G.R. No. 225973 - Separate Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016,
♦ Decision, Peralta, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Sereno, [CJ]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Carpio, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Bersamin, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Brion, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Perez, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Mendoza, [J]

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TRINIDAD H. REPUNO, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, BONIFACIO P. ILAGAN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, M.D., SAMAHAN NG EXDETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT ARESTO (SELDA), REPRESENTED BY DIONITO CABILLAS, CARMENCITA M. FLORENTINO, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, FELIX C. DALISAY, AND DANILO M. DELAFUENTE,* PETITIONERS, VS. REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR RESERVIST AND RETIREE AFFAIRS, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES), THE GRAVE SERVICES UNIT (PHILIPPINE ARMY), AND GENERAL RICARDO R. VISAYA (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES), DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AND HEIRS OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, REPRESENTED BY HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, RESPONDENTS.

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., RENE A.C. SAGUISAG III, INTERVENORS.

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, IN HIS PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AND AS A MEMBER OF CONGRESS AND AS THE HONORARY CHAIRPERSON OF THE FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE (FIND); FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE (FIND), REPRESENTED BY ITS COCHAIRPERSON, NILDA L. SEVILLA; REP. TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR.; REP. TOMASITO S. VILLARIN; REP. EDGAR R. ERICE; AND REP. EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA; DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA; AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA; AFP DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ; AND HEIRS OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, REPRESENTED BY HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, RESPONDENTS.

LORETTA ANN PARGAS-ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, AIDA F. SANTOSMARANAN, JO-ANN Q. MAGLIPON, ZENAIDA S. MIQUE, FE B. MANGAHAS, MA. CRISTINA P. BAWAGAN, MILA D. AGUILAR, MINERVA G. GONZALES, MA. CRISTINA V. RODRIGUEZ, LOUIE G. CRISMO, FRANCISCO E. RODRIGO, JR., LIWAYWAY D. ARCE, AND ABDULMARI DE LEON IMAO, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AFP DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA, AND PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO) ADMINISTRATOR LT. GEN. ERNESTO G. CAROLINA (RET.), RESPONDENTS.

HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, FRANCIS X. MANGLAPUS, EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS, BELINDA O. CUNANAN, CECILIA GUIDOTE ALVAREZ, REX DEGRACIA LORES, SR., ARNOLD MARIE NOEL, CARLOS MANUEL, EDMUND S. TAYAO, DANILO P. OLIVARES, NOEL F. TRINIDAD, JESUS DELA FUENTE, REBECCA M. QUIJANO, FR. BENIGNO BELTRAN, SVD, ROBERTO S. VERZOLA, AUGUSTO A. LEGASTO, JR., AND JULIA KRISTINA P. LEGASTO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA, AFP DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ, AND PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO) OF THE DND, RESPONDENTS.

ZAIRA PATRICIA B. BANIAGA, JOHN ARVIN BUENAAGUA, JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JUAN ANTONIO RAROGAL MAGALANG, PETITIONERS, VS. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE DELFIN N. LORENZANA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF RICARDO R. VISAYA, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE ERNESTO G. CAROLINA, RESPONDENTS.

ALGAMAR A. LATIPH, PETITIONER, VS. SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SUED IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LT. GEN. ERNESTO G. CAROLINA (RET.), IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO), RESPONDENTS.

LEILA M. DE LIMA, IN HER CAPACITY AS SENATOR OF THE REPUBLIC AND AS TAXPAYER, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA, UNDERSECRETARY ERNESTO G. CAROLINA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO) ADMINISTRATOR AND B/GEN. RESTITUTO L. AGUILAR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SHRINE CURATOR AND CHIEF VETERANS MEMORIAL AND HISTORICAL DIVISION AND HEIRS OF FERDINAND EDRALIN MARCOS, RESPONDENTS.

I write this Separate Concurring Opinion to express the reasons for my vote to dismiss the petitions assailing President Rodrigo Duterte's order to inter the remains of former President Ferdinand Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB).

I opine that the Court cannot grant the petitions as the petitioners presented issues that are outside our judicial authority - as defined by law and jurisprudence - to resolve.

I am not insensitive to the plight of victims of human rights violations, nor am I unaware of the allegations they raised against the Marcos administration. But their emotions and beliefs cannot and should not influence the faithful discharge of my duties as a Member of this Court.

The judicial power that the Court wields is symbolized by a blindfolded lady carrying a set of scales for a reason: it bases its decision, not on who the litigants are, nor on the clout - political, emotional, or financial - they may carry; judicial adjudication is based on law and evidence alone. Under this standard, I cannot grant the petitions without knowingly crossing the line separating judicial power from judicial overreach.

To my mind, the present petitions, however emotionally charged they might be, do not present an actual case or controversy that calls for the exercise of the power of judicial review.

Without an actual case or controversy, we cannot and should not exercise this exceptional power; even our expanded jurisdiction under the Constitution does not allow exceptions to this deficiency. For us to indulge in this exercise would not only amount to a judicial overreach, but could possibly thrust this Court into a political minefield that could not be traversed without weakening the public's trust and confidence in our institution.

Ours is a power that emanates from the authority, granted to us under the Constitution, to interpret and apply the law in actual and live disputes. We exercise this power through the decisions we render in cases presented before us; without the public's respect and trust in the legal soundness of our decisions, our pronouncements would be no different from meaningless doodles that children write on throw away papers.

Even if we were to exercise our power of judicial review in these petitions, the exercise of our judgment should be limited by the following considerations:

First, judicial review, even under our Court's expanded jurisdiction, does not empower the Court to directly pass upon allegations involving violations of statutes;

Second, the Constitution's "faithful execution" clause cannot be made the basis to question the Executive's manner of implementing our laws;

Third, the petitioners failed to specify any treaty obligation prohibiting Marcos' burial at the LNMB;

Fourth, the Constitution, while built on the ashes of the Marcos regime, should not be interpreted in a way that would prevent reconciliation and the country's move towards national unity; and

Finally, the necessity of Marcos' burial at the LNMB is a political question that the President has decided, and is not without support from the Filipino electorate.

Judicial review, even under our Court's expanded jurisdiction, does not empower the Court to directly pass upon allegations involving violations of statutes.

The petitions directly assail before this Court the President's decision allowing the interment of the remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB; they impute grave abuse of discretion on President Duterte for this decision and seek, under this Court's expanded jurisdiction, the nullification of his actions. By doing so, the petitioners directly seek the exercise of our power of judicial review.

After due consideration, I find that these petitions failed to establish the necessity of the Court's direct exercise of its power of judicial review, as their cited legal bases and arguments largely involve violations of the law or its misapplication. The remedy available to them, given their objective, is not judicial review under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, but the ordinary remedies available for errors of law under the Rules of Court.

Thus, we cannot grant to the petitioners the remedy they seek, as their desired remedy lies outside this Court's power to directly provide.

The petitions collectively assert that the burial order violates several statutes and implementing rules and regulations, among them: AFP Regulations G 161-373,1 Republic Act (RA) No. 289,2 and RA 10368.3 The petitions further assert that the President's failure to interpret these laws, together or in relation with one another, to bar Marcos' burial at the LNMB,

Indeed, our Court now possesses the duty to determine and to act when "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of ... the government" exists. This is a grant of power under the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

Under the expanded jurisdiction that the Constitution granted this Court, our duty to exercise judicial review runs broad and deep; it exists even when an aspect of the case involves a political question. We have in fact cited this duty to justifY the relaxation of the "standing" requirement for judicial review when the case presents a matter of transcendental importance, a standard that the Court has formulated and self-defined to allow for the exceptional application of our jurisdiction.

Separately from all these, I have also been pushing for an alternative approach in invoking our expanded jurisdiction, by recognizing that a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government in cases involving constitutional violations, should be sufficient to give a Filipino citizen the standing to seek judicial remedy.1aшphi1

The Court's expanded jurisdiction, however, affects only the means of invoking judicial review, and does not change the nature of this power at all. The power of judicial review pertains to the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution.4 As a requirement for its direct exercise by this Court, the "grave abuse of discretion" that triggers the Court's expanded jurisdiction must necessarily involve a violation of the Constitution.

In other words, the Court's direct authority to exercise its expanded jurisdiction is limited to the determination of the constitutionality of a governmental act. Grave abuse of discretion arising from mere violations of statutes cannot, as a rule, be the subject of the Court's direct exercise of its expanded jurisdiction. The petitioners' recourse in this situation lies with other judicial remedies or proceedings, allowed under the Rules of Court, that may arrive in due course at the Court's portals for review.

In the context of the present case, for the Court to directly exercise its expanded jurisdiction, the petitioners carry the burden of proving, prima facie, that the President's decision to inter Marcos at the LNMB violates the Constitution.

This view is not only in accord with existing pronouncements on judicial review and the exercise of judicial power; it is also the more prudent and practicable option for the Court.

Opening the Court's direct exercise of its expanded jurisdiction to acts that violate statutes, however grave the abuse of the statute might be, significantly dilutes the doctrines of hierarchy of courts,5 primary jurisdiction,6 and exhaustion of administrative remedies.7 In short, the necessity for the application of these doctrines diminishes when recourse to the Court is immediately and directly made available.

The practice of directly accessing this Court could also possibly add petitions that are jointly cognizable with the lower courts, to the Court's already clogged dockets, and deluge this Court with matters that are highly technical in nature or are premature for adjudication. Let it be remembered that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; this adjudicatory role belongs, as a rule, to the lower courts.

In these lights, I find that the petitioners' allegations equating President Duterte's alleged statutory violations (when he issued his burial order) to grave abuse of discretion, are not the proper subject of judicial review under the Court's direct exercise of its expanded jurisdiction.

Assuming, hypothetically, that several statutes have indeed been erroneously applied by the President, the remedy for the petitioners is not the direct and immediate recourse to this Court for the nullification of the illegal acts committed. Violations of statutes by the Executive may be assailed through administrative bodies that possess the expertise on the applicable laws and that possess as well the technical expertise on the information subject of, or relevant to, the dispute.

For these statutory violations, recourse may be made before the courts through an appeal of the administrative body's ruling, or by filing for a petition for declaratory relief before the lower court with jurisdiction over the matter. Only when these lower courts have rendered their decisions should these matters be elevated to this Court by appeal or certiorari; even then, the issues the petitioners may present are limited to questions of law, not to questions of fact.

The faithful execution clause does not allow the constitutionalization of issues that, if proven to be true, would amount to the violation of statutes.

Neither can I agree that the "faithful execution" clause found in the Constitution may be used to constitutionalize issues that primarily involve the manner by which laws are implemented.

The Constitution vests in the President the power to execute laws under Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

SECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

The Constitution has apparently left out from this provision a definition of what "executive power" exactly is, in order to give the President sufficient flexibility and leeway in the implementation of laws. We thus have jurisprudence recognizing the vast and plenary nature of executive power,8 and the President's vast discretion in implementing laws.

This immense executive power, however, is not without limitations. The Constitution provides clear and categorical limits and any violation of these limits could amount to a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President.

The Constitution has as well defined how the President is to relate to other officials within his own department. Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Through jurisprudence, we have recognized that this provision vests in the President the power of control and supervision over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.9 The first sentence pertains to the President's power of control, while the latter, to his power of supervision. His duty to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed" pertains to his power (and duty) of supervision over the executive branch, and when read with Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, over local government units.10 Notably, the provision on the President's supervision over autonomous regions follows a similar language, thus:

SECTION 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

How laws are to be "faithfully executed" provides a broad standard generally describing the expectations on how the President is to execute the law. The nature and extent of the constitutionally-granted presidential powers, however, negate the concept that this standard can be used as basis to constitutionally question the manner by which the President exercises executive power.

To hold otherwise is inconsistent with the plenary nature of executive power that the Constitution envisions. The Constitution intends as well a tripartite system of government where each branch is co-equal and supreme in its own sphere.

These intents could be defeated if the standard of "faithfulness" in executing our laws would be a constitutional standard measuring the manner of the President's implementation of the laws. In the first place, it places the Court in the position to pass upon the scope and parameters of the vague and not-easily determinable "faithfulness" standard. Putting the Court in this position (especially when considered with the Court's expanded jurisdiction) amounts to placing it in a higher plane from where it can dictate how laws should be implemented. In fact, it is hard to discern how the Court can apply a standard for the faithful execution of the laws, without determining how the law should be implemented in the first place.

Additionally, characterizing the failure to ensure faithful execution of the laws as a constitutional violation can prove to be an unreasonably restricting interpretation. It could possibly paralyze executive discretion, and expose the Executive to constant lawsuits based on acts of grave abuse of discretion he or she allegedly committed.

Thus, the duty to "ensure that laws are faithfully executed" should not be read as the constitutional standard to test the legality of the President's acts so that a legal error in the implementation of a law becomes a con:stitutional violation of his faithful execution duty.

Incidentally, the interpretation that the faithful execution clause refers to the President's power of control and supervision is in line with US jurisprudence interpreting the "take care" clause of the United States Constitution, which - as everyone knows - served as the 1935 Philippine Constitution's model from which our later constitutions have not departed. Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution provides:

Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

In the United States, the take care clause has generally been accepted as imposing a constitutional duty on the President not to suspend or refuse the enforcement of laws, particularly of statutes.11

In Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,12 for instance, the US Supreme Court characterized a provision requiring the Postmaster General to provide back pay to mail courier providers as a ministerial duty that the President had no authority to prevent. The US Court arrived at this ruling in Kendall using the take care clause as basis to prevent the President from stopping the implementation of a ministerial duty that Congress imposed.

On the flipside, the take care clause has likewise been used to invalidate laws that rob the President of his powers of control and supervision over the Executive. In Buckley v. Valeo,13 for instance, the US Court held that the Congress cannot arrogate unto itself the power to appoint officials to an independent commission that exercises executive powers. The reason for this ruling is the President's duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

While the two functions of the take care clause in US jurisprudence could at times seem to conflict with each other (one imposes a duty on the President, the other recognizes his authority)14 it has never been used to question the manner by which the President's executive power is exercised.

Notably, the President's duty to implement laws under the take care clause is judicially enforceable only where the statute in question provides a clear and categorical directive to the President. Where a statute leaves to the executive the details of its implementation, the latter should be given sufficient leeway in exercising its duty.

In sum, the petitioners' insistence that the burial order's violation of various laws amounts to a constitutional violation involving the faithful execution clause, rests on a very tenuous interpretation of this clause that stretches it to its breaking point. The faithful execution clause does not allow litigants to question - as a constitutional violation - the manner by which the President implements a law. The Court, for its part, has no authority to directly resolve the alleged statutory violations that, in this case, allegedly attended the burial order.

The petitioners' international law arguments, in my view, likewise fail to establish the unconstitutionality of the President's burial order.

The petitioners argue that the burial order violates several international law obligations, based on the Philippines' status as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Rome Statute, and Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).

While I agree that these international agreements (except for the UDHR, which is a non-binding document with provisions attaining the status of customary international law) had been ratified by the Philippine government and hence have the force and effect of law in the Philippines, the petitioners failed to point to any specific treaty obligation prohibiting Marcos' burial at the LNMB or at any other public cemetery.

These treaties prohibit torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,15 and recognize these acts as crimes against humanity16 falling within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.17 State parties to CAT are likewise obliged to criminalize torture and take effective legislative, administrative, judicial, and other measures to prevent torture.18 Parties also have the obligation to investigate claims of torture19 and ensure that torture victims have an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation.20

Article 14 of the CAT, in particular, requires state parties to "ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to compensation."

The petitioners assert that the burial order amounts to a state sanctioned narrative that violates the Philippines' duty to provide a "full and effective reparation" for human rights violations victims. The petitioners cite as legal bases Principle 22 and Principle 23 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a remedy; Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law (IHRL); Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL); and Principle 2 and Principle 3 of the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity.

These principles, however, do not create legally binding obligations. They are not international agreements that states accede to and ratify, as states have not agreed to formally be bound by them. Declarations, principles, plans of action and guidelines are considered "soft law" because they do not bind states, although they may carry considerable political and legal weight. They are considered statements of moral and political intent that, at most, may subsequently ripen into international norms.21

Paragraph 7 of the Preamble of The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law (IHRL), for instance, does not create new international or domestic legal obligations, viz:

Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein do not entail new international or domestic legal obligations but identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of existing legal obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law which are complementary though different as to their norms,

That these principles do not create obligation legally binding on the State means that they cannot be interpreted as constraints on the discretion of the President who acts, not only as the government's chief executive, but as its chief architect in foreign affairs.

Without any specific and legally binding prohibition limiting the President's actions, no basis exists to nullify his order and to disregard the presumption of regularity that exists in the performance of his duties.

Lastly, it must be considered that the burial order does not have the effect of rewriting jurisprudence and excusing the ills of the Marcos administration; neither does it amend Republic Act No. 10368 ("Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013"), a law that had been enacted as part of the Philippines' compliance with its obligations in the ICCPR and CAT.

RA 10368, among others, creates a Human Rights Victims Claims Board tasked to recognize victims of human rights violations and to recommend their claims for reparation. RA 10368 even recognizes the "heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance, and other gross human rights violations committed during the regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986." The law makes it a policy to "restore the victims' honor and dignity" and acknowledge the State's moral and legal obligation to recognize and/or provide reparation to said victims and/or their families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations, and damages they suffered under the Marcos regime.

These terms and provisions, however, while critical of the Marcos regime hardly amount to a prohibition barring the interment of his remains in a resting place duly reserved by law for soldiers; former President Marcos indisputably was a soldier during his lifetime and was one long before the human rights violations attributed to him took place. To deny him now, despite the law entitling him to a LNMB resting place, may only lay the petitioners to the charge that they are now doing to another what they have accused former President Marcos of doing - denying another of the rule of law.

Divining the spirit of the Constitution is acceptable only to clarify ambiguities in its provisions, and not to create entirely new provisions.

The petitioners further argue that Marcos' interment at the LNMB violates the spirit of the 1987 Constitution which was crafted as a reaction to the abuses during the Marcos regime. Limitations and restrictions to the President's power, in particular, had been introduced because of former President Marcos' abuses during his regime. Thus, to inter him at the LNMB would amount to a violation of the reasons underlying the Constitution.

In particular, the petitioners assert that former President Marcos' burial at the LNMB violates two other principles enshrined in the 1987 Constitution: first, it violates Section 27, Article II of the Constitution as the burial of a dishonest and disgraced public official will not promote honesty and integrity in public service; second, it violates Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution22 because it goes against the precept that corruption is never forgotten.

Constitutional provisions, read by themselves for the principles and precepts they embody, hardly reveal the clear intents that drove the constitutional framers to incorporate these provisions in the Constitution. These intents, however, are neither lost nor hidden as they can be gleaned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the Constitution.

In this Court, we use and have used these deliberations as guides to interpret the Constitution when there exist ambiguous or seemingly conflicting provisions crucial to the resolution of a case. We look to these deliberations to find the intent behind the constitutional provisions to clarify how they should be applied.

While constitutional intent serves as a valuable guide in undertaking our adjudicatory duties, it does not embody a right and, by itself, is not a basis for the enforcement of a right. Neither does it provide a standard on how the President should act and enforce the laws, without prior reference to specific provisions or legislations applying the intent of the Constitution.

In the context of the present petitions, without any specific provision alleged to have been violated by the burial order, the constitutional intents that the petitioners brought to light cannot be used as a measure to resolve the issues that bedevil us in these cases. Specifically, they cannot be used as basis to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion under the Court's expanded jurisdiction. As we have done by long established practice, we rely on intent only to settle ambiguities that cross our paths in the course of reading and considering constitutional provisions.

To go to the concrete and the specific demands of the issues at hand, we cannot use the faithful execution clause as basis to question the manner by which the Executive implements a law.

Neither can we interpret Article II, Section 27 and Article XI, Section 1 to prohibit former President Marcos' interment at the LNMB. To be sure, these are provisions that cannot be faulted as they enshrine honesty, integrity, and accountability in the public service, and require government officials to exercise their functions "with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."

Despite their high minded terms, however, these provisions can hardly be claimed as basis, in the absence of clear and concrete legislation embodying actionable standards, for the petitioners' claims; these provisions can only describe our aspirations for our government and government officials, and could not have been meant to dilute the President's prerogatives in making his political moves, among them, his decision on the interment of a previously deposed president.

It should be noted, too, that Article II, Section 27 does not appear to be a self-executing provision. Its location, i.e., under Article II, Declaration of State Principles, strongly hints of its non-self-executing23 nature. The language itself of the provision obligates the State to "take posttlve and effective measures against graft and corruption." Under these terms and circumstances, this provision merely reflects a statement of an ideal that cannot be realized independently of a concrete congressional enactment. Its goal of maintaining honesty and integrity in the public service cannot likewise be implemented without laws defining and promoting these values.

The Constitution was undeniably forged out of the ashes of the Marcos regime. Its enactment after the Marcos regime collapsed, however, does not suggest and cannot be translated into an implied command preventing his burial at the LNMB or in a shrine of national significance. Had such prohibition been the intent, the Constitution's transitory provisions would have specifically so provided in the manner these provisions incorporated terms that the framers wanted to implement within intended and foreseeable time frames.24

Unfortunately, both in the pleadings and in the media, the Court majority has been accused of being quick to forget the lessons of the Martial Law Era. I see no point in directly answering this charge as this Opinion has not been written to consider historical perspectives except to the extent that they bear on the immediate business an concern of the Court the interpretation and application of the Constitution.

The Court, of course, is not blind to history but is not a judge of history; it is a judge of the interpretation and application of the terms of the Constitution.25 When the time comes therefore when we are tested by push and pull of history and those of the Constitution, an answer is not difficult to make even if we are dealing with an exceptional historical figure.

The clear and simple response is that concerns raised by the Constitution must first be addressed; historical considerations follow unless the constitutional concern is so affected or intertwined with history that we cannot consider one without the other. Fortunately for us in the present case, no such consideration requires to be taken as the way is clear: we rule based on the standards of our Constitution.

Based on these considerations, I believe we should not be charged with being blind to the lessons of the past, in partic;ular of what transpired during the martial law era. Rather than being blind, we simply do not look first to history in resolving disputes before us; we look to the law as our primary guide and consideration.

Thus, if we do rule in favor of the burial of former President Marcos at the LNMB, we do not thereby dishonor those who believe they suffered under his regime. Nor are we unmindful of the laws crafted in their favor; we considered these laws but they are simply not the laws primarily relevant and applicable to the issue before us - the interment of former President Marcos at the LNMB.

I do know as a matter of law and history that the framers of our Constitution crafted it with the intent of preventing another tyrant from rising to power and from consolidating the State's might for himself. A stronger tripartite government with a system of checks and balances became the cornerstone of our new democracy. Under this system, each of the three branches of government perform specific, distinct, and clearly delineated functions. The intent is to prevent one branch from encroaching on the prerogatives of another and to characterize any usurpation as an act of tyranny. These constitutional principles are the policies that receive primary consideration from us as a Court.

The Constitution vested the Supreme Court with judicial power the power and duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Considering that Justices of this Court are not elected by the sovereign people, the framers did not see it fit to give us dominion over matters of policy.

From these perspectives, this Court is clearly not a court of public opinion; we are court of law. With respect to matters of policy, we have no right to substitute our wisdom over that of duly elected political branches. They carry the mandate of the popular will we do not.

Under the impetus of these constitutional realities, the wisdom of or need for the interment of former President Marcos at the LNMB is a political question26 that our President decided after an assessment of the thoughts and sentiments of the people from all the regions in our country; it is a policy determination that is outside the Court's jurisdiction to pass upon or interfere with as a matter of law.

Separately from our consideration of the Executive and its policy, we are also aware that strong sentiments exist against the burial of former President Marcos at the LNMB. We hear the loud and strident voices that proclaim these sentiments. But we are likewise aware that against the pull by those who voice these sentiments are counterforces pulling into other directions, specifically, the pull of the law and those of policy.

As I have already indicated, I again say that the law must prevail under the unwavering standard we observe. But we recognize at the same time that policy has its own demands. Ultimately, we recognize that vowing to the raucous crowd may temporarily signify harmony, but we do so at the expense of disregarding Executive policy and weakening the political branches, and indeed, the very institution of government itself.

Thus, we have no choice if we are to truly serve as guardians of the Constitution. In the absence of any countervailing legal considerations, we give primacy to the Executive's policy as this is the law - the constitutional separation of power - that we have to fully respect.

As my last point, that the burial of Marcos had been a campaign promise strengthens the nature of former President Marcos' burial at the LNMB as a political question. Voters knew of his plan to bury Marcos at the LNMB at the time he campaigned, and might have voted for him because or regardless of this plan. President Duterte's victory in the polls signifies, at the very least, the electorate's tolerance of his decision and, at most, the electorate's support.

In sum and without hesitation, we must now recognize that the petitioners have failed to establish any clear constitutional breach attendant to the President's burial order. We must therefore respect and abide by the Executive's decision to allow the interment of former President Marcos at theLNMB.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petitions, and to lift the status quo ante order this Court issued to avoid rendering the petitions moot and academic prior to our decision.