G.R. No. 207264 - Separate Opinions

Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, 22 October 2013
♦ Resolution, Perez [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Sereno [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Carpio [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Brion [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonen [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Abad [J]

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

Certain views, distinctly different from the ponencia and from the Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, prompt me to write this Separate Opinion.

Guided by consistency in the interpretation of constitutional language, it is my view that the 1987 Constitution "intended to give the electoral tribunals full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners."¹

Javier v. COMELEC², decided under the auspices of the 1973 Constitution, is instructive and sheds light on the extent of the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the electoral tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.

Under the 1973 Constitution, COMELEC was given the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials."³

The Court, speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, interpreted this constitutional grant of jurisdiction as follows:

We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.⁴

The 1987 Constitution transferred the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives to be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members,''⁵ but the constitutional language has not changed. The jurisdiction granted was similar to that of the COMELEC under the 1973 Constitution, which the Court interpreted to mean full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.⁶

When the same language was adopted in the 1987 Constitution, it must be interpreted in the same way. Thus, petitions to deny due course or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of those aspiring to be members of the Senate or the House of Representatives under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code⁷ should be under the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals and not of the COMELEC.

Be that as it may, this view cannot be applied to petitioner's cause, as she has never questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to take cognizance of and rule on Section 78 petitions. Petitioner came to this Court to assail both the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division dated 27 March 2013 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 4 May 2013 based on grave abuse of discretion, and not on patent lack of jurisdiction on constitutional grounds.

As will be discussed, there is nothing on record to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC, either the First Division or En Bane in promulgating the assailed Resolutions. Petitioner reiterates in her Motion for Reconsideration the imputation of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC in the following manner:

The right of petitioner to due process was never violated, as she was given every opportunity to present her side during the reception of evidence at the Division level. She was furnished a copy of the Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits.⁸ She had all the right to interpose her objections to the documentary evidence offered against her, but she failed to exercise that right.

The COMELEC First Division, therefore, did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it admitted in evidence the documents offered, even if the printed Internet article showing that petitioner had us ~ a U.S. passport might have been hearsay, and even if the copy of the Bureau of Immigration Certification was merely a photocopy and not even a certified true copy of the original.

Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure⁹ provides for the suppletory application of the Rules of Court. The third paragraph of Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court."

Petitioner failed to raise any objection to the offer of evidence on time. It is now too late for her to question its admissibility. The rule is that evidence not objected to may be deemed admitted and validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.¹⁰ As a corollary point, the COMELEC En Bane committed no grave abuse of discretion when it did not set petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for hearing. Setting a case for hearing is discretionary on its part. In fact, in summary proceedings like the special action of filing a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, oral testimony is dispensed with and, instead, parties are required to submit their position paper together with affidavits, counter affidavits and other pieces of documentary evidence.¹¹

There was no grave abuse of discretion when, based on the records, the COMELEC cancelled the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner after finding that she had committed false material misrepresentation with respect to her citizenship and residency. It thereafter declared that she should have complied with the requirements of renouncing her foreign citizenship and taking the oath of allegiance under R A 9225 before she could qualify to run for any elective office.

It bears stressing that when the petition to deny due course or to cancel her Certificate of Candidacy was filed alleging that she possessed American citizenship, petitioner denied the allegation, claiming that no evidence whatsoever was presented to support the claim.¹² When herein private respondent filed her Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits, petitioner did not object to the documentary evidence offered to support the allegation that the latter possessed American citizenship.

In her Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division Resolution dated 27 March 2013, petitioner, without providing any basis, claimed that she had not lost her Filipino citizenship. Yet, she attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. She claimed that even if it was a superfluity, she was attaching her duly accomplished personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships in compliance with the requirements under R.A. 9225, "if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and comply with rules."¹³

In her original Petition before this Court, petitioner contends that "even granting for the sake of argument but without conceding that the 'newly discovered evidence' of Respondent Tan were admissible, it merely established the fact that Petitioner is an American citizen which does not translate to her not being a Filipino."¹⁴ Yet, in her present Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner begs the indulgence of this Court for the belated submission of her Identification Certificate recognizing her as a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the provisions and implementing regulations of R. A.¹⁵

This submission of the Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship and the Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration confirms the acquisition of foreign citizenship by petitioner and the applicability of R.A. 9225 to her. Thus, the COMELEC was correct in ruling that she was no longer a Filipino citizen when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy and that without complying with the requirements of R.A. 9225, she was not qualified to run for public office. Since these two documents were not submitted to the COMELEC, there can be no grave abuse of discretion either on the part of the COMELEC First Division when it cancelled her Certificate of Candidacy, or on the part of the COMELEC En Bane when it affirmed the cancellation.

Petitioner also imputes grave abuse to the COMELEC for enforcing and applying R.A. 9225 to her, claiming that by doing so, the Commission added a requirement to the qualifications set to become a member of the House of Representatives as set by the Constitution. Petitioner must be reminded that it was the legislature that added the requirement of renunciation of foreign citizenship by those who have lost their citizenship and who seek elective office. COMELEC has the constitutional duty to enforce this law.

Let me now proceed to an explanation why -despite my view that under the 1987 Constitution, the HRET is given the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the x x x qualifications of its Members -the present case cannot be the basis for declaring the unconstitutionality of the COMELEC's action of exercising jurisdiction over Section 78 petitions involving candidates for Member of the House of Representatives or the Senate.

It must be pointed out that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to entertain and rule on the Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy in the instant case was never questioned. In fact, petitioner fully participated in the action, by filing her Answer and Memorandum before the First Division and subsequently filing a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC after the First Division cancelled her Certificate of Candidacy on 27 March 2013. The COMELEC had the legal duty to decide on the matter and, in fact, the COMELEC En Bane resolved to affirm the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy on 4 May 2013.

This Court has held in Tajonera v. Lamaroza:¹⁶ The rule is that jurisdiction is conferred by law and the objection to the authority of the tribunal to take cognizance of a case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the attendant circumstances in the cases at bar, petitioners are now barred from claiming lack of jurisdiction at this stage with their active participation.

… They never mentioned lack of jurisdiction in their memorandum of appeal, in their motion for reconsideration or in their position paper. They are now estopped from raising such objection. It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (citing the case of Tijam v. Sibunghanoy 23 SCRA 35).

In the instant Petition, petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC after it cancelled the Certificate of Candidacy, and after the proclamation was made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Contending that her proclamation as winner in the congressional race in the Province of Marinduque effectively ousted COMELEC of any jurisdiction, she claimed that its disqualification of the Petitioner should be declared to have no legal force and effect and may not be made the basis to annul petitioner's proclamation or to unseat her from office.¹⁷

It was this prayer of petitioner in her original Petition before this Court that prompted this Court to declare:

More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy -that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Bane had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En Bane decision. The Board of Canvassers which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC en Bane which affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division.¹⁸

Petitioner now states in her Motion for Reconsideration that her proclamation is not and has never been an issue in her Petition. She must be reminded that she is anchoring her claim that COMELEC has been ousted of any jurisdiction, to even enforce its final decision by virtue of her proclamation.

These questions compel us to look into the set of circumstances surrounding petitioner's proclamation.

On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Bane had already resolved the Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy filed against Reyes. Based on Sec. 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,¹⁹ this Resolution was already final and should have become executory five days after its promulgation. But despite this unrestrained ruling of the COMELEC En Bane the PBOC still proclaimed Reyes as the winning candidate on 18 May 2013.

On 16 May 2013, petitioner had already received the judgment cancelling her Certificate of Candidacy. As mentioned, two days thereafter, the PBOC still proclaimed her as the winner. Obviously, the proclamation took place notwithstanding that petitioner herself already knew of the COMELEC En Bane Resolution.

It must also be pointed out that even the PBOC already knew of the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner when it proclaimed her. The COMELEC En Bane Resolution dated 9 July 2013 and submitted to this Court through the Manifestation of private respondent, quoted the averments in the Verified Petition of petitioner therein as follows:

xxx While the proceedings of the PBOC is suspended or in recess, the process server of this Honorable Commission, who identified himself as PEDRO P STA. ROSA II (Sta. Rosa, for brevity), arrived at the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque where the provincial canvassing is being held.

xxx The process server, Sta. Rosa, was in possession of certified true copies of the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections En Bane on 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) entitled Joseph Socorro B. Tan vs. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes and an Order dated 15 May 2013 to deliver the same to the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marinduque. The said Order was signed by no less than the Chairman o the Commission on Elections, the Honorable Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.

xxx Process Server Pedro Sta. Rosa II immediately approached Atty. Edwin Villa, the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Marinduque, upon his arrival to serve a copy of the aforementioned Resolution dated 14 May 20 3 in SPA No. 13-05 3 (DC). Despite his proper identification that he is a process server from the COMELEC Main Office, the PES totally ignored Process Server Pedro Sta. Rosa II.

xxx Interestingly, the PES likewise refused to receive the copy of the Commission on Elections En Bane Resolution dated 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) despite several attempts to do so.

xxx Instead, the PES immediately declared the resumption of the proceedings of the PBOC and instructed the Board Secretary to immediately read its Order proclaiming Regina Ongsiako Reyes as winner for the position of Congressman for the Lone District of Marinduque.²⁰

This narration of the events shows that the proclamation was in contravention of a COMELEC En Bane Resolution cancelling the candidate s Certificate of Candidacy.

The PBOC, a subordinate body under the direct control and supervision of the COMELEC,²¹ cannot simply disregard a COMELEC En Banc Resolution brought before its attention and hastily proceed with the proclamation by reasoning that it has not officially received the resolution or order.

The relevance of Sees. 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 is brought to the fore. These provisions read:

Sec. 6 Effect of Disqualification Case. -Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

See. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Big. 881.

The law provides for the suspension of a proclamation whenever there are pending disqualification cases or petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, and the evidence of guilt is strong. This provision points to the legislative intent to be cautious in proceeding with the proclamation of candidates against whom pending disqualification cases or petitions for cancellation of certificate of candidacy are filed. When the petition for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy is no longer pending as when the COMELEC En Banc had, in fact, affirmed the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy, the need for the suspension of the proclamation becomes more apparent.

In this case, the technical requirement of Sees. 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 -to suspend the proclamation in the face of the motion of a complainant or any intervenor to suspend the proclamation was, in fact, substantially complied with. The compliance was when the other candidate, through his counsel, moved for his proclamation in view of the affirmation by the COMELEC En Banc of the cancellation of petitioner s Certificate of Candidacy and actually provided a copy of the Resolution to the PBOC.²² That Motion, together with a copy of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution, should have given enough notice to the PBOC that there was an incident analogous to a prejudicial question in criminal cases,²³ an incident that called for the suspension of the proclamation of the candidate whose Certificate of Candidacy had already been cancelled.

The elements of a prejudicial question in criminal actions as set forth in Sec. 7 Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as follows:

Applying the elements of a prejudicial question to Sees. 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 on the pendency of disqualification cases or of petitions filed under Sec. 78 call for the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate when the evidence of guilt or the likelihood of the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy is strong. The main issue in the disqualification case or the Petition to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy is directly related to and, is, in fact, the crucial element that must be decided before a proclamation can be had.

The PBOC denied the motion to proclaim candidate Velasco on the ground that neither the counsel of petitioner nor the PBOC was duly furnished or served an official copy of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution²⁴ dated 14 May 2013 and forthwith proceeded with the proclamation of herein petitioner, whose Certificate of Candidacy has already been cancelled, bespeaks mala fide on its part.

As early as 27 March 2013, when the COMELEC First Division cancelled petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy, the people of Marinduque, including the COMELEC officials in the province, were already aware of the impending disqualification of herein petitioner upon the finality of the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy. When the COMELEC En Bane affirmed the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy on the day of the elections, but before the proclamation of the winner, it had the effect of declaring that herein petitioner was not a candidate.

Thus, when the PBOC proclaimed herein petitioner, it proclaimed not a winner but a non-candidate.

The proclamation of a non-candidate cannot take away the power vested in the COMELEC to enforce and execute its decisions. It is a power that enjoys precedence over that emanating from any other authority, except the Supreme Court, and that which is issued in habeas corpus proceedings as provided in Sec. 52(f) of the Omnibus Election Code.²⁵

On a final note, I respectfully take exception to my distinguished colleague's statement that the novel argument from no less than the Chief Justice regarding petitioner Reyes' bad faith was out of the blue and without any previous circulated written opinion considering that, from the very beginning of the deliberations of this case I, together with another colleague, had already clearly expressed my opinion that bad faith should never be rewarded. Furthermore, the argument of bad faith is neither novel nor out of the blue, as it had been repeatedly raised in several deliberations on this matter. The bad faith element was further confirmed by the records through the antecedents cited in the Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 09 July 2013.²⁶

Be that as it may, it is unseemly to question the participation in the deliberations by a member of this Court for lack of a previously circulated written opinion. Indeed, given the nature of our collegial discussions on the matters presented to us, every member of the Court has the right to participate in the deliberations En Banc with or without having previously circulated his or her opinion on the cases before us.

I reiterate my view that the COMELEC Decision dated 14 May 2013 has already become final and that the HRET has no jurisdiction over this electoral case.

I dissent. Based on existing jurisprudence, jurisdiction over any election contest involving House Members is vested by the Constitution in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upon proclamation of the winning candidate. Any allegation that the proclamation is void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. It is the HRET that has jurisdiction to resolve the validity of the proclamation as the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications"¹ of House Members. To hold otherwise will result in a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies.

We must correct the error in the Court's 25 June 2013 Resolution that "to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office."² The 25 June 2013 Resolution amends the 1987 Constitution, overturns established jurisprudence, and results in absurdities.

To recall, Reyes was proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Reyes' term of office began, under the 1987 Constitution, at noon of 30 June 2013.³ Reyes took her oath of office on 5 June 2013 before Speaker Feliciano Belmonte. Reyes again took her oath of office on 27 June 2013 before President Benigno S Aquino III. Reyes then took her oath of office before Speaker Belmonte in open session on 22 July 2013.

Under the 25 June 2013 Resolution of the Court, Reyes could assume office only upon taking her oath before the Speaker in open session -an event that usually happens only after new House Members elect their Speaker sometime in mid-July. The 25 June 2013 Resolution effectively cuts short Reyes' constitutional term of office by a little less than one month, thereby amending the Constitution. In the meantime, new House Members, and their employees, cannot draw their salaries until the members take their oath of office before the Speaker. The Resolution of 25 June 2013 also requires that every new House Member should take his or her oath of office before the Speaker in open session -a requirement not found in the Constitution. While the Speaker is authorized to administer oaths,⁴ the Constitution does not distinguish between an oath before officers authorized by law to administer oaths and an oath before the Speaker in open session. Members of this Court have been administering the oaths of Senators and House Members for the longest time.

We have consistently ruled that proclamation alone of a winning congressional candidate following the elections divests COMELEC of its jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET.⁵ Proclamation alone of a winning congressional candidate is sufficient, and is the only essential act to vest jurisdiction upon the HRET. Taking of the oath and assumption of office are merely descriptive of what necessarily comes after proclamation. In Jalosjos v. COMELEC⁶ the most recent decision on the matter, the ponente Justice Roberto A. Abad wrote:

The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the proclaimed Representatives in favor of the HRET. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 17 Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the House Members. Certiorari will not lie considering that there is an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceedings before the COMELEC.⁷ Indeed, even if Joseph Socorro B. Tan alleged, as he did allege in his Comment⁸ to Reyes' Motion for Reconsideration, that Reyes' proclamation is null, void and without legal force and effect,⁹ such allegation does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.¹⁰

Upon proclamation of the winning candidate as House Member and despite any allegation of invalidity of his or her proclamation, the HRET alone is vested with jurisdiction to hear the election contest. The COMELEC's jurisdiction ends where the HRET's jurisdiction begins. We previously ruled in Lazatin v. Commission on Elections¹¹ that:

The petition is impressed with merit because the petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which has been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal (Emphasis supplied)

We underscored the purpose for the mutually exclusive jurisdictions of the COMELEC and the HRET in Guerrero v. Commission on Elections,¹² where we stated that:

(I)n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate. (Emphasis supplied)

Upon proclamation, jurisdiction over any election contest against the proclaimed candidate is vested in the HRET by operation of the Constitution. Any challenge to the validity of the proclamation falls under the HRET's jurisdiction as sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of House Members. To hold that the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a challenge to the validity of a proclamation is to hold that while jurisdiction vests in the HRET upon proclamation, the HRET loses such jurisdiction if a challenge is filed assailing the validity of the proclamation. If so, a party then exercises the power to terminate HRET’s jurisdiction that is vested by the Constitution. This is an absurdity.

It may also happen that one losing candidate may assail the validity of the proclamation before the Supreme Court while another losing candidate will file an election protest before the HRET within 15 days from the proclamation. In such a situation, there will be a direct clash of jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the HRET. The case in the Supreme Court can remain pending even after the House Members have assumed their office, making the anomaly even more absurd.

In the present case, the issue of the validity of Reyes' proclamation was never raised as an issue before the COMELEC. Reyes herself mentioned her proclamation as a statement of fact, and used it to support her claim that the HRET already has jurisdiction over her case. As the petitioner before this Court, Reyes will not question the validity of her own proclamation. In any event, the determination of the validity of Reyes' proclamation allegedly on the ground of bad faith on the part of the Board of Canvassers is a factual matter not within the jurisdiction of this Court. Moreover, Rules 16 and 17 of the 20 11 HRET Rules require a verified election protest or a verified petition for quo warranto to be filed within 15 days after the proclamation of the winner, thus:

RULE 16 Election Protest. – A verified petition contesting the election or returns of any Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within fifteen (15) days after the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant while the adverse party shall be known as the protestee.

No joint election protest shall be admitted, but the Tribunal, for good and sufficient reasons, may consolidate individual protests and hear and decide them jointly. Thus, where there are two or more protests involving the same protestee and common principal causes of action, the subsequent protests shall be consolidated with the earlier case to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. In case of objection to the consolidation, the Tribunal shall resolve the same. An order resolving a motion for or objection to the consolidation shall be unappealable.

The protest is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read it and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief or based on verifiable information or authentic records. A verification based on information and belief, or upon knowledge, information and belief, is not a sufficient verification.

An unverified election protest shall not suspend the running of the reglementary period to file the protest.

RULE 17. Quo Warranto. A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any registered voter of the district concerned within fifteen 15) days from the date of the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph to the contrary notwithstanding, a petition for quo warranto may be filed by any registered voter of the district concerned against a member of the House of Representatives, on the ground of citizenship, at any time during his tenure.

The rule on verification and consolidation provided in Section 16 hereof shall apply to petitions for quo warranto. (Emphasis supplied)

If we follow the 25 June 2013 Resolution's strict application of the concurrence of the three requisites and use the pertinent dates in the present case, any election protest filed against Reyes within 15 days from her proclamation in accordance with the present HRET Rules will be dismissed outright by the HRET for being premature. Under the 25 June 2013 Resolution, jurisdiction vests in the HRET only when the House Members take their oath of office before the Speaker in open session, an event that happens only sometime in mid-July following the elections. Thus, the earliest that any election contest arising from the May 2013 elections can be filed with the HRET is 22 July 2013, the day the House Members took their oath of office before the Speaker in open session. This amends the HRET Rules, and changes well-established jurisprudence, without any justifiable reason whatsoever.

The Court's ruling today is a double flip-flop: (1) it reverses the well-settled doctrine that upon proclamation of a winning congressional candidate, the HRET acquires sole jurisdiction over any contest relating to the "election, returns and qualifications" of House Members; and (2) it also reverses the well-settled doctrine that any question on the validity of such proclamation falls under the sole jurisdiction of the HRET.

I vote to ENY petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes Manifestation and Notice o Withdrawal. I also vote to GR NT Reyes Motion for Reconsideration to DISMISS her petition since jurisdiction over her petition had vested in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal upon her proclamation.

This Dissent responds to the ponencia’s ruling on the following pending incidents:

A. The January 25, 2013 Resolution and the Dissent Previous to these incidents, the majority -in its June 25, 2013 Resolution - dismissed outright Reyes petition for certiorari, filed to nullify the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruling cancelling her certificate of candidacy (CoC).

In my Dissent to this Resolution, I characterized the ruling as "unusual" for several reasons, the most important of which is that it raised very substantial issues as shown by the discussions below. In this light, the outright dismissal was attended by undue haste and without even hearing Tan and allowing him to defend his case by himself. As a result, the grounds that the Court cited in its Resolution of dismissal were reasons that the Court raised on its own, on contentious issues that, in the usual course of Court processes, are resolved after hearing the respondent and after joinder of issues. In this unusual ruling, the Court, among others, held that:

The Court's handling of the case was all the more unusual because the son of a member (Mr. Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.) of this Court, although not a direct party, directly stood to be benefited by the Court's ruling -a fact that was reiterated both during the deliberations of the Court and in the Dissenting Opinion filed.

As will be seen from the discussions below, the reason for the haste was apparently the desire to avoid the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) where Mr. Justice Velasco currently sits as Chairman and whose participation and ruling could result (if Reyes is unseated) in the declaration of the vacancy of the Marinduque congressional seat, not the seating of the second placer in the elections.

Aside from pointing out the undue haste that characterized the June 25, 2013 ruling, my previous Dissent argued that no outright dismissal should have been made because of the intervening events and "in light of the gravity of the issues raised and the potential effect on jurisprudence of the Court s ruling on the case.

For a full appreciation of the facts and supervening developments, outlined below is a brief summary of the antecedents and the supervening developments in the present case.

Reyes filed her CoC on October 1 2012 for the pos1t10n of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque.⁷ Her opponent was former Congressman Lord Allan Jay Velasco, the son ofa sitting Member of this Court, Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. On October 10, 2012, Tan filed with the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to or to cancel Reyes CoC on the ground that she committed material misrepresentations in her CoC when she declared that: (1) she is a resident of Barangay Lupac, Boac, Marinduque; (2) she is a natural born Filipino citizen; (3) she is not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country; (4) her date of birth is July 3, 1964; (5) she is single; and (6) she is eligible to the office she seeks to be elected.⁸

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a resolution granting Tan's petition and cancelling Reyes CoC based on its finding that Reyes committed false material representation in her citizenship and residency.⁹ Reyes duly filed a motion for the reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division s ruling on April 8, 2013.¹⁰

On May 14 2013 or a day after the congressional elections, the COMELEC en bane issued a resolution denying Reyes motion for reconsideration, thus affirming the COMELEC First Division s ruling. This resolution would have lapsed to finality on May 19, 2013 or five (5) days after the resolution s issuance, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.¹²

On May 18, 2013 the Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers PBOC) without being officially informed of the COMELEC's ruling- proclaimed Reyes as the duly elected member of the House of Representatives for Marinduque. She garnered 52 209 votes as against the 48 396 votes for former Cong. Velasco.¹³

On May 31, 2013 former Cong. Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes with the HRET.¹⁴ On the same date, a certain Christopher Matienzo also filed a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam questioning Reyes' eligibility before the HRET.¹⁵

On June 5, 2013 the COMELEC en bane issued a Certificate of Finality declaring its May 14, 2013 resolution final and executory.¹⁶ Note that this came way after Reyes had been proclaimed the winner on May 18, 2013.

On June 7, 2013 Reyes as the duly proclaimed winner took her oath of office before House Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr.¹⁷

On June 10, 2013 Reyes filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and/or status quo ante order with the Court to annul the March 27, 2013 and the May 14, 2013 COMELEC resolutions cancelling her CoC for the position of Representative in the lone district of Marinduque, and the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 COMELEC resolution final and executory in SPA Case No. 13-053(DC).¹⁸

On June 25, 2013 the Court hastily, and without requiring the COMELEC and Tan to comment, dismissed Reyes' petition outright through a Resolution finding that the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case. The majority ruled as well that the COMELEC retained jurisdiction over the cancellation case considering that Reyes could not yet be considered a Member of the House of Representatives; thus, she could not assume office before the start of the congressional term at noon on June 30,2013.¹⁹

On June 28, 2013 Reyes filed a Manifestation with the Court that on June 19, 2013 the COMELEC First Division denied former Cong. Velasco s petition to declare the proceedings of the Marinduque PBOC and her subsequent proclamation null and void.²⁰

At noon of June 30, 2013, by the authority of the 1987 Constitution, the term of the outgoing (20 10-2013) elective congressional officials expired and the term of the incoming (2013-2016) officials began.²¹

On July 2, 2013, Reyes filed another Manifestation with the Court stating that she had assumed office and had started performing her functions as a Member of the House of Representatives on June 30, 2013.²² As proof of her assumption to office, Reyes attached to the Manifestation a copy of a bill and a resolution she filed in the House of Representatives.²³

On July 9, 2013, the COMELEC en bane issued a Resolution annulling Reyes proclamation and proclaimed the second placer, former Cong. Velasco, as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. Notably, the COMELEC, at this point, was acting on the proclamation of a sitting member of the House of Representatives.²⁴

On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally convened, elected its officers, and, in a joint session, received the President of the Philippines for his State of the Nation Address.²⁵ Reyes, together with other Members of the House of Representatives, ceremonially took their oaths in open session before Speaker Feliciano Belmonte whom they earlier elected. Thus, the House of Representatives fully and formally accorded Reyes its recognition as the duly elected Member for the lone district of Marinduque.

In the interim, on July 15, 2013, Reyes filed her Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Inhibition of Justice Jose P. Perez from the Court s June 25, 2013 Resolution.²⁶

Reyes repleaded in her motion for reconsideration the arguments she raised in her petition for certiorari on due process, citizenship and residency requirements, and submitted the following additional positions and arguments in response to the arguments the majority made in dismissing her petition outright.

In the same motion, Reyes also alleges that there are now two (2) pending cases filed against her in the HRET: (1) Election Protest Ad Cautelam filed on May 31, 2013, entitled Lord Allan Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes docketed as Case No. 13-028;³¹ and (2) Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam filed on May 31, 2013, entitled Christopher P. Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes docketed as Case No. 13-027.³²

On July 22, 2013, Tan filed his Comment on Reyes' Motion for Reconsideration praying for the dismissal of her petition with finality.³³ Tan submitted the following arguments:

On July 23, 2013, Reyes filed a Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of Petition in the present case, "without waiver of her arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as will be articulated in the HRET which is now the proper forum." Reyes emphasized that she filed the Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of Petition considering the absence of any comment or opposition from the respondents to the petition. In her Motion, Reyes alleged:³⁴

A. Reyes cannot unilaterally withdraw her pending Petition for Certiorari before this Court.

Although not a disputed issue as the ponencia simply "Notes" Reyes' Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of Petition, I nevertheless address this point as a preliminary issue that the Court must rule upon on record in order to fully resolve all the outstanding issues. I submit that Reyes can no longer and should not be allowed to unilaterally withdraw her petition.

The rule on adherence of jurisdiction applies to the present case. This rule states that once the jurisdiction of a court attaches, the court cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character that would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance; the court retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.³⁵ If at all possible, the withdrawal should be for a meritorious and justifiable reason, and subject to the approval of the Court.

An illustrative case is Aruego Jr v. Court of Appeals³⁶ where the Court ruled on whether the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case through the filing of the complaint, lost that jurisdiction because of the passage of Executive Order No. 209 (Family Code of the Philippines). In ruling that the trial court cannot be ousted of its jurisdiction by subsequent happenings or events, the Court held:

Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.³⁷

In the present case, the Court had acquired jurisdiction and has in fact ruled on Reyes petition; thus the Court s jurisdiction should continue until it finally disposes of the case. Reyes cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court and thereafter simply withdraw her petition, especially after the Court has ruled and after its ruling has generated a lot of public attention and interest, some of them adverse to the reputation of the Court.

Reyes’ justification for filing her Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of the Petition the absence of any comment or opposition from the respondents to the Petition -is no longer supported by existing facts; Tan filed a Comment on Reyes motion for reconsideration dated July 22, 2013. Thus, as matters now stand, Reyes move is not supported by any factual justification.

Reyes’ legal justification on the other hand, could be seen in her allegations that she had been proclaimed, had taken her oath, and Congress itself has convened on July 22, 2013. Thus, pursuant to the Constitution, the HRET now has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters relating to her elections, returns and qualifications that the COMELEC had not finally resolved. This ground, however, is a submitted issue in the present case and is for the Court to appreciate and rule upon in this motion for reconsideration; it is not a ground that Reyes can act upon on her own independently of the ruling of this Court.

That cases -an election protest and a quo warranto petition -have been filed against Reyes before the HRET all the more render it imperative for this Court to settle, in a well reasoned manner, whether the jurisdiction exercised by the COMELEC through the cancellation of a CoC filed against Reyes, now rests with the HRET. At this point and after the attention that media have given the case, no less than a ruling by the Court is needed to clear the air as, constitutionally, the election, returns and qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives are already involved -a matter that on its face appropriately lies within the competence and jurisdiction of the HRET.

Reyes’ unilateral withdrawal of her petition after the Court had acted on the petition, in my view, was not done n the exercise of any right of withdrawal that Reyes can demand from this Court. While no express rule exists under the Rules of Court on the withdrawal of an original petition before the Supreme Court, this is the only conclusion that can be made, consistent with the spirit that pervades the Rules of Court. Rule 17 of the Rules of Court on the dismissal of actions at the instance of the plaintiff embodies this spirit and can be applied by analogy

Under this Rule, dismissal by notice of the plaintiff can only be before service of the defendant s answer or before service of a motion for summary judgment. On the other hand, dismissal of a complaint by motion of the plaintiff can only be upon approval by the court and upon such terms and conditions that the court shall deem to be proper.

The points comparable to the markers laid down by Rule 1 7 have all been reached and left behind in the present case so that Reyes can no longer be said to have full and sole control over her petition: the Court has ruled on the petition and a Dissent has in fact been filed against the ruling; the petitioner has filed a motion for reconsideration and the respondent has filed its Comment on the Motion. External developments have also taken place, among them, the proclamation of Reyes as winner; the administration of her oath of office no less than by the Speaker of the House and by the President of the Philippines; and the convening of the House of Representatives where Reyes fully participated. All these developments cannot simply be disregarded in one sweep by the simple act of withdrawal that Reyes wishes the Court to approve.

Lastly, we must consider that our exercise of jurisdiction over the present petition is an original one, undertaken in the exercise of the Court s expanded jurisdiction under the second paragraph of Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution, to determine whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling Reyes CoC and in declaring the COMELEC s ruling final after Reyes had been proclaimed, taken her oath, and assumed office.

The fact that developments (properly raised and pleaded) have intervened and have cut across these questioned COMELEC actions all the more render it necessary for the Court to determine whether the HRET's jurisdiction has already begun and where, in fact, the COMELEC's jurisdiction ended. This approach will clear the air so that the substantive issues on Reyes election, returns and qualifications can be resolved by the proper body without any doubt hanging over the question of jurisdiction.

To proceed now to the crux and the overriding issue of the petition and one that the intervening developments have not overtaken under the circumstances of this case - did the COMELEC sufficiently accord Reyes due process, or did a violation of her right to due process occur?

The due process issue is important as a finding of violation, because of the inherent arbitrariness it carries, necessarily amounts to grave abuse of discretion, and lays to rest all questions regarding the COMELEC's continued exercise of jurisdiction.

In Mendoza v Commission on Elections³⁸ the Court elaborated on the due process standards that apply to the COMELEC's proceedings:

The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below:

These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings.

The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 7 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.

The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.

Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based. As a component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the "duty to give reason" to enable the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the decision-maker.³⁹ (citations omitted, italics supplied, emphasis ours)

Reyes invokes both the due process component rights at the hearing and deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights have all been violated. These allegations are discussed below.

In her petition, Reyes argues that the COMELEC violated her right to due process when it took cognizance of the documents submitted by Tan that were not testified to and which were offered and admitted in evidence without giving her the opportunity to question the authenticity of these documents and to present controverting evidence.

Based on the pleadings filed in the present case, no factual and legal basis is evident for Reyes to complain of the denial of her hearing stage rights.

In the first place, she does not dispute that she fully participated in the proceedings of the cancellation of her CoC until the case was deemed submitted for resolution; she had representation during the proceedings before the COMELEC First Division where she duly presented her evidence and summed up her case through a memorandum.

In addition, she even filed a motion for reconsideration from the COMELEC First Division resolution dated March 27, 2013 cancelling her CoC. Under these circumstances, the COMELEC had more than satisfied the opportunity to be heard that the Ang Tibay hearing stage rights require. Reyes had her day in court from the perspective of her hearing rights, and she cannot now complain of any denial of this right.

The violation of Reyes’ deliberation stage rights, however, is a different matter altogether and one that this Court cannot close its eyes to, most especially after this violation was made glaring in the rulings below.

To recall, the COMELEC First Division, in this case, found-based on Tan s submitted evidence (Eli J. Obligacion’s blog article and the Sanchez certification) -that Reyes was a holder of a U.S. passport, which she continued to use until June 30, 2012. The COMELEC also found that she also failed to establish that she had applied for repatriation under RA 9225 by taking the required Oath of Allegiance and by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation of her American Citizenship. Based on these findings, the COMELEC First Division ruled that Reyes remains an American citizen who is ineligible to run and hold any elective office. This conclusion and the use of the hearsay evidence occasioned a strong dissent from no less than COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.

As likewise emphasized in my previous Dissenting Opinion, the COMELEC seemed to have recklessly thrown away the rules of evidence in concluding -to the point of grave abuse of discretion -that Reyes misrepresented that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and that she had abandoned and lost her domicile of origin when she became a naturalized American citizen. To quote and reiterate what I said:

First, Tan submitted an article published online (blog article) written by one Eli J. Obligacion Obligacion) entitled "Seeking and Finding the Truth About Regina O. Reyes." This printed blog article stated that the author had obtained records from the BID stating that Reyes is an American citizen; that she is a holder of a US passport and that she has been using the same since 2005.

How the law on evidence would characterize Obligacion's blog article or, for that matter, any similar newspaper article, is not hard for a law student answering the Bar exam to tackle: the article is double hearsay or hearsay evidence that is twice removed from being admissible as it was offered to prove its contents (that Reyes is an American citizen) without any other competent and credible evidence to corroborate them. Separately of course from this consideration of admissibility is the question of probative value. On top of these underlying considerations is the direct and frontal question: did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it relied on this piece of evidence to conclude that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen?

Second, Tan also submitted a photocopy of a certification issued by Simeon L. Sanchez of the BID showing the travel records of Reyes from February 15, 2000 to June 30, 2012 and that she is a holder of US Passport No. 306278853. This certification also indicates. in some entries that Reyes is an American while other entries denote that she is Filipino. The same questions of admissibility and probative value of evidence arise, together with the direct query on the characterization of the COMELEC action since the COMELEC concluded on the basis of these pieces of evidence that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen because it is not only incompetent but also lacks probative value as evidence.

Contributory to the possible answer is the ruling of this Court that a "certification" is not a certified copy and is not a document that proves that a party is not a Filipino citizen.⁴⁰ (italics and emphases supplied)

For reasons only known to the Commission, the COMELEC egregiously ignored the settled principle in jurisprudence that uncorroborated hearsay does not constitute substantial evidence. In Rizal Workers Union v. Han. Calleja⁴¹ the Court, citing Ang Tibay categorically ruled:

The clear message of the law is that even in the disposition of labor cases, due process must never be subordinated to expediency or dispatch. Upon this principle, the unidentified documents relied upon by the respondent Director must be seen and taken for what they are, mere inadmissible hearsay. They cannot, by any stretch of reasoning, be deemed substantial evidence of the election frauds complained of. And as this Court held in Ang Tibay v. CIR:

x x x (the) assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.⁴² (citation omitted, italics supplied, emphases ours)

At the very least, the COMELEC should have considered whether purported evidence from a person not before the court and whose statement cannot be confirmed for the genuineness, accuracy and truth of the basic fact sought to be established in the case should be taken as the "truth."

Even without the use of technical rules of evidence, common sense and the minimum sense of fairness, to my mind, dictate that a blog article published online or unidentified documents cannot simply be taken to be evidence of the truth of what they say, nor can photocopies of documents not shown to be genuine can be taken as proof of the truth on their faces. By accepting these materials as statements of the truth, the COMELEC clearly violated Reyes' right to both procedural and substantive due process.

In his Comment to Reyes' motion for reconsideration, Tan apparently tried to give the COMELEC a helping hand in curing the fatal evidentiary deficiency of its case by claiming that the original certification issued by Acting Chief Simeon Sanchez was submitted to the COMELEC First Division, thus subtly belying the statement of Chairman Brillantes in his dissent that only a photocopy of the certification was before them. Chairman Brillantes pointedly stated:

The travel records submitted by Petitioner are also without bearing. The printed internet article from the blog of a certain Eli Obligacion showing that Respondent used a US Passport on June 30, 2012 is hearsay while the purported copy of the Bureau of Immigration Certification is merely a xerox copy and not even certified to be a true copy of the original, thus similarly inadmissible.⁴³ (emphasis supplied)

This claim does not appear to have been refuted nor rebutted in the records before us, except in Tan s claim that came out of the blue. The records (specifically, the Certified True Copy from the MACHINE COPY ON FILE WITH THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE COMMISSION of the Sanchez Certification dated January 22, 2013 submitted by Reyes),⁴⁴ however, plainly show that the copy on file with the COMELEC of the Sanchez certification is a machine copy and not an original copy. The statement that a machine copy is on file with the COMELEC came from no less than the Clerk of the Commission, Ma. Josefina E. dela Cruz. Thus, Chairman Brillantes was correct -what was before the COMELEC, when it ruled on the Tan petition, was a mere machine copy of the Sanchez certification.

Even assuming for the sake solely of argument that the Sanchez certification is admissible and has probative value, the certification itself is not sufficient to establish that Reyes was a naturalized U.S. citizen.

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,⁴⁵ the Court ruled that Juan Frivaldo was a naturalized U.S. citizen on the basis of a certification from a United States District Court that he was a naturalized U.S. citizen and was thus disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. In Frivaldo the evidence clearly showed that Frivaldo was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification of the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, U.S.A.

In a similar case - Labo Jr. v. Commission on Elections⁴⁶ – the Court also found Ramon Labo to be a naturalized Australian citizen on the basis of a certification from the Australian Government that he was indeed a naturalized Australian citizen and was thus disqualified from serving as Mayor Of Baguio City. The Labo records showed that he had been married to an Australian citizen and was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, pursuant to a certification from the Australian Government through its Consul in the Philippines which certification was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

In Reyes' case, the COMELEC's conclusion (based on the Sanchez certification) that Reyes was a naturalized American citizen was not grounded on the required premises and was thus not supported by substantial evidence. Unlike Frivaldo nd Labo Tan miserably failed to submit relevant evidence showing that Reyes had been a naturalized American citizen (such as a certification from the U.S. government that Reyes was a naturalized U.S. citizen) who would now require the application of RA 9225 to run for elective office. As emphasized in my previous Dissenting Opinion, Tan's submitted evidence does not adequately prove that Reyes was a naturalized American citizen. To quote my previous Dissent:

To begin with, the evidence submitted by Tan, even assuming that it is admissible, arguably does not prove that Reyes was a naturalized American citizen. At best, the submitted evidence could only show that Reyes was the holder of a US passport indicating that she is American, nothing more. In Aznar v. Comelec the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmeña was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration did not amount to a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. In the present case, the fact that Reyes is a holder of a US passport does not portend that she is no longer a natural born Filipino citizen or that she had renounced her Philippine citizenship. In addition, how the Comelec arrived at a conclusion that Reyes is naturalized American citizen can be seen as baffling as it did not appear to have provided any factual basis for this conclusion.⁴⁷

Tan interestingly argues that Reyes herself admitted before the COMELEC en bane (in her motion for reconsideration of the March 27, 2013 COMELEC First Division ruling cancelling her CoC) that she is an American citizen. Supposedly, this admission constitutes sufficient basis for the COMELEC en bane to cancel her CoC.

First, the COMELEC, both division and en bane did not find the supposed admission material in resolving Reyes' motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC en bane itself, in its May 14 2013 resolution, merely considered Reyes' motion for reconsideration⁴⁸ - the source of the supposed admission - "a mere rehash and a recycling of claims."⁴⁹ Thus, the alleged admission is not an issue at all in the present petition. Based on the COMELEC rulings, what stands out before the Court is the utter lack of basis supporting the COMELEC s cancellation of Reyes CoC.

Second, from the perspective of the present petition for certiorari, Tan apparently overlooks the legal issues presented before the Court as these issues determine the scope of the Court s certiorari jurisdiction. The core issues before the Court are: (i) whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling Reyes CoC; and (ii) whether the subsequent proclamation of Reyes (before the COMELEC en bane's May 14, 2013 resolution, cancelling her CoC, became final) divested the COMELEC of jurisdiction to rule on her qualifications and transferred the matter to the HRET.

In this light, the alleged admission is not an issue that can be submitted and appreciated by this Court in the present proceedings. If the Court appreciates at all the evidence that the COMELEC cited, appreciated and evaluated, it is for the purpose of determining if the appreciation and evaluation are so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC s error.⁵⁰ Note that – as pointed out above -the COMELEC never even considered the alleged admission in its rulings. Thus, there is no basis for this Court to consider or appreciate this admission in the present proceedings.

Third, an admission of dual citizenship, without more, is not a sufficient basis for a CoC cancellation, as this Court has already held in its settled rulings.

While Reyes might have admitted in her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC that she had been married to an American citizen, the admission did not mean that she had already lost her Philippine citizenship in the absence of any showing that, by her act or omission, she is deemed under the law to have renounced it. Section 4, Article 4 of the Constitution is very clear on this point – "Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it."

As applied to Reyes, her possession and use of a U.S. passport, by themselves, did not signify that she is no longer a natural born Filipino citizen or that she had renounced her Philippine citizenship.

The latest related jurisprudence on this matter s Cordora v. Commission on Elections,⁵¹ where the Court held that the twin requirements of RA 9225 do not apply to a candidate who is a natural born Filipino citizen who did not become a naturalized citizen of another country, thus:

We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v. Manzano Valles v. COMELEC and AASJS v. Datumanong. Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts as the present case. Manzano and Valles like Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United States which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother and a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand is brought about by the individual's active participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen's foreign citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 was enacted years after the promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:

e. Conclusion and consequences of the COMELEC s violation of Reyes due process rights.

Based on these considerations, I submit that the violation of Reyes right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue that cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will, and cannot be saved by the claim that she had been accorded her hearing rights. The latter relates purely to the actual hearing process and is rendered meaningless where there is failure at the more substantive deliberation stage.

Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right should be declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The rule is equally true for quasi-judicial bodies (such as the COMELEC), for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where the violation occurs.⁵³ Consequently, the assailed March 27, 2013 and May 14, 2013 COMELEC resolutions cancelling Reyes CoC should be declared void for having been rendered in violation of her right to due process.

As a relevant side observation, the nullity of the cancellation proceedings before the COMELEC fully validates the PBOC s action in proclaiming Reyes as the winner in the congressional elections. The proclamation of Reyes, of course, is not a material issue in the present case as I discuss at length below. I will dwell on it nevertheless in order to clear the air to place matters in their proper perspective, and if only to clarify and rectify what has been erroneously and recklessly claimed by the ponencia particularly on the effect of a proclamation on the jurisdictional boundary separating the COMELEC and the HRET.

a. The present petition is for the nullification of the COMELEC CoC proceedings and rulings.

A very critical point to appreciate in considering the present petition for certiorari is that it was filed by Reyes who is pointedly questioning the cancellation of her CoC. She never asked this Court in her petition to act on her proclamation.

The party who has the interest and the personality to seek the annulment of Reyes proclamation is the losing candidate former Cong. Velasco -who is not even a party to the present petition and who never raised the issue of the validity of Reyes proclamation before this Court.

Thus, the fact of proclamation is an undisputed matter before this Court and cannot be attacked directly or collaterally until after the issue of Reyes qualifications (which would necessarily include the merits of the validity or invalidity of her CoC) is resolved before the proper tribunal. The entity, too, that can annul or set aside the proclamation at this stage of the case should be the HRET, not this Court. Any other manner or forum for the resolution of the Marinduque election dispute would result in a clash of jurisdiction that the law and the decided cases have sought to avoid.

In this light, I note with concern the majority s attempt in the Court s June 25, 2013 Resolution to indirectly question the validity of Reyes proclamation by holding that:

More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy-that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner s lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending cases on petitioner s qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En Bane decision. The Board of Canvassers which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Bane which affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division. [emphasis ours]⁵⁴

In the present ponencia that this Dissent disputes, the attack on the proclamation again surfaces, this time, directly and unabashedly. To quote the present ponencia:

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner s submission. The crucial question is whether or not the petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?

Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petition on May 18, 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner s oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.⁵⁵

I submit that the Court cannot rule on the issue of the validity or invalidity of Reyes proclamation as this is NOT an issue raised in the present petition before this Court nor an issue in the COMELEC proceedings that is now under review. Proclamation is a separate COMELEC action that came after and separately from the CoC cancellation ruling.

As a cautionary note, any ruling by the Court on the validity or invalidity of Reyes proclamation is beyond the Court s jurisdiction at the present time since the Court does not have original jurisdiction over annulment of proclamations and no petition is before this Court seeking to impugn or sustain Reyes proclamation. By law, it is the COMELEC that has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies, including the annulment of proclamations⁵⁶ for positions other than the President, the Vice President, and the Members of the two Houses of Congress which all have their specific constitutional rules on the resolution of their elections, returns and qualifications.⁵⁷

As matters now stand, from the perspective of the petition for certiorari now before this Court, the proclamation is simply an event (albeit, an important one) that transpired in the course of the election process and in Reyes assumption to office as Member of the House of Representatives. If it can be an issue at all, the issue is whether it did or did not transpire; its legal standing or legality is not in issue and cannot be questioned before this Court simply because no such issue is before us.

Once proclamation is established as a fact, the COMELEC s jurisdiction ends and the HRET s jurisdiction begins. As Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio very ably argued in his own Dissenting Opinion, any legal issue on the validity or invalidity of the proclamation then passes on to the HRET; to hold otherwise would lead to conflicts of jurisdiction that the law could not have intended.

To reiterate what I have stated above, the party who may have the standing to raise this issue is not before us. In her motion for reconsideration, Reyes –

the party who presented the petition before this Court -pointedly stated that she never raised the issue of her proclamation before this Court.

Tan, in his Comment (i.e., the first time he was ever heard by this Court), mentioned proclamation but only to assert that Reyes had not complied with the requirements of the June 25, 2013 Resolution of this Court to become a Member of the House of Representatives – a legal issue extraneous to the CoC cancellation that he initiated. Tan's claim that the May 14, 2013 COMELEC en bane ruling became final on May 19, 2013, on the other hand, clearly forgets that the proclamation took place a day before, or on May 18, 2013.

In sum, it is only the ponencia that raises, argues about, and seeks to impugn the validity of Reyes' proclamation. This, by itself, is another unusual feature of this case – self-raised arguments from the Court on an issue that had not been raised in the petition or in any significant manner, in the Comment.

b. Mere mention of the word "proclamation" in the petition is not sufficient basis to argue that the validity of such proclamation has already been raised before this Court.

In its bid to make an issue of the validity of Reyes' proclamation, the ponencia now argues that it was Reyes herself who raised the matter of her proclamation in her petition.

This is a very misleading and careless claim if indeed the ponencia would insist on this position. As has been repeatedly mentioned, Reyes' petition addresses the COMELEC's cancellation of her CoC, not her proclamation which she does not complain about and which she has not brought before this Court s an issue. This is the context in which any mention of the word proclamation should be read and understood, and such mention should not be unduly stretched to bring before this Court an issue that is not before it.

For the Court's ready and easy understanding of the context of Reyes' mention of the word proclamation, her argument in her petition runs this way:

a. the COMELEC's cancellation of her CoC should be nullified as it was attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

b. in any case, with the fact of proclamation by the PBOC, the COMELEC has now lost jurisdiction over the cancellation proceedings as jurisdiction now rests with the HRET.⁵⁸

Understood in this manner, Reyes main cause of action is the nullity of the COMELEC s action on her CoC the COMELEC ruling she wants the Court to nullify. This cause of action has nothing to do with her proclamation -a separate COMELEC action (through its PBOC) that came after the COMELEC en bane s ruling. The mention of proclamation in Reyes petition, examined closely, was an assertion of fact leading to a legal conclusion that was apparently made to support her position that the assailed COMELEC CoC cancellation never lapsed to finality and did not become executory. It was nothing more and nothing less than this, yet this merited the June 25, 2013 Resolution s own conclusion that to be a member of the House of Representatives, there must be a proclamation, an assumption to office and an oath taken before the Speaker of the House while the House is assembled in session.

All these, of course, do not affect the main question raised before this Court -whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling on the cancellation of Reyes CoC. If indeed it did, then there is no valid and standing COMELEC en bane ruling that would prevent the proclamation of Reyes as the duly-elected congresswoman of the lone district of Marinduque. If the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, then the Court should so rule. What happens then to the proclamation -a legal question that is not before this Court - is a matter that should be taken up before the proper tribunal. Viewed in this manner, everything goes back to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion that Reyes brought before this Court.

c. Upon proclamation, the HRET alone has jurisdiction over Reyes qualifications, including the validity of her proclamation.

With the fact of Reyes proclamation established or undisputed, the HRET alone -to the exclusion of any other tribunal -has jurisdiction over Reyes qualifications, including the matter of the validity or invalidity of her proclamation.

Prevailing jurisprudence dictates that upon proclamation of the winning candidate and despite the allegation of the invalidity of the proclamation, the HRET acquires jurisdiction to hear the election contest involving the election, returns and qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives.

As early as 1988, in Lazatin v. The Commission on Elections,⁵⁹ the Court held that upon proclamation, oath and assumption to office of the winning candidate as Member of the House of Representatives, any question relating to the invalidity of the winning candidate s proclamation should be addressed to the sound judgment of the HRET.

In this cited case, Carmelo Lazatin assailed the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath and assumed his office as Congressman of the First District of Pampanga. In reversing the COMELEC s annulment of Lazatin s proclamation, the Court held:

The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.⁶⁰

Guerrero v. Commission on Elections⁶¹ explained the rationale behind the ruling in Lazatin as follows:

But as we already held, in an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people s mandate.⁶²

The Court reiterated the ruling in the subsequent cases of Aggabao v Commission on Elections⁶³ and Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections.⁶⁴ The latest jurisprudence on the matter is Limkaichong v. Commission on Election.⁶⁵ In Limkaichong the petitioners therein argued that the irregularity that tainted Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong s proclamation should prevent the HRET from acquiring jurisdiction. In ruling against the petitioners, the Court held:

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. The Court has shed light on this in the case of Vinzons-Chato to the effect that:

x x x. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico s proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico s proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:

In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from assuming jurisdiction over all matters essential to a member s qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.⁶⁶

In the case now before us, Tan argues in his Comment on Reyes Motion for Reconsideration that Reyes proclamation on May 18, 2013 was null and void, citing the July 9, 2013 COMELEC en bane resolution annulling Reyes proclamation. He emphasizes that the finality of the May 14, 2013 resolution on May 19, 2013 automatically voided Reyes May 18, 2013 proclamation, rendering it a ministerial duty for the COMELEC to annul Reyes proclamation and proclaim Velasco as the sole eligible candidate and winner for the position of Representative of Marinduque.

In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Abad argues that Reyes case, which the COMELEC has already decided with finality, can no longer be taken over by the HRET even if Reyes had already assumed office, if such decision has been elevated to the Supreme Court on certiorari. He argues that the HRET cannot oust the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction under the Constitution.

These allegations fall within the type of situation that the above-cited cases cover so that the COMELEC (and even this Court) is now barred from ruling on the validity of Reyes proclamation. The issue should now be left to the sound discretion of the HRET. Even this Court is covered by this ruling as the grant of jurisdiction to the HRET is exclusive; the Court’s turn will come in a duly filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

c.1. Codilla is not applicable and cannot be used to support the view that the COMELEC, not the HRET, has jurisdiction over the validity of Reyes proclamation.

In his Comment, Tan cited the case of Codilla Sr. v. Hon. de Venecia⁶⁷ to support his argument that it is the COMELEC, not the HRET, that has jurisdiction over the present case. Eufrocino Codilla, Sr. and Ma. Victoria Locsin were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th Legislative District of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. Codilla garnered the highest number of votes (71,350 versus Locsin’s 53,447 votes) but his proclamation was suspended because he was facing charges of indirect solicitation of votes. Codilla filed a motion to lift the suspension order. The COMELEC Second Division, without resolving Codilla’s pending motion, issued a resolution declaring his disqualification and directing the immediate proclamation of Locsin. Despite Codilla’s timely Motion for Reconsideration where he squarely raised the invalidity of Locsin s proclamation, the votes cast for Codilla were declared stray and Locsin was proclaimed winner.

Codilla duly filed with the COMELEC en bane a petition to annul Locsin s proclamation.1awp++i1 The COMELEC en bane granted Codilla s petition and declared Locsin s proclamation as null and void. Locsin did not appeal from this decision and Codilla was proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the 4th District of Leyte. In the meantime, Locsin took her oath of office on June 18, 2001 and assumed office on June 30, 2001.

In the petition for mandamus and quo warranto Codilla filed with this Court to question Locsin’s proclamation, the latter argued in defense that the COMELEC en bane had no jurisdiction to annul her proclamation. She maintained that the COMELEC en bane had been divested of jurisdiction to review the validity of her proclamation because she had become a member of the House of Representatives and the proper forum to question her membership was the HRET.

The Court disregarded Locsin’s arguments and held that the HRET could not assume jurisdiction as Locsin’s proclamation was invalid.

Even a cursory reading of Codilla would reveal that its factual antecedents and legal issues are far different from those of the present case; thus, Codilla cannot be used as basis to hold that the COMELEC, not the HRET, has jurisdiction over the issue of the validity of Reyes’ proclamation.

First, the Codilla ruling was made in a petition brought before this Court to question Locsin’s proclamation.

The Court found that Locsin's proclamation was patently invalid because: (1) Codilla's right to due process was denied during the entire proceedings leading to the proclamation of Locsin; (2) the order of disqualification was not yet final, hence the votes cast in favor of Codilla could not be considered stray; and (3) Locsin, as a mere second placer, could not be proclaimed. Specifically, the Court in Codilla characterized the hurried and premature proclamation of Locsin who obtained the second highest number of votes as brazen because the petition to disqualify the winning candidate had not yet been determined with finality.

Unlike Codilla and as I have repeatedly harped on, the present Reyes petition relates to the COMELEC s cancellation of her CoC and is not about her proclamation. In fact, her proclamation was never an issue before the COMELEC. Specifically, proclamation was not an issue in the Motion for Reconsideration Reyes filed on April 8 2013 and which the COMELEC First Division ruled upon on March 27, 2013. It was this First Division ruling that the COMELEC en bane ruled upon on May 14, 2013. These facts alone show that Reyes proclamation was a separate COMELEC action that came after and separately from the CoC cancellation ruling.

Second, as will be discussed at length below, the records before the Court do not support the patent invalidity of Reyes' proclamation. Without a final and executory ruling cancelling Reyes' CoC, and in the absence of any order from the COMELEC to suspend Reyes' proclamation, the PBOC acted well within its authority to proclaim Reyes who garnered the highest number of votes, unlike Locsin who was a mere second placer.

Third, the core issue in Codilla was whether the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes could be validly proclaimed as the winner in the election contest in the event that the winner is disqualified. The Court took note in this case of the settled jurisprudence that a candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes is not entitled to assume the position in case the winner is disqualified.

In the present case, the core issues before the Court are: (i) whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling Reyes' CoC; and (ii) as an obiter side issue, whether the subsequent proclamation of Reyes divested the COMELEC of jurisdiction to rule on her qualifications. Thus, the facts and issue raised are far different from Codilla. If this cited case is applicable at all, it is under the ruling that the Court has jurisdiction because grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC is involved.

Fourth, from the perspective of this Court, the jurisprudential rule that Codilla establishes is that the jurisdiction of this Court prevails when there is grave abuse of discretion rendering a ruling void. Thus, the Court assumed jurisdiction despite the previous proclamation of Locsin as the proclamation was void. Parenthetically, in Codilla what was brought squarely before the Court was a petition questioning the proclamation of Locsin itself.

d. Nothing in the records support he view that Reyes’ proclamation is invalid, even assuming that this issue is presently before this Court.

Assuming arguendo that the Court can rule on the validity of Reyes' proclamation, the records before this Court suggest that the PBOC correctly proclaimed Reyes.

The antecedents outlined above show that it was only on March 27, 2013 that the COMELEC First Division ruled on Tan’s cancellation petition. It was also only May 14, 2013 that the COMELEC en banc denied Reyes' motion for reconsideration. By the COMELEC's own Rules, this en banc ruling does not become final and executory until after five (5) days from its promulgation.⁶⁸ Thus, it was only on May 19, 2013 that the en bane ruling should have lapsed to finality, but before then, on May 18, 2013, the PBOC had proclaimed Reyes.

In this regard, I find Justice Abad's position that the May 14, 2013 COMELEC en bane Resolution became final and executory on May 27, 2013 to be without factual and legal basis. As stated elsewhere in this Opinion, the assailed resolution could not have attained finality because Reyes' proclamation on May 18, 2013 divested the COMELEC of jurisdiction over matters pending before it with respect to Reyes' eligibility.

First, I note that Justice Abad failed to cite any legal basis for his proposition that the May 14, 2013 COMELEC en bane resolution became final and executory on May 27, 2013 after Reyes failed to file a petition within ten (10) days from receipt of the COMELEC's May 14, 2013 resolution. On the contrary, Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly states that decisions in x x x petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, x x x shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court. Thus, in the present case, Reyes' proclamation on May 18, 2013 came one (1) day ahead of the May 19, 2013 deadline for the finality of the May 14, 2013 resolution, pursuant to the afore-cited rule.

Second, even if we reckon the date of finality of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC en bane resolution from the date of receipt (May 16, 2013) of the said resolution, Reyes' proclamation would still be three (3) days ahead of the deadline for finality. COMELEC Resolution No. 9648 dated February 22, 2013 provides that the ruling of the Commission En Bane shall become final and executory if no restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court within five (5) days from receipt of the decision or resolution. Applied in this case, Reyes' proclamation on May 18, 2013 came three (3) days ahead of the May 21, 2013 deadline for the finality of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC en bane resolution, pursuant to Section 28 (1) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9648.

Significantly, the PBOC was legally in the position to make a proclamation as the canvass had been completed, with Reyes as the winner; at that point, the PBOC had no official notice of any final and executory COMELEC en bane ruling.

COMELEC Resolution No. 9648 which the ponencia conveniently ignores clearly provides that the Board is authorized to proclaim a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes except in case the CoC of the candidate who obtains the highest number of votes has been cancelled or denied due course by a final and executory decision or resolution. In such cases, the Board is authorized to proceed to proclaim the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, provided the latter's CoC has not likewise been cancelled by a final and executory decision or resolution.⁶⁹

Thus, without a final and executory ruling cancelling Reyes' CoC, and in the absence of any order from the COMELEC to suspend Reyes' proclamation, the PBOC acted well within its authority to proclaim Reyes as the winner in the Marinduque congressional elections.

In its arguments, the ponencia harps on the COMELEC ruling of May 14, 2013 and claims that What the petitioner did was to 'take the law into her hands' and secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC en bane decision that was final on May 14, 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter."⁷⁰ The ponencia thereafter proceeds to pointedly allege bad faith and claims that she cannot sit as Member of the House of Representatives by virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with knowledge of the existing legal impediment.⁷¹ These arguments forget the existing legal realities pointed out above. It forgets, too, that it cannot single out and isolate a set of circumstances in a given case and, based on these, impute bad faith against a party to the case in the absence of a clear showing of such bad faith based on the totality of all the attendant circumstances.

Elementary fairness demands that if bad faith would be imputed, the ponencia should have viewed the Marinduque election dispute in its entirety, starting from the fact that Reyes handily won over her opponent and that the only claim to negate this victory is the cancellation of her CoC through extremely questionable proceedings before the COMELEC Notably, in these proceedings, no less than COMELEC Chairman Brillantes spoke out to comment on the grave abuse of discretion that transpired. If only the ponencia had been mindful of this reality and the further reality that the democratic choice of a whole province should be respected, then perhaps it would not have carelessly imputed bad faith on Reyes.

Everything considered, Reyes was well within her rights to move for her proclamation as the winning candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. Stated in the context of the ponencia it cannot attribute bad faith to Reyes since she was merely exercising her legal right as the winning candidate following the legal truism that the proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded.⁷²

e. The COMELEC en banc’s cancellation of Reyes' CoC on May 14 2013 did not render her proclamation void.

The ponencia’s position that the COMELEC en bane already cancelled with finality Reyes' CoC on May 14, 2013 pnor to her proclamation on May 18, 2013 is simply incorrect.

The COMELEC en banes May 14, 2013 Resolution (cancelling Reyes' CoC) could not have attained finality as Reyes' valid proclamation on May 18, 2013 had the effect of divesting the COMELEC of jurisdiction over matters pending before it relating to Reyes' eligibility.

The first is the proclamation on May 18, 2013 which came one (1) day ahead of the May 19, 2013 deadline for the finality of the May 14, 2013 resolution, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Under this COMELEC Rule, decisions in x x x petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, x x x shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court."⁷³

As has been mentioned earlier, this proclamation was based on the results of the voting on the May 13, 2013 elections and the PBOC canvass that Reyes secured 52,209 votes, as against former Cong. Velasco's 48,396 votes. This election result is the silent argument in this case that can hardly be contested, or, if at all, must be addressed before the proper tribunal. Before this proper tribunal rules, the Marinduque electorate -who had voted for Reyes on May 13, 2013 despite the COMELEC First Division ruling cancelling her CoC -should not be disenfranchised, particularly not by this Court through its flawed June 25, 2013 ruling.

The second material record is the COMELEC Order of June 5, 2013 which declared its resolution of May 14, 2013 final and executory. When the COMELEC made this declaration, Reyes had long been proclaimed by the PBOC as the candidate who had garnered the highest number of votes.

This material record further strengthens the conclusion that no legal impediment existed for the PBOC on May 18, 2013 when it proclaimed Reyes.

Given this conclusion, an interesting question that still arises is: has Reyes now fully and successfully blocked the objections to her candidacy?

The short answer is NO, far from it, as already impliedly suggested above. If former Cong. Velasco and the quo warranto petitioner before the HRET are determined to pursue their petitions, then they are free to do so without any hindrance from this Court; what simply transpires is the transfer of the forum of their disputes from the COMELEC to the HRET.

Hard though this conclusion may seem for the HRET petitioners, it is the command of no less than the Constitution and, as such, must be strictly obeyed. The upside, of course, of this observation is that they are not denied their legal remedies; these are simply relocated to another forum out of respect for their separation of powers and independence that the Constitution ordains.

D. Reyes proclamation divested the COMELEC of jurisdiction over her qualifications in favor of the HRET.

I reiterate my previous Dissenting Opinion position that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers the jurisdiction o the HRET over election contests relating to the winning candidate s election, returns, and qualifications.

In other words, the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time o the proclamation; the party questioning the election, returns and the qualifications of the winning candidate should now present his or her case in a proper proceeding (i.e., an election protest or a quo warranto petition) before the HRET that, by constitutional mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.

I take firm exception to the majority s conclusion that the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the representative who has been proclaimed but who has not yet assumed office. This ruling is contrary to the Court s prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.

Prevailing jurisprudence dictates that the proclamation alone of a congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representatives in favor of the HRET, although some of these decided cases mention that the COMELEC s jurisdiction ends and the HRET s own jurisdiction begins once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives.

The latest relevant ruling on COMELEC/HRET jurisdictional boundary came via Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections⁷⁴ where the Court through Mr. Justice Roberto Abad no less, categorically ruled that the Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins.⁷⁵ In Jalosjos, the Court held that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET. I note, at this point, that by arguing in his Concurring Opinion that the COMELEC s jurisdiction ends and the HRET begins only upon the assumption to the office on June 30 by the winning candidate, Justice Abad conveniently eschews the prevailing jurisprudence of the Court on the matter and makes an extraordinary volte face from his categorical declaration in Jalosjos, Jr.

In that case, the Court ruled that the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it issued its June 3, 2010 order granting the motion for reconsideration and declaring Jalosjos ineligible after he had already been proclaimed the winner for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. Significantly, at the time the COMELEC issued the order Jalosjos had yet to take his oath of office and assume the duties of his office, viz.:

Here, when the COMELEC En Bane issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Here, however, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmo s appeal from the Second Division s dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELEC s Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Bane did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.

Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Bane exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case. Necessarily, Erasmo’s petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELEC s failure to annul his proclamation also fail. The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET.⁷⁶ (citations omitted, emphases ours, italics supplied)

Similarly, in the earlier Perez v. Commission on Elections,⁷⁷ the Court ruled that the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion for reconsideration dated May 22, 1998 and could not have passed upon the eligibility of Marcita Mamba Perez who was already a Member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the Court considered Perez a Member of the House of Representatives on the sole basis of her proclamation. The Court also held that upon filing of the petition on June 16, 1998, the Court no longer had jurisdiction over the same: As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private respondent was decided by the First Division of the COMELEC on May 10, 1998. The following day, May 11, 1998, the elections were held. Notwithstanding the fact that private respondent had already been proclaimed on May 16, 1998 and had taken his oath of office on May 17, 1998, petitioner still filed a motion for reconsideration on May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en bane denied on June 11, 1998. Clearly, this could not be done. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed. The COMELEC en bane had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation of private respondent barred further consideration of petitioner s action. In the same vein, considering that at the time of the filing of this petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a member of the House of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI, § 17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private respondent s ineligibility.⁷⁸ (italics supplied; emphases and underscore ours)

In Planas v. Commission on Elections,⁷⁹ a 2006 case, the Court held that the general rule is that the proclamation of a congressional candidate divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction in favor of the HRET, viz.:

The general rule is that the proclamation of a congressional candidate divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in favor of the HRET This rule, however, is not without exception. As held in Mutuc, et al. v. COMELEC, et al.,

x x x It is indeed true that after proclamation the usual remedy of any .J Y aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only on the assumption that there has been a valid proclamation. Where as in the case at bar the proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in any way affect the basic issues.

In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of Defensor who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final, hence, he had at that point in time remained qualified. Therefore, his proclamation was valid or legal. Following Mutuc then, as at the time of Defensor s proclamation the denial of his CoC due course was not yet final, his proclamation was valid or legal and as he in fact had taken his oath of office and assumed his duties as representative, the COMELEC had been effectively divested of jurisdiction over the case.⁸⁰ (citation omitted, italics supplied, emphases and underscores ours)

To support its erroneous conclusion that the COMELEC still retained jurisdiction over the present case, the majority, in the Court s June 25, 2013 Resolution, disingenuously cites the cases of Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections,⁸¹ Limkaichong v. Commission on Elections⁸² and Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections,⁸³ where the Court invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET own jurisdiction begins.

What the majority conveniently failed to cite in these cases, however, was the Court s definitive qualification that where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an election protest with the HRET. In Vinzons-Chato v Commission on Elections,⁸⁴ the Court pertinently held:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as · Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET s own jurisdiction begins. Stated in another manner, where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET.

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato s petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. [emphases and underscore ours]

The majority also conveniently failed to note the Court's explicit qualification in Limkaichong that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The Court pointedly stated in this case that -

We do not agree. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter s election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidate in the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail one s eligibility/ineligibility/qualification/disqualification is to file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the HRET Rules. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, we ruled that where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. 85 (citations omitted, italics supplied, emphases and underscore ours)

This survey of jurisprudence delineating the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, vis-à-vis the HRET, indubitably shows that the operative fact that clearly divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction is the proclamation of the winning candidate and not the assumption to the office as the majority erroneously concluded in the Court s June 25, 2013. Resolution. As I previously noted in my previous Dissent, the majority s conclusion on the issue of jurisdiction between the COMELEC and the HRET is a major retrogressive jurisprudential development; is a complete turnaround from the Court s prevailing jurisprudence; and is a ruling that can effectively emasculate the HRET.

As my previous Dissent discussed, under the HRET Rules of Procedure, no election protest or quo warranto petition can successfully be filed if the HRET s jurisdiction would be viewed in the manner the majority posits i.e., after proclamation, oath and assumption when Congress convenes) as the HRET Rules require that the election protest or quo warranto petition be filed fifteen (15) days after the winning candidate s proclamation.⁸⁶

In this regard, I take exception to Justice Abaci s view that the period for the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto is merely a deadline. The HRET Rules clearly state that filing periods are jurisdictional Rule 19 of the 2011 HRET Rules provides that the period for the filing of the appropriate petition, as prescribed in Rules 16⁸⁷ and Rule 17,⁸⁸ is jurisdictional and cannot be extended. Significantly, the filing of an election protest or petition for quo warranto beyond the periods provided in Rule 16 and Rule 17 of the HRET Rules is a ground for summary dismissal of the petition.

Thus, using the facts of the present case, if indeed no election protest or quo warranto petition can be filed until after July 22, 2013 (the day that Congress convened), then the HRET would simply dismiss any petition filed after that date for having filed out of time since Reyes was proclaimed on May 18, 2013 or more than 2 months before Congress formally convened. We cannot simply close our eyes to this resulting absurdity proposed by the majority, considering that the presumption is always against absurdity, and it is the duty of the courts to interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd results.⁸⁹

Interestingly, even the losing candidate, former Cong. Velasco, and the quo warranto petitioner do not appear to agree with the majority's position as they made sure they filed their petitions within fifteen (15) days from the time Reyes was proclaimed. They filed their petitions on May 31, 2013, or well within 15 days from May 18, 2013.

To reconcile the apparent conflicts in jurisprudence, I wish to point out the following observations to the Court:⁹⁰

d. Conclusion: Only the HRET can now rule on the pending election disputes; the Court only comes in under Rule 65 if the HRET gravely abuses the exercise of its discretion.

Despite the recourse to this Court and the original jurisdiction we now exercise over the petition, our action on the present petition should understandably be limited. We can only rule on the existence of the grave abuse of discretion we found and on the consequent invalidity of the COMELEC action in the cancellation case before it; we cannot rule on the issue of Reyes' qualifications i.e., on the issue of citizenship and residency). We have so held in Perez v. Commission on Elections⁹³ and Bello v. Commission on Elections⁹⁴ and we have no reason to change tack now. The HRET, as the constitutionally designated tribunal to rule at the first instance, should resolve the issues presented before it, including the task of appreciating the supposed admission of Reyes that she married an American citizen.

In the Court's final deliberation on the case, the ponente - as expected -dwelt on the proclamation aspect of the case. The ponente essentially maintained that Reyes should not be allowed to evade the final COMELEC decision that cancelled her CoC, by having herself illegally proclaimed by the PBOC and subsequently claiming that the COMELEC cancellation ruling never became final because it was overtaken by the proclamation that divested the COMELEC of jurisdiction over the election dispute.

I likewise harped on the grave abuse of discretion argument that I have outlined above. I pointed out that the proclamation is not an issue before the Court as the petition is for the nullification of the COMELEC ruling cancelling Reyes' CoC -an event that stands by itself and that came way before the proclamation. I pointed, too, to the terms of Reyes' petition that, under the established rules of procedure, define the issues brought by her before the Court: Reyes never questioned her own proclamation, and the losing · candidate -former Cong. Velasco -never questioned the proclamation before the Court. Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen and Justice Carpio raised their own arguments, too. Justice Leonen counseled caution and joined Justice Carpio in pointing out that the venue now to question the proclamation is the HRET.

All these arguments, of course, came to naught and this outcome -while patently objectionable for its own grave abuse of discretion -came after full argument, for and against, and could be charged to the usual vagaries of decision-making in the Court. What came as a surprise, however, was not the argument that hewed to the ponencia’s "proclamation line, but the novel argument from no less than the Chief Justice.

Out of the blue and without any previous circulated written opinion, the Chief Justice argued that in the COMELEC's resolution of July 9, 2013, annulling Reyes' proclamation a resolution rendered by the COMELEC long after the disputed cancellation of CoC ruling on May 14, 2013, and likewise long after the proclamation of May 18, 2013 that the ponencia capitalized on), she saw how Reyes acted in bad faith and the Court should not allow this kind of action to pass. She thus declared that she was voting based on this consideration.

To be sure, I tried to point out that the COMELEC July 9, 2013 resolution is not covered by the petition; that the COMELEC's statements in its resolution had never been placed in issue before the parties; that Reyes herself was never heard on this matter; and that bad faith cannot and should not be deduced from the cited incident but from the totality of the attendant circumstances: Reyes won the elections by a wide margin and is now being dispossessed of that victory through the grave abuse of discretion that the COMELEC committed in cancelling her CoC. But all these proved unavailing as the ensuing 5 to 4 vote showed.

It was on this manner through l ver upon l ver of grave abuse of discretion that the democratic choice of the people of the Province of Marinduque was subverted.

I join Justices Carpio and Brion in their Dissent, but I wish to clarify my reasons further.

In case of doubt, there are fundamental reasons for this Court to be cautious in exercising its jurisdiction to determine who the members are of the House of Representatives. We should maintain our consistent doctrine that proclamation is the operative act that removes jurisdiction from this Court or the Commission on Elections and vests it on the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The first reason is that the Constitution unequivocably grants this discretion to another constitutional body called the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. This is a separate organ from the Judiciary.

As early as the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 known as the Jones Law, the Senate and the House of Representatives were granted the power to "be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their respective elective members."1 Section 18 of this organic act provides:

Section 18 -That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members, and each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member. x x x

The 1935 Constitution transferred the same power to an Electoral Commission which altered the composition of the electoral tribunal but still continued a membership that predominantly originated from the Legislature.

Section 4 -There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.

In Anga.ra v Electoral Commission,² this Court noted the change in the composition of the electoral tribunal in the 1935 Constitution.³ Nevertheless, the authority of the electoral tribunal remained the same as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their members. The electoral tribunal in the 1935 Constitution was characterized as an independent tribunal, separate from the Legislative Department. However, "the grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature."⁴

The 1973 Constitution briefly transferred the authority of an electoral tribunal to the Commission on Elections.⁵ The 1987 Constitution reverted this authority back to electoral tribunals. The present Section 17 of Article VI provides:

Section 1 7 -The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

The authority of electoral tribunals as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their members was described in Races v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:⁶

The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives and has the power to promulgate procedural rules to govern proceedings brought before it. This exclusive jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether that state of facts exists which confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters which arise in the case legitimately before it. Accordingly, it has the power to hear and determine or inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction both as to parties and as to subject matter, and to decide all questions, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction. One of the three essential elements of jurisdiction is that proper parties must be present. Consequently, the HRET merely exercised its exclusive jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to contest the election of Roces.⁷ (Citations omitted)

Initially, our organic act envisioned both the House of Representatives and the Senate to determine their members by creating tribunals that would decide on contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. This was to maintain the integrity of the Legislature as a separate branch of government. The House of Representatives and the Senate act collectively, and the numbers that determine the outcome of their respective actions are sensitive to the composition of their memberships.

The 1935 Constitution enhanced this ability by altering the composition of the electoral tribunals. Introducing members from the Judiciary to participate in the tribunal provided the necessary objectivity from the partisan politics of each chamber. Both the 1935 and the 1987 Constitution, however, did not intend the Judiciary to take over the function of deciding contests of the election, returns, and qualification of a member of either the House of Representatives or the Senate.

The earliest moment when there can be members of the House of representatives or the Senate is upon their proclamation as winners of an election. Necessarily, this proclamation happens even before they can actually assume their office as the elections happen in May, and their terms start "at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."⁸ Contests of elected representatives or senators can happen as soon as they are proclaimed. We should remain faithful to the intention of the Constitution. It is at the time of their proclamation that we should declare ourselves as without jurisdiction.

This s clear doctrine and there are no reasons to modify it in the present case.

The jurisdiction of electoral tribunals as against other constitutional bodies has been put in issue in many cases.

In Angara v. Electoral Commission,9 this Court held that the authority of the Electoral Commission as the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" begins from the certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers of the member-elect:¹⁰

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, cannot be construed as a limitation. upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly , to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the. Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1 par. 1 Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).¹¹ (Emphasis supplied)

Since then, more Petitions, including this one, have been filed in this Court invoking the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals against the Commission on Elections. Time and again, this Court has been asked to resolve the issue when jurisdiction over election contests vests on electoral tribunals. In all these cases, this Court has consistently held that it is the proclamation of a candidate in the congressional elections that vests jurisdiction on the electoral tribunals of any election contest, even though the candidate has not yet assumed his or her office or the protest was filed before June 30.¹² Once the winning candidate vying for a position in Congress is proclaimed, election contests must be lodged with the electoral tribunals and not with the Commission on Elections. To repeat, certification by the proper x x x board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in Congress and to render him eligible to any office in the said body."¹³

Conversely, if a candidate for Congress was elected but was not proclaimed due to a suspension order issued by the Commission on Elections, the latter retains jurisdiction over protests concerning the candidate's qualifications.¹⁴ Thus, we stated:

The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners.¹⁵

In this case, the Commission on Elections En Banc Resolution ordering the cancellation of the petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy was issued only after the elections. The Resolution did not yet attain finality when the petitioner was proclaimed, and no Order was issued by the Commission on Elections to suspend the proclamation of the petitioner after the votes had been counted. Thus, the Provincial Board of Canvassers was well within its right and duty to proclaim the petitioner as the winning candidate.¹⁶

It is my opinion that this Court did not, in any of the cases cited in the main ponencia change the time-honored rule that "where a candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest for a petition or quo warranto with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal."¹⁷ The main ponencia cites several cases to support its ratio decidendi that three requisites must concur before a winning candidate is considered a "member" of the House of Representatives to vest jurisdiction on the electoral tribunal. These cases appear to have originated from Guerrero v. Commission on Elections.¹⁸

In Guerrero, this Court held that "x x x once a winning candidate has been proclaimed taken his oath and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins."¹⁹ The case cited Aquino v. Commission on Elections²⁰ and Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections²¹ to support the statement.

A closer reading of Aquino and Romualdez-Marcos will reveal that this Court did not rule that three requisites must concur so that one may be considered a "member" of the House of Representatives subject to the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunal. On the contrary, this Court held in Aquino that:

Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate.

Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of either the senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution. While the proclamation of the winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. x x x.²² (Citations omitted)

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.²³ (Citations omitted)

To be sure, the petitioners who were the winning candidates in Aquino and Romualdez-Marcos invoked the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal though they had not yet been proclaimed. Thus, this Court held that the Commission on Elections still had jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.²⁴

This Court did not create a new doctrine in Aquino as seen in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Francisco where he said:

The operative acts necessary for an electoral candidate's rightful assumption of the office for which he ran are his proclamation and his taking an oath of office. Petitioner cannot in anyway be considere9 as a member of the House of Representatives for the purpose of divesting the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to declare his disqualification and invoking instead HRET s jurisdiction, it indubitably appearing that he has yet to be proclaimed, much less has he taken an oath of office. Clearly, petitioner's reliance on the aforecited cases which when perused involved Congressional members, is totally misplaced, if not wholly inapplicable. That the jurisdiction conferred upon HRET extends only to Congressional members is further established by judicial notice of HRET Rules of Procedure, and HRET decisions consistently holding that the proclamation of a winner in the contested election is the essential requisite vesting jurisdiction on the HRET.²⁵

In fact, the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos will tell us that he espoused a more radical approach to the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals. Justice Mendoza is of the opinion that "the eligibility of a candidate for the office in the House of Representatives may only be inquired into by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,"²⁶ even if the candidate in Romualdez-Marcos was not yet proclaimed. Justice Mendoza explained, thus:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, Section 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be.²⁷

Thus, the pronouncement in Guerrero that is used in the main ponencia as the basis for its ruling is not supported by prior Decisions of this Court. More importantly, it cannot be considered to have changed the doctrine in Angara v. Electoral Commission. Instead, it was only made in the context of the facts in Guerrero where the Decision of the Commission on Elections En Banc was issued only after the proclamation and the assumption of office of the winning candidate. In other words, the contention that there must be proclamation, taking of the oath, and assumption of office before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal takes over is not ratio decidendi. The other rulings cited in the main ponencia support our view.

x x x once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Stated in another manner, where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET.²⁹ (Emphasis supplied)

It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation.³¹ (Emphasis supplied)

In Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections³² the paragraph that contains the statement cited in the main ponencia is as follows:

In any case, the point raised by the COMELEC is irrelevant in resolving the present controversy. It has long been settled that pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, a final judgment before the election is required for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered stray. In the absence of any final judgment of disqualification against Gonzalez, the votes cast in his favor cannot be considered "stray." After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of his qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct of election and contested returns -were transferred to the HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the same. The Court thus does not concur with the COMELEC's flawed assertion of jurisdiction premised on its power to suspend the effects of proclamation in cases involving disqualification of candidates based on commission of prohibited acts and election offenses. As we held in Limkaichong any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from assuming jurisdiction over all matters essential to a member's qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.³³ (Emphasis supplied)

The above discussion, including the statement cited in the main ponencia is obiter because this Court already found that "the petition for disqualification and cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy x x x was filed out of time. The Commission on Elections therefore erred in giving due course to the petition.''³⁴ Further, the context of the statement cited in the main ponencia emphasized the doctrine that the votes for a candidate who is not yet disqualified qy final judgement cannot be considered stray votes. In Gonzalez this Court did not require the assumption of office of the candidate-elect before the electoral tribunal was vested with jurisdiction over electoral protests.

To reiterate, there is only one rule that this Court has consistently applied: It is the proclamation of the winning candidate vying for a seat in Congress that divests the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction over any electoral protest. This rule is consistent with the Constitution, the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the Omnibus Election Code, and jurisprudence.

An electoral protest that also assails the validity of the proclamation will not cause the Commission on Elections to regain jurisdiction over the protest.³⁵ Issues regarding the validity or invalidity of the proclamation may be threshed out before the electoral tribunals. As held in Caruncho Ill v. Commission on Elections,³⁶ the electoral tribunal has jurisdiction over a proclamation controversy involving a member of the House of Representatives:

A crucial issue in this petition is what body has jurisdiction over a proclamation controversy involving a member of the House of Representatives. The 1987 Constitution cannot be more explicit in this regard. Article VI thereof states:.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election: returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x.

The foregoing constitutional provision is reiterated in Rule 14 of the 1991 Revised Rules of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, to wit:

Rule 14. Jurisdiction. – The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.

In the same vein, considering that petitioner questions the proclamation of Henry Lanot as the winner in the congressional race for the sole district of Pasig City, his remedy should have been to file an electoral protest with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).³⁷ (Citations omitted)

This Court may obtain jurisdiction over questions regarding the validity of the proclamation of a candidate vying for a seat in Congress without encroaching upon the jurisdiction of a constitutional body, the electoral tribunal. "The remedies of certiorari and prohibition will not lie in this case to annul the proclamation of a candidate considering that there is an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; that is, the filing of an electoral protest before the electoral tribunals."³⁸ These remedies, however, may lie only after a ruling by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal or the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

We have said that "the proclamation of the petitioners enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity."³⁹ Unless it is annulled by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal after giving petitioner Reyes' due notice and hearing,⁴⁰ her proclamation as a member-elect in the House of Representatives must stand.

The second fundamental reason for us to exercise caution in determining the composition of the House of Representatives is that this is required for a better administration of justice. Matters relating to factual findings on election, returns, and qualifications must first be vetted in the appropriate electoral tribunal before these are raised in the Supreme Court.

Giving due course to a Petition for Certiorari is indeed discretionary before this Court. We do have the option to dismiss outright on the basis o the allegations in the Petition. In many cases we have done so through Minute Resolutions. In other cases this Court released Resolutions to state more fully its reasons why it dismissed the Petitions.

We have varied reasons for dismissing. Petitions even without requiring a Comment from the respondent. We may find that the recital of facts and the procedure that was followed do not warrant a review of the interpretation and application of the relevant law. In other words we may find that the allegations are insufficient to find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.

In appropriate cases we dismiss without the need for a Comment from the respondent when we find that the Petition shows that a procedural prerequisite was not followed. We may also dismiss without Comment when we find that we do not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Petition or the remedy invoked.

The relief we grant for outright dismissals of Petitions without Comment ends with the dismissal of the Petition. It leaves the parties to where they were prior to the filing of the Petition. We grant no affirmative relief to the respondent simply because the basis for doing so has neither been pleaded nor argued with due process.

The main ponencia went beyond dismissal of the Petition. The initial resolution of this case supported by the majority attempted to declare new doctrine. It should just have simply dismissed the Petition and allowed the parties to litigate at the House o Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The better part of prudence should have been to require the respondent to file a Comment⁴¹ assuming without agreeing that there may have been a need to revisit doctrine because of the unique facts of this case. In my view the personalities in this case may have been different. However the facts and circumstances were not unique to unsettle existing rational doctrine.

A Comment is required so that there may be a fuller exposition of the issues from the point of view of the respondent. It is also required to prevent any suspicion that judges and justices litigate, not decide. This Court has expressed its disfavor of some judges, thus:

We cannot close this opinion without expressing our disapproval of the action taken by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo in filing his own motion for reconsideration of the decision of the respondent court. He should be admonished for his disregard of a well-known doctrine imposing upon the judge the duty of detachment in case where his decision is elevated to a higher court for its review. The judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave it to the parties themselves to argue their respective positions and for the appellate court to rule on the matter without his participation. The more circumspect policy is to recognize one s role in the scheme of things, remembering always that the task of a judge is to decide and not to litigate.⁴² (Emphasis supplied)

The majority persisted in declaring that the petitioner's proclamation was "without any basis" despite the absence of a responsive pleading. This may not be cured by the Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration. In my view, the validity of the proclamation of petitioner Reyes was never raised as an issue. No responsive pleading exists to have sufficiently tendered it as an issue.

Good faith must be presumed in the conduct of the petitioner unless evidence to the contrary is submitted to this Court. We have already ruled that:

When a litigant exhausts all the remedies which the rules allow, in order to seek an impartial adjudication of his case, the dignity of the judge is not thereby assailed or affected in the least; otherwise, all remedies allowed litigants, such as appeals from judgments, petitions for reconsideration thereof or for the disqualification of judges, or motions questioning the jurisdiction of courts, would be deemed derogatory to the respect due a judge. These remedies may be availed of by any litigant freely, without being considered guilty of an act of disrespect to the court or the judge.⁴³

Similarly, the same presumption of good faith must be accorded to all Members of this Court. We may not be on all fours in our opinions, but we must believe in the courage of each Member: of the Court to vote with the objectivity his or her office demands, guided only by his or her conscience, and our collective hope for a better future.

Our disagreement with the course taken by the majority neither endows us with the competence nor the entitlement to impute ill motives. However, motives notwithstanding, our people do have to live with the practical consequences of our words. That, definitely, is a formidable measure of what it is that we have done.

For these reasons, I vote to GRANT the petitioner s Motion for Reconsideration. The Petition should be dismissed. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction after petitioner s proclamation.

I would like to explain why I vote to deny petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes’ motion for reconsideration of the Court s Resolution of June 25, 2013.

When Congress enacted the Omnibus Election Code, among its concerns were persons who, although not qualified, seek public office and mar the orderly conduct of the elections. To address this problem and for the public good, Congress empowered the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hear and decide petitions for the cancellation of their certificates of candidacies on the ground of false material representations that such certificates contain.

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

The validity of Section 78 has never been challenged since it simply addresses a reprehensible mischief committed during elections. Anticipating this need, Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the duty and the power to enforce this and other laws relative to the conduct of the elections, thus:

Article IX, Title C, Sec. 2 The Commission on Elections shall / exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

Clearly then, actions to cancel certificates of candidacies of members of the House of Representatives (the House), allegedly containing material misrepresentation, are within the constitutional and statutory power of the COMELEC to hear and adjudicate.

But related to this is the exclusive power of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal HRET) to hear and decide all contests also relating to the qualifications of the members of the House. The pertinent portion of Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x

The problem is that a contest over the qualifications of a candidate for the House often begins in the form of a petition filed with the COMELEC for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy on ground of false representation regarding his qualifications. At times, the COMELEC case is overtaken by the elections and the subsequent proclamation of the challenged candidate as winner. It is inevitable that, after taking his oath and assuming membership in the House, he would insist that any pending question relating to his qualifications before the COMELEC should now be heard and decided by the HRET.

To avoid a conflict of jurisdiction, the Court recognized and established the rule that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the case ceases where the jurisdiction of the HRET begins. Ultimately, this brings about the issue of when this turnover of jurisdiction takes place.

Past precedents appear to be divided into two views: the first is that the proclamation of the winning candidate for the House divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over pending disputes relating to his qualifications in favor of the HRET.¹ The second is that the turnover of jurisdiction over a pending action from the COMELEC to the HRET takes place only after the winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office.²

These conflicting views should now be settled with finality. And the solution lies in the provision of the Constitution that defines the jurisdiction of the HRET. It says:

The above categorically states that the HRET's jurisdiction covers only contests relating, among other things, to the qualifications of their respective Members. This power is inherent in all organizations as a means of preserving their integrity. For the HRET to have jurisdiction, the case must involve a member of the House. The fact alone that one won the elections and has been proclaimed does not, to be sure, make him a member of the House. To become a member, the candidate to the position must win the election,³ take an oath,⁴ and assume office when his term begins. The term of a member of the House begins on the 30th of June next following his election.

Sec. 7 The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

Clearly, a proclaimed winner will be a member of the House only at noon of June 30 following his election and not earlier when he was merely proclaimed as a winning candidate. The reason is simple. There is no vacancy in that office before noon of June 30. It is implicit that the term of the member whom he would succeed would continue until noon of that day when the term of the new member begins. Consequently, the proclaimed winner in the elections remains an outsider before June 30. Only on June 30 will his term begin. And only then will the COMELEC be divested of its jurisdiction over any unresolved petition for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.

Here, on March 27, 2013 the COMELEC's Second Division rendered a decision cancelling petitioner Reyes' certificate of candidacy. She filed a motion for reconsideration but on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC En Bane issued a Resolution denying it. Since her counsel received a copy of the En Bane Resolution on May 16, 2013, she had until May 21, 2013 within which to file a petition before the Court assailing the COMELEC's action. But she did not, thus rendering its decision against her final and executory as of May 22, 2013. This prompted the COMELEC to issue a certificate of finality on June 5, 2013.

Consequently, since the COMELEC Decision in petitioner Reyes' case already became final and executory on May 22, 2013, it cannot be said that the HRET can still take over some unfinished COMELEC action in her case. The COMELEC's final decision, rendered pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers, binds her, the HRET, and the Court. Further, given the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy, she in effect was not validly voted upon as a candidate for the position of Representative of the lone District of Marinduque on May 13, 2010. Parenthetically, a reading of the COMELEC En Bane s Resolution of July 19, 2013⁵ shows that its process server, Pedro P. Sta. Rosa arrived at the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque where the provincial canvassing was being held prior to petitioner Reyes' proclamation to serve a copy of the COMELEC En Bane s Resolution of May 14, 2013 and Order of May 18 2013 but the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) refused to accept them. Thus, said the COMELEC:

x x x While the proceedings of the PBOC is suspended or in recess, the process server of this Honorable Commission, who identified himself as PEDRO P. STA. ROSA II (Sta. Rosa, for brevity), arrived at the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque where the provincial canvassing is being held.

x x x The process server, Sta. Rosa, was in possession of certified true copies of the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections En Bane on 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) entitled Joseph Socorro B. Tan vs. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes and an Order dated 15 May 2013 to deliver the same to the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marinduque. The said Order was signed by no less than the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, the Honorable Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.

x x x Process Server Pedro Sta. Rosa II immediately approached Atty. Edwin Villa, the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Marinduque, upon his arrival to serve a copy of the aforementioned Resolution dated 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC). Despite his proper identification that he is a process server from the COMELEC Main Office, the PES totally ignored Process Server Pedro Sta. Rosa II.

x x x Interestingly, the PES likewise refused to receive a copy of the Commission on Elections En Bane Resolution dated 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) despite several attempts to do so.

x x x Instead, the PES immediately declared the resumption of the proceedings of the PBOC and instructed the Board Secretary to immediately read its Order proclaiming Regina Ongsiako Reyes as winner for the position of Congressman for the Lone District of Marinduque.

The above shows bad faith on the part of the Provincial Election Supervisor and Provincial Board of Canvassers in proclaiming petitioner Reyes despite COMELEC En Bane s resolution denying her motion for reconsideration of the decision cancelling her certificate of candidacy. Such lawless conduct cannot be countenanced by the Court.

In his dissent, Justice Antonio T. Carpio claims that the Court's June 25, 2013 Resolution states that petitioner Reyes could assume office only upon taking her oath before the Speaker in open session when the new Congress convenes in late July. Thus, this would effectively cut her term short by a month since the Constitution provides that the term of office of newly elected members of the House begins at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

But the Court's June 25 Resolution did not state that petitioner Reyes can only assume office after taking her oath pursuant to Section 6 Rule II of the Rules of the House. Such statement would have been clearly incorrect. That resolution merely said that she did not yet take the proper oath in accordance with that Section 6. Actually, the Court's June 25 Resolution said that the term of office of a Member of the House begins at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election, thus:

Here the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.

The Court said that petitioner Reyes did not yet take the proper oath as required by the rules of the House of Representatives merely to emphasize the fact that she filed her action with the Court even before Congress had buckled down to work and reorganize the HRET.

Justice Carpio also claims that it could happen that a losing candidate would assail the validity of the proclamation before the Supreme Court while another losing candidate could file an election protest before the HRET within 15 days of the proclamation. When this happens, he says, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the HRET would be in direct clash.

But such supposed clash of jurisdiction between the HRET and the Court is illusory and cannot happen.1avvphi1 Any clash of jurisdiction would essentially be between the COMELEC, asserting its power to hear and decide petitions for cancellation of certificates of candidacies of those who seek to be elected to the House, and the HRET, asserting its power to decide all contests relating to the qualifications of its members. The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the jurisdictional boundaries of all constitutional bodies. The HRET has never claimed this role.

What is more, it is understood that the HRET can take over only those cancellation cases that have remained unresolved by the COMELEC by the time the House member assumes office. Cases that the COMELEC has already decided cannot be taken over by the HRET, even when the challenged winner has already assumed office, if such decision has been elevated to the Supreme Court on certiorari as provided under the pertinent portion of Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution.

Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. The HRET cannot oust the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction under the Constitution. As the Court held in Codilla Sr v. Han. De Venecia,⁶ the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over a cancellation case involving members of the House that had already been decided by the COMELEC and is under review by the Supreme Court.

It can be said that it is for the above reasons that the Court heard and decided a number of petitions filed by losing party-list organizations that sought membership in the House. The Court did not inhibit itself from deciding their cases even if the winners had already been proclaimed since it was merely exercising its sole power to review the decisions of the COMELEC in their cases. The Court took cognizance of and decided their petitions in Senior Citizens Party-List v. COMELEC.⁷

Justice Carpio also claims that if the HRET jurisdiction begins only upon assumption of office of the winning candidate, then any petition filed with it within 15 days from his proclamation can be dismissed on the ground that the respondent is not yet a member of the House.

But, firstly, the HRET of the new Congress can be organized and can discharge its functions only after June 30 following the elections. Consequently, it cannot dismiss any petition filed with it before that date. When that date arrives, the respondent would have already assumed office, enabling the HRET to act on his case.

Secondly, the 15-day period after proclamation is merely the deadline set for the filing of the election contest before the HRET. It enables the parties to immediately take steps to preserve the integrity of the ballots and other election records. It is of course to be assumed that the HRET is admitting the petition filed with it within 15 days from proclamation, conditioned on its having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

For the above reasons, I vote to DENY petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes’ motion for reconsideration.