G.R. No. 197146 - Concurring Opinion




G.R. No. 197146, December 6, 2016, ♦ Decision, Bersamin, [J] ♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonardo-De Castro, [J] ♦ Dissenting Opinion, Brion, [J] ♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J] EN BANC [ G.R. No. 197146. December 06, 2016 ] HON. MICHAEL L. RAMA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF CEBU CITY, METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT (MCWD), REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER, ARMANDO PAREDES; THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF MCWD, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIR, ELIGIO A. PACANA; JOEL MARI S. YU, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MEMBER OF THE MCWD BOARD; AND THE HONORABLE TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOUTH DISTRICT, CEBU CITY, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. GILBERT P. MOISES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 18, CEBU CITY; AND HON. GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA, IN HER CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU, RESPONDENTS. CONCURRING OPINION LEONEN, J.: I concur. The provincial governor has no power to appoint members of Metropolitan Cebu Water District's (MCWD) board. This case involves the validity and proper interpretation of Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 198 or the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973. Metropolitan Cebu Water District, having been created in 1974 by virtue of this Decree, was subject to its provisions including that in dispute: Section 3. Definitions. - As used in this Decree, the following words and terms shall have the meanings herein set forth, unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context. The definition of a word or term applies to any of its variants. (a) Act - This Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973. (b) Appointing authority. The person empowered to appoint the members of the board of Directors of a local water district, depending upon the geographic coverage and population make-up of the particular district. In the event that more than seventy-five percent of the total active water service connections of a local water district are within the boundary of any city or municipality, the appointing authority shall be the mayor of that city or municipality, as the case may be; otherwise, the appointing authority shall be the governor of the province within which the district is located. If portions of more than one province are included within the boundary of the district, and the appointing authority is to be the governors then the power to appoint shall rotate between the governors involved with the initial appointments made by the governor in whose province the greatest number of service connections exists. The controversy started when in 2002, after consistent exercise by the Cebu City Mayor of the power to appoint MCWD directors from 1974 to 2002, the Governor of the Province of Cebu decided to assert her power of appointment. The Governor claims that the provision gives her the power to appoint directors of MCWD whenever none of the cities or municipalities covered by MCWD holds seventy-five percent (75%) of its total active water service connections. Despite the Provincial Governor's claim, however, the Cebu City Mayor exercised the authority when he appointed Joel Mari S. Yu in 2008 to fill a vacant seat in MCWD's board of directors. Both the Mayor of Cebu City and the Provincial Governor of Cebu claim authority to appoint directors of MCWD in case none of the cities or municipalities covered by MCWD reaches seventy-five percent (75%) of its total active water service connections. Petitioners claim that Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 198 is unconstitutional because it violates Cebu City's local autonomy, and the due process and equal protection clause. The provincial government had not participated in the creation of MCWD. Cebu City also holds majority, though not 75% of MCWD's total active water service connections. Hence, Cebu City's Mayor and not Cebu's Provincial Governor should be given the power to appoint directors of MCWD. On the other hand, respondents claim that Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 198 is clear that if the 75% requirement under Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 198 is not met, it is the Provincial Governor who has the authority to appoint MCWD directors. We are asked to determine whether Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 198 is unconstitutional. I Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 198 is unconstitutional because it violates the local autonomy of cities and municipalities covered by MCWD. It interferes with the cities' and municipalities' power and duty to conduct their own affairs, particularly with regard to the delivery of basic services. Local governments were instituted as a means to allocate powers and responsibilities to units that are most aware of and can best meet the needs of its constituents.1 Through this, the State fosters self-reliant communities and furthers a government structure that is both responsive and accountable to its citizens.2 The importance of self-reliant communities was expressed in the 1900 McKinley Instructions: You will instruct the commission to proceed to the city of Manila, where they will make their principal office, and to communicate with the military governor of the Philippine Islands, whom you will at the same time direct to render to them every assistance within his power in the performance of their duties. Without hampering them by too specific instructions, they should in general be enjoined, after making themselves familiar with the conditions and needs of the country, to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments, in which the natives of the islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of their capacities and observations of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order, and loyalty. The next subject in order of importance should be the organization of government in the larger administrative divisions corresponding to counties, departments, or provinces, in which the common interests of many or several municipalities falling within the same tribal lines, or the same natural geographical limits, may best be subserved by a common administration.1aшphi1 Whenever the commission is of the opinion that the condition of affairs in the islands is such that the central administration may safely be transferred from military to civil control, they will report that conclusion to you, with their recommendations as to the form of central government to be established for the purpose of taking over the control.3 (Emphasis supplied) Local government autonomy had been impliedly adopted as State policy as early as 1935 when our Constitution defined the kind of power that the President may exercise over executive departments and local governments. Article VII, Section 11(1) of the 1935 Constitution provided that the President exercised control over executive departments. However, the President's power over local governments was limited to general supervision: SEC. 11. (1) The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. "Control" has been consistently defined in our jurisprudence as the power to "alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."4 On the other hand, "supervision" has been defined as "overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to compel his subordinates to perform their duties."5 This court further explained the difference between "control" and "supervision" in Drilon v. Lim:6 An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules.ℒαwρhi৷ He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.7 Thus, when the 1935 Constitution limited the President's power over local government units to supervision, he or she had been proscribed from interfering or taking an active part in the affairs of local government units. The State, at that time, had already recognized local autonomy as a means to more effectively determine and address local concerns. The principle of local autonomy was expressly adopted as a State policy in Article II, Section 10 of 1973 Constitution: SEC. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the [barangays], to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. A similar provision can be found among the State policies enumerated in Article II of the 1987 Constitution: SECTION 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. Both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution devoted a whole Article to local governments as a means to institutionalize the principle of local autonomy.8 The Article XI9 of the 1973 Constitution enjoined the enactment of a Local Government Code. It defined the relationship between local government units with their component units.10 It explicitly gave local government units a form of fiscal independence by giving them power to create their own revenues.11 As a reflection of the increasing importance our State gives to local autonomy, the present Constitution expanded the 1973 Constitution's Article XI to reiterate the guarantee that local governments shall enjoy local autonomy. Section 2 of Article X provides: SECTION 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. Aside from the power to create their own revenues, the present Constitution gave local governments entitlement to shares in the national taxes and in proceeds of the utilization of their wealth and resources.12 Local government units were also guaranteed sectoral representation.13 Further, the present Constitution created autonomous regions for areas "sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures[.]"14 The present Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution provides that the President's power over local government units is limited to general supervision. Thus: SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.15 In other words, the present Constitution reiterated that not even the President may determine and dictate how local government units' duties shall be performed. The autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution to local government units should apply not only against the national government but also against other local government units. After all, Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution does not limit only the President's powers over local government units but also the local government units' powers over other local government units. It provides that provinces and cities or municipalities shall only "ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions." This, essentially, refers only to the power of supervision. Thus, the national government may only exercise supervisory powers over local government units. Similarly, local government units may only exercise supervisory powers over their component units. Provinces do not exercise control over their component cities and/or municipalities and over highly urbanized cities.16 Cities or municipalities do not control their barangays. The Local Government Code has a general welfare clause that provides local government units with as much power necessary to "[accelerate] economic development and [upgrade] the quality of life for the people in the community[.]"17 Section 16 of the Local Government Code provides: SECTION 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. Further, the Local Government Code provides that local government units "shall endeavor to be self-reliant"18 and shall be responsible for providing the basic services needed by its constituents. Thus: SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein[.] Among the basic services that municipalities and cities must provide their constituents are infrastructure facilities such as water supply systems. Thus: SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities .... (b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following: (2) For a municipality: .... (viii) Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the municipality and which are funded out of municipal funds including, but not limited to, municipal roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary schools; clinics, health centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out health services; communal irrigation, small water impounding projects and other similar projects; fish ports; artesian wells, spring development, rainwater collectors and water supply systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and sewerage, and flood control; traffic signals and road signs; and similar facilities; .... (4) For a City: All the services and facilities of the municipality and province[.] (Emphasis supplied) Presidential Decree No. 198 allows provinces to interfere with this duty of municipalities and cities when it empowered the governor to appoint MWCD directors in case none of the cities and municipalities covered by MCWD reached the 75% requirement. Indeed, provinces are also given the power and the duty to provide its constituents with inter-municipal waterworks and other similar facilities.19 However, this is not equivalent to a grant of power to take control of duties necessarily imposed on cities or municipalities. Provisions granting powers to the provincial government should not only be interpreted in a manner that favors its own local autonomy, but also the local autonomy of local government units outside its control.20 The spirit of the principle of local autonomy is upheld if local government units are allowed to exercise the most degree of control possible over its policies and operations to the exclusion of other local government units. Thus, to attain the goals of giving local autonomy to local governments, the smallest possible unit of local government should be allowed to determine and provide the basic services needed by its constituents in accordance with the Local Government Code. More than the provincial government, municipalities and cities are more familiar with the needs and are more capable of determining the best policies that would serve their constituents. Since MCWD's polices are created by MCWD's Board of Directors,21 the appointment of directors is the only means by which local government units may exercise control over the policies that will be implemented by MCWD. Any exercise of this appointment power entails great consideration not only of the needs of the most affected but also judgment as to whose decisions could best determine and serve the needs of the local community. The person who could make such judgment is not the governor but the mayor of the most number of barangays served by MCWD. It is that city or municipality that will be most affected by the decisions and policies of the board of directors of MCWD. Thus, the power to appoint MCWD's directors may not be taken away by the provincial government from the cities or municipalities covered by MCWD without violating their local autonomy. This interpretation is in consonance with the spirit of the principle of local autonomy. It is in accordance with our state policy to foster self-reliant communities and accountable systems of government. II Further, the presumption of constitutionality accorded to laws passed by Congress should not apply in the same degree to presidential decrees. Presidential decrees and laws passed by the Congress do not belong in the same category. The presumption of constitutionality enjoyed by laws is based on the principle of separation of powers implied under our Constitution. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches each has distinct powers and duties, which may not be encroached upon by the other.22 "The executive power [is] vested in the President of the Philippines,"23 who must ensure the faithful execution of laws.24 Judicial power is vested upon courts, whose duties, essentially, is to settle actual controversies and declare acts, in proper cases, as void for being an exercise of grave abuse of discretion or for being unconstitutional.25 Legislative powers are vested solely upon the Congress.26 It is the Congress, composed of senators and representatives elected periodically by the people, that enact laws.27 "The principle [of separation of powers] presupposes mutual respect by and between the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the government and calls for them to be left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit."28 The principle of separation of powers prevents government powers from being concentrated in one branch of the government.29 It has been theorized that a combination of any of the government powers into one person "would create a system with an inherent tendency towards tyrannical actions[.]"30 Thus, the principle of separation of powers under our present Constitution ensures that none of the branches are superior to another. The three branches of the government are considered co-equal branches. Our Constitution, however, also recognizes the need for coordination among the three branches of the government. Hence, the three branches operate under a system of checks and balances.31 Each government branch has a means of checking the workings of another branch. In Angara v. Electoral Commission:32 But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.33 The presumption of constitutionality accorded to laws passed by the Congress also recognizes the meticulousness imposed by our Constitution on the process by which the legislative department should promulgate laws. Each law passed by the legislative department undergoes three readings.34 In between those readings, public hearings may be conducted wherein the representatives from the public and private sectors, members of the academe, and experts in the field related to the proposed law may participate. The law may also undergo discussions and debates. Opinions by the representatives from the public, private, and academic communities and the differences that emerge from the discussions and debates will result to several amendments of the proposed law before its actual passage.35 After its passage by the Congress, the law shall be submitted to the President for approval.36 In sum, the principles of separation of powers, the special process of legislation that allows participation of representatives of the people and the operation of the system of checks and balances provide bases for the presumption of constitutionality we accord to legislative enactments. In Angara v. Electoral Commission: More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.37 (Emphasis supplied) In Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan:38 In Garcia v. Executive Secretary, the rationale for the presumption of constitutionality was explained by this Court thus: "The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted."39 (Emphasis supplied) In Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), et al. vs. The Secretary of Budget and Management, et al.:40 In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary, the Court held that: Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it."41 (Emphasis supplied) These principles were inoperative when President Ferdinand Marcos issued presidential decrees. Presidential decrees were laws promulgated by President Ferdinand Marcos in arrogation of the Congress' legislative powers, under his martial law powers.42 The issuance of presidential decrees at that time was an exercise by the executive of his legislative powers.43 This was made possible in the 1973 Constitution, which had provisions allowing for such combined powers. Under the 1973 Constitution, the President may exercise legislative powers as long as martial law was in effect.44 Thus, the premises for according in favor of statues a presumption of constitutionality are absent in presidential decrees. Separation of powers, as well as the principle of checks and balances, were limited during the martial law. Indeed, presidential decrees are laws, but they are laws that did not undergo the careful process of discussion, debates, approval and disapproval by representatives of the people. They are not in reality the product of two government branches in coordination and in accordance with the system of checks of balances. They are essentially laws issued by one person. Hence, presidential decrees and statutes promulgated by the Congress should not be examined under the same lens. The presumption of constitutionality accorded to legislative acts by the Congress should not equally apply to presidential decrees. The courts should consider the different circumstances under which presidential decrees were issued whenever they examine their validity. Presidential decrees should undergo a stricter review than statutes promulgated by the Congress. Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition. Footnotes 1 LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 3 provides: Section 3. Operative Principles of Decentralization. - The formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the following operative principles: (a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources; (b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of its communities[.] 2 LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 2 provides: Section 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units. (b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum. (c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. 3 Full text of "Instructions of the President to the Philippine commission, April 7, 1900.." (Last visited November 15, 2016). 4 The National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Judge Paredes, 482 Phil. 331, 355 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], citing Mondano v. Silvosa, etc., et al., 97 Phil. 143, 148 (1955) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc]. See also Taule v. Secretary Santos, 277 Phil. 584, 598 (1991) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc]. 5 The National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Judge Paredes, 482 Phil. 331, 355 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], citing Mondano v. Silvosa, etc., et al., 97 Phil. 143, 147 (1955) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc]. See also Taule v. Secretary Santos, 277 Phil. 584, 598 (1991) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc], Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre, 391 Phil. 84, 98-100 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc], and Drilon v. Lim, 235 Phil. 135, 140-141 (1994) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc]. 6 235 Phil. 135 (1994) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc]. 7 Id. at 142. 8 CONST. (1973), art. XI and CONST., art. X. 9 CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 2 provides: ARTICLE XI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT .... SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government code which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose. 10 CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 4(1) provides: ARTICLE XI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT .... SEC. 4(1). Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barrios, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their assigned powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities, as determined by standards established in the local government code, shall be independent of the province. 11 CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 5 provides: ARTICLE XI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT .... SEC. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. 12 CONST., art. X, secs. 6 and 7. 13 CONST., art. X, sec. 9. 14 CONST., art. X, sec. 15. 15 CONST., art. X, sec. 4. 16 CONST., art. X, sec. 12 provides: ARTICLE X. Local Government .... SECTION 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials. 17 LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 5(c) provides: SECTION 5. Rules of Interpretation. - In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply: .... (c) The general welfare provision in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community. 18 LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 17(a). 19 LOCAL GOVT. CODE, sec. 17(3)(vii) provides: SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. .... (3) For a Province: .... (vii) Infrastructure facilities intended to service the needs of the residents of the province and which are funded out of provincial funds including, but not limited to, provincial roads and bridges; inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems; reclamation projects; and similar facilities[.] 20 See also San Juan v. Civil Service Commission (273 Phil. 271, 279 (1991) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc]), where the Court upheld the primacy of interpretations favouring local autonomy over interpretations favouring centralized power of the national government. 21 Pres. Decree No. 198 (1973), secs. 17, 18, 23, and 24 provide: SEC. 17. Performance of District Powers. - All powers, privileges, and duties of the district shall be exercised and performed by and through the board: Provided, however, That any executive, administrative or ministerial power shall be delegated and redelegated by the board to officers or agents designated for such purpose by the board. SEC. 18. Functions Limited to Policy Making. - The function of the board shall be to establish policy. The Board shall not engage in the detailed management of the district. .... SEC. 23. The General Manager. - At the first meeting of the Board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the Board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process. (As amended by Pres. Decree No. 768 (1975), sec. 9 and Rep. Act No. 9286 (2003), sec. 2) SEC. 24. Duties. - The duties of the General Manager and other officers shall be determined and specified from time to time by the board. The general manager, who shall not be a director, shall have full supervision and control of the maintenance and operation of water district facilities, with power and authority to appoint all personnel of the district: Provided, That the appointment of personnel in the supervisory level shall be subject to approval by the board. (As amended by Pres. Decree No. 768 (1975), sec. 9) 22 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. 23 CONST., art. VII, sec. 1. 24 CONST., art. VII, sec. 17. 25 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1. 26 CONST., art. VI, sec. 1. 27 CONST., art. VI, secs. 1, 2, 4, 5(1), and 7 provide: ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law. .... SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. .... SECTION 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. 28 Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary Ermita, 558 Phil. 338, 353 (2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc], citing Atitiw v. Zamora, 508 Phil. 321, 342 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]. 29 J. Puno, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, 453 Phil. 586, 732 (2003) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc]. 30 Id. at 734. 31 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. 32 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. 33 Id. at 156-157. 34 CONST., art. VI, sec. 26 provides: ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department .... SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof: (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. 35 Legislative Process: How a bill becomes a law, House of Representatives (Last visited November 15, 2016). 36 CONST., art. VI, sec. 27 provides: ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department .... SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. 37 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158-159 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. 38 479 Phil. 265 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc]. 39 Id. at 284-285, citing Congressman Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, 281 Phil. 572, 579-580 (1991) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc]. 40 686 Phil. 357 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. 41 Id. at 372-373, citing Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179, 197 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc] and ABAKADA GURO Party List (formerly AASJS), et al. v. Han. Purisima, et al., 584 Phil. 246, 267-268 (2008) [Per J. Corona, En Banc]. 42 See also Presidential Decrees, Official Gazette (Last visited November 15, 2016). 43 See Prof David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc]. 44 1976 Amendments (Last visited November 15, 2016). 1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the Members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, while the sector shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law. 2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof. 3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the Members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions, and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the 1935 Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitutions. 4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President (Prime Minister), if he so desires, may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary. 5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted. 6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land. (Emphasis supplied) The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation