G.R. No. 223395 - Dissenting Opinion




G.R. No. 223395, December 4, 2018, ♦ Decision, Tijam, [J] ♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J] EN BANC [ G.R. No. 223395. December 04, 2018 ] RENATO V. PERALTA, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION (PHILPOST), REPRESENTED BY MA. JOSEFINA MDELACRUZ IN HER CAPACITY AS POSTMASTER GENERAL AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF PHILPOST, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN CESAR N. SARINO, RESPONDENTS. DISSENTING OPINION LEONEN, J.: I dissent. Enshrined as a major principle is the inviolabilty of separation of church and State. Thus, in Article II, Section 6 of the Constitution: ARTICLE II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES .... Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. This inviolability is without qualification. The provision requires fealty to a strict reading. It should mean that the use of State resources to incidentally support a religion must be inevitable and unavoidable. I An image1 of the assailed centennial stamp is reproduced below: (See image p. 2) According to petitioner Peralta, the issuance of the Iglesia ni Cristo stamps is "purely religious"2 mainly because their design "commemorates the 100th year founding of [Felix Y. Manalo] of [Iglesia Ni Cristo], his leadership as First Executive Minister and with the [Iglesia Ni Cristo] Central Temple and Central Logo[.]"3 As such, their issuance and distribution are allegedly violative of the non-establishment clause and of Article VI, Section 29(2) of the Constitution prohibiting the employment of public money or property for the benefit of any religion. The non-establishment clause is found in Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, thus: Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Based on this provision, the State has two (2) fundamental duties: to respect the free exercise of any religious faith; and to not establish, endorse, or favor any religion.4 In my dissent in Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano,5 I stated: There is no duration, degree of convenience, or extent of following that justifies any express or implied endorsement of any religious message or practice. There is also no type of endorsement allowed by the provision. It is sufficient that the State, through its agents, favors expressly or impliedly a religious practice.6 The non-establishment clause recognizes the cultural power of the State. In my dissent in Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, I explained that: Congealed in this provision is the concept that the Constitution acknowledges the cultural power of the State. Government's resources, its reach, and ubiquity easily affect public consciousness. For example, actions of public officials are regular subjects of media in all its forms. The statements and actions of public officials easily pervade public deliberation. They also constitute frames for public debate on either personality or policy. The rituals and symbolisms of government not only educate the public but also etch civic and constitutional values into mainstream culture. The flag for instance, reminds us of our colorful history. Flag ceremonies instill passionate loyalty to the republic and the values for which it stands. Halls of Justice consist of buildings to remind the public that their cases are given equal importance. The arrangement of bench and bar within our courtrooms exhibits the majesty of the law by allowing the judicial occupants to tower over the advocates to a cause. This arrangement instills the civic value that no one's cause will be above the law: that no matter one's creed or belief, all will be equal. Any unnecessary endorsement, policy, or program that privileges, favors, endorses, or supports a religious practice or belief per se therefore would be constitutionally impermissible. It communicates a policy that contrary beliefs are not so privileged, not so favored, not so endorsed and unsupported by the Constitutional order. It implies that those whose creeds or whose faiths are different may not be as part of the political community as the other citizens who understand the rituals that are supported. It is to install discrimination against minority faiths or even against those who do not have any faith whatsoever.7 Relatedly, Article VI, Section 29(2) of the Constitution prohibits the appropriation or employment of public money or property for the use, benefit, or support of any religion: Section 29. .... (2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. The text of Article VI, Section 29(2) allows for no qualification. As I had previously remarked in my dissent in Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano: Section 29 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is straightforward and needs no statutory construction. The religious use of public property is proscribed in its totality. This proscription applies to any religion. This is especially so if the accommodation for the use of public property is principally, primarily, and exclusively only for a religious purpose.8 (Emphasis in the original) It is true that this Court has recognized one instance when governmental action may be inextricably linked with an event that is religious in character. In the old case of Aglipay v. Ruiz,9 this Court allowed the "incidental endorsement" of a religion so long as the challenged act has a secular purpose. Gregorio Aglipay, then Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, sought to enjoin the issuance and sale of commemorative stamps of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress of the Roman Catholic Church. He contended that the design and the very issuance of the stamps violated the separation of church and State as well as the constitutional prohibition on the appropriation of public money for the benefit of any religion. The design of the stamp assailed in Aglipay contained a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, with the inscription "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937."10 This Court dismissed the Petition, allowing the sale and distribution of the stamps. In so ruling, the Court observed that the primary purpose for the issuance of the stamps was secular. The stamps were designed in such a way that Manila was emphasized as the seat of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Thus, while the event was "religious in character,"11 the distribution of the stamps was nevertheless allowed because the main purpose for their sale and issuance was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country."12 Through Justice Laurel, this Court said: In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications [to] the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated.13 (Citations omitted) Identifying the secular purpose in an image and projecting its dominance are not enough. This mode of analysis invites courts to use their subjectivities in deciding how to look at an image. In a country with a dominant religion, this spells disaster for those whose faiths are not in the majority. It will also further marginalize those whose spiritual beliefs are not theistic, e.g. Buddhists, or those who are agnostic or atheistic. Iglesia ni Cristo's ability to fund the printing of the centennial stamps attests to its cultural dominance. It also reveals that it has the resources to mark its own anniversary through means other than the use of government facilities. Therefore, the government's issuance of stamps in its favor has no other purpose other than to favor its dominant religious teachings disguised through its anniversary. Our reading of the non-establishment clause should not be as superficial. Dominant religions may command their faithful to vote as a block for certain political candidates. In doing so, they can slowly erode the separation of church and State, sacrificing genuine sovereignty among our people. Therefore, the sponsorship of any faith through a commemorative stamp unwittingly furthers proselytization. Aglipay and the proposed decision record the pliability of our State to major religious denominations. In the guise of looking for the dominant secular purpose or benevolent neutrality,14 current doctrine may only be favoring these religions. Furthermore, it is not clear as to who decides that a particular religion is officially part of government history. In lieu of subjectivity, we must return to the Constitution in Article II, Section 6: the separation of church and State shall be inviolable. Should there be a link between governmental action and religion, the burden is on the government to show that the link is inevitable and unavoidable. Our Bill of Rights protects those who do not count themselves as part of the dominant religious faiths. Their beliefs, though fervent, may not translate to huge resources allowing them to influence politics and the use of the State's resources. Yet, it is for them that the assurance of separation of church and state has been made. Reifying faith in Aglipay does the exact opposite. Unfortunately, I dissent on these findings. II The Philippine Postal Corporation, in its Comment, maintains that "religion and politics are inextricably linked[.]"15 As basis, it again cites Aglipay, decided during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, where the Filipino people in the preamble implored the aid of Divine Providence. The present Constitution, according to the preamble, was ordained and promulgated with the aid of Almighty God.16 In my view, the preamble should not be a basis to raise the possibility of faiths which are not theistic. The epilogue of my dissent in Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano remains relevant here. The faiths which anchor our Constitution are diverse. It should not be the monopoly of any sect. The diversity mandated by our Constitution deepens our potentials as sovereigns. Therefore, to favor a belief system in a divine being, in any shape, form, or manner, is to undermine the very foundations of our legal order. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The printing and issuance of the Iglesia ni Cristo commemorative stamps should be declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Footnotes 1 Last accessed on December 3, 2018. 2 Rollo, p. 7. 3 Id. 4 See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Re: Letter ofTony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017, 10 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. 5 A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. 6 Id. at 15. 7 Id. at 14. 8 Id. at 18. 9 64 Phil. 201 (1937) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. 10 Id. at 209. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Id. at 209-210. 14 See Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]. 15 Rollo, p. 29. 16 The Preamble of the Constitution provides: PREAMBLE We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation