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The CA, performing its sworn duty to re-examine the trial records as thoroughly as it could in order to uncover any fact or circumstances that could impact the verdict in favor of the appellants, is presumed to have uncovered none sufficient to undo or reverse the conviction.27 The Court, on the one hand, did not find any compelling cause or impetus to disturb the findings of the CA especially so that the accused-appellants failed to convincingly argue their claim that these cases fall within the determined exclusions. Most significantly, in every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, even if the commission of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained.28 In these cases, the prosecution had undoubtedly discharged its task in accordance with the required degree of proof. It was the position of the accused-appellants that Jocelyn failed to elucidate who were the actual perpetrators and how the alleged crimes were carried out. The petitioners claimed that the tales of the events were all speculations and self-serving perceptions.29 Credible witness and credible testimony are the two essential elements for determining the weight of a particular testimony.30 Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.31 Although Jocelyn was only twelve years old when the incident happened and when called to the witness stand, the Court takes note of the truth that she possessed all the qualification and none of the disqualification to testify in these cases, viz:
Jocelyn's young age had no bearing on her qualification to testify on what happened that night on 19 November 1999. As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness.33 Significantly, even under the crucible of an intense cross-examination, Jocelyn never wavered in her narration as to the incidents that led to the killing of Artemio and the burning of their house, and in the affirmative identification of Sota and Gadjadli as two of the five persons who were responsible for these crimes. In Salvador v. People,34 the Court laid down the rule that direct evidence is not the only ground by which the guilt of an accused may be anchored, viz:
Jocelyn gave the credible testimony that on the night of 19 November 1999, Sota, Gadjadli, and three other unidentified persons lit the torch to burn their house but Artemio was able to put out the fire. Because the moon was bright, she vividly saw that it was Sota who acted as the leader of the group while Gadjadli carried a pistol. She witnessed that the group started to shoot at the house when Artemio became adamant not to open the door for fear he would be killed. It was with this burst of gunshots that made her jump out of the window and run towards the house of her brother Eusebio. When she looked back, their house was already burning while the group was shooting at Artemio who ran down the house.36 Plainly, these circumstances as testified to by Jocelyn produced a conviction beyond reasonable doubt that Sota, Gadjadli, and the three unidentified persons were responsible for the killing of Artemio and the burning of their house. Accused-appellants denigrate as contrary to human experience the testimony of Jocelyn that Eusebio, having been informed of what had happened to their father, did not make any move to help him.37 Noteworthy, in People v. Banez,38 the Court ruled that it is not at all uncommon or unnatural for a witness who, as in this case, having seen the killing of a person, did not even move, help, or run away from the crime scene, but simply chose to stay and continue plowing. It explained its ruling as follows:
Jocelyn testified that Eusebio did not help Artemio because he was trembling with fear. Presumably, Eusebio had been informed by Jocelyn that five malefactors came to Artemio's house that night. Eusebio's immediate reaction was to cower in fear with concern for his self-preservation rather than coming to the aid of his father. Jocelyn had no motive in Sota and Gadjadli failed to attribute any ill motive on the part of Jocelyn in testifying against them. Notably, nothing from the records can sustain a finding that Jocelyn, who was a child when called to the witness stand, was moved by ill will against Sota and Gadjadli sufficient to encourage her to fabricate a tale before the trial court. Both Sota and Gadjadli, according to her, were even the friends of Artemio. At her tender age, Jocelyn could not have been able to concoct particulars on how the group killed Artemio and burned their house. Settled is the rule that the absence of evidence as to an improper motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.40 Moreover, it has been observed that the natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victims, in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the culprits would gain immunity.41 The defenses of alibi and Sota's alibi was that he had fever due to chicken pox on 19 November 1999; thus, he stayed with his parents and siblings at their parents' house, located at Sibulan, Barangay Balas. Artemio's house stood on an adjacent lot. To fortify Sota's defense, Saaban testified that he was treating Sota for the swelling in his body at New Salvacion. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Sota and Saaban were readily apparent. Sota stated that he was staying in the house of his parents in Sibulan while Saaban claimed that Sota had been staying at New Salvacion where he had been treating the latter. To bolster his claim that Sota could not have committed the crime, Saaban stated that Sota's penis had been swollen; thus, Sota could not have walked to Sibulan. It must be stressed, however, that Sota's defense was that he was at Sibulan at his parents' house because he had fever and chicken pox. On the one hand, Janjali stated that he saw Sota on 19 November 1999 as the latter was on his way to Dipolog to seek medical attention for his scabies. He claimed that it was three days thereafter when Sota came back from Dipolog, thus, it was impossible for Sota to be at the crime scene on 19 November 1999 because Sota was still at a hospital in Dipolog. He asserted that he was sure about this because Sota passed by his house going to and coming from Dipolog. The testimony of Janjali fatally weakens Sota's alibi. To stress, Sota insisted that he was at the house of his parents on 19 November 1999 while Saaban confirmed that Sota was in Labason on that day. It was clear, therefore, that contrary to Janjali's testimony, Sota was not in Dipolog; thus, it was not impossible for Sota to be at the scene of the crime. Gadjadli offered the absurd alibi that it was Eusebio who had the intention to kill Artemio. He claimed that three nights before the incident Eusebio came to his house asking if he knew someone who could kill Artemio for ₱30,000.00. Noteworthy, the testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety and not merely on its truncated parts. In deciphering a testimony, the technique is not to consider only its isolated parts nor anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts.42 The defense of Gadjadli easily amounted to nothing when assayed as to the other portions of his testimony. He had stated that, on 19 November 1999 at around 6:00 p.m., he was on his way to inform Artemio about Eusebio' s plan when he came upon Eusebio, Solaydi, and a masked man shooting at Artemio. Gadjadli failed to consider the fact that the incident happened at 9:00 p.m. on 19 November 1999; thus, it was impossible for him to have witnessed the shooting of Artemio at 6:00 p.m. When compared to the alibi offered by Gadjadli to justify his presence at the scene of the crime, the Court finds more credible Jocelyn's testimony identifying him as the one carrying the pistol and firing the first shot at Artemio. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense that further crumbles when it comes face-to-face with the positive identification and straightforward narration of the prosecution witnesses.43 For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.44 The defense of denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.45 Sota's testimony that he was at his parents' house adjacent to the lot where Artemio's house stood, while Gadjadli claimed that he was actually at the scene of the crime, clearly proves it was probable that both Sota and Gadjadli had committed the crimes as charged. It was the position of Sota and Gadjadli that they had no motive to kill Artemio.46 Generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven.47 In these cases, the proof of motive of the appellants becomes even more irrelevant considering that their identity as two of the persons responsible for the killing of Artemio and the burning of his house was no longer in question. Criminal Case No. L-00355 Foremost, there is a need to determine whether the crime committed by the petitioners based on the facts was arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder using the following guidelines based on jurisprudence:48
According to Jocelyn, when Artemio refused to open the door, the group began shooting at the house. The group followed Artemio when he ran under the house, and there shot him - facts that unerringly leave the conclusion that the group's objective was to kill Artemio. Jocelyn testified that when Artemio refused to heed the demand of the group to give them food by opening the door, the group started to bum the house using a lighted torch of coconut leaves, which flames Artemio was able to put out. When Artemio still refused to open the door, the group threatened that they would burn the house. They made good their threat before they went after Artemio who ran below his house. Undoubtedly, the group's intent was also to burn down the house of Artemio, not only to kill him. With these established facts, the prosecution was correct in charging Sota, Gadjadli, and the three unnamed persons with murder and arson. Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 765950 as follows:
The RTC held that the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, and the aggravating circumstance of superior strength that attended the killing of Artemio had been proven by the prosecution.51 Jurisprudence dictates that, to be liable for murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide.52 The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and is done in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.53 In treachery, the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim is without the slightest provocation on his part.54 The mode of attack, therefore, must have been planned by the offender and must not have sprung from an unexpected turn of events.55 What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Treachery is likewise committed when the victim, although warned of the danger to his life, is defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.56 Jurisprudence57 defines evident premeditation as follows:
It was obvious that the group had deliberately reflected on the means to carry out their plan to kill Artemio, i.e., by making him open the door of his house when he hands them the food they demanded and thereafter to shoot him. They had a torch made of coconut leaves while Gadjadli was armed with a pistol which, as pointed out by the RTC, was an effective ploy and calculation by the group, considering that if Artemio refused to come out of the house, they would burn it.59 There was treachery when the group made Artemio believe they would bum his house for refusing to open the door and hand them the food they were demanding. Although Artemio knew the danger to his life if the group proceeded with its threat to bum the house should he still refuse to open the door, the unexpected firing at his house made it impossible for him to defend himself or to retaliate. The circumstance of use of superior strength cannot serve to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.60 Pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, the penalty to be imposed upon the accused-appellants should be reclusion perpetua to death.1âwphi1 With the effectivity of R.A. No. 9346,61 murder shall no longer be punishable by death but by reclusion perpetua. Following the ruling of the Court in People v. Jugueta,62 appellants shall be liable for the following: civil indemnity of ₱100,000.00; moral damages of ₱l00,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱l00,000.00; and temperate damages of ₱50,000.00. Additionally, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and temperate damages shall be subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of decision until fully paid.63 Criminal Case No. L-00356 In Criminal Case No. L-00356, accused-appellants were charged with arson under Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613.64 Enlightened precedent65 dictates the meaning of corpus delicti m arson, viz:
As testified to by Jocelyn, she and her siblings found the house and everything inside it burned to the ground the day after the incident. Noteworthy, the fact that the house of Artemio was burned was never assailed by the accused-appellants. Section 367 of P.D. No. 1613 provides that the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is an inhabited house or dwelling, while Section 4 thereof states that the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed if arson was attended by the following special aggravating circumstances:
The special aggravating circumstance that arson was committed by a syndicate should have been appreciated in this case.
The above provisions requiring that the qualifying and aggravating circumstances be specified in the information are in consonance with the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.68 Hence, even if the prosecution has duly proven the presence of the circumstances, the Court cannot appreciate the same if they were not alleged in the information.69 The information in Criminal Case No. L-00356 pertinently states that the "above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another and with intent to destroy property and moved by hatred or resentment, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously set on fire the residential house of one ARTEMIO EBA, causing to be totally burned including his belongings."70 The information clearly informs the accused that they, i.e., Sota, Gadjadli, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe, were being charged for having set on fire Artemio's house. The allegation that there were five accused conspiring to bum Artemio's house undoubtedly qualifies the crime as having been committed by a syndicate. Put otherwise, the information was couched in ordinary and concise language enough to enable the accused to know that they were being charged with arson perpetrated as a syndicate. Hence, to further state in the information that the crime was attended by the special aggravating circumstance that it was committed by a syndicate would only be a superfluity. The aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by a syndicate was confirmed by the fact that the accused-appellants and three other unidentified persons carried a torch and assembled outside Artemio' s house making threats to bum it. The well-coordinated movements of the group fortified their joint purpose and design, and community of interest in burning Artemio's house. The group started to bum the house of Artemio when he refused to open his door in order to hand them food. It was fortunate that Artemio was able to put out the fire from the torch; but after the group had fired on the house of Artemio, they set fire to his house and thereafter ran after him to shoot him. Noteworthy, in their respective decisions, both the RTC71 and the CA72 ruled that there were five persons who killed Artemio and burned his house down. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to a previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.73 In such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.74 Considering the presence of the special aggravating circumstance, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed on the accused-appellants. On damages, the CA was correct in awarding temperate damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00. In view of the presence of the special aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱20,000.00 is likewise appropriate.75 In addition, the temperate damages and exemplary damages to be paid by the accused-appellants are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of decision until fully paid.76 WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows: In Criminal Case No. L-00355, the Court finds GOLEM SOTA and AMID AL GADJADLI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of ARTEMIO EBA as follows: civil indemnity of ₱100,000.00; moral damages of ₱l00,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱l00,000.00; and temperate damages of ₱50,000.00, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and temperate damages. In Criminal Case No. L-00356, the Court finds GOLEM SOTA and AMIDAL GADJADLI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Arson defined and penalized under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1613; and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of ARTEMIO EBA the sum of ₱30,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid. SO ORDERED. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES WE CONCUR: PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
(On leave) A T T E S T A T I O N I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Footnotes * On Leave. 1 Rollo, pp. 3-18; penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino, and concurred in by Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Zenaida T. Galapate-Lagulles. 2 Records, pp. 172-199; penned by Judge Oscar D. Tomarong. 3 Id. at 1. 4 Id. at 2. 5 Records, pp. 33-34 and 44-45; TSN, 4 October 2000. 6 Also known as "Eboy." 7 Records, pp. 34-35, 40, 46-47 and 50-52. 8 Id. at 60-61; TSN, 24 January 2001. 9 Id. at 6. 10 Id. at 5. 11 Id. at 38-39; TSN, 4 October 2000; id. at 62; TSN, 24 January 2001. 12 Id. at (no proper pagination); TSN, 22 May 2008, pp. 2-10 and 15-16. 13 Id. at 129-131; TSN, 31 July 2008. 14 Id. At l31-133;id. 15 Id. at 134; id. 16 Id. at 154-157; TSN, 17 December2008. 17 Id. at 157-158; id. 18 Id. at (no proper pagination); TSN, 27 August 2009, pp. 2-3 and 7-9. 19 Records, pp. 172-199. 20 Id. at 197-198 21 Rollo, p. 17. 22 CA rollo, pp. 11-24. 23 Id. at 30-32; the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, likewise manifested that it was adopting its Brief for the Appellee as its Supplemental Brief. 24 People v. Dayaday, G.R. No. 213224, 16 January 2017. 25 Torres v. People, G.R. No. 206627, 18 January 2017. 26 Macayan, Jr. v. People, 756 Phil. 202, 215-216 (2015). 27 Luy v. People, G.R. No. 200087, 12 October 2016. 28 People v. Yau, 741 Phil. 747, 763-764 (2014). 29 CA rollo, pp. 18 and 20. 30 People v. Mangune, 698 Phil. 759, 769 (2012), citing People v. Sorongon, 445 Phil. 273, 278 (2003). 31 Idanan v. People, G.R. No. 193313, 16 March 2016, 787 SCRA 499, 506. 32 Rules of Court, Rule 130. 33 People v. Esugon, 761 Phil. 300, 310 (2015). 34 581 Phil. 430 (2008). 35 Id. at 439-440. 36 Records, pp. 33-35; TSN, 4 October 2000. 37 CA rollo, p. 20. 38 770 Phil. 40 (2015). 39 Id. at 46. 40 People v. Ygot, G.R. No. 210715, 18 July 2016, 797 Phil. 87, 94. 41 People v. Reynes, 423 Phil. 363, 382 (2001). 42 People v. Com bate, 653 Phil. 487, 500 (2010). 43 Ibanez v. People, G.R. No. I 90798, 27 January 2016, 782 SCRA 291, 312. 44 People v. Pitalla, Jr., G.R. No. 22356 I, I 9 October 20 I 6. 45 People v. Regalado, G.R. No. 210752, 17 August 2016. 46 CA rollo, pp. 21-22. 47 People v. De Guzman, 690 Phil. 701, 716 (2012). 48 People v. Baluntong, 629 Phil. 441 (2010). 49 Id. at 446-447, citing People v. Malngan, 534 Phil. 404, 431 (2006). 50 Entitled "An Act to impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, as amended, Other Special Laws, and for Other Purposes" which was approved on 13 December 1993. 51 CA rollo, pp. 38-40. 52 People v. Carnal, 692 Phil. 55, 73 (2012). 53 People v. Zuliela, 720 Phil. 818, 826 (2013), citing People v. Jalbonian, 713 Phil. 93, 106 (2013) further citing People v. Dela Cruz, 626 Phil. 631, 640 (2010). 54 People v. Juguela, G.R. No. 202124, 5 April 2016, 788 SCRA 331, 350. 55 People v. Caftaveras, 722 Phil. 259, 270 (2013). 56 People v. Carnal, supra note 52 at 85, citing People v. Nugas, 677 Phil. 168, 179-180 (2011). 57 People v. Repollo, 387 Phil. 390 (2000). 58 Id. at 403, 59 CA rollo, p. 40. 60 People v. Dadao, 725 Phil. 298, 314 (2014). 61 Entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines" dated 24 January 2006. 62 Supra note 54 at 381-382 and 388. 63 Id. at 388. 64 Entitled "Amending The Law On Arson" dated 7 March 1979. 65 People v. De Leon, 599 Phil. 759 (2009). 66 Id. at 769. 67 Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
68 People v. Lab-eo, 424 Phil. 482, 497 (2002). 69 People v. Lapore, 761 Phil. 196, 203 (2015). 70 Records, p. 2. 71 Id. at 186. 72 Rollo, p. 13. 73 People v. CA, 755 Phil. 80, 114 (2015). 74 Buebos v. People, 573 Phil. 347, 360 (2008). 75 People v. De Leon, 599 Phil. 759, 770 (2009). 76 People v. Jugueta, supra note 54 at 388. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation 
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