G.R. No. 158464 - Separate Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 158464, August 02, 2016,
♦ Decision, Bersamin, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Velasco, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Jardeleza, [J]

JOCELYN S. LIMKAICHONG, PETITIONER, VS. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, THROUGH THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER, RESPONDENTS.

I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin who, with his lucidity of exposition and fealty to the due process tenet of prospective application of new doctrine, masterfully secured our unanimous vote today.

The ponencia reaffirms our unanimous en banc declaration in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Martinez1 that:

In no uncertain terms, Justice Bersamin underscores that the Court made its declaration in Martinez "to purge any uncertainties brought upon by the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter"3 and to "unanimously resolve[d] [a] jurisprudential conundrum."4 After today, there should be no more doubt about the "preeminence of the pronouncement xxx that the parties only have 15 days from their receipt of the decision/order of the DAR within which to invoke the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC; otherwise, the decision/order attains finality and immutability."5

I write only to address the concurring opinions of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco and Justice Marvic M. V. F. Leonen.

Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution6 provides that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."

The right of a landowner to just compensation for the taking of his or her private property is a legally demandable and enforceable right guaranteed by no less than the Bill of Rights, under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution.7 Thus, the determination of just compensation in cases of eminent domain is an actual controversy that calls for the exercise of judicial power by the courts. This is what the Court means when it said that "[t]he determination of 'just compensation' in eminent domain cases is a judicial function."8

There is, however, no constitutional provision, policy, principle, value or jurisprudence that places the determination of any justiciable controversy beyond the reach of Congress' constitutional power and prerogative to require, through a grant of primary jurisdiction, that a controversy be first referred to an expert administrative agency for adjudication, subject to subsequent judicial review.

The authority of Congress to create administrative agencies and grant them preliminary jurisdiction flows not only from the exercise of its plenary legislative power9 but also from its constitutional power to apportion and diminish the jurisdiction of courts inferior to the Supreme Court.10

In Tropical Homes, Inc. v. National Housing Authority,11 it has been settled that "[t]here is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise."12 Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides for a uniform procedure for appeals from a long list of quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals, is a loud testament to the power of Congress to vest myriad agencies with the preliminary jurisdiction to resolve controversies within their particular areas of expertise and experience.

On June 10, 1988, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 665713 (RA 6657) to implement a comprehensive agrarian reform program. In sharp contrast to Presidential Decree No. 2714 (PD 27), which covered only rice and corn lands, RA 6657 sought to cover all private and public agricultural lands. It is the Government's most ambitious land reform program ever, subjecting an estimated 7.8 million hectares of land for acquisition and redistribution to landless farmer and farmworker beneficiaries.15

With a project of such scale, the Congress decided to, among others, vest the DAR with primary jurisdiction to determine just compensation, subject, to final review by the courts. Thus, Section 16 of RA 6657 provides:

In case a party disagrees with the DAR's decision on the amount of compensation, Section 16 and related provisions allow him to bring the matter to the courts for final determination, as follows:

Appeals from SAC decisions may thereafter be taken to the Court of Appeals (and later the Supreme Court) via a petition for review.16

The validity of the grant by Congress to the DAR of the primary jurisdiction to determine just compensation, under the summary administrative process in Section 16 of RA 6657, has been settled by this Court more than twenty-five (25) years ago in the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform.17 There, this Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 6657 and, with specific reference to Section 16, declared:

At this point, it should be emphasized that Congress in RA 6657 provided for a heightened judicial review of the DAR's preliminary determination of just compensation pursuant to Section 16. In case of a proper challenge, SACs are actually empowered to conduct a de novo review of the DAR's decision. Under RA 6657, a full trial is held where SACs are authorized to (1) appoint one or more commissioners,19 (2) receive, hear, and retake the testimony and evidence of the parties, and (3) make findings of fact anew. In other words, in exercising its exclusive and original jurisdiction to determine just compensation under RA 6657, the SAC is possessed with exactly the same powers and prerogatives of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In such manner, the SAC thus conducts a more exacting type of review, compared to the procedure provided either under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, which governs appeals from decisions of administrative agencies to the Court of Appeals, or under Book VII, Chapter 4, Section 2520 of the Administrative Code of 1987,21 which provides for a default administrative review process. In both cases, the reviewing court decides based on the record, and the agency's findings of fact are held to be binding when supported by substantial evidence.22 The SAC, in contrast, retries the whole case, receives new evidence, and holds a full evidentiary hearing.1aшphi1

In this light, until and unless this Court's ruling in Association of Small Landowners is reversed, a becoming modesty and respectful courtesy towards a co-equal branch of government demand that the Court defer to the Congress' grant of primary jurisdiction to the DAR.

The grant of primary jurisdiction to administrative agencies over otherwise immediately justiciable controversies is constitutionally permissible because, as explained in the case of Far East Conference v. United States,23 courts and agencies are both instrumentalities of justice, with complementary roles in the pursuit of similar ends:

[C]ourt and agency are not to be regarded as wholly independent and unrelated instrumentalities of justice, each acting in the performance of its prescribed statutory duty without regard to the appropriate function of the other in securing the plainly indicated objects of the statute. Court and agency are the means adopted to attain the prescribed end, and, so far as their duties are defined by the words of the statute, those words should be construed so as to attain that end through coordinated action. Neither body should repeat in this day the mistake made by the courts of law when equity was struggling for recognition as an ameliorating system of justice; neither can rightly be regarded by the other as an alien intruder, to be tolerated if must be, but never to be encouraged or aided by the other in the attainment of the common aim. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)

Justice Velasco, citing Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines,24 opines that direct resort to the SAC is valid as the Court has never considered the issuance of a prior DAR valuation a jurisdictional requirement or condition precedent.25

Justice Leonen argues that the determination of the DAR is "superfluous," being only "recommendatory to the courts."26 Since "nothing in the Constitution mandates the judiciary to follow recommendations coming from the executive," he asserts that the DAR's determination can even be disregarded by the courts.27

We read Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines differently. It held that the determination by DAR of the amount of just compensation becomes final if not elevated "on time" to SAC:

It must be emphasized that the taking of property under RA 6657 is an exercise of the State's power of eminent domain. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies. When the parties cannot agree on the amount of just compensation, only the exercise of judicial power can settle the dispute with binding effect on the winning and losing parties, On the other hand, the determination of just compensation in the RARAD/DARAB requires the voluntary agreement of the parties. Unless the parties agree, there is no settlement of the dispute before the RARAD/DARAB, except if the aggrieved party fails to file a petition for just compensation on time before the RTC.28 (Citations omitted, emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Neither landowner nor agency can disregard the administrative process provided under RA 6657 without offending the constitutional prerogative of the Congress to grant primary jurisdiction to the DAR.

xxx [I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so even though the facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure.29 (Emphasis supplied.)

The adjudication by the DAR on just compensation is not an executive recommendation or a superfluity to be blithely dismissed by the courts. They are, rather, quasi-judicial decisions reached as a result of what the Administrative Code of 1987 considers as a contested case, where "legal rights, duties or privileges asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are xxx determined after hearing."30 These decisions become final and immutable if not timely challenged before the SAC. The SAC, in resolving such challenge, must dispose, affirm or reverse the administrative agency's determination by way of a full decision, expressing "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law" on which the SAC decision is based.31

The requirement for a fifteen-day period to file with the SAC is expressly provided for in RA 6657 and its validity foreclosed by our ruling in Martinez.

Justice Velasco is, however, of the view that there is no statutory basis for the imposition of a fifteen-day period and asserts that Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure and Section 6, Rule XIX of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure must be struck down as void and of no legal effect.32

The fifteen-day period is provided for in Sections 51 and 54, in relation to Section 57, of RA 6657, which provides as follows:

While Section 51 expressly provides for the fifteen-day period, Section 54 states that any decision of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or matter pertaining to the implementation of the Act (including, perforce, determination of just compensation) may be brought to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of the DAR decision, "except as otherwise provided in the Act," The proviso refers to the exception provided under Section 57, namely, the special jurisdiction of the SAC to determine just compensation. On top of Section 51, Sections 54 and 57, read together, provide that decisions of the DAR become final within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision, unless brought to the Court of Appeals under Section 54, or to the SAC under Section 57.

Even assuming arguendo Justice Velasco is correct in stating that RA 6657 does not provide for the fifteen-day period, the constitutional and statutory authority of the DAR to promulgate its own rules of procedure is not in issue in this case. Neither is the validity of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. The DARAB Rules of Procedure were promulgated under authority of Sections 49 and 50 of RA 6657, which grant the DAR the power to "issue rules and regulations, whether substantive or procedural, to carry out"33 RA 6657 and "adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination for every action or proceeding before it."34

This Court, in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Authority,35 has recognized the power of administrative bodies to "fill in the details" to implement the policies laid down in a statute through supplementary regulation.

More, the Administrative Code of 1987 which provides for, among others, a default uniform procedure for the judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies, also provides that decisions of administrative agencies become final after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the agency order.1aшphi136 The Administrative Code of 1987 provides, in pertinent part:

The Revised Rules of Court finally also provide, under Rule 43, Section 4, for a fifteen-day period of finality for agency action.37

Justice Leonen suggests that the applicable time limit to bring the DAR decision to the SAC is the thirty (30) year prescriptive period over real actions provided under the Civil Code.38

A thirty-year period is unreasonable. It is oppressive to the landowner, to the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) because it violates the Constitution's command that "[a]ll persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."39 It also defeats the primordial objective of the Revised Rules of Court "of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."40

A thirty-year period will also impermissibly erode the "justness" of the just compensation inasmuch as just compensation requires that the payment be made closest to the taking:

The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.41 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)

Finally, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws demands that a thirty-year period should be available to both the landowner and the DAR/LBP. Under this regime, landowners would be tempted to speculate on receiving interest if they postpone the filing of the action to determine just compensation, thus, shifting the burden of the risk of inflation to the Government. This, in turn, will disturb the Government's budget process and consequently increase the cost to be incurred by the Government in implementing land reform, Conversely, unscrupulous DAR/LBP functionaries may be tempted to unduly delay appeal for corrupt reasons. This will leave a landowner uncertain, for the duration of the thirty-year period, as to the true value of his property, the very evil he is sought to be protected from by Martinez:

xxx This rule is not only in accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to the true value of his property.42