Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186070 April 11, 2011
CLIENTLOGIC PHILPPINES, INC. (now known as SITEL), JOSEPH VELASQUEZ, IRENE ROA, and RODNEY SPIRES, Petitioners,
vs.
BENEDICT CASTRO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the September 1, 2008 Decision1 and the January 7, 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification the November 29, 2007 resolution3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which held that respondent Benedict Castro was not illegally dismissed. The CA, however, awarded respondent’s money claims, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 29 November 2007 and 23 January 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division) in NLRC CN. RAB-CAR-02-0091-07 LAC NO. 08-002207-07 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the monetary awards of Executive Labor Arbiter Vito C. Bose in his Decision dated 29 June 2007, as computed in Annex "A" thereof, ONLY for holiday premiums of Php 16,913.35; service incentive leave pay Php8,456.65; overtime pay of Php 578,753.10; and rest day pay of Php 26,384.80 which (petitioners) shall jointly and solidarily pay to petitioner, are hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.4
The second assailed issuance of the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The facts:
Respondent was employed by petitioner ClientLogic Philippines, Inc. (now known and shall hereafter be referred to as SITEL) on February 14, 2005 as a call center agent for its Bell South Account. After six (6) months, he was promoted to the "Mentor" position, and thereafter to the "Coach" position. A "Coach" is a team supervisor who is in charge of dealing with customer complaints which cannot be resolved by call center agents. In June 2006, he was transferred to the Dot Green Account.
During respondent’s stint at the Dot Green Account, respondent noticed that some of the call center agents under him would often make excuses to leave their work stations. Their most common excuse was that they would visit the company’s medical clinic. To verify that they were not using the clinic as an alibi to cut their work hours, respondent sent an e-mail to the clinic’s personnel requesting for the details of the agents’ alleged medical consultation. His request was denied on the ground that medical records of employees are highly confidential and can only be disclosed in cases involving health issues, and not to be used to build any disciplinary case against them.
On October 11, 2006, respondent received a notice requiring him to explain why he should not be penalized for: (1) violating Green Dot Company’s Policy and Procedure for Direct Deposit Bank Info Request when he accessed a customer’s online account and then gave the latter’s routing and reference numbers for direct deposit; and (2) gravely abusing his discretion when he requested for the medical records of his team members. Respondent did not deny the infractions imputed against him. He, however, justified his actuations by explaining that the customer begged him to access the account because she did not have a computer or an internet access and that he merely requested for a patient tracker, not medical records.
In November 2006, a poster showing SITEL’s organizational chart was posted on the company’s bulletin board, but respondent’s name and picture were conspicuously missing, and the name and photo of another employee appeared in the position which respondent was supposedly occupying.
On January 22, 2007, SITEL posted a notice of vacancy for respondent’s position, and on February 12, 2007, he received a Notice of Termination. These events prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal; non-payment of overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay; full backwages; damages; and attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter (LA) against herein petitioners SITEL and its officers, Joseph Velasquez (Velasquez), Irene Roa (Roa), and Rodney Spires (Spires).5
In their position paper,6 petitioners averred that respondent was dismissed on account of valid and justifiable causes. He committed serious misconduct which breached the trust and confidence reposed in him by the company. He was duly furnished the twin notices required by the Labor Code. Further, he is not entitled to overtime pay, rest day pay, night shift differential, holiday pay, and service incentive leave pay because he was a supervisor, hence, a member of the managerial staff.
In a decision dated June 29, 2007,7 the LA ruled in favor of respondent by declaring him illegally dismissed and ordering petitioners to pay his full backwages and, in lieu of reinstatement, his separation pay. The LA further awarded respondent’s money claims upon finding that he was not occupying a managerial position. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all premises duly considered, the (petitioners) are hereby found guilty of illegally dismissing (respondent). As such, (petitioners) shall be jointly and solidarily liable to pay (respondent) his full backwages from the date of his dismissal to the finality of this decision, computed as of today at One Hundred Thirty Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Nine Pesos and 80/100 (₱138,759.80) plus, Seven Hundred Sixty Three Thousand Two Hundred Forty Eight Pesos and 67/100 (₱763,248.67) representing his separation pay at one month pay for every year of service, holiday pay and service incentive leave pay for the three years prior to the filing of this case, overtime pay for six (6) hours daily, rest day and ten percent (10%) as attorney’s fees.
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of evidence.
The computation of the foregoing monetary claims is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex "A."
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the NLRC, which, in its November 29, 2007 resolution,9 reversed and set aside the decision of the LA by dismissing the complaint for lack of merit on the ground that respondent’s employment was terminated for a just cause. The NLRC failed to discuss the money claims.
On September 1, 2008, the CA affirmed the NLRC’s finding that there was no illegal dismissal. Anent the money claims, however, the CA concurred with the LA’s ruling.10
Petitioners and respondent respectively moved for partial reconsideration, but their motions were denied in the CA Resolution dated January 7, 2009.11 From the said denial, only petitioners sought recourse with this Court through the petition at bar. Respondent’s failure to partially appeal the CA’s Decision finding him not illegally dismissed has now rendered the same final and executory; hence, the instant petition shall traverse only the issue on money claims.
Petitioners argue in the main12 that, as a team supervisor, respondent was a member of the managerial staff; hence, he is not entitled to overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, and service incentive leave pay.
We deny the petition.
The petition hinges on the question of whether the duties and responsibilities performed by respondent qualify him as a member of petitioners’ managerial staff. This is clearly a question of fact, the determination of which entails an evaluation of the evidence on record.
The alleged errors of the CA lengthily enumerated in the petition13 are essentially factual in nature and, therefore, outside the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court does not try facts since such statutory duty is devolved upon the labor tribunals. It is not for this Court to weigh and calibrate pieces of evidence otherwise adequately passed upon by the labor tribunals especially when affirmed by the appellate court.14
Petitioners claim exception to the foregoing rule and assert that the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC were conflicting. This is not correct. The labor tribunals’ decisions were at odds only with respect to the issue of illegal dismissal. Anent the money claims issue, it cannot be said that their rulings were contradictory because the NLRC, disappointingly, did not make any finding thereon and it erroneously construed that the resolution of the money claims was intertwined with the determination of the legality of respondent’s dismissal. Nonetheless, the CA has already rectified such lapse when it made a definitive review of the LA’s factual findings on respondent’s money claims. Agreeing with the LA, the CA held:
Article 82 of the Labor Code states that the provisions of the Labor Code on working conditions and rest periods shall not apply to managerial employees. Generally, managerial employees are not entitled to overtime pay for services rendered in excess of eight hours a day.
Article 212 (m) of the Labor Code defines a managerial employee as "one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions.
In his Position Paper, (respondent) states that he worked from 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 a.m. or 4 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. of the following day; he was also required to work during his restdays and during holidays but he was not paid; he was also not paid overtime pay; night shift differentials, and service incentive leave. He was employed as call center agent on 14 February 2005, then promoted as "Mentor" in August 2005, and again promoted to "Coach" position in September 2005, which was the position he had when he was terminated. A "coach" is a team supervisor who is in charge of dealing with customer complaints which could not be dealt with by call center agents, and if a call center agent could not meet the needs of a customer, he passes the customer’s call to the "coach." Clearly, (respondent) is not a managerial employee as defined by law. Thus, he is entitled to his money claims.
As correctly found by Executive Labor Arbiter Bose:
Employees are considered occupying managerial positions if they meet all of the following conditions, namely:
1) Their primary duty consists of management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof;
2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein;
3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight.
They are considered as officers or members of a managerial staff if they perform the following duties and responsibilities:
1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management of policies of their employer;
2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;
3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty consists of management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or (ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute, under general supervision, special assignment and tasks xxx.
(Respondent’s) duties do not fall under any of the categories enumerated above. His work is not directly related to management policies. Even the circumstances shown by the instant case reveal that (respondent) does not regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment. (Petitioners) submitted a list of the responsibilities of "HR Manager/Supervisor" and "Division Manager/Department Manager/Supervisors" but these do not pertain to (respondent) who does not have any of the said positions. He was just a team Supervisor and not (an) HR or Department Supervisor.15
We find no reversible error in the above ruling. The test of "supervisory" or "managerial status" depends on whether a person possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer and whether such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.16 The position held by respondent and its concomitant duties failed to hurdle this test.
As a coach or team supervisor, respondent’s main duty was to deal with customer complaints which could not be handled or solved by call center agents. If the members of his team could not meet the needs of a customer, they passed the customer’s call to respondent.
This job description does not indicate that respondent can exercise the powers and prerogatives equivalent to managerial actions which require the customary use of independent judgment. There is no showing that he was actually conferred or was actually exercising the following duties attributable to a "member of the managerial staff," viz.:
1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management of policies of their employer;
2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;
3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty consists of management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or (ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute, under general supervision, special assignment and tasks; and
4) Who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked in a workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) above.17
According to petitioners, respondent also performed the following duties, as shown in the company’s Statement of Policy on Discipline:
a. Know and understand in full the Policy on Discipline including their underlying reasons.
b. Implement strictly and consistently the Policy on Discipline.
c. Ensure that the said Policy on Discipline is communicated to and understood by all employees.
d. Monitor compliance by employees with the said Policy.
e. Advise HR Manager on the state of discipline in their respective departments; problems, if any, and recommend solution(s) and corrective action(s).
As correctly observed by the CA and the LA, these duties clearly pertained to "Division Managers/Department Managers/ Supervisors," which respondent was not, as he was merely a team supervisor. Petitioners themselves described respondent as "the superior of a call center agent; he heads and guides a specific number of agents, who form a team."181âwphi1
From the foregoing, respondent is thus entitled to his claims for holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, overtime pay and rest day pay,
pursuant to Book Three of the Labor Code, specifically Article 82,19 in relation to Articles 87,20 93,21 and 9522 thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The September 1, 2008 Decision and the January 7, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 33-51.
2 Id. at 64-65.
3 Id. at 83-90.
4 Supra note 1, at 48.
5 Respondent’s Position Paper as cited in pages 2-3 of the CA Decision; supra note 1.
6 Rollo, pp. 128-161.
7 Id. at 69-81.
8 Id. at 79-80.
9 Supra note 3.
10 Supra note 1.
11 Supra note 2.
12 In their petition, petitioners ascribe the following errors to the CA:
I. REINSTATING THE LABOR ARBITER’S RULING THAT -
(a) PRIVATE RESPONDENT BENEDICT CASTRO’S DUTIES WITH THE COMPANY AS SIMPLY CHARACTERIZED AS, LIMITED TO, CATCHING A CUSTOMER CALL/COMPLAINTS WHEN THE SAME COULD NOT BE ADDRESSED BY CALL CENTER AGENTS;
(b) PRIVATE RESPONDENT BENEDICT CASTRO’S DUTIES WITH THE COMPANY DO NOT MAKE HIM FALL UNDER THE CATEGORY OF A "MANAGERIAL" EMPLOYEE OR A "MEMBER OF THE MANAGERIAL STAFF";
(c) PRIVATE RESPONDENT BENEDICT CASTRO IS "JUST A TEAM SUPERVISOR" IMPLYING THAT HE IS NOT A SUPERVISOR CONTEMPLATED BY LAW AS BEING EXEMPT FROM PAYMENT OF HOLIDAY PAY, OVERTIME PAY, REST DAY PAY, AND SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY;
(d) PRIVATE RESPONDENT BENEDICT CASTRO’S WORK WAS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO MANAGEMENT POLICIES;
(e) SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BENEDICT CASTRO WAS PAID HIS 13th MONTH PAY, THE SAME PRECLUDES HIM FROM BEING A "MEMBER OF THE MANAGERIAL STAFF"
II. IN RELATION TO THE FOREGOING, REINSTATING THE LABOR ARBITER’S FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT BENEDICT CASTRO IS ENTITLED TO HOLIDAY PAY, OVERTIME PAY, REST DAY PAY AND SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY;
III. FAILING TO CONSIDER ADMITTED AND OTHERWISE UNDISPUTED FACTS ESSENTIAL AND RELEVANT IN THE DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO HOLIDAY PAY, OVERTIME PAY, REST DAY PAY AND SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY. (Rollo, p. 22.)
13 Id.
14 See Diversified Security, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 152234, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 28, 293, citing Reyes v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 160233, August 8, 2007, 529 SCRA 487, 494.
15 Supra note 1, at 46-48.
16 Gonzales v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 131653, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 195, 208, citing Magos v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123421, December 28, 1998, 300 SCRA 484, 490; see also A. D. Gothong Manufacturing Corporation Employees Union-ALU v. Hon. Nieves Confessor, et al., 376 Phil. 168, 173-174 (1999), citing Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines v. Trajano, 241 Phil. 432, 439 (1988).
17 Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, Book III, Rule I, Sec. 2(c).
18 Rollo, pp. 11-30.
19 Art. 82. Coverage. – The provisions of this title shall apply to employees in all establishment and undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field personnel, members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results xxx. (Emphasis Supplied)
20 Art. 87. Overtime work. - Work may be performed beyond eight (8) hours a day provided that the employee is paid for the overtime work, an additional compensation equivalent to his regular wage plus at least twenty-five (25%) per cent thereof. Work performed beyond eight hours on a holiday or rest day shall be paid an additional compensation equivalent to the rate of the first eight hours on a holiday or rest day plus at least thirty percent thereof."
21 Art. 93. Compensation for rest day, Sunday or holiday work. - (a) Where an employee is made or permitted to work on his scheduled rest day, he shall be paid an additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of his regular wage. An employee shall be entitled to such additional compensation for work performed on Sunday only when it is his established rest day.
(b) When the nature of the work of the employee is such that he has no regular workdays and no regular rest days can be scheduled, he shall be paid an additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of his regular wage for work performed on Sundays and holidays.
(c) Work performed on any special holiday shall be paid an additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of the regular wage of the employee. Where such holiday work falls on the employees scheduled rest day, he shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least fifty percent (50%) of his regular wage.
(d) Where the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract stipulates the payment of a higher premium pay than that prescribed under this Article, the employer shall pay such higher rate.
22 Art. 95. Right to Service Incentive Leave. – (a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay. x x x.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
