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According to the Labor Arbiter, those illness not listed under Section 32 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) are disputably presumed as work-related; thus, the burden is on the respondents to present substantial evidence or such relevant evidence that there is no causal connection between the nature of the seafarer's work and his illness, or that the risk of contracting the illness was not increased by his working condition. The Labor Arbiter further stated that she is not bound by the assessment of the company-designated physician because no such qualifying terms as "only" and "exclusively" in the POEA-SEC limit her judgment and that a contrary interpretation would lead to the absurdity of petitioner's disability being decided by the designated physician and not by the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC. Thus, in view of the uncertainty of the diseases' development, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner's work as team headwaiter cannot be discounted as contributory, even to a small degree, in the development of his condition. The NLRC, in its Decision dated December 15, 2012, affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, thus:
It held that the nature of the petitioner's employment is presumed to be the cause of the illness because it occurred during his stint with respondents and that his employment need not be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of his illness as it is enough that it contributed to the development thereof. After respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied, they filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA and in its Decision dated October 9, 2013, the latter granted the petition and reversed and set aside the Decision of the NLRC, thus: premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated December 15, 2011 and February 15, 2012, respectively, are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.7 According to the CA, while degenerative, Parkinson's Disease is neither listed as a disability under Sec. 32 of the POEA-SEC, nor is it considered an occupational disease under Sec. 32-A thereof. Thus, the CA held that it is imperative that petitioner establish the existence of a causal connection between his illness and the work for which he was contracted for and petitioner fell short of the standards imposed upon him by law. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in the CA's Resolution dated November 5, 2014. Thus, the present petition with the following grounds:
It is petitioner's contention that his illness is work-related and insists that he was exposed to the harsh conditions of the elements, the perils at sea, severe stress while being away from his family and fatigue due to long hours of work on board the vessel, 10-12 hours daily. Petitioner further argues that due to his not being able to return to the seafaring occupation because of his illness, he is entitled to permanent total disability as the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC determined. In their Comment8 dated March 20, 2015, respondents reiterated the Decision of the CA. As a general rule, only questions of law raised via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court9 are reviewable by this Court.10 Factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, including labor tribunals, are accorded much respect by this Court as they are specialized to rule on matters falling within their jurisdiction especially when these are supported by substantial evidence.11 However, a relaxation of this rule is made permissible by this Court whenever any of the following circumstances is present:
Whether or not petitioner's illness is compensable is essentially a factual issue. Yet, this Court can and will be justified in looking into it considering the conflicting views of the NLRC and the CA.13 For disability to be compensable under Section 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.14 The POEA-SEC defines a work-related injury as "injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment," and a work-related illness as "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied."15 For illnesses not mentioned under Section 32, the POEA-SEC creates a disputable presumption in favor of the seafarer that these illnesses are work-related.16 Notwithstanding the presumption, We have held that on due process grounds, the claimant-seafarer must still prove by substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or, at least, increased the risk of contracting the disease.17 This is because awards of compensation cannot rest entirely on bare assertions and presumptions.18 In order to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection is sufficient-direct causal relation is not required.19 Thus, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.20 A careful review of the findings of the NLRC and the LA show that petitioner was able to meet the required degree of proof that his illness is compensable as it is work-connected. The NLRC correctly ruled that his work conditions caused or, at least, increased the risk of contracting the disease, thus:
In reversing the NLRC's decision, the CA is of the opinion that petitioner was never exposed to any toxic elements on board because the vessel was a cruise ship akin to a five star restaurant and could not have been exposed to any harsh condition thereof. Furthermore, according to the CA, no other guests or employees suffered any illness being exposed to the same work condition as petitioner, hence, his condition cannot be deemed to be work-related. Those findings, however, are flawed. Working on any vessel, whether it be a cruise ship or not, can still expose any employee to harsh conditions.1âwphi1 In this case, aside from the usual conditions experienced by seafarers, such as the harsh conditions of the sea, long hours of work, stress brought about by being away from their families, petitioner, a team head waiter, also performed the duties of a "fire watch" and assigned to welding works, all of which contributed to petitioner's stress, fatigue and extreme exhaustion. To presume, therefore, that employees of a cruise ship do not experience the usual perils encountered by those working on a different vessel is utterly wrong. As aptly observed by the Labor Arbiter, petitioner's work as Team Headwaiter cannot be discounted as contributory factor, even to a small degree in the development of his illness, thus:
Anent the CA's opinion that no other guests or employees suffered any illness being exposed to the same conditions as petitioner, and thus, his illness cannot be considered as work-related, such is completely erroneous because not all persons have the same health condition, stamina and physical capability to fight an illness. In view of the above disquisitions, this Court therefore affirms the compensability of petitioner's permanent disability. The US$60,000.00 (the equivalent of 120o/o of US$50,000.00) disability allowance is justified under Section 32 of the POEA Contract as petitioner suffered from permanent total disability. The grant of attorney's fees is likewise affirmed for being justified in accordance with Article 2208(2)23 of the Civil Code, since petitioner was compelled to litigate to satisfy his claim for disability benefits.24 WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated November 26, 2014 of petitioner Lamberto M. De Leon is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated October 9, 2013 and the Resolution dated November 5, 2014, both of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated December 15, 2011 and Resolution dated February 15, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission, granting petitioner disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00 or its Philippine Peso equivalent and the award of attorney's fees, are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA* A T T E S T A T I O N I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Footnotes * Designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2416, dated January 4, 2017. 1 Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, rollo, pp. 25-32. 2 Id. at 23-24. 3 Id. at 35-44 4 Id. at 33-34. 5 Id. at 55. 6 Id. at 44. 7 Id. at 31-32. 8 Id. at 62-76. 9 Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
10 Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al. v. Joselito A. Cristino, G.R. No. 188638, December 9, 2015, citing Heirs of Pacencia Racaza v. Abay-Abay, 687 Phil. 584, 590 (2012). 11 Merck Sharp and Dohme (Phils.), et al. v. Robles, et al., 620 Phil. 505, 512 (2009). 12 Co v. Vargas, 676 Phil. 463, 471 (2011). 13 Bandila Shipping, Inc., et al. v. Marcos C. Abalos, 627 Phil. 152, 156 (2010), citing Masangcay v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., 590 Phi. 611, 625 (2008). 14 Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., et al. v. Eduardo C. Obrero, et al., G.R. No. 192754, September 7, 2016, citing Tagle v. Anglo-Eastern Crew Management, Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 209302, July 9, 2014, 729 SCRA 677, 694-695. 15 POEA-SEC (2000), Definition of Terms. 16 POEA-SEC (2000), Sec. 20(B)(4). 17 Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Aligway, G.R. No. 201793, September 16, 2015, 770 SCRA 609; Dahle-Philman Manning Agency, Inc. v. Heirs of Andres G. Gazzingan, G.R. No. 199568, June 17, 2015, 759 SCRA 209, 226; Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division), 630 Phil. 352, 365 (2010). 18 Casomo v. Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., 692 Phil. 326, 334 (2012). The prevailing rule is analogous to the rule under the old Workmen's Compensation Act that a preliminary link between the illness and the employment must first be shown before the presumption of work-relation can attach. 19 Grace Marine Shipping Corporation v. Alarcon, G.R. No. 201536, September 9, 2015, 770 SCRA 259, 279-280. 20 Gabunas, Sr. v. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., 653 Phil. 457, 468 (2010); NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. v. NLRC, 336 Phil. 466, 474 (1997). 21 Rollo, pp. 40-42. 22 Id. at 52. 23 Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation. attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered except:
24 PHILASIA Shipping Agency Corporation v. Tomacruz, 692 Phil. 632, 651 (2012). The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation 
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