Manila
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 220492. July 11, 2018 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. CCC, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
MARTIRES, J.:
The instant case is another account of incestuous rape brought before the Court on appeal from the 19 December 2014 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 06025 affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Nueva Vizcaya (RTC), convicting accused-appellant CCC (accused-appellant) of three (3) counts of Rape.
THE FACTS
Antecedent
In Criminal Case Nos. 3149-50, accused-appellant was accordingly charged in two (2) separate informations which read:
Criminal Case No. 3149
That sometime in January 2011, in the Municipality of [XXX], Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then and there, by means of force and intimidation inserted his penis inside the vagina and for several times had carnal knowledge of his own daughter [AAA],3 a 17 year old minor, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA].4 (emphasis and underlining omitted)
Criminal Case No. 3150
That sometime in September 2011, in the Municipality of [XXX], Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then and there, by means of force and intimidation inserted his penis inside the vagina and for several times had carnal knowledge of his own daughter [AAA], a 17 year old minor, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA].5 (emphasis and underlining omitted)
On 3 September 2012, accused-appellant was arraigned and, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty.6 Pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecution's Evidence
The prosecution's evidence accounted three (3) episodes of rape committed by accused-appellant against AAA that all happened in 2011. As a result, AAA conceived. She alleged it was her father's child as she did not have any prior sexual experience with any other man. The child was born on 27 May 2012.
In her testimony, AAA narrated that the first time his father raped her was while she was in the bathroom outside their house. While she was about to take a bath, accused-appellant entered, removed her panty, and made her lie down. He held her feet down, mounted her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After he was done, accused-appellant left, AAA continued to take a bath.
The second time AAA was raped happened inside her parent's bedroom. Accused-appellant pressed on AAA's thighs and removed her undergarments while she was lying down. Again, accused-appellant went on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina. When he was done, accused-appellant left AAA inside the bedroom. While all this was happening, AAA's mother was out at the garden and her siblings were in school.
The last episode AAA narrated was when accused-appellant told her to fix the water fixture beside the palali tree near their house. As she did, accused-appellant followed AAA, grabbed her, and removed her undergannents. While he was doing this, he told AAA he would hurt her if she told anyone. After instructing her to lie down, accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina.1âшphi1
AAA never told anybody about what was happening until her sister, asked if she was pregnant. Upon her sister’s insistence, AAA confided to her that their father had been raping her.7
When AAA was brought to the proper authorities to file the complaint, she was made to undergo a physical examination. The medico-legal examiner testified that AAA had told her that she was raped; thus, she concluded that the lacerations she noted in her genitalia at 11 o'clock and 6 o'clock positions were caused by sexual abuse.8
The Defense of the Accused-Appellant
On his part, accused-appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi. He said that he would never do such a thing to his own daughter and that the charge was brought against him because he would often scold and spank AAA for being stubborn. Also, it was impossible for him to rape AAA because his paralyzed father-in-law was always at home. Moreover, he said that he rarely encountered AAA at home because of their work schedule on the farm. He also offered the alibi that he rarely went home because he did not live in the same house with his family.9
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial on the merits, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape as defined under Article 266-A and penalized 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 9353 and RA 9346, and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole in each of the cases. He is also ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P75,000.00 as indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as [exemplary damages] in each of the three counts.10
In convicting the accused-appellant, the RTC found AAA's account of what happened credible and more believable. The trial court considered her testimony over the accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi which simply could not prevail against her positive and credible testimony. More than this, the evidence to prove his alibi was not enough to show that it was physically impossible for accused-appellant to have been present at the scene of the crime.
The Assailed CA Decision
On appeal, accused-appellant raised the following arguments: (1) AAA's testimony was improbable as it failed to mention any act of resistance and interest to fight back; (2) her narration of how she was raped was contrary to common human experience because accused-appellant could not hold both AAA's hands and feet simultaneously; (3) accused-appellant's moral ascendancy over AAA was insufficient or not overpowering enough to have a paralyzing effect on AAA; (4) AAA's reaction after every episode of rape puts doubt in her story's credibility; and (5) the real motive in filing rape charges against her father is to hide her indiscretion of having consented sexual intercourse with him.11
The CA found no reason to depart from the trial court's finding that AAA's testimony is credible. It said that an error-free testimony cannot be expected of a rape victim for she may not be able to recount every detail of her harrowing experience. Furthermore, the CA held that AAA's silence and submission to accused-appellant's abuses should not be taken as giving her consent because her father's moral ascendancy over her substitutes for violence and intimidation. The CA did not give much credence to accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi.
As a result, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision, but imposed legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all the damages awarded.
OUR RULING
The appeal lacks merit.
We find no reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC and the CA. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that an appellant can justifiably be convicted of rape based solely on the credible testimony of the victim. We consider, too, that nothing in the records indicates that the RTC and the CA had overlooked or had failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the outcome of the case.
In rape cases where no other person could accurately account what happened, except for the victim and the accused-appellant, the witnesses' credibility plays a big factor. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.12 Matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before him.13 The appellate courts are far detached from the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying during trial and thus have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, we acknowledge said limitations and recognize the advantage of the trial court whose findings must be given due deference.14
As a result, the findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are binding upon us. On the question of whether to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, the trial court's choice is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to conclude so, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness stand as they gave their testimonies.15 Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, this rule should not be disturbed.16
In appreciating the testimony of the victim, we have to bear in mind that rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For some, however, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would not easily forget. To recall this unwanted episode in one's life, not to mention having to call on one's memory over and over again just to narrate what really happened, is something we have to consider especially when it causes humiliation and mortification to the victim.
Here, we do not see any possible reason why AAA would falsely accuse her own father and at the same time divulge to the public that she had been sexually abused by the man who nurtured her as she was growing up. Worse, the accused failed to adduce evidence of ill motive against him for us to even consider that AAA would come up with a dastardly story just to see his father in jail. That a daughter would make up a story that would send her own father to jail is far beyond what the human conscience could take.
Moreover, the moral ascendancy of the accused took the place of the element of violence and intimidation. When the offender is the victim's father, there need not be actual force, threat or intimidation. When a father commits the odious crime of rape against his own daughter, as in this case, was a minor at the time of the commission of the offenses, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation.17 In People v. Barcela,18 the Court expounded:
[I]n the incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be [proven]. x x x The moral and physical [domination] of the father is sufficient to [intimidate] the victim into submission to his [carnal] desires. x x x The [rapist], by his overpowering and overbearing moral influence, can easily consummate his bestial lust with impunity. [Consequently], proof of force and violence is unnecessary, unlike when the accused is not an ascendant or a blood relative of the victim.19
All said, we affirm the conviction of accused-appellant. Whatever beastly motive drove him to commit such a vile and despicable act on his own daughter is something he should ponder on for the rest of his life. For a man who rapes his own daughter violates not only her purity and her trust but also the mores of society which he had scornfully defied.20 By inflicting his animal greed on her in a disgusting coercion of incestuous lust, he forfeits all respect as a human being and is justly to be spurned by all, not least of all by the fruit of his own loins whose progeny he has forever stained with his shameful and shameless lechery.21
We have to correct, however, the number of counts of rape accused appellant is convicted of. To recall, accused-appellant was charged under two (2) separate informations, but was convicted for three (3) counts of rape because AAA testified to three (3) accounts: (a) one was before she took a bath; (b) another in her parents' bedroom; and (c) lastly, by the palali tree. On this matter, the RTC said:
As stated in the informations, the accused was charged with multiple rape. The accused did not file any motion to quash on the ground that more than one offense had been charged. Thus, the accused is considered to have waived the defect and he may be convicted of as many offenses as has been charged and proven. During trial, the prosecution elicited from the complainant the fact that the accused had carnal knowledge of her on three separate occasions. The accused never raised any objection to the presentation of such evidence.22
Contrary to the understanding of the trial court, the informations filed against accused-appellant do not charge more than one offense which could be the subject of a motion to quash. A cursory reading of the informations filed against accused-appellant would show that each information charged him for a single crime of rape—the first one in January 2011 and the second one in September 2011. There is no duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges in a single information in the case at bar.1a⍵⍴h!1
This said, we, therefore, cannot convict accused-appellant for three (3) counts of rape absent a third charge or information filed against him. Simply said, there is no basis for the third count of rape.
Lastly, following our ruling in People v. Jugueta,23 we increase the award of exemplary damages to P75,000.00 for each crime of rape when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, in the light of all these, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM the 19 December 2014 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06025 with the following MODIFICATION: accused-appellant CCC is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of only two (2) counts of rape, and hereby impose upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole in each count. He is also ordered to pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages in each of the two counts.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., on official leave.
August 1, 2018
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on July 11, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on August 1, 2018 at 10:40 a.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 2-12; penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes and Melchor Q. Sadang.
2 Records, pp. 68-81; penned by Judge Jose Godofredo M. Naui.
3 Pursuant to R.A. No. 7610, "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes;" R.A. No. 9262, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefore, and for Other Purposes;" Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the "Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children," effective 15 November 2004; and People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006), the real name of the rape victim is withheld and, instead, fictitious initials are used to represent her. Also, the personal circumstances of the victim or any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, is not disclosed.
4 Records, p. 4.
5 Id. at 1.
6 Id. at 33.
7 Rollo, p. 3: CA Decision.
8 Id. at 4.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 81.
11 CA rollo, 57-67; Brief for the accused-appellant.
12 People v. Court of Appeals, People v. CA, 755 Phil. 80, 110 (2015).
13 Valbueco, Inc. v. Province of Bataan, 710 Phil. 633, 652 (2013) citing Sapu-an v. CA, 289 Phil. 319, 325 (1992).
14 People v. Vergara, 713 Phil. 224, 234 (2013).
15 People v. Burce, 730 Phil. 576, 586 (2014).
16 People v. Basao, 697 Phil. 193, 209 (2012).
17 People v. Bentayo, G.R. No. 216938, 5 June 2017 citing People v. Fragante, 657 Phil. 577, 592 (2011).
18 652 Phil. 134 (2010).
19 Id. at 147.
20 People v. Ramos, 247-A Phil. 484, 492 (1988).
21 Id.
22 Records, p. 80.
23 783 Phil. 806, 851 (2016).
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