, as equally compelling evidence such as having undergone rehabilitation is similarly acceptable. In this light, it should be noted that, in the current case, PAL has proffered similar evidence on its behalf, as it has more than once asserted and proved that the SEC has approved its petition for rehabilitation and has in fact appointed a receiver on two occasions by virtue of its financial condition, not to mention that Petitioner has similarly judicially admitted and recognized PAL’s financial losses at that time. All these show that PAL had indeed been besieged by and suffered severe financial losses, which justify its resort to drastic cuts in personnel.
In addition, the Court has, in fact, recognized PAL’s financial conditions on various occasions, and it has consequently ruled in the latter's favor, as it recognized that PAL was undergoing receivership. Consequently, claims filed against it were either rejected or shelved in view thereof, as in the cases of Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Philippine Airlines Employees Association,47 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,48 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,49 Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals and Koschinger,50 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Sps. Kurangking, 51 Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. 52 and Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Zamora.53
The Court likewise recognized the urgency and gravity of PAL’s financial distress in Rivera v. Espiritu54 where it recognized that the carrier was financially beleaguered and faced with bankruptcy, as a result of its pilots' three-week strike and the subsequent four-day employee-wide strike involving 1,899 union members, requiring it to resort to downsizing and to seek rehabilitation.
Premises considered, PAL’s substantial business losses therefore stand amply substantiated, despite the failure to timely present its financial statements. Disregarding such facts and blindly insisting on the timely presentation of financial statements would only be a superfluity given the confluence of all the above. This Court should not be so unreasonable as to turn a blind eye to the factual circumstances surrounding the controversy, if only to uphold the "general rule." With all these, PAL’s claims of substantial financial losses should be upheld - and PAL’s 2nd MR should be granted.
On the basis of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of October 2, 2009 and Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008 filed by respondents Philippine Airlines, Inc. and Patria Chiong. Accordingly, I concur with the ponencia in denying the Motion for Reconsideration (Re: The Honorable Court's Resolution dated March 13, 2012) filed by the Petitioner Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines, setting aside the Decision dated July 22, 2008 and Resolution dated October 2, 2009, and affirming the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 23, 2006.
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA Footnotes 1 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion, p. 5. 2 Id. at 18. 3 Id.atl9. 4 Resolution, p. 16. Emphasis and underscoring supplied. 5 In re: Letters of Atty. Mendoza re: G.R. No. 178083 - FASAP v. PAL, Inc., et al., 684 Phil. 55 (2012). 6 Id. at 74-75. 7 Id. at 76-77. 8 Id. at 77, 79. 9 For a detailed explanation regarding the changes in the membership of the Third Division that rendered the relevant Decision and Resolution, please refer to the Court en banc’s March 2012 Resolution in AM. No. 11-10-1-SC. See id. at 74-85. 10 Id. at 79. 11 Id. at 85. Emphasis omitted. 12 Id. at 86-87. 13 Id. at 91. Emphasis omitted. 14 Id. at 91-92. 15 Id. at 92. Emphasis omitted. 16 Id. at 99. Emphasis in the original omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied. 17 Id. Emphasis omitted. 18 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion, p. 6. 19 719 Phil. 680 (2013). 21 Club Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista, 750 Phil. 599, 616 (2015); penned by J. Leonen. 22 See id. at 616. 23 Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Phils., 647 Phil. 251, 288-290 (20 10). 24 389 Phil. 810 (2000). 25 Id. at 825. 26 The September 7, 2011 Resolution denied with finality PAL’s second motion for reconsideration. 27 In re: Letters of Atty. Mendoza re: G.R. No. 178083 - FASAP v. PAL, Inc., et al., supra note 5, at 93. Emphasis omitted. 28 Id. at 99. 29 352 Phil. 461 (1998); 359 Phil. 210 (1998); 371 Phil. 672 (1999). 30 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion, p. 21. 31 520 Phil. 982 (2006). 32 Id. at 990-991. 33 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 113-114. 34 Id. at 164-165. 35 Id. at 176. 36 Id. at 196. 37 Id. at 549 38 Id. at 550. 39 See Precision Electronics Corporation v. NLRC, 258-A Phil. 449, 451-452 (1989). 40 See Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation v. Binamira, 639 Phil. 1, 12 (2010). See also Manatad v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, 571 Phil. 494, 508-509 (2008). 41 785 Phil. 133, 156 (2016). 42 315 Phil. 372, 390 (1995). 43 Blue Eagle Management, Inc. v. Naval, supra note 41, at 156. 44 500 Phil. 61 (2005). 45 Id. at 75-76. 46 Id. at 79. 47 552 Phil. 118 (2007). 48 648 Phil. 238 (2010). 49 G.R. No. 123238, July 11, 2005 (Unsigned Resolution). 50 596 Phil. 500 (2009). 51 438 Phil. 375 (2002). 52 558 Phil. 328 (2007). 53 543 Phil. 546 (2007). 54 425 Phil. 169 (2002). The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
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