CONCURRING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I concur in the ruling of the ponencia, but would like to underscore the procedural considerations underlying my concurrence. Specifically, the focal point of this elucidation is on how parties similarly situated to the ones herein are to proceed had the Court not opted to resolve the petition on the merits.
Having ruled that the DOJ properly exercised jurisdiction over the controversy pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 242 and Executive Order No. (EO) 292, it behooves the Court to require similarly situated agencies adversely affected by latter rulings of the DOJ in intra-governmental disputes to observe the procedural steps for appeal as prescribed by the very same statutes that conferred jurisdiction to it.
Moving forward, it is as Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) proffered - rulings of the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) in the exercise of his jurisdiction over controversies solely involving government agencies ought to be appealed to the Office of the President. As per Section 70, Chapter 14, Title I, Book IV of EO 292:
Section 70. Appeals. - The decision of the Secretary of Justice as well as that of the Solicitor General, when approved by the Secretary of Justice, shall be final and binding upon the parties involved. Appeals may, however, be taken to the President where the amount of the claim or the value of the property exceeds one million pesos. The decision of the President shall be final.
The authority of the President to review the ruling of the DOJ is part and parcel of his extensive power of control over the executive department and its officers, from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk,1 that is preserved in Article VII, Section 17 of the Philippine Constitution, to wit:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
"Control," in this context, is defined in jurisprudence as "the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."2 With this definition in mind, it becomes apparent that Section 70, Chapter 14, Title I, Book IV of EO 292 had been crafted to enable the President to exercise this power of control over his alter-egos by allowing him to substitute their judgment with his own, which in this case permits the President to reverse the finding of the DOI acting as a quasi-judicial body on appeal.
Appeal to the Office of the President likewise finds support in the doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies. The rule calls for a party to first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes before seeking intervention of the court, so as not to deprive these agencies of their authority and opportunity to deliberate on the issues of the case.3 In the same vein, the doctrine allows the President to correct the actions of his subordinates, including those of the SOJ, before these can be questioned in a court of law.
Judicial recourse from the exercise of administrative agencies of quasi-judicial powers is to the Court of Appeals (CA), save for those directly appealable to this Court. This finds basis under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,4 as amended by RA 7902,5 which grants the CA with general appellate jurisdiction over judgments of quasi-judicial bodies, viz:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
x x x x
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
As identified in Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,6 the Office of the President is among the governmental bodies whose rulings fall under the CA's appellate jurisdiction. Be that as it may and with all due respect to Justice Carpio, it is humbly submitted that, by way of exception, direct recourse to this Court is justified insofar as tax controversies solely between government institutions that have been resolved by the Office of the President are concerned.
A review of recent jurisprudence reveals that the thrust of the Court has been to divest the CA of jurisdiction over tax-related controversies.1âwphi1 To illustrate, the Court En Banc in the recent case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo ruled that it is not the CA, but the CTA, that is the proper forum for challenging interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in cases that would fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA on appeal.7 In devolving from the CA the exercise of certiorari powers in favor of the CTA, the Court held that:
x x x x [W]hile there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 8
And in Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company v. Secretary of Finance, We recognized that there was a trend wherein both the CT A and the CA disclaim jurisdiction over tax cases: on the one hand, mere prayer for the declaration of a tax measure's unconstitutionality or invalidity before the CT A resulted in a petition's outright dismissal, and on the other hand, the CA would dismiss the same petition should it find that the primary issue is not the tax measure's validity but the assessment or taxability of the transaction or subject involved.9 In punctuating the issue, We held that, pursuant to the CTA's power of certiorari recognized in City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, appeals from the ruling of the Secretary of Finance is to the CT A, not the CA, even though the case involved a challenge against the validity of a revenue regulation, thus:
x x x x [I]t is now within the power of the CT A, through its power of certiorari, to rule on the validity of a particular administrative rule or regulation so long as it is within its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, it can now rule not only on the propriety of an assessment or tax treatment of a certain transaction, but also on the validity of the revenue regulation or revenue memorandum circular on which the said assessment is based.10
The policy has therefore been clear - to transfer appellate jurisdiction over tax-related controversies from the CA to the CTA. It would then be an act of regression for the Court to once again vest the CA with jurisdiction over cases concerning the interpretation of tax statutes, similar to the subject matter of the case at bar, simply because it was appealed from the Office of the President.
One may then be tempted to presume that judicial recourse from the ruling of the Office of the President over a tax-related dispute is to the CT A. However, We have already categorically ruled herein that it is the DOJ, rather than the CTA, that has jurisdiction over the controversy. To later on declare that the CT A may nevertheless exercise appellate jurisdiction over the ruling of the Office of the President would run counter to this earlier pronouncement, and would also unduly lengthen the proceedings by burdening the aggrieved party to appeal the case to two more bodies, the CT A Division and CT A En Banc, before the case reaches this Court.
Moreover, the CTA does not have appellate jurisdiction over tax controversies resolved by the Office of the President. To be sure, Republic Act No. (RA) 1125,11 as amended by RA 9282,12 delineates the jurisdiction of the CT A in the following manner:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties.
The CT A, as a specialized court, enjoys jurisdiction limited to those specifically mentioned in the law. Noteworthy is that the exhaustive enumeration aforequoted does not include appeals from the Office of the President. Thus, the CT A could not be deemed to have been bestowed with the authority to review the said rulings regardless of whether or not the dispute involves the interpretation of tax laws.
With both the CA and the CT A unable to exercise appellate jurisdiction over rulings of the Office of the President in tax-related controversies, it becomes evident that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to the government agency aggrieved. Direct recourse to this Court via certiorari should then be permissible under such circumstances in fulfillment of Our role as the final arbiter and court of last resort, and of Our constitutional mandate and bounden duty to settle justiciable controversies.
In view of the foregoing, I reiterate my concurrence with the holding of the ponencia that the DOJ properly exercised jurisdiction over the controversy between the conflicting arms of the government, and that, for future reference, appeal should be taken by the aggrieved agency to the Office of the President. It is humbly submitted, however, that appeals from the Office of the President in inter-governmental tax disputes should be elevated to this Court, rather than the CA, by way of certiorari.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Carpio v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992, 206 SCRA 290, 295.
2 Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955).
3 Fua, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 175803, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA347, 352.
4 AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
5 AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION NINE OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129, AS AMENDED, KNOWN AS THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980.
6 Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (emphasis added)
7 G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014, 715 SCRA 182, 202.
8 Id.
9 G.R. No. 210987, November 24, 2014, 741 SCRA 578, 597.
10 Id. at 600.
11 AN ACT CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS.
12 AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS (CTA), ELEVATING ITS RANK TO THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH SPECIAL JURISDICTION AND ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1125, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LAW CREA TING THE COURT OFT AX APPEALS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
DISSENTING OPINION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The Majority Opinion opines that the Secretary of Justice has jurisdiction over the instant case pursuant to Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Presidential Decree No. (PD)242.
With much regret, I am unable to give my concurrence.
Disputed tax assessments solely involving government entities fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner of P1temal Revenue (CIR) and the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
Section 41 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) states that the CIR has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to interpret tax laws and to decide tax cases. Thus, the CIR has the power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the 1997 NIRC or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
On the other hand, Section 72 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1125, as amended by RA 9282, provides that decisions or inactions of the CIR in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the 1997 NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR are under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
In this case, since what is involved is petitioner's disputed Value-Added Tax (VAT) assessment, which it paid under protest, it is the BIR and the CTA, not the Secretary of Justice, which have exclusive jurisdiction. In fact, the question of whether petitioner's sale of the power plants is suqject to VAT is a tax issue that should be resolved by the CIR, subject to the review of the CTA. Unlike the Secretary of Justice, the BIR and the CTA have developed expertise on tax matters. It is only but logical that they should have exclusive jurisdiction to decide on these matters. The authority of the Secretary of Justice under PD 242 to settle and adjudicate all disputes, claims and controversies between or among national government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, therefore, does not include tax disputes, which are clearly under the jurisdiction of the BIR and the CTA.
Worth mentioning at this point is the case of National Power Corporation v. Presiding Judge, RTC, 10th Judicial Region, Br. XXV, Cagayan de Oro City,3 where the Court affirmed the trial court's jurisdiction over a complaint for the collection of real property tax and special education fund tax filed under PD 464 (The Real Property Tax Code, enacted on July 1, 1974) by the Province of Misamis Oriental against National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). In that case, NAPOCOR cited PD 242 and argued that it is the Secretary of Justice, not the trial court, which had jurisdiction over the case. Applying the rules on statutory construction, the Court, ruled that PD 242, a general law which deals with administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes, claims and controversies between or among national government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, must yield to PD 464, a special law which deals specifically with real property taxes.
The same ruling must be applied in this case. Thus, PD 242, which is a general law on the authority of the Secretary of Justice to settle and adjudicate all disputes, claims and controversies between or among national government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, must yield to the specific provisions of RA 1125, as amended by RA 9282, which is a specific law vesting exclusive and primary jurisdiction to the CIR and the CTA on cases pertaining to disputed tax assessments, tax laws and refunds of internal revenue taxes.
Moreover, this Court has already made a pronouncement in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Secretory of Justice,4 to 1he effect that the Secretary of Justice has no jurisdiction over disputed assessments issued by the BIR in light of the ruling of the Court in Philippine National Oil Company v. Court of Appeals.5 For reference, I quote herein the ruling of the Court, viz.:
1. The Secretary of Justice has no jurisdiction to
review the disputed assessments
The petitioner contends that it is the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), not the Secretary of Justice, that has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction in this case, pursuant to Section 7 (1) of Republic Act No. 1125 (R.A. No. 1125), which grants the CTA the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review, among others, the decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue "in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue."
PAGCOR counters, however, that it is the Secretary of Justice who should adjudicate the dispute by virtue of Chapter 14 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
CHAPTER 14. CONTROVERSIES AMONG GOVERNMENT OFFICES AND CORPORATIONS. SEC. 66. How settled. - All disputes/claims and controversies, solely between or among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, such as those arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements shall be administratively settled or adjudicated in the manner provided for in this Chapter. This Chapter shall, however, not apply to disputes involving the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commission and local governments.
SEC. 67. Disputes Involving Questions of Law. - All cases involving only questions of law shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice as Attorney General of the National Government and as exofficio legal adviser of all government-owned or controlled corporations. His ruling or decision thereon shall be conclusive and binding on all the parties concerned.
SEC. 68. Disputes Involving Questions of Fact and Law. - Cases involving mixed questions of law and of fact or only factual issues shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by:
(1) The Solicitor General, if the dispute, claim or controversy involves only departments, bureaus, offices and other agencies of the National Government as well as government-owned or controlled corporations or entities of whom he is the principal law officer or general counsel; and (2) The Secretary of Justice, in all other cases not falling under paragraph (1).
Although acknowledging the validity of the petitioner's contention, the Secretary of Justice still resolved the disputed assessments on the basis that the prevailing doctrine at the time of the filing of the petitions in the Department of Justice (DOJ) on January 5, 2004 was that enunciated in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, whereby the Court ruled that:
x x x (T)here is an "irreconcilable repugnancy x x between Section 7(2) of R.A. No. 1125 and PD. No. 242," and hence, that the latter enactment (P.D. No. 242), being the latest expression of the legislative will, should prevail over the earlier.
Later on, the Court reversed itself in Philippine National Oil Company v. Court of Appeals, and held as follows:
Following the rule on statutory construction involving a general and a special law previously discussed, then P.D. No. 242 should not affect R.A. No. 1125. RA. No. 1125, specifically Section 7 thereof on the jurisdiction of the CTA, constitutes an exception to P.D. No. 242. Disputes, claims and controversies, falling under Section 7 of RA. No. 1125, even though solely among government offices, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, remain in the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. Such a construction resolves the alleged inconsistency or conflict between the two statutes, x x x.
Despite the shift in the construction of P.D. No. 242 in relation to R.A. No. 1125, the Secretary of Justice still resolved PAGCOR's petitions on the merits, stating that:
While this ruling (DBP) has been superseded by the ruling in Philippine National Oil Company vs. CA, in view of the prospective application of the PNOC ruling, we (the DOJ) are of the view that this Office can continue to assume jurisdiction over this case which was filed and has been pending with this Office since January 5, 2004 and rule on the merits of the case.
We disagree with the action of the Secretary of Justice.
PAGCOR filed its appeals in the DOJ on January 5, 2004 and August 4, 2004. Philippine National Oil Company v. Courtof Appeals was promulgated on April 26, 2006. The Secretary of Justice resolved the petitions on December 22, 2006. Under the circumstances, the Secretary of Justice had ample opportunity to abide by the prevailing rule and should have referred the case to the CTA because judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law formed part of the legal system of the country, and are for that reason to be held in obedience by all, including the Secretary of Justice and his Department. Upon becoming aware of the new proper construction of P.D. No. 242 in relation to RA. No. 1125 pronounced in Philippine National Oil Company v. Court of Appeals, therefore, the Secretary of Justice should have desisted from dealing with the petitions, and referred them to the CTA, instead of insisting on exercising jurisdiction thereon. Therein lay the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Secretary of Justice, for he thereby acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ignoring the pronouncement in Philippine National Oil Company v. Court of Appeals. Indeed, the doctrine of stare decisis required him to adhere to the ruling of the Court, which by tradition and conformably with our system of judicial administration speaks the last word on what the law is, and stands as the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. In other words, there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts and everyone else should take their bearings.
Nonetheless, the Secretary of Justice should not be taken to task for initially entertaining the petitions considering that the prevailing interpretation of the law on jurisdiction at the time of their filing was that he had jurisdiction. Neither should PAGCOR [be] blame[d] in bringing its appeal to the DOJ on January 5, 2004 and August 4, 2004 because the prevailing rule then was the interpretation in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals. The emergence of the later ruling was beyond PAGCOR's control. Accordingly, the lapse of the period within which to appeal the disputed assessments to the CTA could not be taken against PAGCOR. While a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that the law was originally passed, the reversal of the interpretation cannot be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of parties who may have relied on the first interpretation.
There is no reason to reverse or abandon the above ruling.
To adopt the view espoused in the Majority Opinion would carry adverse effects on the jurisdiction of the CTA and on the CIR with regard to its available remedy. It must be pointed out that to allow the Secretary of Justice to have jurisdiction over the instant case would not only deprive the CTA of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction but would also deprive respondent CIR of any judicial remedy. The Majority Opinion recommends that "since the amount involved in this case is more than one million pesos, respondent CIR may appeal the DOJ Secretary's Decision to the Office of the President in accordance with Section 70, Chapter 14, Book IV of EO 292 and Section 5 of PD 242." 'However, if the appeal to the Office of the President were denied, respondent CIR would have no judicial recourse. Respondent CIR would not be able to appeal the decision of the Office of the President to the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court because the CA has no jurisdiction to review tax cases. Neither can respondent CIR file a Petition with the CTA because the CTA has no jurisdiction over decisions of the Office of President or the Secretary of Justice.
In his Reply, Justice Carpio states that "if the appeal to .the Office of the President is denied, the aggrieved party can still appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) under Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."
With due respect, this is specious. An appeal to the CA is not a remedy available to the aggrieved party.
It must be stressed that what is involved in this case is a tax issue, that is, petitioner's disputed Value-Added Tax (VAT) assessment, which it paid under protest. The aggrieved party could no longer resort to an appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; this is not allowed simply because the CA no longer has jurisdiction over tax cases.
To recall, Republic Act No. 9282,6 6enacted on April 23, 2004, expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) and elevated its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction. Thus, the CTA, a specialized court dedicated exclusively to the study and resolution of tax issues, is no longer under the appellate jurisdiction of the CA. Accordingly, the CA has no jurisdiction to review tax cases as these are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CTA, a co-equal court. In fact, the remedy of a party adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the CTA en bane is to directly file with the Supreme Court, not with the CA, a verified petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from receipt of the copy of the decision or resolution of the CTA.7
Furthermore, in The City of Manila v. Judge Grecia-Cuerdo,8 the Court ruled that it is the CTA, not the CA, which has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. In that case, the Court explained that:
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CT A, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter- precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CT A, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the CT A, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an
absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter.
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CT A shall be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.
Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates." Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the CT A to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
x x x x
Using the reasoning in the above-cited case, it is clear that the CA should not be allowed to resolve tax issues, such as the instant case, as this would deprive the CTA of its exclusive jurisdiction. It would create an absurd situation of a split-jurisdiction between the CTA and the CA. In addition, this might create conflicting decisions or interpretations of tax laws.
To prove this point, it is significant to mention that the ruling of the Secretary of Justice in this case that the sale of the power plants is not subject to VAT conflicts with the ruling of the CTA in Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA EB No. 1282, May 17, 2016, that the proceeds from sale of generating assets is subject to VAT. The said case, docketed as GR. No. 226556, is now pending before this Court.
All told, I vote to DENY the Petition and maintain my view that disputed tax assessments solely involving government entities fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the CIR and the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. Thus, to allow the Secretary of Justice to have jurisdiction over the instant case would not only deprive the CTA of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction but would also deprive respondent CIR of any judicial remedy.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 SEC. 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax Cases. - The power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance.
2 The power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under this Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the Commissioner, subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.
3 SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
(1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of lnternal Revenue;
(2) Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of lnternal Revenue, x x x 268 Phil. 507 (1990).
4 GR. No. 177387, November9, 2016.
5 496 Phil. 506 (2005).
6 AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS (CTA), ELEVATING ITS RANK TO THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH SPECIAL JURISDICTION AND ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1125, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LAW CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
7 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9282, Section 12.
8 726 Phil. 9 (2014).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
