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Though [Valencia] worked in the premises of Classique Vinyl x x x and that the [equipment] he used in the performance of his work was provided by the between [Valencia] and Classique Vinyl x x x in view of the foregoing circumstances earlier reflected. Besides, as articulated by jurisprudence, the power of control does not require actual exercise of the power but the power to wield that power x x x. With the foregoing chain of events, it is evident that [Valencia] is an employee of respondent [CMS]. x x x x10 Accordingly, the NLRC held that there is no basis for Valencia to hold Classique Vinyl liable for his alleged illegal dismissal as well as for his money claims. Hence, the NLRC dismissed Valencia's appeal and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Valencia's motion for reconsideration thereto was likewise denied for lack of merit in the Resolution11 dated June 8, 2011. Ruling of the Court of Appeals When Valencia sought recourse from the CA, the said court rendered a Decision12 dated December 5, 2012 denying his Petition for Certiorari and affirming the ruling of the NLRC. Valencia's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution 13 dated March 18, 2013. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari imputing upon the CA the following errors: WITH DUE RESPECT, IT IS A SERIOUS ERROR WHICH CONSTITUTE[S] GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO HAVE RULED THAT PETITIONER IS AN EMPLOYEE OF CMS AND FURTHER RULED THAT HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO HIS MONETARY CLAIMS. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS['] DECISION AND RESOLUTION ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND WELL-SETTLED RULE.14 Valencia points out that the CA, in ruling that he was an employee of CMS, relied heavily on the employment contract which the latter caused him to sign. He argues, however, that the said contract deserves scant consideration since aside from being improperly filled up (there were many portions without entries), the same was not notarized. Valencia likewise stresses that ti.11e burden of proving that CMS is a legitimate job contractor lies with respondents. Here, neither Classique Vinyl nor CMS was able to present proof that the latter has substantial capital to do business as to be considered a legitimate independent contractor. Hence, CMS is presumed to be a mere labor-only contractor and Classique Vinyl, as CMS' principal, was Valencia's true employer. As to his alleged dismissal, Valencia argues that respondents failed to establish just or authorized cause, thus, his dismissal was illegal. Anent his monetary claims, Valencia invokes the principle that he who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Since respondents failed to present even a single piece of evidence that he has been paid his labor standards benefits, he believes that he is entitled to recover them from respondents who must be held jointly and severally liable for the same. Further, Valencia contends that respondents should be assessed moral and exemplary damages for circumventing pertinent labor laws by preventing him from attaining regular employment status. Lastly, for having been compelled to engage the services of counsel, Valencia claims that he is likewise entitled to attorney's fees. For their part, respondents Classique Vinyl and Chang point out that the issues raised by Valencia involve questions of fact which are not within the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari. Besides, findings of facts of the labor tribunals when affirmed by the CA are generally binding on this Court. At any rate, the said respondents reiterate the argun1ents they raised before the labor tribunals and the CA. With respect to respondent CMS, the Court dispensed with the filing of its comment15 when the resolution requiring it to file one was returned to the Court unserved 16 and after Valencia informed the Court that per Certification 17 of the Office of the Treasurer of Valenzuela City where CMS's office was located, the latter had already closed down its business on March 21, 2012. Our Ruling There is no merit in the Petition. The core issue here is whether there exists an employer-employee relationship between Classique Vinyl and Valencia. Needless to state, it is from the said detennination that the other issues raised, i.e., whether Valencia was illegally dismissed by Classique Vinyl and whether the latter is liable for his monetary claims, hinge. However, as correctly pointed out by Classique Vinyl, "[t]he issue of whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between [Valencia] and [Classique Vinyl] is essentially a question of fact." 18 "The Court is not a trier of facts and will not review the factual findings of the lower tribunals as these are generally binding and conclusive."'19 While there are recognized exceptions,20 none of them applies in this case. Even if otherwise, the Court is not inclined to depart from the uniform findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA. "It is an oft-repeated rule that in labor cases, as in other administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, 'the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.’ ‘The burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue’."21 Since it is Valencia here who is claiming to be an employee of Classique Vinyl, it is thus incumbent upon him to proffer evidence to prove the existence of employer-employee relationship between them. He "needs to show by substantial evidence that he was indeed an employee of the company against which he claims illegal dismissal."22 Corollary, the burden to prove the elements of an employer-employee relationship, viz.: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power of control, lies upon Valencia. Indeed, there is no hard and fast rule designed to establish the aforementioned elements of employer-employee relationship.23 "Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted."24 In this case, however, Valencia failed to present competent evidence, documentary or otherwise, to support his claimed employer-employee relationship between him and Classique Vinyl. All he advanced were mere factual assertions unsupported by proof. In fact, most of Valencia's allegations even militate against his claim that Classique Vinyl was his true employer. For one, Valencia stated in his Sinumpaang Salaysay that his application was actually received and processed by CMS which required him to submit the necessary requirements for employment. Upon submission thereof, it was CMS that caused him to sign an employment contract, which upon perusal, is actually a contract between him and CMS. It was only after he was engaged as a contractual employee of CMS that he was deployed to Classique Vinyl. Clearly, Valencia's selection and engagement was undertaken by CMS and conversely, this negates the existence of such element insofar as Classique Vinyl is concerned. It bears to state, in addition, that as opposed to Valencia's argument, the lack of notarization of the said employment contract did not adversely affect its veracity and effectiveness since significantly, Valencia does not deny having signed the same.25 The CA, therefore, did not err in relying on the said employment contract in its determination of the merits of this case. For another, Valencia himself acknowledged that the pay slips26 he submitted do not bear the name of Classique Vinyl. While the Court in Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission27took judicial notice of the practice of employer to course through the purported contractor the act of paying wages to evade liabilities under the Labor Code, hence, the non-appearance of employer's name in the pay slip, the Court is not inclined to rule that such is the case here. This is conside1ing that although CMS claimed in its supplemental Position Paper/Comment that the money it used to pay Valencia's wages came from Classique Vinyl,28 the same is a mere allegation without proof Moreover, such allegation is inconsistent with CMS's earlier assertion in its Position Paper29 that Valencia received from it non-cash wages in an approximate amount of ₱3,000.00. A clear showing of the element of payment of wages by Classique Vinyl is therefore absent. Aside from the afore-mentioned inconsistent allegations of Valencia, his claim that his work was supervised by Classique Vinyl does not hold water. Again, the Court finds the same as a self-serving assertion unworthy of credence. On the other hand, the employment contract which Valencia signed with CMS categorically states that the latter possessed not only the power of control but also of dismissal over him, viz.:
Clearly, therefore, no error can be attributed on the part of the labor tribunals and the CA in ruling out the existence of employer-employee relationship between Valencia and Classique Vinyl. Further, the Court finds untenable Valencia's argument that neither Classique Vinyl nor CMS was able to present proof that the latter is a legitimate independent contractor and therefore, unable to rebut the presumption that a contractor is presumed to be a labor-only contractor. "Genera1ly, the presumption is that the contractor is a labor-only [contractor] unless such contractor overcomes the burden of proving that it has the substantial capital, investment, tools and the lik.e."31 Here, to prove that CMS was a legitimate contractor, Classique Vinyl presented the former's Certificate of Registration32 with the Department of Trade and Industry and, License33 as private recruitment and placement agency from the Department of Labor and Employment. Indeed, these documents are not conclusive evidence of the status of CMS as a contractor. However, such fact of registration of CMS prevented the legal presumption of it being a mere labor-only contractor from arising.34 In any event, it must be stressed that "in labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. The principal employer therefore becomes solidarily liable with the labor-only contractor for all the rightful claims of the employees."35 The facts of this case, however, failed to establish that there is any circumvention of labor laws as to call for the creation by the statute of an employer-employee relationship between Classique Vinyl and Valencia. In fact, even as against CMS, Valencia's money claims has been debunked by the labor tribunals and the CA. Again, the Court is not inclined to disturb the same. In view of the above disquisition, the Court finds no necessity to dwell on the issue of whether Valencia was illegally dismissed by Classique Vinyl and whether the latter is liable for Valencia's money claims. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. 'The assailed December 5, 2012 Decision and March 18, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120999 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO WE CONCUR: MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Footnotes 1 CA rollo, pp. 325-336; penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ricardo R. Rosario. 2 Id. at 389-390. 3 NLRC records, pp. 1-3. 4 Id. at 7-8. 5 Id. at 27-29. 6 Id. at 139. 7 Id. at 208-215; penned by Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac. 8 Id. at 213-215. 9 Id. at 263-273; penned by Commissioner Teresita D. Castillon-Lora and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Napoleon M. Menese. 10 Id. at 270-272. 11 Id. at 3i7-318. 12 CA rollo, pp. 325-336. 13 Id. at 396-397. 14 Rollo, p. 8. 15 Id. at 448-449. 16 Id. at 441-442. 17 Id. at 448-449. 18 Legend Hotel (Manila) v. Realuyo, 691 Phil. n6, 236 (2012). 19 Cavite Apparel, Incorporated v. Marquez, 703 Phil. 46, 53 (2013). 20 These exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings of the Court of Appeals an: contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they am based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record, (Pascual v. Burgos, G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016, 778 SCRA 189, 205-206) 21 Tenazas v. R. Villegas Taxi Transport, G,R. No. 192998, April 2, 2014, 720 SCRA 467, 480-481. 22 Javier v. Fly Ace Corporation, 682 Phil. 359, 372 (2012). 23 Tenazas v. R. Villegas Taxi Transport, supra at 481. 24 Id. 25 Gelos v. Court of Appeals, 284-A Phil. 114, 120 (1992) 26 NLRC records, pp. 30-3 l. 27 381 Phil. 460, 480 (2000). 28See CMS' Position Paper/Comment, Supplemental, NLRC records, pp. 144-147 at 146. 29 Id. at 36-39. 30 Id. at 139. 31 Garden of Memories Park and Life Plan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 681 Phil. 299, 311 (2012), 32NLRC records. p. 183. 33 Id. at 184. 34 Babas v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, 653 Phil. 421, 433 (2010). 35 7K Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 537 Phil. 664, 680-681 (2006). The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation ![]() ![]() |