Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the plaintiff’s burden to convince the court of the existence of these facts.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 of the Court of Appeals’ (CA) May 27, 2004 Decision2 and December 15, 2004 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240, which reversed the trial court’s declaration of nullity of the herein parties’ marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE¸the appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March 1983.5
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with Tyrone.6 Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.7
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.8 The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.9
In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyn’s permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US.10 After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyn’s family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.11
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.12 He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyn’s following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;
2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and
3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.13
During trial,14 Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyn’s alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his brother-in-law, Ronald Fernandez (Malyn’s brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn was occupying a room with a certain Benjie Guevarra (Benjie). When he proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside.15 At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a towel around his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange of words, he agreed not to charge Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental rights.16 They put their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyn’s psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s behavior – her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends – may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).17 NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.18 Malyn’s NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.19
Dr. Gates reported that Malyn’s personality disorder "may have been evident even prior to her marriage" because it is rooted in her family background and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role model.20
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrone’s sister-in-law), and the son Miggy. She also read the transcript of Tyrone’s court testimony.21
Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates’ assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties.22 He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyn’s ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids’ and husband’s needs became secondary. Malyn is so self-absorbed that she is incapable of prioritizing her family’s needs.
Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They only constitute psychological incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the detriment of one’s familial duties.23 Fr. Healy characterized Malyn’s psychological incapacity as grave and incurable.24
He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyn’s expert witness.25 He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s "habits" because he believed it is the court’s duty to do so.26 Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations are indeed true.
Malyn’s version
Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.27 While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.28 And in those instances, she always had Tyrone’s permission and would often bring the children and their respective yayas with her.29 She maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother and wife.
Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained that she did so only to escape her physically abusive husband.30 On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He called up the security guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyn’s head and proceeded to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and into her mother-in-law’s room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave her ₱300 to leave the house.31 She never returned to their conjugal home.
Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrone’s wishes, because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from her discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.32
Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so drunk after partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at that time.33 Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights under duress.34
After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in school. She later obtained partial custody of the children as an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action was subsequently dismissed for lack of interest).
As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.35 Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness.
Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual narrations culled from these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a "lousy" mother because of her mahjong habit,36 while Malyn was fed up with Tyrone’s sexual infidelity, drug habit, and physical abuse.37 Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise of their marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:
The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for marriage even after two years of living together and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she could ‘take him or leave him.’ But the minute she started to care, she became a different person – clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that her style then was when she begins to care for a man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on herself. This imbalance between thinking and feeling was overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when he was in his younger years, he was often out seeking other women. His interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for fun – dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.
Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to her husband who was a moody man with short temper and unresolved issues with parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about his work and friends tha[n] he was about spending time with his family. Because of Malyn’s and Tyrone’s backgrounds (both came from families with high conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of control Their individual personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of their marriage.38
Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and compulsiveness.39
On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good relationship with her kids.40 As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from committing himself to his duties as a husband. He is unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.41
Children’s version
The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being neglected or feeling abandoned.
The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her mother.42 The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their mother would visit them only in school.43
The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time that their dad was abroad.44 While they did not live with their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that their mother took care of them on weekends and would see to their needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp would call their mother to come and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever any of them was sick.45
Other witnesses
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrone’s attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrone’s confinement, the couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her spouse.46 He likewise testified that Tyrone tested negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent.47
Malyn’s brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrone’s allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary to Tyrone’s version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-naked.48
Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyn’s group of friends. He stated on the stand that they would go on nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.49
Social worker
The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the minor children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrone’s live-in partner, Jocelyn;50 and Tyrone and Malyn’s only daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially stable and have positive relationships with their children, she recommended that the custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of family members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more available to the children and to exercise better supervision and care. The social worker commended the fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children clandestinely in their respective schools. And while she was only granted weekend custody of the children, it appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to their needs and to devote time with them.51
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couple’s de facto separation, simply left the children for several years with only a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second family abroad.52 The social worker found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this history during the formative years of the children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court53
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The court’s Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their children to become responsible individuals. Parties’ psychological incapacity is grave, and serious such that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The incapacity has been clinically established and was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable.54
The trial court then declared the parties’ marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.55
Ruling of the Court of Appeals56
Malyn appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA.1âwphi1 The CA reversed the trial court’s ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both parties’ allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. The parties’ faults tend only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.57 Moreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioner’s expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage.58
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration59 but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.60
Petitioner’s arguments
Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the best position to appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:
a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondent’s egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-obsession and self-centeredness were manifestations of respondent’s NPD;61
b) these expert witnesses proved that respondent’s NPD is grave and incurable and prevents her from performing her essential martial obligations;62 and
c) that respondent’s NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing, family background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.63
Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioner’s part.64
Respondent’s arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged psychological incapacity.65 She argues that the testimonies of her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and attentive mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrone’s allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible.66
She assails Dr. Gates’s report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover, her report failed to state that Malyn’s alleged psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.67 Fr. Healy’s testimony, on the other hand, was based only on Tyrone’s version of the facts.68
Malyn reiterates the appellate court’s ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to support its conclusion of psychological incapacity with factual findings.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Withdraw Comment and Memorandum.69 She manifested that she was no longer disputing the possibility that their marriage may really be void on the basis of Tyrone’s psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with justice.70 Her manifestation and motion were noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.71
Issue
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court’s Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations.72 The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.73 The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.74
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice |
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* In lieu of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.
1 Rollo, pp. 26-56.
2 Id. at 9-20; penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Vicente Q. Roxas.
3 Id. at 22-23.
4 CA Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 19.
5 Social Case Study Report, p. 14; Records, Vol. I, p. 216.
6 TSN dated March 15, 1995, pp. 11-12.
7 Social Case Study Report, p. 14; Records, Vol. I, p. 216.
8 Social Case Study Report, pp. 11 and 13; id. at 213 and 215.
9 Dr. Dayan’s Psychological Evaluation Report, p. 7; id. at 259.
10 Id. at 10-11; id. at 259.
11 TSN dated March 15, 1995, pp. 23-24; Dr. Dayan’s Psychological Evaluation Report, pp. 7-8; Records, Vol. I, p. 259.
12 Id. at 1-4.
13 Id. at 2; Petitioner’s Memorandum in JDRC Case No. 3100, records, Vol. II, pp. 306-307.
14 The case proceeded to trial after the fiscal manifested to the court that there was no collusion between the parties (Records, Vol. I, p. 45).
15 TSN dated January 5, 1995, pp. 16-17.
16 Id. at 17-18.
17 Psychological Report, Records, Vol. I, pp. 173-175.
18 TSN dated February 15, 1995, pp. 6-7.
19 Id. at 7.
20 Psychological Report, Records, Vol. I, pp. 174-175.
21 TSN dated February 15, 1995, p. 4.
22 TSN dated June 17, 1998, p. 24.
23 Id. at 30-31.
24 Id. at 26-27.
25 Id. at 22-23.
26 Id. at 23.
27 Records, Vol. I, pp. 20-21.
28 TSN dated July 8, 1998, pp. 5-7.
29 Id. at 6-7.
30 TSN dated March 15, 1995, pp. 12-13.
31 Id. at 11-12.
32 Id. at 9-11.
33 Id. at 15-17.
34 Id. at 17-18.
35 Records, Vol. I, p. 21.
36 Dr. Dayan’s Psychological Evaluation Report, p. 13; id. at 259.
37 Id. at 4-6; id.
38 Id. at 17-18; id.; TSN dated March 14, 1996, p. 10.
39 TSN dated January 30, 1996, p. 13.
40 Id. at 15.
41 TSN dated March 14, 1996, p. 12.
42 Social Case Study Report, p. 13 (Records, Vol. I, p. 215); Dr. Dayan’s Psychological Evaluation Report, p. 9 (Records, Vol. I, p. 259).
43 TSN dated June 8, 1995, p. 6; Dr. Dayan’s Psychological Evaluation Report, p. 9 (Id.); Rio’s deposition, p. 3 (Id. at 356).
44 Social Case Study Report, pp. 11 and 13; Records, Vol. I, pp. 213 and 215.
45 TSN dated June 8, 1995, p. 9; Social Case Study Report, pp. 11 and 19 (Id. at 213 and 221).
46 TSN dated November 20, 1995, pp. 15 and 21.
47 Id. at 8-10.
48 TSN dated January 4, 1996, pp. 4-6.
49 TSN dated April 2, 1998, pp. 18-20.
50 Tyrone alleges that he married Jocelyn Quejano in 1990 in California, United States of America after divorcing with Malyn also in California sometime in 1987. There is, however, no documentary evidence of the divorce and remarriage. There is no allegation that Tyrone had obtained American citizenship and is indicated in the Social Case Study Report as a Filipino citizen (Records, Vol. I, p. 219).
51 Social Case Study Report, pp. 19-20; id. at 221-222.
52 Id.; id.
53 Records, Vol. II, pp. 382-389; penned by Judge Jose R. Hernandez of Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
54 RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; id. at 388-389.
55 The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Valerio Kalaw and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez celebrated on November 4, 1976 is declared void ab initio pursuant to the provisions of Article 36 of the Family Code, and of no further effect.
The provisions of Article[s] 50, 51, and 52 of the Family Code of the Philippines relative to the delivery of their children’s presumptive legitime shall not apply because parties were not able to prove the existence of any conjugal partnership of gains.
Upon finality of this Decision, furnish a copy each to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City and the National Statistics Office, Quezon City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
SO ORDERED. (Id.; id.)
56 CA rollo, pp. 262-273.
57 CA Decision, p. 7; CA rollo, p. 268.
58 Id. at 11; id. at 272.
59 CA rollo, pp. 281-298.
60 Id. at 310-311.
61 Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 23-26; rollo, pp. 606-609.
62 Id. at 13-20; id. at 596-603.
63 Id. at 20-22; id. at 603-605.
64 Id. at 26-27; id. at 609-610.
65 Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 2; id. at 551.
66 Id. at 17-18; id. at 566-567.
67 Id. at 19; id. at 568.
68 Id. at 20; id. at 569.
69 Rollo, pp. 650-654.
70 Respondent’s Manifestation, p. 2; id. at 651.
71 Rollo, p. 662.
72 Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 502 (2005), citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 678 (1997).
73 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 676 (1997).
74 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 39 (1995).
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