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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 167139               February 25, 2010

SUSIE CHAN-TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
JESSE C. TAN, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review¹ of (i) the 17 May 2004 Resolution² amending the 30 March 2004 Decision³ and (ii) the 15 February 2005 Resolution⁴ of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, in Civil Case No. Q-01-45743. In its 30 March 2004 Decision, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner Susie Chan-Tan and respondent Jesse Tan void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Incorporated as part of the decision was the 31 July 2003 Partial Judgment⁵ approving the Compromise Agreement⁶ of the parties. In its 17 May 2004 Resolution, the trial court granted to respondent custody of the children, ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling. In its 15 February 2005 Resolution, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 Resolution⁷ denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the 12 October 2004 Resolution,⁸ which in turn denied for late filing petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution.

The Facts

Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral in Intramuros, Manila.⁹ They were blessed with two sons: Justin, who was born in Canada in 1990 and Russel, who was born in the Philippines in 1993.¹⁰

In 2001, twelve years into the marriage, petitioner filed a case for the annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties submitted to the court a compromise agreement, which we quote in full:

1. The herein parties mutually agreed that the two (2) lots located at Corinthian Hills, Quezon City and more particularly described in the Contract to Sell, marked in open court as Exhibits "H" to "H-3" shall be considered as part of the presumptive legitimes of their two (2) minor children namely, Justin Tan born on October 12, 1990 and Russel Tan born on November 28, 1993. Copies of the Contract to Sell are hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B" and made integral parts hereof.

2. Susie Tan hereby voluntarily agrees to exclusively shoulder and pay out of her own funds/assets whatever is the remaining balance or unpaid amounts on said lots mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof directly with Megaworld Properties, Inc., until the whole purchase or contract amounts are fully paid.

Susie Tan is hereby authorized and empowered to directly negotiate, transact, pay and deal with the seller/developer Megaworld Properties, Inc., in connection with the Contract to Sell marked as Annexes "A" and "B" hereof.

The property covered by CCT No. 3754 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and located at Unit O, Richmore Town Homes 12-B Mariposa St., Quezon City shall be placed in co-ownership under the name of Susie Tan (1/3), Justin Tan (1/3) and Russel Tan (1/3) to the exclusion of Jesse Tan.

The property covered by TCT No. 48137 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and located at View Master Town Homes, 1387 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City shall be exclusively owned by Jesse Tan to the exclusion of Susie Tan.

The undivided interest in the Condominium Unit in Cityland Shaw. Jesse Tan shall exclusively own blvd. to the exclusion of Susie Tan.

The shares of stocks, bank accounts and other properties presently under the respective names of Jesse Tan and Susie Tan shall be exclusively owned by the spouse whose name appears as the registered/account owner or holder in the corporate records/stock transfer books, passbooks and/or the one in possession thereof, including the dividends/fruits thereof, to the exclusion of the other spouse.

Otherwise stated, all shares, bank accounts and properties registered and under the name and/or in the possession of Jesse Tan shall be exclusively owned by him only and all shares, accounts and properties registered and/or in the possession and under the name of Susie Tan shall be exclusively owned by her only.

However, as to the family corporations of Susie Tan, Jesse Tan shall execute any and all documents transferring the shares of stocks registered in his name in favor of Susie Tan, or Justin Tan/Russel Tan. A copy of the list of the corporation owned by the family of Susie Tan is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made an integral part hereof.

The parties shall voluntarily and without need of demand turn over to the other spouse any and all original documents, papers, titles, contracts registered in the name of the other spouse that are in their respective possessions and/or safekeeping.

3. Thereafter and upon approval of this Compromise Agreement by the Honorable Court, the existing property regime of the spouses shall be dissolved and shall now be governed by "Complete Separation of Property". Parties expressly represent that there are no known creditors that will be prejudiced by the present compromise agreement.

The parties shall have joint custody of their minor children. However, the two (2) minor children shall stay with their mother, Susie Tan at 12-B Mariposa St., Quezon City.

The husband, Jesse Tan, shall have the right to bring out the two (2) children every Sunday of each month from 8:00 AM to 9:00 PM. The minor children shall be returned to 12-B Mariposa Street, Quezon City on or before 9:00 PM of every Sunday of each month.

The husband shall also have the right to pick up the two (2) minor children in school/or in the house every Thursday of each month. The husband shall ensure that the children be home by 8:00 PM of said Thursdays.

During the summer vacation/semestral break or Christmas vacation of the children, the parties shall discuss the proper arrangement to be made regarding the stay of the children with Jesse Tan.

Neither party shall put any obstacle in the way of the maintenance of the love and affection between the children and the other party, or in the way of a reasonable and proper companionship between them, either by influencing the children against the other, or otherwise; nor shall they do anything to estrange any of them from the other.

The parties agreed to observe civility, courteousness and politeness in dealing with each other and shall not insult, malign or commit discourteous acts against each other and shall endeavor to cause their other relatives to act similarly.

4. Likewise, the husband shall have the right to bring out and see the children on the following additional dates, provided that the same will not impede or disrupt their academic schedule in Xavier School, the dates are as follows:

a. Birthday of Jesse Tan

b. Birthday of Grandfather and Grandmother, first cousins and uncles and aunties

c. Father's Day

d. Death Anniversaries of immediate members of the family of Jesse Tan

e. During the Christmas seasons/vacation the herein parties will agree on such dates as when the children can stay with their father. Provided that if the children stay with their father on Christmas Day from December 24th to December 25th until 1:00 PM the children will stay with their mother on December 31 until January 1, 1:00 PM, or vice versa.

The husband shall always be notified of all school activities of the children and shall see to it that he will exert his best effort to attend the same.

5. During the birthdays of the two (2) minor children, the parties shall as far as practicable have one celebration.

Provided that if the same is not possible, the Husband (Jesse Tan) shall have the right to see and bring out the children for at least four (4) hours during the day or the day immediately following/or after the birthday, if said visit or birthday coincides with the school day.

6. The existing Educational Plans of the two children shall be used and utilized for their High School and College education, in the event that the Educational Plans are insufficient to cover their tuition, the Husband shall shoulder the tuition and other miscellaneous fees, costs of books and educational materials, uniform, school bags, shoes and similar expenses like summer workshops which are taken in Xavier School, which will be paid directly by Jesse Tan to the children's school when the same fall due. Jesse Tan, if necessary, shall pay tutorial expenses, directly to the tutor concerned.

The husband further undertake to pay ₱10,000.00/monthly support pendente lite to be deposited in the ATM Account of SUSIE CHAN with account no. 3-189-53867-8 Boni Serrano Branch effective on the 15th of each month. In addition Jesse Tan undertakes to give directly to his two (2) sons every Sunday, the amount needed and necessary for the purpose of the daily meals of the two (2) children in school.

7. This Compromise Agreement is not against the law, customs, public policy, public order and good morals. Parties hereby voluntarily agree and bind themselves to execute and sign any and all documents to give effect to this Compromise Agreement.¹¹

On 31 July 2003, the trial court issued a partial judgment¹² approving the compromise agreement. On 30 March 2004, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity of the parties. The trial court incorporated in its decision the compromise agreement of the parties on the issues of support, custody, visitation of the children, and property relations.

Meanwhile, petitioner cancelled the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No. 12, Block 2. She authorized Megaworld Corp. to allocate the amount of ₱11,992,968.32 so far paid on the said lot in the following manner:

(a) ₱3,656,250.04 shall be transferred to fully pay the other lot in Corinthian Hills on Lot 11, Block 2;

(b) ₱7,783,297.56 shall be transferred to fully pay the contract price in Unit 9H of the 8 Wack Wack Road Condominium project; and

(c) ₱533,420.72 shall be forfeited in favor of Megaworld Corp. to cover the marketing and administrative costs of Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot 12, Block 2.¹³

Petitioner authorized Megaworld Corp. to offer Lot 12, Block 2 of Corinthian Hills to other interested buyers. It also appears from the records that petitioner left the country bringing the children with her.

Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the children. The evidence presented by respondent established that petitioner brought the children out of the country without his knowledge and without prior authority of the trial court; petitioner failed to pay the ₱8,000,000 remaining balance for the Megaworld property which, if forfeited would prejudice the interest of the children; and petitioner failed to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's name.1avvphi1

Thus, the trial court, in its 17 May 2004 resolution, awarded to respondent custody of the children, ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City.

Petitioner filed on 28 June 2004 a motion for reconsideration¹⁴ alleging denial of due process on account of accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. She alleged she was not able to present evidence because of the negligence of her counsel and her own fear for her life and the future of the children. She claimed she was forced to leave the country, together with her children, due to the alleged beating she received from respondent and the pernicious effects of the latter's supposed gambling and womanizing ways. She prayed for an increase in respondent's monthly support obligation in the amount of ₱150,000.

Unconvinced, the trial court, in its 12 October 2004 Resolution,¹⁵ denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. It also declared petitioner in contempt of court for non-compliance with the partial judgment and the 17 May 2004 resolution. The trial court also denied petitioner's prayer for increase in monthly support. The trial court reasoned that since petitioner took it upon herself to enroll the children in another school without respondent's knowledge, she should therefore defray the resulting increase in their expenses.

On 4 November 2004, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss¹⁶ and a motion for reconsideration¹⁷ of the 12 October 2004 Resolution. She claimed she was no longer interested in the suit. Petitioner stated that the circumstances in her life had led her to the conclusion that withdrawing the petition was for the best interest of the children. She prayed that an order be issued vacating all prior orders and leaving the parties at the status quo ante the filing of the suit.

In its 28 December 2004 Resolution,¹⁸ the trial court denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. It held that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution had become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party.

Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 resolution, which the trial court denied in its 15 February 2005 resolution.¹⁹ The trial court then issued a Certificate of Finality²⁰ of the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution.

The Trial Court's Rulings

The 30 March 2004 Decision²¹ declared the marriage between the parties void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. It incorporated the 31 July 2003 Partial Judgment²² approving the Compromise Agreement²³ between the parties. The 17 May 2004 Resolution²⁴ amended the earlier partial judgment in granting to respondent custody of the children, ordering petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowing respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City. The 15 February 2005 Resolution²⁵ denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 Resolution²⁶ denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the 12 October 2004 Resolution,²⁷ which in turn denied for late filing petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution.

The Issue

Petitioner raises the question of whether the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court have attained finality despite the alleged denial of due process.

The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed to file pleadings and appear at the hearings for respondent's omnibus motion to amend the partial judgment as regards the custody of the children and the properties in her possession. Petitioner claims the trial court issued the 17 May 2004 resolution relying solely on the testimony of respondent. Petitioner further claims the trial court erred in applying to her motion to dismiss Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Petitioner argues that if indeed the provision is applicable, the same is unconstitutional for setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family.

Respondent maintains that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court are now final and executory and could no longer be reviewed, modified, or vacated. Respondent alleges petitioner is making a mockery of our justice system in disregarding our lawful processes. Respondent stresses neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared in court at the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion or on petitioner's motion to dismiss.

The issue raised in this petition has been settled in the case of Tuason v. Court of Appeals.²⁸ In Tuason, private respondent therein filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage on the ground of her husband's psychological incapacity. There, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of the marriage and awarding custody of the children to private respondent therein. No timely appeal was taken from the trial court's judgment.

We held that the decision annulling the marriage had already become final and executory when the husband failed to appeal during the reglementary period. The husband claimed that the decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of his right to due process. He argued he was denied due process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment based solely on the evidence presented by private respondent. We upheld the judgment of nullity of the marriage even if it was based solely on evidence presented by therein private respondent.

We also ruled in Tuason that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of the counsel to inform the client of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of the latter's right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.²⁹

In the present case, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had become final and executory upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal.³⁰ Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution, which the trial court received on 28 June 2004, was clearly filed out of time. Applying the doctrine laid down in Tuason, the alleged negligence of counsel resulting in petitioner's loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial court's judgments.

Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she may have lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel, she cannot say she was denied her day in court. Records show petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below, filing motion after motion. Contrary to petitioner's allegation of negligence of her counsel, we have reason to believe the negligence in pursuing the case was on petitioner's end, as may be gleaned from her counsel's manifestation dated 3 May 2004:

Undersigned Counsel, who appeared for petitioner, in the nullity proceedings, respectfully informs the Honorable Court that she has not heard from petitioner since Holy Week. Attempts to call petitioner have failed.

Undersigned counsel regrets therefore that she is unable to respond in an intelligent manner to the Motion (Omnibus Motion) filed by respondent.³¹

Clearly, despite her counsel's efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter disinterest in the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion seeking, among others, custody of the children. The trial judge was left with no other recourse but to proceed with the hearings and rule on the motion based on the evidence presented by respondent. Petitioner cannot now come to this Court crying denial of due process.

As for the applicability to petitioner's motion to dismiss of Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, petitioner is correct. Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides:

SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer. (Emphasis supplied)

The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all possible defenses in an answer, instead of a mere motion to dismiss, so that judgment may be made on the merits. In construing a statute, the purpose or object of the law is an important factor to be considered.³² Further, the letter of the law admits of no other interpretation but that the provision applies only to a respondent, not a petitioner. Only a respondent in a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage files an answer where any ground that may warrant a dismissal may be raised as an affirmative defense pursuant to the provision. The only logical conclusion is that Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to a motion to dismiss filed by the party who initiated the petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage.

Since petitioner is not the respondent in the petition for the annulment of the marriage, Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to the motion to dismiss filed by her. Section 7 of the Rule not being applicable, petitioner's claim that it is unconstitutional for allegedly setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family is without basis.

Section 1 of the Rule states that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage. In this connection, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court allows dismissal of the action upon notice or upon motion of the plaintiff, to wit:

Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. - A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. x x x

Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. - Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had long become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party. The 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution may no longer be disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss filed by petitioner. The trial court was correct in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.³³ The reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law. Once a judgment has become final and executory, the issues there should be laid to rest.³⁴

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. We AFFIRM the (i) 17 May 2004 Resolution amending the 30 March 2004 Decision and (ii) the 15 February 2005 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, in Civil Case No. Q-01-45743.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

² Records, pp. 261-269.

³ Id. at 235-251.

⁴ Id. at 499-505.

⁵ Id. at 141-147.

⁶ Id. at 124-129.

⁷ Id. at 482-490.

⁸ Id. at 393-403.

⁹ Id. at 11.

¹⁰ Id. at 12-13.

¹¹ Id. at 124-128.

¹² Id. at 141-147.

¹³ Id. at 427.

¹⁴ Id. at 319-326.

¹⁵ Id. at 393-403.

¹⁶ Id. at 414-416.

¹⁷ Id. at 418-423.

¹⁸ Id. at 482-490.

¹⁹ Id. at 499-505.

²⁰ Rollo, pp. 246-248.

²¹ Records, pp. 235-251.

²² Id. at 141-147.

²³ Id. at 124-129.

²⁴ Id. at 261-269.

²⁵ Id. at 499-505.

²⁶ Id. at 482-490.

²⁷ Id. at 393-403.

²⁸ 326 Phil. 169 (1996).

²⁹ Id.

³⁰ Perez v. Zulueta, 106 Phil. 264 (1959).

³¹ Records, p. 259.

³² Philippine Sugar Central Agency v. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131 (1927).

³³ Nuñal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94005, 6 April 1993, 221 SCRA 26.

³⁴ Enriquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83720, 4 October 1991, 202 SCRA 487.

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