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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 149548               December 4, 2009

ROXAS & COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
DAMBA-NFSW and the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,* Respondents.

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G.R. No. 167505               December 4, 2009

DAMAYAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID SA ASYENDA ROXAS-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (DAMBA-NFSW) Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ROXAS & Co., INC. AND/OR ATTY. MARIANO AMPIL, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 167540               December 4, 2009

KATIPUNAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA HACIENDA ROXAS, INC. (KAMAHARI), rep. by its President CARLITO CAISIP, and DAMAYAN NG MANGGAGAWANG BUKID SA ASYENDA ROXAS-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (DAMBA-NFSW), represnted by LAURO MARTIN, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ROXAS & Co., INC., Respondents.

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G.R. No. 167543               December 4, 2009

DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM, FORMERLY DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR), Petitioner,
vs.
ROXAS & CO, INC., Respondent.

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G.R. No. 167845               December 4, 2009

ROXAS & CO., INC., Petitioner,
vs.
DAMBA-NFSW, Respondent.

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G.R. No. 169163               December 4, 2009

DAMBA-NFSW REPRESENTED BY LAURO V. MARTIN, Petitioner,
vs.
ROXAS & CO., INC., Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179650               December 4, 2009

DAMBA-NFSW, Petitioner,
vs.
ROXAS & CO., INC., Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.

The main subject of the seven consolidated petitions is the application of petitioner Roxas & Co., Inc. (Roxas & Co.) for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use of its three haciendas located in Nasugbu, Batangas containing a total area of almost 3,000 hectares. The facts are not new, the Court having earlier resolved intimately-related issues dealing with these haciendas. Thus, in the 1999 case of Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,¹ the Court presented the facts as follows:

. . . Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in area and is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 985. This land is covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0465, 0466, 0468, 0470, 0234 and 0354. Hacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area, registered under TCT No. 924 and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0236, 0237 and 0390. Hacienda Caylaway is 867.4571 hectares in area and is registered under TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665.

x x x x

On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.

Before the law’s effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by … DAR in accordance with the CARL.

x x x x

Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, [Roxas & Co.], through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of …DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.

x x x x² (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 and 167543 nub on the interpretation of Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1520 which was issued on November 28, 1975 by then President Ferdinand Marcos. The PP reads:

DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, certain areas in the sector comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas have potential tourism value after being developed into resort complexes for the foreign and domestic market; and

WHEREAS, it is necessary to conduct the necessary studies and to segregate specific geographic areas for concentrated efforts of both the government and private sectors in developing their tourism potential;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby declare the area comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province as a tourist zone under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Section 5 (D) of P.D. 564.

The PTA shall identify well-defined geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value, wherein optimum use of natural assets and attractions, as well as existing facilities and concentration of efforts and limited resources of both government and private sector may be affected and realized in order to generate foreign exchange as well as other tourist receipts.

Any duly established military reservation existing within the zone shall be excluded from this proclamation.

All proclamation, decrees or executive orders inconsistent herewith are hereby revoked or modified accordingly. (emphasis and underscoring supplied).

The incidents which spawned the filing of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 149548, 167505, 167845, 169163 and 179650 are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Minita Chico-Nazario, the original draft of which was made the basis of the Court’s deliberations.

Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for conversion of its three haciendas from argricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505.

The application for conversion of Roxas & Co. was the subject of the above-stated Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals which the Court remanded to the DAR for the observance of proper acquisition proceedings. As reflected in the above-quoted statement of facts in said case, during the pendency before the DAR of its application for conversion following its remand to the DAR or on May 16, 2000, Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application for exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994³ which states that all lands already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.

It bears mentioning at this juncture that on April 18, 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu enacted Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 (Nasugbu MZO No. 4) which was approved on May 4, 1983 by the Human Settlements Regulation Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

The records show that Sangguniang Bayan and Association of Barangay Captains of Nasugbu filed before this Court petitions for intervention which were, however, denied by Resolution of June 5, 2006 for lack of standing.⁴

After the seven present petitions were consolidated and referred to the Court en banc,⁵ oral arguments were conducted on July 7, 2009.

The core issues are:

1. Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non-agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.’s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage;

2. Whether Nasugbu MSO No. 4, Series of 1982 exempted certain lots in Hacienda Palico from CARP coverage; and

3. Whether the partial and complete cancellations by the DAR of CLOA No. 6654 subject of G.R. No. 167505 is valid.

The Court shall discuss the issues in seriatim.

I. PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN THE THREE MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDING NASUGBU TO NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS.

Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as each constituting a tourism zone, reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore, converted their use to non-agricultural purposes.

To determine the chief intent of PP 1520, reference to the "whereas clauses" is in order. By and large, a reference to the congressional deliberation records would provide guidance in dissecting the intent of legislation. But since PP 1520 emanated from the legislative powers of then President Marcos during martial rule, reference to the whereas clauses cannot be dispensed with.⁶

The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the sector comprising the [three Municipalities that] have potential tourism value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" to achieve its purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those potential tourism areas are. If all the lands in those tourism zones were to be wholly converted to non-agricultural use, there would have been no need for the PP to direct the PTA to identify what those "specific geographic areas" are.

The Court had in fact passed upon a similar matter before. Thus in DAR v. Franco,⁷ it pronounced:

Thus, the DAR Regional Office VII, in coordination with the Philippine Tourism Authority, has to determine precisely which areas are for tourism development and excluded from the Operation Land Transfer and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. And suffice it to state here that the Court has repeatedly ruled that lands already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988 do not need any conversion clearance.⁸ (emphasis and underscoring supplied).

While the above pronouncement in Franco is an obiter, it should not be ignored in the resolution of the present petitions since it reflects a more rational and just interpretation of PP 1520. There is no prohibition in embracing the rationale of an obiter dictum in settling controversies, or in considering related proclamations establishing tourism zones.

In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA,⁹ the Court made it clear that the "power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] lies with the [Department of Agrarian Reform], not with this Court."¹⁰ The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, by Order of October 22, 2001, the application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time, identified the "specific geographic areas" for tourism development and had no pending tourism development projects in the areas. Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the areas were planted with sugar cane and other crops.¹¹

Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2004,¹² came up with clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed that

A. x x x x.

B. Proclamations declaring general areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas as tourist zones that merely:

(1) recognize certain still unidentified areas within the covered provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulas to be with potential tourism value and charge the Philippine Tourism Authority with the task to identify/delineate specific geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value and to coordinate said areas’ development; or

(2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located within the general area declared as tourist zone (i.e. x x x x) and direct the Philippine Tourism Authority to coordinate said areas’ development;

could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the land area declared as tourist zone. This is so because "reclassification of lands" denotes their allocation into some specific use and "providing for the manner of their utilization and disposition (Sec. 20, Local Government Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan." (Joint HLURB, DAR, DA, DILG Memo. Circular Prescribing Guidelines for MC 54, S. 1995, Sec.2)

A proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said proclamation direct that otherwise CARPable lands within the zone shall already be used for purposes other than agricultural.

Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulas would be unreasonable as it amounts to an automatic and sweeping exemption from CARP in the name of tourism development. The same would also undermine the land use reclassification powers vested in local government units in conjunction with pertinent agencies of government.

C. There being no reclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances, assuming [these] took effect before June 15, 1988, could not supply a basis for exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced therein from CARP coverage x x x x.

D. x x x x. (underscoring in the original; emphasis and italics supplied)

The DAR’s reading into these general proclamations of tourism zones deserves utmost consideration, more especially in the present petitions which involve vast tracts of agricultural land. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within the general area declared as tourism zones. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use.

Apart from PP 1520, there are similarly worded proclamations declaring the whole of Ilocos Norte and Bataan Provinces, Camiguin, Puerto Prinsesa, Siquijor, Panglao Island, parts of Cebu City and Municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete in Cebu Province as tourism zones.¹³

Indubitably, these proclamations, particularly those pertaining to the Provinces of Ilocos Norte and Bataan, did not intend to reclassify all agricultural lands into non-agricultural lands in one fell swoop. The Court takes notice of how the agrarian reform program was—and still is—implemented in these provinces since there are lands that do not have any tourism potential and are more appropriate for agricultural utilization.

Relatedly, a reference to the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995¹⁴ provides a parallel orientation on the issue. Under said Act, several towns and cities encompassing the whole Philippines were readily identified as economic zones.¹⁵ To uphold Roxas & Co.’s reading of PP 1520 would see a total reclassification of practically all the agricultural lands in the country to non-agricultural use. Propitiously, the legislature had the foresight to include a bailout provision in Section 31 of said Act for land conversion.¹⁶ The same cannot be said of PP 1520, despite the existence of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 or the Tenant Emancipation Decree,¹⁷ which is the precursor of the CARP.

Interestingly, then President Marcos also issued on September 26, 1972 PD No. 2 which declared the entire Philippines as land reform area.¹⁸ Such declaration did not intend to reclassify all lands in the entire country to agricultural lands. President Marcos, about a month later or on October 21, 1972, issued PD 27 which decreed that all private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn were deemed awarded to their tenant-farmers.

Given these martial law-era decrees and considering the socio-political backdrop at the time PP 1520 was issued in 1975, it is inconceivable that PP 1520, as well as other similarly worded proclamations which are completely silent on the aspect of reclassification of the lands in those tourism zones, would nullify the gains already then achieved by PD 27.

Even so, Roxas & Co. turns to Natalia Realty v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde to support its position. These cases are not even closely similar to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 and 167543. The only time that these cases may find application to said petitions is when the PTA actually identifies "well-defined geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value."

In remotely tying these two immediately-cited cases that involve specific and defined townsite reservations for the housing program of the National Housing Authority to the present petitions, Roxas & Co. cites Letter of Instructions No. 352 issued on December 22, 1975 which states that the survey and technical description of the tourism zones shall be considered an integral part of PP 1520. There were, however, at the time no surveys and technical delineations yet of the intended tourism areas.

On hindsight, Natalia and Allarde find application in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 179650 & 167505, which petitions are anchored on the extenuating effects of Nasugbu MZO No. 4, but not in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167540 & 167543 bearing on PP 1520, as will later be discussed.

Of significance also in the present petitions is the issuance on August 3, 2007 of Executive Order No. 647¹⁹ by President Arroyo which proclaimed the areas in the Nasugbu Tourism Development Plan as Special Tourism Zone. Pursuant to said Executive Order, the PTA completed its validation of 21 out of 42 barangays as tourism priority areas, hence, it is only after such completion that these identified lands may be subjected to reclassification proceedings.

It bears emphasis that a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that process of conversion before one is permitted to use it for other purposes.²⁰

The recent passage of the Tourism Act of 2009²¹ also impacts on the present petitions since Section 32 thereof states that:

Sec. 32. x x x x. - Any other area specifically defined as a tourism area, zone or spot under any special or general law, decree or presidential issuance shall, as far as practicable, be organized into a TEZ under the provisions of this Act. x x x x. (italics and emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, it is only under this same Act that it is explicitly declared that lands identified as part of a tourism zone shall qualify for exemption from CARP coverage.²²

The dissenting opinion ignores the supervening issuances mentioned above during the pendency of the present petitions because they came after the effectivity of the CARP on June 15, 1988. It labors on the supposition that PP 1520 had already reclassified the lands encompassing the tourism zones; and that those subsequent issuances, even if applied in the present cases, cannot be applied retroactively.

Relevantly, while it may be argued that a remand to the DAR would be proper in light of the recent formulation of a tourism development plan, which was validated by the PTA, that would put the cases within the ambit of PP 1520, the Court sees otherwise. Roxas & Co. can only look to the provisions of the Tourism Act, and not to PP 1520, for possible exemption.

II. ROXAS & CO.’S APPLICATION IN DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 FOR CARP EXEMPTION IN HACIENDA PALICO SUBJECT OF G.R. NO. 179650 CANNOT BE GRANTED IN VIEW OF DISCREPANCIES IN THE LOCATION AND IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND.

Since PP 1520 did not automatically convert Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad and Palico into non-agricultural estates, can Roxas & Co. invoke in the alternative Nasugbu MZO No. 4, which reclassified in 1982 the haciendas to non-agricultural use to exclude six parcels of land in Hacienda Palico from CARP coverage?

By Roxas & Co.’s contention, the affected six parcels of land which are the subject of DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 and nine parcels of land which are the subject of DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 involved in G.R. No. 167505, all in Hacienda Palico, have been reclassified to non-agricultural uses via Nasugbu MZO No. 4 which was approved by the forerunner of HLURB.

Roxas & Co.’s contention fails.

To be sure, the Court had on several occasions decreed that a local government unit has the power to classify and convert land from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL.²³ In Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association v. Nicolas,²⁴ it reiterated that

. . . the facts obtaining in this case are similar to those in Natalia Realty. Both subject lands form part of an area designated for non-agricultural purposes. Both were classified as non-agricultural lands prior to June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of CARL.

x x x x

In the case under review, the subject parcels of lands were reclassified within an urban zone as per approved Official Comprehensive Zoning Map of the City of Davao. The reclassification was embodied in City Ordinance No. 363, Series of 1982. As such, the subject parcels of land are considered "non-agricultural" and may be utilized for residential, commercial, and industrial purposes. The reclassification was later approved by the HLURB.²⁵ (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The DAR Secretary²⁶ denied the application for exemption of Roxas & Co., however, in this wise:

Initially, CLUPPI-2 based [its] evaluation on the lot nos. as appearing in CLOA No. 6654. However, for purposes of clarity and to ensure that the area applied for exemption is indeed part of TCT No. T-60034, CLUPPI-2 sought to clarify with [Roxas & Co.] the origin of TCT No. T-60034. In a letter dated May 28, 1998, [Roxas & Co.] explains that portions of TCT No. T-985, the mother title, …was subdivided into 125 lots pursuant to PD 27. A total of 947.8417 was retained by the landowners and was subsequently registered under TCT No. 49946. [[Roxas & Co.] further explains that TCT No. 49946 was further subdivided into several lots (Lot 125-A to Lot 125-P) with Lot No. 125-N registered under TCT No. 60034. [A] review of the titles, however, shows that the origin of T-49946 is T-783 and not T-985. On the other hand, the origin of T-60034 is listed as 59946, and not T-49946. The discrepancies were attributed by [Roxas & Co.] to typographical errors which were "acknowledged and initialled" [sic] by the ROD. Per verification…, the discrepancies . . . cannot be ascertained.²⁷ (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In denying Roxas & Co.’s motion for reconsideration, the DAR Secretary held:

The landholdings covered by the aforesaid titles do not correspond to the Certification dated February 11, 1998 of the [HLURB] , the Certification dated September 12, 1996 issued by the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, and the Certifications dated July 31, 1997 and May 27, 1997 issued by the National Irrigation Authority. The certifications were issued for Lot Nos. 21, 24, 28, 31, 32 and 34. Thus, it was not even possible to issue exemption clearance over the lots covered by TCT Nos. 60019 to 60023.

Furthermore, we also note the discrepancies between the certifications issued by the HLURB and the Municipal Planning Development Coordinator as to the area of the specific lots.²⁸ (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In affirming the DAR Secretary’s denial of Roxas & Co.’s application for exemption, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 63146 subject of G.R. No. 179650, observed:

In the instant case, a perusal of the documents before us shows that there is no indication that the said TCTs refer to the same properties applied for exemption by [Roxas & Co.] It is true that the certifications …refer, among others, to DAR Lot Nos. 21, 24, 28, 31, 32 and 34…But these certifications contain nothing to show that these lots are the same as Lots 125-A, 125-B, 125-C, 125-D and 125-E covered by TCT Nos. 60019, 60020, 60021, 60022 and 60023, respetively. While [Roxas & Co.] claims that DAR Lot Nos. 21, 24 and 31 correspond to the aforementioned TCTs submitted to the DAR no evidence was presented to substantiate such allegation.

Moreover, [Roxas & Co.] failed to submit TCT 634 which it claims covers DAR Lot Nos. 28, 32 and 24.(TSN, April 24, 2001, pp. 43-44)

x x x x

[Roxas & Co.] also claims that subject properties are located at Barangay Cogunan and Lumbangan and that these properties are part of the zone classified as Industrial under Municipal Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982 of the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. ….a scrutiny of the said Ordinance shows that only Barangays Talangan and Lumbangan of the said municipality were classified as Industrial Zones…Barangay Cogunan was not included. x x x x. In fact, the TCTs submitted by [Roxas & Co.] show that the properties covered by said titles are all located at Barrio Lumbangan.²⁹ (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Its foregoing findings notwithstanding, the appellate court still allowed Roxas & Co. to adduce additional evidence to support its application for exemption under Nasugbu MZO No. 4.

Meanwhile, Roxas & Co. appealed the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 63146 affirming the DAR Secretary’s denial of its application for CARP exemption in Hacienda Palico (now the subject of G.R. No. 149548).

When Roxas & Co. sought the re-opening of the proceedings in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 (subject of G.R. No. 179650), and offered additional evidence in support of its application for CARP exemption, the DAR Secretary, this time, granted its application for the six lots including Lot No. 36 since the additional documents offered by Roxas & Co. mentioned the said lot.

In granting the application, the DAR Secretary³⁰ examined anew the evidence submitted by Roxas & Co. which consisted mainly of certifications from various local and national government agencies.³¹ Petitioner in G.R. Nos. 167505, 167540, 169163 and 179650, Damayan Ng Mga Manggagawang Bukid Sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of Sugar Workers (DAMBA-NFSW), the organization of the farmer-beneficiaries, moved to have the grant of the application reconsidered but the same was denied by the DAR by Order of December 12, 2003, hence, it filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82225, on grounds of forum-shopping and grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court, by Decision of October 31, 2006, ruled that DAMBA-NFSW availed of the wrong mode of appeal. At all events, it dismissed its petition as it upheld the DAR Secretary’s ruling that Roxas & Co. did not commit forum-shopping, hence, the petition of DAMBA-NGSW in G.R. No. 179650.

While ordinarily findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded great weight and even finality by the Court if supported by substantial evidence in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their consideration,³² this legal precept cannot be made to apply in G.R. No. 179650.

Even as the existence and validity of Nasugbu MZO No. 4 had already been established, there remains in dispute the issue of whether the parcels of land involved in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 subject of G.R. No. 179650 are actually within the said zoning ordinance.

The Court finds that the DAR Secretary indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when he ignored the glaring inconsistencies in the certifications submitted early on by Roxas & Co. in support of its application vis-à-vis the certifications it later submitted when the DAR Secretary reopened DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97.

Notably, then DAR Secretary Horacio Morales, on one hand, observed that the "landholdings covered by the aforesaid titles do not correspond to the Certification dated February 11, 1998 of the [HLURB], the Certification dated September 12, 1996 issued by the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, and the Certifications dated July 31, 1997 and May 27, 1997 issued by the National Irrigation Authority." On the other hand, then Secretary Hernani Braganza relied on a different set of certifications which were issued later or on September 19, 1996.

In this regard, the Court finds in order the observation of DAMBA-NFSW that Roxas & Co. should have submitted the comprehensive land use plan and pointed therein the exact locations of the properties to prove that indeed they are within the area of coverage of Nasugbu MZO No. 4.

The petitions in G.R. Nos. 179650 & 149548 must be distinguished from Junio v. Garilao³³ wherein the certifications submitted in support of the application for exemption of the therein subject lot were mainly considered on the presumption of regularity in their issuance, there being no doubt on the location and identity of the subject lot.³⁴ In G.R. No. 179650, there exist uncertainties on the location and identities of the properties being applied for exemption.

G.R. No. 179650 & G.R. No. 149548 must accordingly be denied for lack of merit.

III. ROXAS & CO.’S APPLICATION FOR CARP EXEMPTION IN DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 FOR THE NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN HACIENDA PALICO SUBJECT OF G.R. NO. 167505 SHOULD BE GRANTED.

The Court, however, takes a different stance with respect to Roxas & Co.’s application for CARP exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 over nine parcels of land identified as Lot Nos. 20, 13, 37, 19-B, 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2 which are portions of TCT No. 985 covering 45.9771 hectares in Hacienda Palico, subject of G.R. No. 167505.

In its application, Roxas & Co. submitted the following documents:

1. Letter-application dated 29 September 1997 signed by Elino SJ. Napigkit, for and on behalf of Roxas & Company, Inc., seeking exemption from CARP coverage of subject landholdings;

2. Secretary’s Certificate dated September 2002 executed by Mariano M. Ampil III, Corporate Secretary of Roxas & Company, Inc., indicating a Board Resolution authorizing him to represent the corporation in its application for exemption with the DAR. The same Board Resolution revoked the authorization previously granted to the Sierra Management & Resources Corporation;

3. Photocopy of TCT No. 985 and its corresponding Tax Declaration No. 0401;

4. Location and vicinity maps of subject landholdings;

5. Certification dated 10 July 1997 issued by Reynaldo Garcia, Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC) and Zoning Administrator of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that the subject parcels of land are within the Urban Core Zone as specified in Zone A. VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), under Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983, dated 4 May 1983;

6. Two (2) Certifications both dated 31 August 1998, issued by Alfredo Tan II, Director, HLURB, Region IV, stating that the subject parcels of land appear to be within the Residential cluster Area as specified in Zone VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983, dated 4 May 1983;³⁵

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By Order of November 6, 2002, the DAR Secretary granted the application for exemption but issued the following conditions:

1. The farmer-occupants within subject parcels of land shall be maintained in their peaceful possession and cultivation of their respective areas of tillage until a final determination has been made on the amount of disturbance compensation due and entitlement of such farmer-occupants thereto by the PARAD of Batangas;

2. No development shall be undertaken within the subject parcels of land until the appropriate disturbance compensation has been paid to the farmer-occupants who are determined by the PARAD to be entitled thereto. Proof of payment of disturbance compensation shall be submitted to this Office within ten (10) days from such payment; and

3. The cancellation of the CLOA issued to the farmer-beneficiaries shall be subject of a separate proceeding before the PARAD of Batangas.³⁶

DAMBA-NSFW moved for reconsideration but the DAR Secretary denied the same and explained further why CLOA holders need not be informed of the pending application for exemption in this wise:

As regards the first ground raised by [DAMBA-NSFW], it should be remembered that an application for CARP-exemption pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, as implemented by DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, is non-adversarial or non-litigious in nature. Hence, applicant is correct in saying that nowhere in the rules is it required that occupants of a landholding should be notified of an initiated or pending exemption application.

x x x x

With regard [to] the allegation that oppositors-movants are already CLOA holders of subject propert[ies] and deserve to be notified, as owners, of the initiated questioned exemption application, is of no moment. The Supreme Court in the case of Roxas [&] Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 106, held:

"We stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA’s already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. x x x x. Anyhow, the farmer[-]beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land."

Since subject landholding has been validly determined to be CARP-exempt, therefore, the previous issuance of the CLOA of oppositors-movants is erroneous. Hence, similar to the situation of the above-quoted Supreme Court Decision, oppositors-movants only hold the property in trust for the rightful owners of the land and are not the owners of subject landholding who should be notified of the exemption application of applicant Roxas & Company, Incorporated.

Finally, this Office finds no substantial basis to reverse the assailed Orders since there is substantial compliance by the applicant with the requirements for the issuance of exemption clearance under DAR AO 6 (1994).³⁷

On DAMBA-NSFW’s petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals, noting that the petition was belatedly filed, sustained, by Decision of December 20, 1994 and Resolution of May 7, 2007,³⁸ the DAR Secretary’s finding that Roxas & Co. had substantially complied with the prerequisites of DAR AO 6, Series of 1994. Hence, DAMBA-NFSW’s petition in G.R. No. 167505.

The Court finds no reversible error in the Court of Appeals’ assailed issuances, the orders of the DAR Secretary which it sustained being amply supported by evidence.

IV. THE CLOAs ISSUED BY THE DAR in ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. A-9999-008-98 SUBJECT OF G.R. No. 179650 TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES INVOLVING THE NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN HACIENDA PALICO MUST BE CANCELLED.

Turning now to the validity of the issuance of CLOAs in Hacienda Palico vis-à-vis the present dispositions: It bears recalling that in DAR Administrative Case Nos. A-9999-008-98 and A-9999-142-97 (G.R. No. 179650), the Court ruled for Roxas & Co.’s grant of exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 but denied the grant of exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 for reasons already discussed. It follows that the CLOAs issued to the farmer-beneficiaries in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 must be cancelled.

But first, the Court digresses. The assertion of DAMBA-NSFW that the petitions for partial and complete cancellations of the CLOAs subject of DARAB Case Nos. R-401-003-2001 to R-401-005-2001 and No. 401-239-2001 violated the earlier order in Roxas v. Court of Appeals does not lie. Nowhere did the Court therein pronounce that the CLOAs issued "cannot and should not be cancelled," what was involved therein being the legality of the acquisition proceedings. The Court merely reiterated that it is the DAR which has primary jurisdiction to rule on the validity of CLOAs. Thus it held:

. . . [t]he failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the [CLOAs] already issued to the farmer-beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. x x x x. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land.³⁹

On the procedural question raised by Roxas & Co. on the appellate court’s relaxation of the rules by giving due course to DAMBA-NFSW’s appeal in CA G.R. SP No. 72198, the subject of G.R. No. 167845:

Indeed, the perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the assailed decision final and executory.⁴⁰ A relaxation of the rules may, however, for meritorious reasons, be allowed in the interest of justice.⁴¹ The Court finds that in giving due course to DAMBA-NSFW’s appeal, the appellate court committed no reversible error. Consider its ratiocination:

x x x x. To deny [DAMBA-NSFW]’s appeal with the PARAD will not only affect their right over the parcel of land subject of this petition with an area of 103.1436 hectares, but also that of the whole area covered by CLOA No. 6654 since the PARAD rendered a Joint Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the [DAMBA-NSFW] with regard to [Roxas & Co.]’s application for partial and total cancellation of the CLOA in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to R-401-005-2001 and No. 401-239-2001. There is a pressing need for an extensive discussion of the issues as raised by both parties as the matter of canceling CLOA No. 6654 is of utmost importance, involving as it does the probable displacement of hundreds of farmer-beneficiaries and their families. x x x x (underscoring supplied)

Unlike courts of justice, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body, is not bound to strictly observe rules of procedure and evidence. To strictly enforce rules on appeals in this case would render to naught the Court’s dispositions on the other issues in these consolidated petitions.

In the main, there is no logical recourse except to cancel the CLOAs issued for the nine parcels of land identified as Lot Nos. 20, 13, 37, 19-B, 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2 which are portions of TCT No. 985 covering 45.9771 hectares in Hacienda Palico (or those covered by DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98). As for the rest of the CLOAs, they should be respected since Roxas & Co., as shown in the discussion in G.R. Nos. 167540, 167543 and 167505, failed to prove that the other lots in Hacienda Palico and the other two haciendas, aside from the above-mentioned nine lots, are CARP-exempt.

Conformably, Republic Act No. 3844 (R.A. No. 3844), as amended,⁴² mandates that disturbance compensation be given to tenants of parcels of land upon finding that "(t)he landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes."⁴³ In addition, DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994 directs the payment of disturbance compensation before the application for exemption may be completely granted.

Roxas & Co. is thus mandated to first satisfy the disturbance compensation of affected farmer-beneficiaries in the areas covered by the nine parcels of lands in DAR AO No. A-9999-008-98 before the CLOAs covering them can be cancelled. And it is enjoined to strictly follow the instructions of R.A. No. 3844.

Finally then, and in view of the Court’s dispositions in G.R. Nos. 179650 and 167505, the May 27, 2001 Decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)⁴⁴ in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 ordering the total cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, subject of G.R. No. 169163, is SET ASIDE except with respect to the CLOAs issued for Lot Nos. 20, 13, 37, 19-B, 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2 which are portions of TCT No. 985 covering 45.9771 hectares in Hacienda Palico (or those covered by DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98). It goes without saying that the motion for reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW is granted to thus vacate the Court’s October 19, 2005 Resolution dismissing DAMBA-NFSW’s petition for review of the appellate court’s Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 75952;⁴⁵

WHEREFORE,

1) In G.R. No. 167540, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the November 24, 2003 Decision⁴⁶ and March 18, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131 which declared that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 reclassified the lands in the municipalities of Nasugbu in Batangas and Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite to non-agricultural use;

2) The Court accordingly GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration of the Department of Agrarian Reform in G.R. No. 167543 and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE its Resolution of June 20, 2005;

3) In G.R. No. 149548, the Court DENIES the petition for review of Roxas & Co. for lack of merit;

4) In G.R. No. 179650, the Court GRANTS the petition for review of DAMBA-NSFW and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the October 31, 2006 Decision and August 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82225;

5) In G.R. No. 167505, the Court DENIES the petition for review of DAMBA-NSFW and AFFIRMS the December 20, 2004 Decision and March 7, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82226;

6) In G.R. No. 167845, the Court DENIES Roxas & Co.’s petition for review for lack of merit and AFFIRMS the September 10, 2004 Decision and April 14, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals;

7) In G.R. No. 169163, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decisions of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 ordering the cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 and DARAB Cases Nos. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 granting the partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654. The CLOAs issued for Lots No. 21 No. 24, No. 26, No. 31, No. 32 and No. 34 or those covered by DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97) remain; and

8) Roxas & Co. is ORDERED to pay the disturbance compensation of affected farmer-beneficiaries in the areas covered by the nine parcels of lands in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 before the CLOAs therein can be cancelled, and is ENJOINED to strictly follow the mandate of R.A. No. 3844.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice	RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice	ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice	TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice	LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice	MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice	MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Now the Department of Land Reform.

¹ G.R. No. 127876, 378 Phil. 727 (1999).

² Id. at 744-745.

³ GUIDELINES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF EXEMPTION CLEARANCES BASED ON SECTION 3(c) OF RA 6657 AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ) OPINION NO. 44, SERIES OF 1990.

⁴ Rollo (G.R. No. 167540), pp. 1280-1281.

⁵ Resolutions of February 22, 2006; October 22, 2006; and February 4, 2009.

⁶ Vide Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No. 157447, 457 SCRA 744 (2005).

⁷ G.R. No. 147479, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 74.

⁸ Id. at 92.

⁹ Supra note 2.

¹⁰ Id. at 783.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² CLARIFICATORY GUIDELINES ON THE EFFECT OF DECLARATIONS OF GENERAL AREAS IN THE COUNTRY AS "TOURIST ZONES" TO THE COVERAGE OF LANDS DEVOTED TO OR SUITABLE FOR AGRICULTURE WITHIN SAID AREAS UNDER THE [CARP]. Issued on March 29, 2004 by then Acting Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce.

¹³ Proclamation Nos. 1653, 1801, 2052 and 2067.

¹⁴ Republic Act No. 7916.

¹⁵ SECTION 5. Establishment of ECOZONES. - To ensure the viability and geographic dispersal of ECOZONES through a system of prioritization, the following areas are initially identified as ECOZONES, subject to the criteria specified in Section 6:

a) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Morong, Hermosa, Dinalupihan, Orani, Samal, and Abucay in the Province of Bataan;

b) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the municipalities of Ibaan, Rosario, Taysan, San Jose, San Juan, and cities of Lipa and Batangas;

c) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the City of Cagayan de Oro in the Province of Misamis Oriental;

d) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the City of Iligan in the Province of Lanao del Norte;

e) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the Province of Saranggani;

f)So much as may be necessary of that portion of the City of Laoag in the Province of Ilocos Norte;

g) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Davao City and Samal Island in the Province of Ilocos Norte;

h) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Oroquieta City in the Province of Misamis Occidental;

i) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Tubalan Cove, Malita in the Province of Davao del Sur;

j) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Baler, Dinalungan and Casiguran including its territorial waters and islets and its immediate environs in the Province of Aurora;

k) So much as may be necessary of that portion of cities of Naga and Iriga in the Province of Camarines Sur, Legaspi and Tabaco in the Province of Albay, and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon;

l) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Bataan Island in the province of Batanes;

m) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Lapu-lapu in the Island of Mactan, and the municipalities of Balamban and Pinamungahan and the cities of Cebu and Toledo and the Province of Cebu, including its territorial waters and islets and its immediate environs;

n) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Tacloban City;

o) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the Municipality of Barugo in the Province of Leyte;

p) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the Municipality of Buenavista in the Province of Guimaras;

q) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the municipalities of San Jose de Buenavista, Hamtic, Sibalom, and Culasi in the Province of Antique;

r) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the municipalities of Catarman, Bobon and San Jose in the Province of Northern Samar, the Island of Samar;

s) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the Municipality of Ternate and its immediate environs in the Province of Cavite;

t) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Polloc, Parang in the Province of Maguindanao;

u) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the Municipality of Boac in the Province of Marinduque;

v) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the Municipality of Pitogo in the Province of Zamboanga del Sur;

w) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Dipolog City-Manukan Corridor in the Province of Zamboanga del Norte;

x) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Mambajao, Camiguin Province;

y) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Infanta, Real, Polillo, Alabat, Atimonan, Mauban, Tiaong, Pagbilao, Mulanay, Tagkawayan, and Dingalan Bay in the Province of Quezon;

z) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Butuan City and the Province of Agusan del Norte, including its territorial waters and islets and its immediate environs;

aa) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Roxas City including its territorial waters and islets and its immediate environs in the Province of Capiz;

bb) So much as may be necessary of that portion of San Jacinto, San Fabian, Mangaldan, Lingayen, Sual, Dagupan, Alaminos, Manaoag, Binmaley in the Province of Pangasinan;

cc) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the autonomous region;

dd) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Masinloc, Candelaria and Sta. Cruz in the Province of Zambales;

ee) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the Palawan Island;

ff) So much as may be necessary of that portion of General Santos City in South Cotabato and its immediate environs;

gg) So much as may be necessary of that portion of Dumaguete City and Negros Oriental, including its territorial waters and islets and its immediate environs.

hh) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the Province of Ilocos Sur;

ii) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the Province of La Union;

jj) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the Province of Laguna, including its territorial waters and its immediate environs;

kk) So much as may be necessary of that portion of the Province of Rizal;

¹⁶ Land Conversion. - Agricultural lands may be converted for residential, commercial, industrial and other non-agricultural purposes, subject to the conditions set forth under Republic Act. No.. 6657 and other existing laws.

¹⁷ Tenant Emancipation Decree of 1972.

¹⁸ On September 26, 1972.

¹⁹ On August 3, 2007.

²⁰ Section 2(k) of DAR Administrative Order No. 01-99, Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses.

²¹ Republic Act No. 9593.

²² SEC. 61. Development Planning. – x x x x.

x x x x.

No [Tourism Enterprise Zone] shall be designated without a development plan duly approved by the [Tourism Infrastructure and Enterprise Zone Authority] and without the approval, by resolution, of the [local government unit] concerned. Any deviation or modification from the development plan shall require the prior authorization of the TIEZA. The TIEZA may cause the suspension of granted incentives and withdrawal of recognition as a TEZ Operator. It may likewise impose reasonable fines and penalties upon TEZ Operators and responsible persons for any failure to properly implement the approved development plan.

Lands identified as part of a TEZ shall qualify for exemption from the coverage of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, and Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, subject to rules and regulations to be crafted by the TIEZA, the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council and the Department of Agrarian Reform.

²³ Vide: Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association v. CA, G.R. No. 142359, May 25, 2004; and Junio v. Garilao, G.R. No. 147146, July 29, 2005.

²⁴ G.R. No. 168394, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 540.

²⁵ Id. at 553-554.

²⁶ Then Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr.

²⁷ CA rollo (CA G.R. No. 63146 as part of G.R. No. 149548), pp. 9-11.

²⁸ Id. (CA G.R. No. 63146 as part of G.R. No. 149548) at 12-17.

²⁹ Id. (CA G.R. No. 63146 as part of G.R. No. 149548) at 345-347.

³⁰ Then Secretary Hernani Braganza.

³¹ The DAR Secretary ruled that:

In the case at hand Records show that subject properties were originally registered under TCT No. T-985. This is shown in the Certification dated 17 June 1998 issued by Alexander Bonuan, Deputy Register of Deeds II, Registry of Deeds, Nasugbu, Batangas. x x x x.

CERTIFICATION

x x x x.

This is to certify that Lot No. 125 of Psd-04016141 (OLT) under TCT No. 49946 is a transfer from TCT-985. Further, it is certified that Lot 125-N Psd-04-046912 under TCT No. 60034 is a transfer from TCT No. T-49946.

x x x x.

In a letter dated 18 July 2000 addressed to Director Ricardo R. San Andres, Head, Center for Land Use, Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI)-2 Secretariat, Deputy Register of Deeds Bonuan clarified that "TCT No. 49946" should read "TCT No. 59946." Attached to said letter is a certified true copy of TCT No. T-59946. A scrutiny of TCT No. T-59946 shows that it covers a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 125 of the subdivision plan Psd-04-016144 with an area of 947.8417 hectares situated in Barangays Bilaran, Lumbangan, Cogonan, and Reparo, Nasugbu, Batangas.

x x x x.

A scrutiny of TCT Nos. T-60019, T-60020, T-60021, T-60022, T-60023 and T-60034 shows that they are transfers from TCT No. T-59946. Furthermore, a Certification dated 6 September 2001 issued by Dante Ramirez, Deputy Register of Deeds, Nasugbu, Batangas, states that the mother title of TCT Nos. T-60019, T-60020, T-60021, T-60022, T-60023 and T-60034 is TCT No. T-985. registered in the name of Roxas Y Cia.

x x x x.

In the case at hand, the Certification dated 19 September 1996 issued by Reynaldo H. Garcia, Zoning Administrator of Nasugbu, Batangas states, among others, that Lots Nos. 31, 24, 21, 32, 28 and 34 situated in Barangays Cogunan and Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, are within the Industrial Zone…. Moreover, a Certification also dated 19 September 1996 issued by Zoning Administrator Reynaldo H. Garcia states that DAR Lot No. 36 with an area of 0.6273 hectares situated in Brgy. Lumbanga, Nasugbu, Batangas, is within the industrial zone…Moreover, a Certification dated 7 January 1998 issued by Maria Luisa G. Pangan, under authority of the HLURB Secretariat, states that Resolution No. 28, Municipal Ordinance No. 4 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas, dated 18 April 1982, was approved by the HSRC, now HLURB, under Resolution No. R-123, Series of 1983, dated 4 May 1983. x x x x.

³² Viva Footwear Manufacturing Corp. v. SEC, G.R. No. 163235, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 609, 615 citing Quiambao v. CA, G.R. No. 128305, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 17, 40.

³³ G.R. No. 147146, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 173.

³⁴ Id. at 187.

³⁵ Rollo (G.R. No. 167505), pp. 529-532.

³⁶ Id. at 533-534.

³⁷ Id. at 525-526.

³⁸ Id. at 91-93.

³⁹ Supra note 1 at 783.

⁴⁰ Sublay v. NLRC, 324 SCRA 188 (2000).

⁴¹ Cuevas v. Bais Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 142689, October 17, 2002, 391 SCRA 192.

⁴² An Act to Ordain the Agricultural Land Reform Code and to Institute Land Reforms in the Philippines, including the Abolition of Tenancy and the Channeling of Capital into Industry, Provide for the Necessary Implementing Agencies, Appropriate Funds therefor and for Other Purposes. As amended by Republic Act No. 6389.

⁴³ Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844.

⁴⁴ PARAD Barbara P. Tan. In the Decision of May 27, 2001, the PARAD disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Finding and declaring the issuance of CLOA 6654 not in accordance with the mandate of Sec. 16, RA 6657 thereby effectively circumventing the implementation of the CARP;

2. Finding CLOA 6654 to be fictitious/null and void having been generated on the basis of a subdivision survey which was plotted on a survey plan which has already been previously cancelled, superseded and extinct, accordingly;

3. Ordering the cancellation of CLOA 6654, as prayed for by Petitioner, without prejudice, however, to the execution of the proper subdivision survey for purposes of delineating accurately the boundaries of the properties subject of acquisition proceedings for purposes of determining their coverage under the CARP or their negotiability for conversion and/or exclusion from the Program.

⁴⁵ Penned by Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with the concurrence of Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo.

⁴⁶ Penned by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with the concurrence of Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Regalado E. Maambong and the dissent of Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired member of the Court) and Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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DISSENTING AND CONCURRING OPINION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

There are seven consolidated Petitions before this Court, involving the question of whether all or certain parcels of land located in Nasugbu, Batangas, are subject to distribution to farmer-beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The seven Petitions are broken into three groups depending on their bases and/or subject matters.

I

ANTECEDENT FACTS

A. CARP Exemption of the Three Haciendas based on Presidential Proclamation No. 1520

G.R. No. 167540

On 28 November 1975, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, with the title "Declaring the municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite and the municipality of Nasugbu in Batangas province as a Tourist Zone, and for other purposes."

After the People Power Revolution which resulted in the ouster of former President Marcos on 24 February 1986, a Constitutional Convention drafted, and the people ratified in a plebiscite held on 2 February 1987, the new Constitution (1987 Constitution). The 1987 Constitution includes, under Article XIII, the following provisions explicitly mandating the State to undertake an agrarian reform program:

Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Sec. 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farm-workers, and landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers’ organizations to participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services.

In compliance with the afore-mentioned constitutional mandate, Congress passed, and then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), which became effective on 15 June 1988. The CARL provided the mechanism for the implementation of the CARP, in order to promote social justice and industrialization.

Roxas & Company, Inc. (Roxas & Co.) was the registered owner of the following vast parcels of land located in Nasugbu, Batangas:

Hacienda	Area (hectares)	Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Hacienda Caylaway	867.9571	TCT No. T-44662 TCT No. T-44663 TCT No. T-44664 TCT No. T-44665
Hacienda Banilad	1,050	TCT No. 924
Hacienda Palico	1,024	TCT No. 985

In a letter dated 6 May 1988, Roxas & Co. informed the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary of the former’s intention to sell to the Government Hacienda Caylaway under the voluntary offer to sell (VOS) component of the CARP. A year later, the Government also sought to acquire Haciendas Banilad and Palico under the compulsory acquisition component of the CARP, and issued to Roxas & Co. notices of acquisition for the two properties.

Notices of land valuation were subsequently issued by the DAR Regional Director fixing the compensation for Haciendas Banilad and Palico, but Roxas & Co. rejected the valuation and protested the compulsory acquisition proceedings for its two haciendas.

On 5 August 1992, Roxas & Co. withdrew its earlier VOS covering Hacienda Caylaway on the ground that the said property had been previously reclassified for non-agricultural purposes. Insisting that Hacienda Caylaway was not exempt from the coverage of CARP, the DAR Secretary sent Roxas & Co. a notice of valuation for the said property, which Roxas & Co. likewise opposed and protested.

Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR on 4 May 1993 an application for conversion of its three haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural uses.

Even during the pendency of the application for conversion of Roxas & Co., the DAR already canceled the TCTs of Roxas & Co. and started issuing Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) covering the three haciendas to farmer-beneficiaries, including members of Katipunan ng mga Magbubukid sa Hacienda Roxas, Inc. (KAMAHARI) and Damayan ng Manggagawang Bukid sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of Sugar Workers (DAMBA-NFSW). Among such CLOAs was CLOA No. 6654, issued on 15 October 1993, covering a portion of Hacienda Palico measuring 513.9863 hectares. This prompted Roxas & Co. to file on 24 August 1993 a Complaint with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA). Roxas & Co. argued in its Complaint that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist zone; that the land is not suitable for agricultural production; and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had already reclassified the land to non-agricultural uses. Roxas & Co. thus prayed for the cancellation of the CLOAs already issued for its three haciendas. DARAB, however, referred Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA) to the Office of the DAR Secretary since it involved the prejudicial question of whether the properties of Roxas & Co. were subject to CARP.

On 29 October 1993, Roxas & Co. filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, questioning the expropriation of its properties under the CARP and the denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings. Roxas & Co. prayed in its Petition that the appellate court (1) direct the DAR to desist from further acquisition proceedings involving the three haciendas; and (2) compel DAR to approve the application of Roxas & Co. for the conversion of the three haciendas to non-agricultural uses. The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32484.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 28 April 1994, dismissed the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 32484, for being premature since Roxas & Co. failed to exhaust prior administrative remedies. The appellate court also stated that the filing by Roxas & Co. of an application for conversion of its haciendas to non-agricultural seemed to be a clear manifestation that the said properties were not yet exempted or excluded from CARP. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 17 January 1997, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Roxas & Co.

Roxas & Co. filed an appeal with this Court, bearing the title Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 127876. In its Decision dated 17 December 1999, the Court granted in part the appeal of Roxas & Co. and nullified the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas because DAR did not accord Roxas & Co. due process. The DAR failed to give proper notices as regards the acquisition proceedings to Roxas & Co. and to identify specifically the portions of the three haciendas placed under CARP. Nevertheless, the Court refused to rule upon the issue of conversion of the three haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural, for the agency charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving applications for conversion was the DAR. Consequently, the case was remanded to DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of the application for conversion of Roxas & Co., in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the Decision and applicable administrative procedure.

On 16 May 2000, Roxas & Co. filed with DAR an application for exemption of the three haciendas from CARP coverage, docketed as DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-084-00. Roxas & Co. essentially contended that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, issued on 28 November 1975, had already declared the Municipalities of Ternate and Margondon in Cavite and Nasugbu in Batangas a tourism zone, and reclassified the entire three municipalities to non-agricultural use. Necessarily, the three haciendas located within Nasugbu were also reclassified to non-agricultural use, long before the effectivity of the CARL on 15 June 1988. As DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994,¹ provided, on the basis of Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, all lands that were already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need conversion clearance from DAR.

KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW opposed the application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co. KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW argued, among other things, that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 did not, by itself, reclassify the three haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural use, because said issuance merely directed the identification and segregation of specific geographic areas in the Municipalities of Ternate, Maragondon, and Nasugbu, to be developed for tourism purposes. The Department of Tourism (DOT) already identified specific areas in Nasugbu to be developed for tourism purposes and such areas did not include the three haciendas of Roxas & Co. Even the Municipality Government of Nasugbu and the barangays where the three haciendas are located opposed the application for exemption of Roxas & Co.

In an Order dated 22 October 2001, then DAR Secretary Hernani A. Braganza denied the application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co. According to the DAR Secretary, although Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 declared Nasugbu as part of a tourism zone, it did not automatically reclassify all the land in the said municipality from its original uses, whether agricultural or non-agricultural. The PTA should first define specifically the areas in Nasugbu that would fall within the tourism zone, but no such definition had been done yet by the PTA. The PTA even declared in its letter addressed to Santiago R. Elizalde, Director of Roxas & Co., that the PTA had no pending tourism development projects in the area. Likewise, the report of the Ocular Investigation Team (OCI) of the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI)² did not indicate that the three haciendas of Roxas & Co. were being used in any way for tourism purposes and, instead, presented the finding that the properties of Roxas & Co. were agricultural lands planted with sugar cane and other crops.

The DAR Secretary, in its 22 October 2001 Order, refused to adhere to the position of Roxas and Co. that by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, entire municipalities had been re-zoned for non-agricultural uses and, thus, became exempt from CARP coverage. This, the DAR Secretary reasoned, would result in absurdity as it would amount to a blanket and automatic CARP exemption without due regard to land use reclassification powers vested in other government agencies such as the PTA, DAR, local government units (LGUs), and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Surely, Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 could have intended such a result.

The DAR Secretary found, in his Order of 22 October 2001, that DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, did not apply to the case of Roxas & Co. since there was no express provision in Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 or in any other documents submitted by Roxas & Co. that the three haciendas in Nasugbu have been reclassified to nonagricultural use prior to the effectivity of the CARL. The DAR Secretary, therefore, decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein application for exemption from CARP coverage pursuant to Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994 involving parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-985, T-924, T-44655 (sic), T-44664, and T-44663 located at Brgys. Caylaway, Palico and Banilad, Nasugbu, Batangas, and with an aggregate area of 2,930.2948 hectares is hereby DENIED. The DAR field office personnel concerned are directed to immediately proceed with the coverage and distribution of subject lands to qualified farmer beneficiaries.³

Roxas & Co. expectedly filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order of the DAR Secretary.

The DAR Secretary denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Roxas & Co. in an Order dated 12 July 2002. The DAR Secretary reiterated the need for the PTA to identify the geographical areas within the zone with potential tourism value, which the PTA still had not done as of yet. The Certifications submitted by Roxas & Co. only recognized that the three haciendas are covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 and that Nasugbu is a priority area for tourism development; but these still did not provide the required delineation of tourism areas. The DAR Secretary also noted that Roxas & Co. did not submit a copy of the alleged Master Tourism Plan for Nasugbu, which purportedly included the three haciendas. And, even assuming the existence of such a Plan, it must still be approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu. As the HLURB asserted, DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, requires that the three haciendas should have been included in a land use or zoning ordinance. Absent compliance with said requirement, the application for CARP exemption should be denied.

On 12 August 2002, Roxas & Co. filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining Order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72131. Roxas & Co. anchored its Petition on the following grounds:

I

THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM ERRED IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS ARE NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS, THE SAME HAVING BEEN CLASSIFIED BY PROCLAMATION NO. 1520 AS PART OF A TOURIST ZONE.

II

THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM ERRED IN NOT EXEMPTING THE SUBJECT LANDS FROM THE COVERAGE OF THE CARL.

The Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, by a vote of three to two, resolved CA-G.R. SP No. 72131 in favor of Roxas & Co.

In the Decision⁴ dated 24 November 2003, the majority determined that the only issue for resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131 was "whether Proc. 1520 (which declared three municipalities of Maragondon, Ternate and Nasugbu as "tourist zone") issued in 1975 converted the entire three municipalities to non-agricultural areas, thereby exempting [Roxas & Co.]’s lands located in Nasugbu from CARP." Answering the said issue in the affirmative, the majority rationalized that:

x x x [t]he Proclamation is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity and leaves no room for construction or interpretation as what [DAR] has done. What is clear is that Nasugbu, Batangas where [Roxas & Co.]’s property is located was declared as Tourist Zone under the administration and control of the Philippine Toursim Authority. When the law speaks with clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application (Republic v. CA, 299 SCRA 199).

x x x x

Presidential Proclamation 1520 clearly established the following, in reference to the case at bench.

(a) It declared the area comprising Nasugbu in Batangas as a Tourist Zone. (underscoring for emphasis)

(b) It placed the said area under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority; therefore not subject to CARP.

(c) Since the entire Nasugbu area cannot at one time be immediately developed for tourism, as intended, there is a need to establish priorities based on potential tourism value within the Tourist Zone wherein optimum use of natural assets and attractions, as well as existing facilities where both the government and private sector can concentrate their efforts and limited resources in order to generate foreign exchange as well as other tourist receipts at the earliest possible time.

(d) The only area exempted from designation as Tourist Zone is any duly established military reservation existing within the zone.

It is therefore beyond any cavil of doubt that as early as 1985, when Proclamation No. 1520 was issued, Nasugbu, Batangas, where [Roxas & Co.]’s properties are located, has been declared as Tourist Zone and placed under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Under such circumstances, it necessarily follows it is exempt from the coverage of CARL and therefore the Secretary of DAR has no authority over the same.⁵

The majority applied Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)⁶ and National Housing Authority (NHA) v. Hon. Allarde⁷ as judicial precedents to CA-G.R. SP No. 72131, addressing the contrary view of the DAR in the following manner:

What is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander. To do otherwise would definitely result in violating the constitutionally guaranteed equal protection right. In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. DAR, 225 SCRA 278, the Supreme Court in an En banc decision upheld the force and effect of the exemption of the lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 from the CARL. The said Proclamation declared 20,312 hectares of land located in the municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite. In the subsequent case of NHA vs. Allarde, 318 SCRA 22, which involved Presidential Proclamation No. 843 declaring Tala Estate as reserved for the housing program of the National Housing Authority, the Supreme Court reiterated the earlier pronouncement in Natalia vs. DAR, supra, the land reserved for or converted prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the CARL, are not considered and treated as agricultural lands and therefore, outside the ambit of said law.

[DAR], however, argues that in both cases, the covered land areas have technical descriptions while that in Proc. 1520 does not and therefore the ruling in said cases cannot be made applicable to the latter. Again, [DAR] conveniently forgot or did not mention that in both the Natalia and NHA cases, there was necessity to delineate the Tourist Zone. In Natalia, the area straddles several municipalities and only portions of said municipality was (sic) included. In the NHA case, it encompasses several parcels of land covered by different titles and involved only certain portions covered by the various titles.

In the case of Proc. 1520, there was no necessity to survey or make a technical description because it included or declared on (1) whole municipality as Tourist Zone exempting only a military reservation, if there is one earlier made (underscoring for emphasis). If both Proclamation 1637 and 843 are given the force and effect of a law by declaring them beyond the CARL coverage, there is no reason why Proc. No. 1520 should be treated otherwise. Such is the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Constitution.⁸

In the end, the majority disposed of CA-G.R. SP No. 72131 as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition having merit, the Orders issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform dated October 22, 2001 and July 12, 2002 are hereby SET ASIDE FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS AND DECLARING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY TCT Nos. T-44665, T-44664 and T-44663, all in the name of [Roxas & Co.] and all situated in Nasugbu, Batangas, particularly those situated in Barangays Caylaway, Palico and Banilad, as exempt from the coverage of CARP pursuant to the declaration of Proclamation No. 1520 as Tourist Zone. No Costs.⁹

Court of Appeals Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, in his Separate Opinion (Dissenting), believed that Roxas & Co. committed forum shopping by filing its application for exemption while its previous application for conversion and complaint for cancellation of CLOAs were still pending with the DAR. Ordinarily, violation of the rule against forum-shopping shall be a cause for summary dismissal of the petition, complaint, application or any other initiatory pleading. However, in light of the substantial issues and subject matter involved in the case, Justice Reyes instead voted for the remand of the same to DAR for joint determination with the pending related cases on conversion and cancellation of CLOAs.

Court of Appeals Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos also dissented from the majority. While it is true that the three haciendas of Roxas & Co. are within the tourist zone, Justice Aliño-Hormachuelos observed in her Dissenting Opinion that there was no evidence that the said properties have been specified or segregated for having potential tourism value as required by law. She thus voted to deny the Petition of Roxas & Co. and affirm the Orders dated 22 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the DAR Secretary in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-084-00.

In the Resolution¹⁰ dated 18 March 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by KAMAHARI, DAMBA-NFSW, and DAR.

Aggrieved, KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW jointly filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking (1) the nullification, reversal, and setting aside of the Decision dated 24 November 2003 and Resolution dated 18 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131; (2) a declaration that the three haciendas of Roxas & Co. are within the coverage of the CARL; (3) and a ruling affirming the Orders dated 22 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the DAR Secretary which denied, for lack of merit, the application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co. in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-084-00. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 167540, and raffled to the Second Division of the Court.

The Second Division of the Court directed Roxas & Co. and DAR to file their respective Comments on the Petition of KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW.

G.R. No. 167543

In the meantime, DAR filed with this Court a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, similarly praying for the setting aside of the Decision dated 24 November 2003 and Resolution dated 18 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131; and the reinstatement of the Orders dated 22 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the DAR Secretary in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-084-00. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 167543, and raffled to the Third Division of the Court.

On 27 June 2005, the Second Division of the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 167543, assigned to the Third Division, with G.R. No. 167540, pending with the Second Division, the latter being the lower-numbered case.

Apparently still unaware of the afore-mentioned Resolution dated 27 June 2005 of the Second Division, the Third Division issued a Minute Resolution on 20 July 2005 already denying the Petition in G.R. No. 167543 for the failure of DAR to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate court. DAR accordingly filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of its Petition.

G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543 were finally consolidated and given due course. During the pendency of these cases, the Sangguniang Bayan and the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) of Nasugbu filed their separate Petitions for Intervention before this Court.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu averred in its Petition for Intervention that its Chairman and Members, as the legislators of Nasugbu, stand to benefit or suffer from the results of the pending cases. The Local Government Code devolved upon them the important function of determining, on behalf of their constituents, the appropriate use of the lands of Nasugbu, as would be embodied in a Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP). Per the record of the Sangguniang Bayan, the three haciendas of Roxas & Co. in Nasugbu have not been reclassified to tourism use, consequently, cannot be exempted from CARP coverage. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu further asserted that it could not perform its function of determining appropriate land use in Nasugbu, and it would remain inutile insofar as said function was concerned, unless the Court reverses the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131 that the entire lands of Nasugbu had been automatically reclassified by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520.

In its Petition for Intervention, the ABC of Nasugbu claimed that majority of its members are CARP beneficiaries themselves, who are entitled in their own right to intervene in G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543; and those who are not CARP beneficiaries are still residents of Nasugbu whose rights may likewise be affected by the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131. In addition, the barangay captains of Nasugbu are the local chief executives tasked to help the DAR implement the CARL at the grassroots level, as well as represent their barangay constituents in voting on land use issues in Nasugbu. As such, they stand to gain or suffer from the outcome of the two cases before this Court. The ABC of Nasugbu argued that with the automatic reclassification of the lands in the entire Nasugbu to tourism use by Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, as the appellate court erroneously and unjustly held, there was practically nothing more that could be done as regards the land use plan for the municipality. Necessarily, there could be no way for the barangay chairmen to still help DAR as mandated by the Local Government Code since it would already be legally impossible to implement the CARP in Nasugbu given the exemption of all lands in said municipality from the program.

Roxas & Co. opposed the two Petitions for Intervention, contending that the parties intending to intervene had no legal interest in G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543. The judgment on appeal before the Court does not deal with land use plans and zoning ordinances issued and implemented by LGUs pursuant to the Local Government Code; instead, it involves laws that are enforced by the DOT, through the PTA (for Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, implementing Presidential Decree No. 564¹¹) and the DAR (CARL). The intervention of the Sangguniang Bayan and ABC of Nasugbu was already prohibited at this stage, and would only prejudicially and unduly delay the proceedings. They are not indispensable parties and their interest should be the subject of separate proceedings.

After further exchange of pleadings among the parties in G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543, they were finally directed by this Court to submit their respective Memoranda.

B. CARP Exemption of Certain Lots in Hacienda Palico, based on Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982

G.R. No. 149548

On 15 October 1993, the DAR issued CLOA No. 6654 in the collective names of 202 farmer-beneficiaries,¹² 137 of whom are members of DAMBA-NFSW. CLOA No. 6654 covered an area of 513.9863 hectares of Hacienda Palico, which was placed by the DAR under CARP through compulsory acquisition.

Roxas & Co., through a letter dated 29 May 1997, applied for exemption from CARP coverage of Lots No. 21, No. 24, No. 28, No. 31, No. 32 and No. 34, comprising 51.5472 hectares, situated in Brgys. Cogunan and Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, which were included in CLOA No. 6654. Roxas & Co. averred that the six lots were already reclassified as non-agricultural by the Nasugbu Municipal Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, as approved by the Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC), now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, under Resolution No. 123 dated 4 May 1983; hence, placing said lots outside the coverage of CARL. This application for exemption of Roxas & Co. was docketed as DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97. It proceeded without notice being given to DAMBA-NFSW and other occupants of the lots.

The DAR Secretary took into consideration the following pieces of evidence submitted by Roxas & Co. in support of the latter’s application for exemption:

1. Certification dated February 11, 1998 issued by the HLRB (sic) stating that Lot Nos. 21, 32, 28, and 34, and portions of Lot Nos. 31 and 24 are within the industrial zone based on the approved Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality per HSRC Resolution No. R-123 dated May 4, 1983;

2. Certification dated September 12, 1996 issued by the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Nasugbu, Batangas stating that the subject parcels of land are within the industrial zone based on Municipal Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982 and approved per HSRC Resolution No. R-123, Series of 1983 dated May 4, 1983;

3. Certification dated July 31, 1997 issued by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) stating that DAR Lot Nos. 32 and 34 are partially irrigated;

4. Certification dated May 27, 1997 issued by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) stating that Lot Nos. 31, 24, 21 and 28 are not within the service area of any existing National Irrigation System and Communal Irrigation System of NIA and not within the area programmed for irrigation with firm funding commitment; and

5. Certification dated September 11, 1997 issued by the [Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)] of Nasugbu, Batangas stating that DAR Lot No. 31, and portions of DAR Lot Nos. 24 and 21 are residential areas, Lot Nos. 32, 28, and 34 and remaining portions of DAR Lot No. 21 are vacant, and 1/3 of the remaining portion of DAR Lot No. 24 has occupants. The same certification states that the subject parcels of land are covered by a CLOA.

Per Ocular Inspection conducted by the CLUPPI-2 OCI team, the prevailing land use of DAR Lot No. 31 and portions of DAR Lot Nos. 21 and 24 is (sic) residential. The rest of the lots are vacant and covered mostly by grass and shrubs. Most of the occupants of DAR Lot Nos. 31, 21, and 24 are workers of the Don Pedro Azucarera located south of the property. Irrigation canals were noted in DAR Lot Nos. 32 and 34.¹³

The DAR Secretary, in an Order dated 26 January 1999, denied the application for exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97, basically due to the failure of Roxas & Co. to establish the identity of the six lots subject thereof:

Initially, CLUPPI-2 based their evaluation on the lot nos. as appearing in CLOA [No.] 6654. However, for purposes of clarity and to ensure that the area applied for exemption is indeed part of TCT No. T-60034, CLUPPI-2 sought to clarify with [Roxas & Co.] the origin of TCT No. T-60034. In a letter dated May 28, 1998, [Roxas & Co.] explains that portions of TCT No. T-985, the mother title, with an aggregate area of 1,023.9999 hectares was subdivided into 125 lots pursuant to PD 27. A total of 947.8417 was retained by the landowners and was subsequently registered under TCT No. 49946. [Roxas & Co.] further explains that TCT No. 49946 was further subdivided into several lots (Lot 125-A to Lot 125-P) with Lot No. 125-N registered under TCT No. 60034. Review of the titles, however, shows that the origin of T-49946 is T-783 and not T-985. On the other hand, the origin of T-60034 is listed as 59946, and not T-49946. The discrepancies were attributed by [Roxas & Co.] to typographical errors which were "acknowledged and initialled (sic)" by the ROD. Per verification conducted by CLUPPI-2 with the ROD of Nasugbu, Batangas, the discrepancies "acknowledged and initialled (sic)" by the ROD cannot be ascertained.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, an exemption clearance for the subject parcels of land covered by CLOA No. 6654 having an area of 51.5472 hectares and situated at Brgys. Cogunan and Lumbagan, Nasugbu Batangas is hereby DENIED.¹⁴

The DAR Secretary likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Roxas & Co. in another Order dated 19 January 2001.

The DAR Secretary ratiocinated that CLOA No. 6654 was still valid and existing, except only as to the three parcels of land subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 36299.¹⁵ This being the case, Roxas & Co. could not file the application for exemption of the six lots in question since the owners thereof were already the farmer-beneficiaries to whom CLOA No. 6654 was issued.

The DAR Secretary also remained steadfast in his earlier finding that the exact identity of the six lots subject of DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 cannot be satisfactorily ascertained from the evidence submitted by Roxas & Co.:

Records also indicate that [Roxas & Co.] merely submitted the following Transfer Certificate of Titles (sic) registered under the name of Roxas Y Cia:

TCT No.	Lot No.	Area (ha)
60019	125-A	0.5324
60020	125-B	0.2209
60021	125-C	0.2237
60022	125-D	1.1960
60023	125-E	1.4106
	Total	3.5836

The landholdings covered by the aforesaid titles do not correspond to the Certification dated February 11, 1998 of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the Certification dated September 12, 1996 issued by the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, and the Certifications dated July 31, 1997 and May 27, 1997 issued by the National Irrigation Authority. The certifications were issued for Lot Nos. 21, 24, 28, 31, 32 and 34. Thus, it was not even possible to issue exemption clearance over the lots covered by TCT Nos. 60019 to 60023.

Furthermore, we also note the discrepancies between the certifications issued by HLURB and the Municipal Planning Development Coordinator as to the area of the specific lots.

Lot No.	Area per HLURB	Area per MPDC
21	17.6113	17.6113
24	6.8088	16.8385
28	7.2333	7.2333
31	0.777
32	1.286	15.7902
34	0.6273	1.286
Total	34.3437	58.7593

With such discrepancy, which appears to be the result of inability to identify specifically the landholdings, it would not be possible for us to grant the exemption clearance applied for.¹⁶

Roxas & Co. filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63146.

The observations of the Court of Appeals in its Decision¹⁷ dated 30 May 2001 were consistent with those of the DAR Secretary. As regards the TCTs submitted by Roxas & Co., the appellate court wrote:

We agree with the DAR that the submission, among others, of the certified true copies of titles of the land subject of the application is necessary in order to ascertain the identity of the owner and of the property applied for exemption.

In the instant case, a perusal of the documents before us shows that there is no indication that the said TCTs refer to the same properties applied for exemption by [Roxas & Co.] It is true that the certifications issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Region IV refer, among others, to DAR Lot Nos. 21, 24, 28, 31, 32 and 34 (Annexes "E", "F", "G" and "N", pp. 55-57 and 98, Rollo). But these certifications contain nothing to show that these lots are the same as Lots 125-A, 125-B, 125-C, 125-D and 125-E covered by TCT Nos. 60019, 60020, 60021, 60022 and 60023, respectively. While [Roxas & Co.] claims that DAR Lot Nos. 21, 24 and 31 correspond to the aforementioned TCTs submitted to the DAR no evidence was presented to substantiate such allegation.

Moreover, [Roxas & Co.] failed to submit TCT 634 (sic) which it claims covers DAR Lot Nos. 28, 32 and 24 (TSN, April 24, 2001, pp. 43-44).

It is settled that mere allegation is not evidence and the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it (Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 735, 754).¹⁸

The Court of Appeals noted the following discrepancies in the zoning classification of the land in Brgys. Cogunan and Lumbangan where the six lots subject of the application for exemption are supposedly located:

[Roxas & Co.] also claims that subject properties are located at Barangay Cogunan and Lumbangan and that these properties are part of the zone classified as Industrial under Municipal Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982 of the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. While this claim is affirmed by the Nasugbu OMPDC per certification dated September 12 and 19, 1996 (Annexes "F" and "N", supra), a scrutiny of the said Ordinance shows that only Barangays Talangan and Lumbangan of the said municipality were classified as Industrial Zones (Annex "D", p. 53, Rollo). Barangays Cogunan was not included. Although there are indications in the said Ordinance that some parts of Barangay Cogunan are classified as residential, thus, non-agricultural, no evidence was submitted by [Roxas & Co.] to prove that portions of the subject properties are located in these areas. In fact, the TCTs submitted by [Roxas & Co.] show that the properties covered by said titles are all located at Barrio Lumbangan (Annexes "H-1" to "H-5", supra).¹⁹

The appellate court discerned finally that while Roxas & Co. claimed that the total area of the six lots subject of its application for exemption was 51.5472 hectares, the certifications of HLURB and OMPDC showed that it was only 49.5066 hectares. In comparison, the aggregate area of the lands covered by TCTs No. 60019 to No. 60023 was 3.5836 hectares. Roxas & Co. was unable to explain these discrepancies.

Hence, the Court of Appeals prescribed that until and unless Roxas & Co. identifies, with certainty, the six lots applied for exemption by showing their exact location and area; and adduces proof sufficient to show that the properties referred to by the TCTs submitted in evidence and the certifications issued by the HLURB, NIA, and the OMPDC of Nasugbu, are identical, the denial by DAR of the application for exemption of Roxas & Co. must be upheld.

Yet, unlike the DAR Secretary, the appellate court still recognized the right of Roxas & Co. to submit additional evidence in support of the latter’s application for exemption for the six lots, thus:

However, this does not operate to divest [Roxas & Co.] of its right to present additional evidence before the DAR to substantiate its claim that the subject lots are indeed exempt from the coverage of RA 6657.

Meanwhile, in view of the Supreme Court ruling in Roxas & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (supra) recognizing the rights of the farmer-beneficiaries to possess and till the lands awarded them under CLOA 6654, respondent DAR may proceed to install farmer-beneficiaries in the lands subject of the present dispute, without prejudice to a final determination of [Roxas & Co.]’s right over subject properties.²⁰

The dispositive portion of the 30 May 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals states:

WHEREFORE, herein petition is DENIED DUE COURSE without prejudice to [Roxas & Co.] adducing additional evidence before the DAR for the ascertainment of the identity, exact location and areas of the lands subject of the application for exemption.²¹

The Motion for Reconsideration of Roxas & Co. was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution²² dated 21 August 2001.

In its Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 149548, Roxas & Co. argues before this Court that:

THE ACT OF THE RESPONDENT DAR IN DISPOSSESSING [ROXAS & CO.] FROM ITS LAND, AND ORDERING THE INSTALLATION OF ALLEGED FARMER BENEFICIARIES THEREON IS NULL AND VOID.

THE COURT OF APPEALS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN ORDERING THE INSTALLATION OF FARMER BENEFICIARIES UPON [ROXAS & CO.]’S PROPERTY NOTWITHSTANDING THE NULLITY OF THE DAR’S ACTUATIONS[;]²³

and seeks the following from the Court:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, [Roxas & Co.] prays that a Temporary Restraining Order be immediately issued and thereafter a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued upon such terms and conditions as the Honorable Court may see fit to impose; and that after proceedings duly taken[,]the REVERSAL and SETTING ASIDE of the Decision of the Hon. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 63146 be ordered, insofar as the same allows the respondent DAR to allow installation of farmer-beneficiaries on the land in dispute and insofar as CLOA 6654 is not nullified with respect to the land in dispute; and thereafter that the Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be then made permanent.

Such other relief as may be just and equitable under the premises is also prayed for.²⁴

DAMBA-NFSW filed a Motion to cite Roxas & Co. in contempt and for the dismissal of the latter’s Petition on the ground of forum-shopping, contending that the six lots sought to be exempted herein were also the subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 82225 (G.R. No. 179650).

G.R. No. 179650

As previously narrated herein, after the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dated 30 May 2001 and Resolution dated 21 August 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63146, Roxas & Co. filed before this Court a Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 149548, challenging the supposed premature installation of the farmer-beneficiaries to Lots No. 21, No. 24, No. 28, No. 31, No. 32 and No. 34, situated in Brgys. Cogunan and Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, while awaiting resolution by the DAR of the application of Roxas & Co. for exemption of the six lots in question.

At the same time, Roxas & Co. sought the re-opening by DAR of the proceedings in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97, so that Roxas & Co. could adduce additional evidence to substantiate the latter’s application for CARP exemption of the same six lots, plus Lot No. 36. The DAR Secretary granted the request of Roxas & Co., and conducted further proceedings in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 for the reception of the latter’s additional evidence.

On 6 January 2003, the DAR Secretary issued an Order, this time, granting the application of Roxas & Co. for CARP exemption of the original six lots, as well as Lot No. 36. The DAR Secretary deemed it appropriate to include Lot No. 36 in the application for exemption since the additional documents presented by Roxas & Co. also covered the said lot.

According to the DAR Secretary, Roxas & Co. was able to establish the identity of all seven lots based on the following evidence:

Records show that subject properties were originally registered under TCT No. T-985. This is shown in the Certification dated 17 June 1998 issued by Alexander Bonuan, Deputy Register of Deeds II, Registry of Deeds, Nasugbu, Batangas. The pertinent portion of said Certification states as follows:

x x x x

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that Lot No. 125 of Psd-04016141 (OLT) under TCT No. 49946 is a transfer from TCT-985. Further, it is certified that Lot 125-N Psd-04-046912 under TCT No. T-60034 is a transfer from TCT No. T-49946.

x x x x

In a letter dated 18 July 2000 addressed to Director Ricardo R. San Andres, Head, Center for Land Use, Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI)-2 Secretariat, Deputy Register of Deeds Bonuan clarified that "TCT No. 49946" should read "T.C.T. No. 59946." Attached to said letter is a certified true copy of TCT No. T-59946. A scrutiny of TCT No. T-59946 shows that it covers a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 125 of the subdivision plan Psd-04-016141 with an area of 947.8417 hectares situated in Brgys. Bilaran, Lumbangan, Cogonan and Reparo, Nasugbu, Batangas.

TCT No. T-59946 (Lot No. 125) was subsequently subdivided into various lots including the following:

NEW TCT NO.	LOT NO.	AREA (in has.)
T-60019	125-A	0.5324
T-60020	125-B	0.2209
T-60021	125-C	0.0237
T-60022	125-D	1.1960
T-60023	125-E	1.4106
T-60034	125-N	839.5059

A scrutiny of TCT Nos. T-60019, T-60020, T-60021, T-60022, T-60023 and T-60034 shows that they are transfers from TCT No. T-59946. Furthermore, a Certification dated 6 September 2001 issued by Dante G. Ramirez, Deputy Register of Deeds I, Nasugbu, Batangas, states that the mother title of TCT Nos. T-60019, T-60020, T-60021, T-60022, T-60023 and T-60034 is TCT No. T-985 registered in the name of Roxas Y Cia.

On 15 October 1993, CLOA No. 6654 was issued covering a 513.9863-hectare property previously registered in the name of Roxas & Company, Inc. A photocopy of CLOA No. 6654 shows that DAR Lots Nos. 21, 24, 28, 31, 32, 34 and 36 are covered therein. The corresponding TCTs of said lots are shown in the Certification dated 8 June 2001 issued by MARO Limjoco, Jr., the pertinent portions of which states (sic) as follows:

x x x x

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that as per verification with available records in this office, the parcels of land situated in Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, identified below as DAR lot Numbers used to be covered by the following Transfer Certificate of Title issued by the Registry of Deeds in Nasugbu, Batangas, to wit:

Lot Nos.	Areas (has.)	TCT Nos.
31	0.7770	T-60019 T-60020 T-60021
34	1.2860	T-60034
32	15.7902	T-60034
28	7.2333	T-60034
24	5.6128 1.1960	T-60034 T-60034
21	17.6113 1.4106	T-60034 T-60034
36	0.6300	T-60034

This is to certify further that the above-mentioned lots are now all covered and portions of CLOA No. 6654.²⁵

Now as to whether the seven lots are exempted from CARP coverage, the DAR Secretary answered in the affirmative, analyzing the available evidence as follows:

In the case at hand, the Certification dated 19 September 1996 issued by Reynaldo H. Garcia, Zoning Administrator of Nasugbu, Batangas, states, among others, that Lots Nos. 31, 24, 21, 32, 28 and 34 situated in Brgys. Cogunan and Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, are within the Industrial Zone based on the Comprehensive Zoning Regulation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved by the HSRC, pursuant to Resolution No. R-123 dated May 4, 1983. Moreover, a Certification also dated 19 September 1996 issued by Zoning Administrator Reynaldo H. Garcia states that DAR Lot No. 36 with an area of 0.6273 hectares situated in Brgy. Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, is within the Industrial Zone based on the Comprehensive Zoning Regulation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, and approved by HSRC pursuant to Resolution No. R-123 dated May 4, 1983. Moreover, a Certification dated 7 January 1998 issued by Maria Luisa G. Pangan, under authority of the HLURB Board Secretariat, states that Resolution No. 28/Municipal Ordinance No. 4 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas, dated 18 April 1982, was approved by the HSRC, now the HLURB, under Resolution No. R-123, Series of 1983, dated 4 May 1983. Clearly, the subject properties were already reclassified to industrial use prior to 15 June 1988, hence, are beyond the ambit of the CARP.

However, we note that the Certification dated 19 September 1996 issued by Zoning Administrator Reynaldo H. Garcia with respect to DAR Lot No. 36 only indicates an area of 0.6273 hectares as having been reclassified as part of Industrial Zone pursuant to the Comprehensive Zoning Regulation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved by HSRC pursuant to Resolution No. R-123 dated 4 May 1983. On the other hand, herein [Roxas & Co.]’s listing and the Certification dated 8 June 2001 issued by MARO Limjoco, Jr., shows that DAR Lot No. 36 has an area of 0.6300 hectare. Because the remaining portion with an area of 0.0027 hectare of DAR Lot No. 36 is not included in the Certification issued by Zoning Administrator Reynaldo H. Garcia, said portion should be denied for exemption.

This Office finds proper compliance by the [Roxas & Co.] with the requirements for exemption clearance under DAR AO 6 (1994).²⁶

As a last note, the DAR Secretary differentiated the present application of Roxas & Co. for exemption of the seven lots in Hacienda Palico, from the application of the same corporation for exemption of the entire Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, and Palico in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-084-00 (G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543). The DAR Secretary, in an Order dated 22 October 2001, denied the application for exemption in the latter case and directed the DAR field office personnel concerned to immediately proceed with the distribution of the said haciendas to qualified farmer-beneficiaries. The DAR Secretary explained herein that:

x x x the grounds for exemption invoked in the present case and the [DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-084-00] cited above are not the same. The present case involves an application for exemption on the ground that the properties enumerated herein were classified in 1982 for industrial use by the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas, which reclassification was approved by the HLURB prior to 15 June 1988. On the other hand, the ground for exemption in ADMIN. CASE No. A-9999-084-00 was an allegation that the properties involved therein were reclassified as tourist zone by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520. Thus, we find no inconsistency between our findings in the present case and that in ADMIN. CASE NO. A-9999-084-00 as the two (2) cases involves (sic) different issues.²⁷

Accordingly, the 6 January 2003 Order of the DAR Secretary in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 ended with the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Application for Exemption Clearance from CARP coverage filed by Roxas & Company, Inc., involving seven (7) parcels of land identified as DAR Lots Nos. 21, 24, 28, 31, 32, 34 and 36 (portion only with an area of 0.6273 hectares), covered by TCT Nos. T-60019, T-600020, T-60021, T-60022, T-60023 and T-60034 with an aggregate are of 51.5445 hectares located at Brgys. Bilaran, Lumbangan, Cogonan and Reparo, Nasugbu, Batangas, is hereby GRANTED, subject to the following conditions:

1. The farmer-occupants within subject parcels of land shall be maintained in their peaceful possession and cultivation of their respective areas of tillage until a final determination by the concerned Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator has been made on the amount of disturbance compensation due and entitlement of such farmer-occupants thereto;

2. No development shall be undertaken within the subject parcels of land until the appropriate disturbance compensation has been paid to the farmer-occupants. Proof of payment of disturbance compensation shall be submitted to this Office within ten (10) days from such payment; and

3. The cancellation of the CLOA issued to the farmer-beneficiaries shall be subject to a separate proceeding before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Batangas.

The Order dated 19 January 2001 issued by this Office, in so far as the installation of the farmers-beneficiaries in the areas or portions of subject landholdings, is hereby lifted.²⁸

When its Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the DAR Secretary in an Order dated 12 December 2003, DAMBA-NFSW filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 82225.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision²⁹ dated 31 October 2006, adjudged that DAMBA-NFSW availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal. It is already settled that judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary is governed by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, rather than the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, DAMBA-NFSW rendered its case dismissible on the ground of wrong mode of appeal, pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90.

Even on the merits, the Court of Appeals found the Petition of DAMBA-NFSW dismissible.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the DAR Secretary that Roxas & Co. did not commit forum-shopping in filing two applications for exemptions: (1) DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97, involving the seven lots in Hacienda Palico; and (2) DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-084-00, involving the entire Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, and Palico, since the two cases were based on different sets of facts and laws.

The appellate court further held that DAMBA-NFSW was not denied due process when DAR heard DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97, the application of Roxas & Co. for exemption of the seven lots in Hacienda Palico, without notice to DAMBA-NFSW. The procedural defect, if any, was cured by the filing by DAMBA-NFSW of numerous pleadings after the issuance by the DAR Secretary of his Order dated 6 January 2003, granting the application for exemption of Roxas & Co. In particular, DAMBA-NFSW filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Reply to Applicant’s Opposition to Oppositor’s Motion for Reconsideration, and Sur-Rejoinder. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals refused to disturb the findings of the DAR Secretary that the seven lots were already non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL on 15 June 1988 and, thus, exempted from CARP coverage. The grant of exemption from coverage is a matter involving the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. It behooves the courts to exercise great caution in substituting their own determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the appellate court finds no such abuse on the part of the DAR Secretary.

Given the foregoing premises, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition of DAMBA-NFSW.

The appellate court subsequently denied the Motion for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW in a Resolution dated 16 August 2007.

Now DAMBA-NFSW comes before this Court via a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 179650. DAMBA-NFSW grounds its Petition on the following assignment of errors:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS THIRD DIVISION COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT ROXAS & CO. INC. AS HAVING VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUM-SHOPPING IN FILING A PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH THE SUPREME COURT SECOND DIVISION [G.R. NO. 149548], AS WELL AS IN FILING A PETITION TO RE-OPEN ITS EARLIER PETITION FOR CARP EXEMPTION ON SUBJECT 51.54-HECTARE PROPERTY, ON THE BASIS OF THE SAME RESOLUTIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 63146; And

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONSIDERING MERE CERTIFICATIONS ISSUED BY THE CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES ON GRANTING CARP EXEMPTION CLEARANCE ON SUBJECT PROPERTY, BASED (sic) DAR AO 06, S. 1994, PER DOJ OPINION, S. 1990, WITHOUT SUBMITTING THE MUNICIPAL COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN DELINEATING SUBJECT PROPERTY AS HAVING BEEN RECLASSIFIED INTO NON-AGRICULTURAL USE.³⁰

DAMBA-NFSW prays for the Court to reverse and set aside the 31 October 2006 Decision and 16 August 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82225; as well as to summarily dismiss the Petition for Review of Roxas & Co. in G.R. No. 149548, pending before another division of the Court, on the ground of forum-shopping.

After Roxas & Co. had filed its Comment to the Petition, DAMBA-NFSW was directed to file its Reply.

G.R. No. 167505

On 29 September 1997, Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application for exemption from CARP coverage of nine lots, identified as Lots No. 20, No. 13 (portion), No. 37, No. 19-B, No. 45, No. 47, No. 48-1, No. 48-2, and No. 49, located in Brgys. Cogonan and Biliran, Nasugbu, Batangas, with an aggregate area of 45.977 hectares. All nine lots were part of Hacienda Palico, covered by TCT No. T-985. This application for exemption was docketed as DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98.

However, the DAR had previously placed Hacienda Palico, by compulsory acquisition, under the CARP, and as early as 1993, distributed CLOAs over the same to farmer-beneficiaries. About 15 hectares of the lots subject of DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 is covered by CLOA No. 6654 issued collectively to members of DAMBA-NFSW; while the rest is covered by individual CLOAs issued to members of KAMAHARI.

In support of its application for exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98, Roxas & Co. submitted the following documents:

1. Letter-application dated 29 September 1997 signed by Elino SJ. Napigkit, for and on behalf of Roxas & Company, Inc., seeking exemption from CARP coverage of subject landholdings;

2. Secretary’s Certificate dated September 2002 executed by Mariano M. Ampil III, Corporate Secretary of Roxas & Company, Inc., indicating a Board Resolution authorizing him to represent the corporation in its applications for exemption with the DAR. The same Board Resolution revoked the authorization previously granted to the Sierra Management & Resources Corporation to represent the applicant corporation;

3. Photocopy of TCT No. 985 and its corresponding Tax Declaration No. 0401;

4. Location and vicinity maps of subject landholdings;

5. Certification dated 10 July 1997 issued by Reynaldo Garcia, Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC) and Zoning Administrator of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that the subject parcels of land are within the Urban Core Zone as specified in Zone A. VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), under Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983, dated 4 May 1983;

6. Two (2) Certifications both dated 31 August 1998, issued by Alfredo Tan II, Director, HLURB, Region IV, stating that the subject parcels of land appear to be within the Residential Cluster Area as specified in Zone VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983, dated 4 May 1983;

7. Letter dated 11 November 1994 sent by Alfredo M. Tan II, Director of HLURB, Region IV, addressed to then DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug, clarifying the classification of subject parcels of land, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

x x x x

Art. V. Sec. 3, paragraph A VII or Zone Boundaries of the Zoning Ordinance of Nasugbu describes Neighborhood Units as settlements clusters/areas in the different barangays outside of the Poblacion specifically Brgys. Lu(m)bangan, Wawa, Lo(oc), Aga and Bilaran.

In the formulation of the Comprehensive Development Plan, the abovementioned barangays emerged as Nodal Growth Barangays, thus, they were highlighted in the Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance. They were classified under Urban Core Zone but categorized further as settlement clusters outside of the Poblacion. The urban core zone proper is the Poblacion and its expansion areas while the neighborhood residential areas will be the urbanized areas in the barangays by the end of the planning period which is year 2000.

x x x" (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

8. Two (2) Certifications both dated 8 September 1997 issued by Rolando T. Bonrostro, Regional Irrigation Manager, National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Region IV, stating that the subject parcels of land are not irrigated, not irrigable and not covered by an irrigation project with firm funding commitment;

9. Certification dated 18 January 1999 issued by Manuel J. Limjoco, Jr., Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that the subject parcels of land are not covered by Operation Land Transfer but are covered by Collective Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) issued to twenty-three (23) farmer-beneficiaries, more or less;

10. Certification dated 10 September 2001, issued by Manuel J. Limjoco, Jr., MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that there was failure to reach an amicable settlement on the amount of disturbance compensation to be paid by Roxas & Company, Inc., to the CLOA holders of subject landholdings; and

11. Photocopy of a Petition to fix disturbance compensation filed by Roxas & Company, Inc., duly received on 28 September 2001 by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Batangas.³¹

The CLUPPI-2 OCI Team submitted its Investigation Report, stating that:

a. Lot Nos. 20, 13 portion, 37 and 19-B with an aggregate area of 30.9025 hectares located at Brgy. Cogonan are mostly planted to sugarcane. Irrigation canals were noted adjacent to said lots. However, said irrigation canals serve the adjoining OLT-covered areas and not the subject parcels of land;

b. Lot Nos. 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2 with an aggregate area of 15.0746 hectares located at Brgy. Bilaran are also planted to sugarcane and are situated along the Provincial Road. No irrigation system was noted in the area; and

c. The dominant uses of the adjacent areas are residential, institutional and agricultural.³²

After consideration of the evidence submitted by Roxas & Co. and the Investigation Report of the CLUPPI-2 OCI Team, the DAR Secretary issued an Order dated 6 November 2002, finding substantial compliance by Roxas & Co. with the requirements for exemption clearance under DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994. The DAR Secretary opined that pursuant to DOJ Opinion No 44, series of 1990, lands already reclassified by a valid zoning ordinance for commercial, industrial, or residential use, which ordinance was approved by the HLURB prior to the effectivity of the CARL on 15 June 1988, no longer needed any conversion clearance. The DAR Secretary thus disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Application of Exemption Clearance from CARP coverage filed by Roxas & Company, Inc., involving nine (9) parcels of land identified as Lots Nos. 20, 13 (portion), 37, 19-B, 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2, which are portions of a landholding covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 985, with an aggregate area of 45.9771 hectares located at Barangays Cogonan and Bilaran, Nasugbu, Batangas, is hereby GRANTED, subject to the following conditions:

1. The farmer-occupants within subject parcels of land shall be maintained in their peaceful possession and cultivation of their respective areas of tillage until a final determination has been made on the amount of disturbance compensation due and entitlement of such farmer-occupants thereto by the PARAD of Batangas;

2. No development shall be undertaken within the subject parcels of land until the appropriate disturbance compensation has been paid to the farmer-occupants who are determined by the PARAD to be entitled thereto. Proof of payment of disturbance compensation shall be submitted to this Office within ten (10) days from such payment; and

3. The cancellation of the CLOA issued to the farmer-beneficiaries shall be subject of a separate proceeding before the PARAD of Batangas.

DAMBA-NFSW filed with the DAR Secretary a Motion for Reconsideration of the 6 November 2002 Order, based on the following assertions: (1) the lack of notice to DAMBA-NFSW was in violation of its right to due process, thereby rendering the assailed Order null and void; (2) the application for exemption of Roxas & Co. was in violation of the anti-forum shopping rule considering its pending application for exemption of the entire Hacienda Palico and two other haciendas; and (3) the grant of the application for CARP exemption of the nine lots were contrary to law and jurisprudence.

In an Order dated 12 December 2003, the DAR Secretary denied the Motion for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW. He ruled that an application for CARP exemption pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1994, was non-adversarial or non-litigious in nature. There was nothing in the DARAB Rules that required the giving of notice to occupants of a landholding subject of an application for CARP exemption. There was also no basis to declare that Roxas & Co. violated the rule on forum-shopping since DAMBA-NFSW did not submit evidence showing that the nine lots subject of the present application were identical to those subject of the other application for exemption of Roxas & Co. Moreover, there was a difference in the bases for the two applications for exemption: the present one was based on a DOJ Opinion, while the other was based on a Presidential Proclamation.

DAMBA-NFSW received on 17 December 2003 a copy of the Order dated 12 December 2003 of the DAR Secretary, wherein the latter denied the former’s Motion for Reconsideration. Sixty-one days thereafter, on 16 February 2004, DAMBA-NFSW filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time (To File Petition Under Rule 65), requesting an additional period ending on 1 March 2003 within which to file said Petition. Yet, DAMBA-NFSW filed its Petition for Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82226, only on 3 March 2004.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision³³ on 20 December 2004, dismissing the Petition for Certiorari of DAMBA-NFSW. The appellate court held that any decision, order, award, or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the implementation of agrarian reform laws may be brought to the Court of Appeals within 15 days from receipt thereof by filing an appeal by certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. The right of DAMBA-NFSW to file an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 expired on 2 January 2004. Certiorari under Rule 65 cannot serve as a substitute for a lost appeal.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that assuming arguendo that certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper procedural remedy for the case at bar, DAMBA-NFSW still lost the said remedy due to the delayed filing of its Petition. In its Motion for Extension of Time, DAMBA-NFSW requested for 15 more days or until 1 March 2004 within which to file its Petition for Certiorari; but it only did so on 3 March 2004. As a result, the assailed Orders of the DAR Secretary attained finality on 2 March 2004. The power of the appellate court to review under Rule 65 does not carry with it the authority to alter final and, therefore, immutable judgments; nor to restore remedies lost.

Even if the Court of Appeals was to brush aside the procedural infirmities of the Petition, it found that the Orders dated 6 November 2002 and 12 December 2003 of the DAR Secretary in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 were in accord with the facts on record, as well as jurisprudence on the matter, and hence, no abuse of discretion, much more of such a grave nature, could be spoken of in the present case.

The Motion for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 7 March 2005. DAMBA-NSFW received a copy of said Resolution on 11 March 2005.

DAMBA-NFSW twice moved for extension of time within which to file its Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court: first, for 15 days; and second, for another 10 days.

DAMBA-NFSW filed its Petition for Review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 167505, on 21 April 2005. DAMBA-NFSW alleged that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in (1) denying the Petition for Certiorari of Roxas & Co. in CA-G.R. SP No. 82226 for having been filed two days late; (2) failing to nullify for grave abuse of discretion the Orders of the DAR Secretary issued in violation of the right to due process of DAMBA-NFSW, the rule against forum-shopping, and the doctrine of res judicata; and (3) ruling that the DAR Secretary did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he granted the application of Roxas & Co. for exemption of the nine lots despite the latter’s failure to present the Comprehensive Land Use Plan of Nasugbu, Batangas.

DAMBA-NFSW prayed in its Petition that the Court render judgment that (1) nullifies, reverses, and sets aside the Decision dated 20 December 2004 and Resolution dated 7 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82226, as well as the Orders dated 6 November 2002 and 12 December 2003 of the DAR Secretary in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98; and (2) declares the nine lots in dispute to be within CARP coverage and denies the application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co. for the same properties.

However, in a Resolution dated 29 June 2005, the Court denied the Petition for Review of DAMBA-NFSW for late filing since it was filed beyond the extended period. Also, DAMBA-NFSW failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise by the Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

DAMBA-NFSW filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 29 June 2005 Resolution of this Court. It maintained that difficulty in reproducing the voluminous documents to be attached to the Petition and a computer virus that destroyed its counsel’s case files compelled DAMBA-NFSW to seek the additional time for the filing of its Petition. In meritorious instances, extension is allowed up to a maximum of 30 days. DAMBA-NFSW was able to file its Petition for Review herein without reaching the maximum extended period of 30 days. Most importantly, DAMBA-NFSW asseverated that it has a meritorious case which deserves full ventilation of issues in order to protect the substantive rights of the parties, and dispense real justice and prevent the miscarriage thereof.

In its Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW, Roxas & Co. asserted that the former’s Petition for Review was indeed filed late and was properly denied by the Court in its 29 June 2005 Resolution. Roxas & Co. invoked A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC which provided that any extension of time to file the required pleading should be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. The original 15-day period for DAMBA-NFSW to file its Petition for Review expired on 26 March 2005, a Saturday. The 15-day extension requested for by DAMBA-NFSW should commence immediately upon expiration of the original period on 26 March 2005, ending on 10 April 2005, a Sunday. When DAMBA-NFSW sought another 10-day extension, the same should be counted from 10 April 2005. Hence, DAMBA-NFSW only had until 20 April 2005 within which to file its Petition for Review. When DAMBA-NFSW filed its Petition on 21 April 2005, it was already one day late.

Meanwhile, in its Comment to the Petition of DAMBA-NFSW, Roxas & Co. reiterated its argument that the said Petition was filed late. Additionally, Roxas & Co. argued that the Petition was an unverified pleading that should be dismissed. The Verification attached to the Petition was fatally defective for it did not refer to the contents of said Petition, but to those of a motion for reconsideration. Roxas & Co. further maintained that it did not commit a violation of the rule against forum-shopping; and that the Court of Appeals did not commit any error warranting the reversal of its Decision dated 20 December 2004 and Resolution dated 7 March 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 82226.

In both of its Comments, Roxas & Co. prayed for the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NSFW of the 29 June 2005 Resolution of this Court, which earlier denied the Petition for Review of DAMBA-NFSW.

C. Petitions for Partial and Complete Cancellation of CLOA No. 6654

G.R. No. 167845

As previously recounted herein, CLOA No. 6654 was issued by the DAR on 15 October 1993 in the collective names of farmer-beneficiaries, who are mostly members of DAMBA-NFSW. It covered an area of 513.9863 hectares of Hacienda Palico, including the following three parcels of land, with an aggregate area of 103.1436 hectares:

Lot No.	TCT No.	Location	Area (hectares)
125-K	TCT No. T-60028	Brgy. Biliran	27.414
125-M	TCT No. T-60032	Sitio Sagbat, Brgy. Lumbangan	37.8648
125-L	TCT No. T-60033	Sitio Lumang Bayan, Brgy. Lumbangan	37.8648
		Total	103.1436

In separate letters dated 14 January 1994 to the MARO, Roxas & Co. protested the inclusion of the afore-mentioned three lots in CLOA No. 6654, and demanded that CLOA No. 6654 be cancelled insofar as the three lots were concerned. Roxas & Co. maintained that by virtue of Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, the three lots were already reclassified to residential and industrial use. The protest of Roxas & Co. was later elevated to the Office of the DAR Regional Director, Region IV, for further proceedings; and then to the Office of the DAR Secretary for final disposition.

In a letter-decision dated 13 July 1994, the DAR Secretary denied the protest of Roxas & Co. and the latter’s request for cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 pertaining to the three lots in Brgys. Biliran and Lumbangan. The DAR Secretary ruled that "only those residential clusters/areas, AFP Camp, Administration building and motor pool, church, schools and cemetery in Bgy. Lumbangan (Sitios Sagbat and Lumang Bayan) and Biliran are exempt from CARP coverage[;]" adding that "actual survey should be done to establish the boundaries of the areas that are deemed exempted from CARP vis-à-vis areas that are not."

Roxas & Co. sought reconsideration of the foregoing letter-decision of the DAR Secretary in a letter dated 2 August 1994; but the DAR Secretary denied the Motion in an Order dated 20 December 1994.

Roxas & Co. then filed with the Court of Appeals on 27 January 1995 a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36299.

The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision³⁴ in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299 on 2 April 1996, favoring Roxas & Co. The appellate court found that the three lots had already been reclassified as residential by Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, enacted in 1982; while the municipal town plan based on said zoning ordinance had been approved by the HRSC, now HLURB, as early as 1983. Therefore, the three lots had long been residential when the CARL took effect on 15 June 1988. The very same lands were also designated by Nasugbu Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, as "Medium and Heavy Industrial Zone," which were definitely non-agricultural.

The Court of Appeals brushed aside the argument of the DAR Secretary and officials that certain portions of the three lots in dispute were still being used for agricultural purposes. What mattered was that the three lots had already been reclassified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL.

The Court of Appeals further found merit in the contention of Roxas & Co. that the latter was deprived of due process because; (1) the DAR failed to identify with certainty the land subject of the compulsory acquisition, thereby preventing Roxas & Co. from disputing the issuance of CLOA No. 6654 and from determining the valuation of the land covered by said certificate; and (2) the DAR violated its own procedural guidelines by distributing the land covered by CLOA No. 6654 even before Roxas & Co. received payment of compensation for its property.

The fallo of the 2 April 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299 reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the challenged letter-decision dated July 13, 1994, and the order dated December 20, 1994 of the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform, as well as the collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 6654 issued by the same respondent on October 15, 1993 over the three (3) parcels of land herein involved, are hereby NULLIFIED, VACATED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.³⁵

The foregoing Decision became final and executory, and entry of judgment was made on 11 April 1997.

Subsequently, relying on the Decision dated 2 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299, Roxas & Co. filed before the PARAD on 26 January 2001 a Petition, docketed as DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001, praying for the cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 insofar as it covered the same three parcels of land.

It must be noted though that the Decision dated 2 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299 stated that the land area of Lot No. 125-L, covered by TCT No. T-60033, was 37.8648 hectares; while the Petition in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 alleged that the land area of the same lot was slightly smaller at 36.9796 hectares. Consequently, the total land area of the three lots subject of DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 was averred to be 102.2614 hectares.

DAMBA-NFSW, on one hand, and the MARO and Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), on the other, separately sought the dismissal of DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001. They argued that the applications for partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 contravened the Decision dated 17 December 1999 of this Court in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, nullifying the acquisition proceedings of DAR over the three haciendas of Roxas & Co. for failure of DAR to observe due process therein, and remanding the case to the DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of the application of Roxas and Co. for conversion of the three haciendas. They emphasized that this Court refrained from nullifying the CLOAs issued by the DAR, which included CLOA No. 6654, to give DAR the chance to correct itself.

DAMBA-NFSW and the MARO and PARO also invited the attention of the PARAD to DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 (G.R. No. 149548 and No. 179650), the application for CARP exemption filed by Roxas & Co. with the DAR, covering Lots No. 21, No. 24, No. 26, No. 31, No. 32, and No. 34, located in Brgys. Cogonan and Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, with an aggregate area of 51.5472 hectares. They claimed that these six lots are superimposed over Lot No. 125-K, Lot No. 125-M, and Lot No. 125-L, subject of DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001, because of a defective subdivision survey. The DAR Secretary denied the application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co. in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97, precisely because the latter was unable to establish with certainty the identity of the six lots subject of said application. The appeal of Roxas & Co. of the denial of its application for exemption of the six lots in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 was then pending before the Court of Appeals, and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63146.³⁶

On 21 May 2001, the PARAD issued a Joint Order in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001, granting the partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, insofar as it pertains to Lots No. 125-K, No. 125-M, and No. 125-L.

The PARAD differentiated between Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals from DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001; and explained why the Decision dated 17 December 1999 of this Court in the former case did not bar the applications for partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 in the latter, to wit:

Admittedly, while both cases have but one common essential which is the irregularly generated collective CLOAs, one among which is CLOA No. 6654, however, the causes of action pursued by the suitor and the subject matter, albeit referred to generally as Hacienda Palico, are totally different, separate and distinct when taken in particular. [Roxas & Co.] in the instant petitions is not seeking the cancellation of CLOA 6654 on the ground of lack of due process but on the basis of a previous finding by the appellate Court, being a competent authority, that three parcels of land which were included in CLOA 6654 are actually outside the scope of CARP and on its judicial pronouncement declaring them exempt/excluded therefrom for which very reason, the appellate Court ordered CLOA 6654 "nullified, set aside and vacated" in respect of the said lots. The Supreme Court decision, upon the other hand, ruled for the nullification of the acquisition proceedings for lack of due process and remanding the matter in controversy to the DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of [Roxas & Co.]’s application for conversion in strict accord with the law and its implementing guidelines and procedures but sustaining the CLOAs already issued in order to give DAR the chance or opportunity to correct itself and for the meantime maintaining the subject properties under the stewardship of the actual tillers or cultivators who shall hold the same in trust for the true landowner. By unmistakable implication, what is contemplated by the Supreme Court decision are those lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture (Sec. 4, R.A. 6657) and such lands although devoted to agricultural activity are negotiable for conversion (DAR Adm. No. 07, Series of 1997) by reason of their natural features and/or characteristics but not lands which have already been previously classified for non-agricultural uses (DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 in relation to Sec. 3, (c) (sic) and judicially declared excluded or exempt from CARP coverage as in the case of the three lots in question. Moreover, the subject parcels of land are not and have never been in the actual possession, much less under the cultivation, of any member of [DAMBA-NFSW], hence, not being held by any of them in trust for the lawful landowner. Conversely, in any event that there be found any occupant on the exempted premises under claim of any right under existing agrarian laws – the same laws shall warrant his dispossession thereof. In fine, the parcels of land in question being beyond the scope of the CARP are outside the contemplation of the Supreme Court decision. Hence, the said decision should not be made to operate against the cancellation of CLOA 6654 in so far as the three parcels of land in question are concerned which have previously been authorized by competent authority in a judgment that is final and executory.³⁷

Under DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994, CLOAs, whether distributed or not, may be cancelled by order of the PARAD or Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) having jurisdiction over the property in accordance with DARAB rules and procedures. Among the recognized grounds for cancellation of CLOAs is that the land covered by the same has been found exempt/excluded from CARP coverage by the DAR Secretary or his authorized representative. Given the final and executory Decision dated 2 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299, declaring Lots No. 125-K, No. 125-M, and No. 125-L exempt from CARP coverage, the PARAD wrote "there is nothing more left to be done by this Adjudicator than the ministerial duty to enforce the Court of Appeals judgment x x x by way of a final order of implementation or execution."³⁸

Even though not a party in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299, the PARAD still deemed DAMBA-NFSW bound by the final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals in said case for the following reasons:

x x x As to the parties bound by the decision sought to be enforced, while [DAMBA-NFSW] and its members appear not to be parties in the Court of Appeals case and that as a general rule, the decision in said case shall only issued against the DAR, by its Secretary, being the direct party to the action, nonetheless, said judgment shall extend to them being privies to the [DAR] which is the source or origin of whatever rights or entitlements they now claim under CLOA 6654 insofar as the three (3) parcels of land are concerned and against whom the decision is deemed binding although they are not literally parties to the said action (St. Dominic Corporation vs. IAC, 151 SCRA 577, Cabreros v. Tiro, 66 SCRA 400).³⁹

Lastly, the PARAD addressed the possibility that the three lots held to be exempt from CARP coverage by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299 may include portions of lots subject of other applications for exemption:

In this respect, the Board takes into view [Roxas & Co.]’s pending application for exemption of certain lots covered by the same CLOA portions of which are said to be overlapping the lots already declared exempt considering the fact that the Board had issued a status quo order pendente lite over the exempted area which might indeed include portions of the lots treated in the pending application for exemption. It must be recalled, however, that the legal duty of defining the true identity and delineating the metes and bounds of the lots, other than those specifically identified and declared as the ones excluded from CARP coverage by virtue of the Court of Appeals decision, as well as competence to determine whether the same are similarly exempt from CARP coverage belong to the exclusive prerogative of the DAR Secretary and his duly authorized representatives. Nonetheless, for purposes of obtaining the desired results, it is considered judicious that a relocation survey be recommended at the instance of any interested party to be plotted on the approved subdivision survey Psd-04-046912. L.R.C. Record No. 102. Meanwhile, as an ancillary relief to be included in the order of cancellation, the status quo order shall continue to operate with full force and effect over the area encompassed by Lots 125-K, 125-L and 125-M as delineated by their respective technical descriptions as appearing in the approved subdivision survey plan, Psd-04-04-046912, L.R.C. Record No. 102 and as contained and stated in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-60028, T-60033 and T-60032, respectively, in order to protect the said premises from undue invasions by illegal entrees.⁴⁰

The PARAD decreed at the end of the Joint Order dated 21 May 2001:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, let Order hereby jointly issue:

1. Directing the Register of Deeds [of] Batangas, Nasugbu Office, to effect the partial cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. CLOA-6654, CLOA No. 00158566 of the Registry of Deeds [of] Batangas (Nasugbu) insofar as the same covers Lot 125-K with an area of 27.4170 hectares situated at Brgy. Bilaran, Nasugbu, Batangas; Lot 125-L with an area of 36.9796 hectares located in Brgy. Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, and Lot 125-M with an area of 37.8648 hectares also located in Brgy. Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, all of Psd-04046912, L.R.C. Record No. 102 as, respectively, described in and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-60028, T-60033 and T-60032 of the same Registry of Property and which titles are hereby declared subsisting and in full force and effect;

2. Making the status quo order permanent over the area/lots described in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-60028, T-60033 and T-60032 without prejudice, however, to [Roxas & Co.]’s lawful exercise of its right of absolute ownership and its incidents over the parcels of land in question.

No pronouncement as to other relief.⁴¹

DAMBA-NFSW alleged that on 13 June 2001, it received a copy of the 21 May 2001 Joint Order of the PARAD in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001; that on 28 June 2001, the last of the 15-day reglementary period, it filed via registered mail its Motion for Reconsideration; and that the next day, on 29 June 2001, it filed by personal delivery to the Office of the PARAD an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Attached Additional Copies of Motion for Reconsideration.

On 10 July 2001, the PARAD issued a Joint Resolution in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 (Petition for partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, insofar as it concerns the three lots with an aggregate area of 102.2614 hectares) and DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 (Petition for total or complete cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, involving the rest of the landholding covered by said certification).⁴² The PARAD dismissed for lack of merit the Motions for Reconsideration filed by DAMBA-NFSW in both cases.

DAMBA-NFSW received on 21 August 2001 a copy of the 10 July 2001 Joint Resolution of the PARAD denying its Motions for Reconsideration in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 and DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001. DAMBA-NFSW, intending to seek recourse from DARAB, filed with the PARAD on 5 September 2001 a joint Notice of Appeal for DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 and DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001. Receiving no word from PARAD, DAMBA-NFSW filed four months later, on 2 January 2002 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Give Due Course to Appellant’s Notice of Appeal and to Admit Attached Joint Memorandum on Appeal.

In an Order dated 19 February 2002 in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001, the PARAD declared that the Motion for Reconsideration and Notice of Appeal of DAMBA-NFSW were filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period based on the following facts:

1) The decision dated May 21, 2001 was received by [DAMBA-NFSW] counsel on June 13, 2001.

2) The motion for reconsideration was filed on June 29, 2001.

3) The denial of the motion for reconsideration was received by [DAMBA-NFSW] counsel on August 21, 2001.

4) The notice of appeal was filed by [DAMBA-NFSW] counsel on September 5, 2001.⁴³

The PARAD, thus, dismissed the Notice of Appeal of DAMBA-NFSW.

DAMBA-NFSW filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of its Notice of Appeal, but the PARAD denied the same in an Order dated 22 May 2002, stating that the lack of knowledge of DARAB rules "cannot be considered excusable neglect nor as compelling reason to reconsider the order of dismissal of the appeal."⁴⁴

DAMBA-NFSW then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72198.

DAMBA-NFSW attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the PARAD, in not giving due course to the former’s Notice of Appeal. DAMBA-NFSW maintained that it had filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 28 June 2001, and not 29 June 2001. DAMBA-NFSW further questioned the deduction of the days it took to file its Motion for Reconsideration from the 15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal. It averred that the DARAB should not be bound by technical rules, which would result in depriving the hundreds of farmers’ family members of substantial justice. Most importantly, DAMBA-NFSW asserted that it had a meritorious case for DARAB to resolve on appeal, particularly:

A) WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT PARAD OF BATANGAS HAS JURISDICTION TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO [ROXAS & CO.]’S PETITION TO CANCEL CLOA NO. 6654 THE SAME ISSUE HAVING BEEN THOROUGHLY PASSED UPON AND SPECIFICALLY RESOLVED BY THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC IN A CASE INVOLVING THE SAME PARTIES AND INVOLVING THE ENTIRE LANDHOLDINGS OF [ROXAS & CO.] INCLUDING THE LANDHOLDINGS SUBJECT MATTER OF THE INSTANT PETITION, ORDERING THAT THE SAME SHOULD NOT BE CANCELLED;

B) WHETHER OR NOT [ROXAS & CO.] IS NOT ENGAGED IN FORUM SHOPPING IN BRINGING THE PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF CLOA 6654 WITH PUBLIC RESPONDENT PARAD OF BATANGAS WHEN THE PRAYER IS THE SAME AS ITS PETITION EARLIER FILED ON MAY 15, 2000 WITH THE OFFICE OF THE DAR SECRETARY SEEKING TO EXEMPT FROM CARP COVERAGE SUBJECT LANDHOLDINGS, AND THAT IF GRANTED TO EFFECT A CANCELLATON OF CLOA No. 6654 AND OTHER CLOA’S COVERING ITS OTHER LANDHOLDINGS IN NASUGBU, BATANGAS. IN FACT, THE OFFICE OF THE DAR SECRETARY HAS RULED WITH FINALITY ON [ROXAS & CO.]’S PETITION FOR CARP EXEMPTION, DENYING THE SAME FOR LACK OF MERIT AND ORDERS THE ACQUISITION PROCEEDINGS OR NOTICE OF COVERAGE TO PROCEED. HOW THEN CAN THE CLOA’S OF SUBJECT LANDHOLDINGS BE CANCELLED, EXCEPT THROUGH [ROXAS & CO.]’S PENCHANT OF BRINGING SUITS IN VIOLATION OF ANTI-FORUM SHOPPING RULE AS IN THE INSTANT CASE; AND

C) WHETHER OR NOT [ROXAS & CO.] CAN CAUSE FOR THE CANCELLATION OF CLOA NO. 6654 COVERING THE THREE PARCELS OF LANDHOLDINGS (103.1436 HECTARES) ON THE BASIS OF ALLEGED DECISION COURT OF APPEALS THIRD DIVISION EARLIER ISSUED BETWEEEN THE SAME PARTIES AND SAME ISSUES WHICH RESULTED FROM A VOID PROCEEDINGS FOR VIOLATING THE ANTI-FORUM SHOPPING RULE AND THE ILLEGAL ACT OF DAR LITIGATION OFFICER IN CONNIVANCE WITH [ROXAS & CO.] IN NOT APPEALING THE CASE TO THE SUPREME COURT, AND PRIMARILY IN THE LIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC DECISION WHICH DECLARED THAT CLOA NO. 6654 CANNOT BE CANCELLED AS THE CASE HAS YET TO BE REMANDED TO THE DAR FOR PROPER ACQUISITION PROCEEDINGS, AND THE FACT THAT THE OFFICE OF THE DAR SECRETARY HAS ALREADY ORDERED FOR THE ISSUANCE OF NOTICE OF COVERAGE ON ALL PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S LANDHOLDINGS IN NASUGBU, BATANGAS.⁴⁵

DAMBA-NFSW prayed that: (1) a temporary restraining order (TRO) be immediately issued to enjoin the PARAD from implementing the Orders dated 19 February 2002 and 22 May 2002; and (2) after due proceedings, the assailed PARAD Orders be annulled and a new Order be issued commanding the PARAD to transmit the records in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 to the DARAB for the appeal of DAMBA-NFSW.

In its Decision⁴⁶ dated 10 September 2004, the Court of Appeals favored DAMBA-NFSW.

The Court of Appeals conceded that under Section 12 of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, DAMBA-NFSW belatedly filed its Notice of Appeal:

x x x Hence, assuming that [DAMBA-NFSW] timely filed its motion for reconsideration, the period to file an appeal had already lapsed considering that the filing of a motion for reconsideration only suspends the running of the period within which the appeal must be perfected, and in case of denial of the motion for reconsideration, the movant only has the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. In this case, [DAMBA-NFSW] had already exhausted the fifteen day period for appeal when it filed its motion for reconsideration, on the last day of the prescribed period. At the most, [DAMBA-NFSW] only had one (1) day from receipt of a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, within which to perfect its appeal, i.e., excluding the day of receipt and including the next day.⁴⁷

While it is also true that the perfection of appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional, and failure to do so renders the questioned judgment final and executory; the Court of Appeals recounted jurisprudence where the rules on the period of appeal were relaxed in favor of the disposition of cases on the merits. The appellate court ratiocinated that:

x x x [t]o deny [DAMBA-NFSW]’s appeal with the PARAD will not only affect their right over the parcel of land subject of this petition with an area of 103.1436 hectares, but also that of the whole area covered by CLOA No. 6654 since the PARAD rendered a Joint Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the [DAMBA-NFSW] with regard to [Roxas & Co.]’s application for partial and total cancellation of the CLOA in DARAB Cases No. R-0401-003 to 005-2001 and R-0401-239-2001. There is a pressing need for an extensive discussion of the issues as raised by both parties as the matter of canceling CLOA No. 6654 is of utmost importance, involving as it does the probable displacement of hundreds of farmer-beneficiaries and their families. This certainly justifies the relaxation of the rules on the period for appeal in order to afford herein petitioners their remedy of appeal, lest it be forgotten that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The merits of [DAMBA-NFSW]’s appeal before the PARAD deserve[s] a full ventilation of the issues involved, to serve the ends of justice and prevent a grave misconduct thereof.⁴⁸

The dispositive portion of the 10 September 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Order of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Batangas dated 19 February 2002, dismissing [DAMBA-NFSW]’s Notice of Appeal and the Order [dated] 22 May 2002, denying [DAMBA-NFSW]’s Motion for Reconsideration of the earlier order are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The PARAD of Batangas is ORDERED to give due course to [DAMBA-NFSW]’s appeal in DARAB Case No. R-0401-003 up to 005-2001.⁴⁹

The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Roxas & Co. in a Resolution dated 14 April 2005.

Thereafter, Roxas & Co. filed with this Court a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 167845. According to Roxas & Co., the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in granting the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus of DAMBA-NFSW, notwithstanding that:

I. THE PARAD’S DENIAL OF DAMBA’S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1994 DARAB RULES.

II. CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR A LOST APPEAL. THE REMEDY OF APPEAL WAS AVAILABLE BUT WAS LOST THROUGH DAMBA’S OWN FAULT.

III. THE ALLOWANCE OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL, WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME, IS NOT A MINISTERIAL DUTY. HENCE, THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE.

IV. DAMBA FAILED TO ADVANCE JUSTIFIABLE REASONS WHY MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL RULES ON APPEAL SHOULD BE DISREGARDED.

V. THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA GR SP NO. 36299, WHICH ANNULLED CLOA NO. 6654 INSOFAR AS IT COVERS THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES, SHOWS THAT DAMBA’S APPEAL IS UNMERITORIOUS.

Roxas & Co. is asking the Court to reverse and set aside the Decision dated 10 September 2004 and Resolution dated 14 April 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72198; and to affirm the Orders dated 19 February 2002 and 22 May 2002 of the PARAD in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001.

The Petition was given due course and the parties have already submitted their Memoranda.

G.R. No. 169163

On 26 January 2001, Roxas & Co. filed before the PARAD a Petition for Cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, docketed as DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001. To recall, CLOA No. 6654 covered a total land area of 513.9863 hectares, all located in Hacienda Palico. Roxas & Co. was seeking the cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 as to the rest of the parcels of land still covered thereby after excluding the 102.2614 hectares, which corresponded to the three lots already subject of DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001. In other words, Roxas & Co. was petitioning for the total or complete cancellation of CLOA No. 6654.

Roxas & Co. basically grounded its Petition for the total or complete cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 on the alleged nullity of the subdivision survey of the lots covered by CLOA No. 6654, due to technical defects in the conduct of said survey, which only surfaced after the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299, ordered the exemption from CARP coverage of the three lots included in CLOA No. 6654. When Hacienda Palico was compulsorily placed under the CARP, a segregation and subdivision survey was conducted by Engr. Miguel V. Pangilinan (Pangilinan) on 22 April to 24 June 1993. Engr. Pangilinan incorrectly plotted his survey using the old subdivision plan, Psd-04-016141 (OLT), which was already cancelled and superseded on 10 July 1991 by subdivision plan Psd-04-6912, LRC Record 102. And, based on the result of Engr. Pangilinan’s defective survey, a new subdivision plan, Bsd-041019-003090 (AR), was approved on 6 October 1993, segregating the 513.9863 hectares subsequently awarded to the farmer-beneficiaries under CLOA No. 6654.

In its Decision dated 27 May 2001, the PARAD found that:

By and large, the assailed CLOA falls squarely within contemplation of DAR Adm. Order No. 02, Series of 1994. The same was issued on October 15, 1993 and is well within the ten year restrictive period; that just compensation for the properties thereby covered has not as yet been paid the landowner, that the same was generated on the basis of an erroneous survey where the lots therein described are not capable of physical distinction and accurate delineation having been plotted with reference to an already extinct survey plan, thusly, depriving the said CLOA of any tangible basis or material content; hence, devoid of legal existence. In fact, the Supreme Court even found the property being acquired not properly segregated and delineated and non-compliant with the statutory requirement under Sec. 16 of RA 6657 that the property/ies acquired shall be identified.

This Board, with due respect to the Supreme Court’s ruling to save the CLOAs is of the humble opinion that their preservation will only serve a purpose if and when their contents and efficacy are confirmed with exactitude by the results of the new acquisition proceedings to be undertaken by the DAR in respect of the proper delineation and/or description of the landholdings and the propriety of their coverage under the CARP. However, in the case of CLOA 6654, based on the evidence on record the lands that would eventually be found proper for final coverage under the CARP will not be as described in the said title: Firstly, by reason of the exclusion of the exempted area; Secondly, due to technical errors in the identification and plotting of the lots resulting in a false subdivision survey. CLOA 6654, for these reasons, now, serves no legal purpose.

Furthermore, considering that the remaining 410.8327-hectares of land covered by CLOA 6654 have yet to pass under the proper acquisition and/or conversion proceedings as ordered by the Supreme Court then no title has as yet been acquired by the DAR over the said properties and, consequently, no proprietary rights to extend to the [DAMBA-NFSW members] under the CLOA which, as yet does not evidence any title , or create any right in favor of the [DAMBA-NFSW members], hence, is devoid of any legal efficacy and effectively non-existing. For practical reasons, to cancel CLOA 6654 will pave the way for a smooth, unobstructed and expeditious re-processing of the compulsory acquisition by erasing all traces of past irregularities, technical errors and lapses of procedure and taking off from a fresh start. Moreover, the cancellation of the subject CLOA shall be without adverse effect to the continuous possession and cultivation of the tillers in place who shall hold the landholdings meanwhile in trust for [Roxas & Co.] as the true landowner in complete accord with the ruling of the Supreme Court.

The decretal portion of the 27 May 2001 Decision of the PARAD in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 is reproduced in full below:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Finding and declaring the issuance of CLOA 6654 not in accordance with the mandate of Sec. 16, RA 6657 thereby effectively circumventing the implementation of the CARP;

2. Finding CLOA 6654 to be fictitious/null and void having been generated on the basis of a subdivision survey which was plotted on a survey plan which has already been previously cancelled, superseded and extinct, accordingly,

3. Ordering the cancellation of CLOA 6654, as prayed for by [Roxas & Co.], without prejudice, however, to the execution of the proper subdivision survey for purposes of delineating accurately the boundaries of the properties subject of acquisition proceedings for purposes of determining their coverage under the CARP or their negotiability for conversion and/or exclusion from the Program.

No pronouncement as to other relief.

After receiving a copy of the foregoing PARAD judgment on 13 June 2001, DAMBA-NFSW alleged that it filed its Motion for Reconsideration by registered mail on 28 June 2001. It then filed personally before the PARAD additional copies of the same Motion for Reconsideration the next day, 29 June 2001.

DAMBA-NFSW contended in its Motion for Reconsideration that: (1) Roxas & Co. violated the rule against forum-shopping in filing before the PARAD the instant Petition for cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, even when Roxas & Co. already made a similar request, which was denied by the Court en banc, in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, despite the procedural lapses committed by the DAR in the acquisition proceedings; (2) the PARAD committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in arrogating to herself the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary over applications for CARP exemption or land conversion; and (3) even assuming for the sake of argument that the subdivision plan, used as basis for CLOA No. 6654, was erroneous, the parties had relied on the same in good faith, and the farmer-beneficiaries should not be made to suffer for the procedural lapse of the DAR.

As has been previously narrated under G.R. No. 167845, the PARAD issued on 10 July 2001 a Joint Resolution dismissing the Motions for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 (Petition for partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654) and DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 (Petition for total or complete cancellation of CLOA No. 6654). After receipt of said Joint Resolution on 21 August 2001, DAMBA-NFSW, wanting to appeal its cases to the DARAB, filed with the PARAD on 5 September 2001 a joint Notice of Appeal. When PARAD failed to act on its Notice of Appeal for four months, DAMBA-NFSW filed with the PARAD on 2 January 2001 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Give Due Course to Appellant’s Notice of Appeal and to Admit Attached Joint Memorandum on Appeal.

The PARAD, in an Order dated 27 February 2002, in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001, refused to give due course to the Notice of Appeal of DAMBA-NFSW since it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, considering that:

1) The decision dated May 27, 2001 was received by [DAMBA-NFSW] counsel on June 29, 2001.

2) The motion for reconsideration was filed on June 29, 2001.

3) The denial of the motion for reconsideration was received by appellant counsel on August 21, 2001.

4) The notice of appeal was filed by appellant counsel on January 9, 2002.

Consequently, the PARAD dismissed the Notice of Appeal of DAMBA-NFSW. DAMBA-NFSW filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of its Notice of Appeal, but said Motion was denied by the PARAD in an Order dated 26 July 2002.

DAMBA-NFSW subsequently filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75952. DAMBA-NFSW presented in this Petition substantially the same averments and arguments as those in its Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 72198, with a closely identical prayer that sought: (1) the immediate issuance of a TRO to enjoin the PARAD from implementing the Orders dated 27 February 2002 and 26 July 2002; and (2) after due proceedings, the nullification of the assailed PARAD Orders and the issuance of a new Order commanding the PARAD to transmit the records in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 to the DARAB for the appeal of DAMBA-NFSW.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision⁵⁰ dated 23 February 2005, withheld its judgment on the merits as it dismissed the Petition of DAMBA-NFSW for having been prematurely filed. The proper recourse of DAMBA-NFSW was to first elevate its appeal of the assailed PARAD Orders to the DARAB, because as can be gleaned from Section 1, Rule XIV of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, judicial review by way of certiorari to the Court of Appeals may only be made on decisions, orders, or rulings on any agrarian dispute, rendered by the DARAB, not the RARAD or PARAD.

In a Resolution dated 3 August 2005, the appellate court denied the Motion for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW.

In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 169163, DAMBA-NFSW asserts that it had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy from the PARAD Orders dated 27 February 2002 and 26 July 2002, except the filing before the Court of Appeals of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the PARAD is not one of the grounds recognized in the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure for filing an appeal before the DARAB. Granting arguendo that the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 75952 was prematurely filed, still, the Court of Appeals should have relaxed the application of procedural rules in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case.

DAMBA-NFSW prays that the Court reverse, annul, and set aside the 28 February 2005 Decision and 3 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75952; and direct the PARAD to give due course to the Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal of DAMBA-NFSW.

In a Resolution dated 19 October 2005, the Court denied the instant Petition for absence of reversible error committed by the appellate court. DAMBA-NFSW moved for reconsideration of the denial of its Petition, with prayer to submit its case to the Court en banc and to set the same for oral argument. In another Resolution dated 14 August 2006, the Court held in abeyance its action on the Motion for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW, pending resolution of the other pending cases involving the CARP exemption of the properties of Roxas & Co. in Nasugbu.

All seven Petitions, i.e., G.R. No. 167540, No. 167543, No. 149548, No. 179650, No. 167505, No. 167845, and No. 169163, being related, were eventually consolidated for uniformity and consistency of rulings. They were referred to the Court en banc and set for oral arguments on 7 July 2009. After the oral arguments, the parties submitted their Memoranda.

Other than filing their Petitions for Intervention, the Sangguniang Bayan and ABC of Nasugbu, no longer participated in the proceedings before this Court, despite due notice. They did not appear during the oral arguments or submitted their Memoranda. The Court, in the exercise of its discretion to allow or disallow the intervention of a third party to the suit, should choose the latter, it being evident in the non-participation of the Sangguniang Bayan and ABC of Nasugbu that they are no longer interested to pursue their Petitions-in-Intervention in G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543.

II
ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION

The fundamental issues to be resolved by this Court are the following:

(1) Whether all parcels of land located in the municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas, had been reclassified for non-agricultural uses by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, thus, exempting the same, including Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, and Palico, owned by Roxas & Co., from CARP coverage;

(2) Whether certain parcels of land located in Hacienda Palico, Nasugbu, Batangas, owned by Roxas & Co., had been reclassified for non-agricultural uses by virtue of the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, thus, exempting the same from CARP coverage;

(3) Whether Roxas & Co. can seek the cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 despite the 17 December 1999 Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127873, Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals; and if said issue is answered in the affirmative, whether the appeal to the DARAB by DAMBA-NFSW of the partial and complete cancellations of CLOA No. 6654 ordered by the PARAD should be given due course; and

(4) Whether Roxas & Co. had committed forum-shopping and/or splitting of causes of action.

III
THE RULING OF THIS COURT

A. CARP Exemption of the Three Haciendas based on Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 (G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543)

In DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-084-00, Roxas & Co. applied for the exemption of Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, and Palico, under DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994. Said administrative order provides for the guidelines for the issuance of exemption clearances based on Section 3(c) of the CARL and DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990.

CARL, in general, covers all public and private agricultural lands. Section 3(c) of the CARL defines an agricultural land as land devoted to agricultural activity⁵¹ and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land.

The approval or disapproval of the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural uses shall be subject to the exclusive authority of the DAR.⁵² However, according to DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, the DAR may only exercise its authority to approve conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses from the date of effectivity of the CARL on 15 June 1988. Necessarily, lands already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential, before 15 June 1988, no longer need a conversion clearance⁵³ from the DAR. Instead of a conversion clearance, such land shall be issued an exemption clearance by the DAR.

Roxas & Co. claims that their three haciendas, located in Nasugbu, Batangas, are exempt from CARP coverage because prior to the effectivity of the CARL on 15 June 1988, the whole Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas, together with the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite, were declared a tourist zone and, thus, reclassified for non-agricultural uses by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, issued on 28 November 1975. In other words, Roxas & Co. asserts that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 automatically reclassified all the lands in the three Municipalities for non-agricultural uses, with the only exception of military reservations within the zone.

On the other hand, KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW, together with the DAR, aver that there has been no automatic reclassification of the entire Nasugbu by Presidential Proclamation No. 1520. The PTA still needs to identify the specific areas within the municipalities that will be developed for tourism purposes.

I agree with Roxas & Co.

A careful scrutiny of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 reveals that the declaration of the three Municipalities as a tourist zone consequentially translates to the classification of all lands therein to tourism and, therefore, non-agricultural uses.

The full text of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 is presented below:

PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 1520

DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, certain areas in the sector comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas have potential tourism value after being developed into resort complexes for the foreign and domestic market; and

WHEREAS, it is necessary to conduct the necessary studies and to segregate specific geographic areas for concentrated efforts of both the government and private sectors in developing their tourism potential;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby declare the area comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province as a tourist zone under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Section 5 (D) of P.D. 564.

The PTA shall identify well-defined geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value, wherein optimum use of natural assets and attractions, as well as existing facilities and concentration of efforts and limited resources of both government and private sector may be affected and realized in order to generate foreign exchange as well as other tourist receipts.

Any duly established military reservation existing within the zone shall be excluded from this proclamation.

All proclamation, decrees or executive orders inconsistent herewith are hereby revoked or modified accordingly.

Right after the enacting clause⁵⁴ is the very purpose of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, as it is also stated in its title: the declaration by former President Marcos of "the area comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province as a tourist zone under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA)."

There is no mistaking the plain and clear intent of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520. It declares the whole of the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province as a tourist zone. The presidential issuance, without qualification, refers to the "area comprising" the three Municipalities as "a tourist zone," which can only mean that the contiguous Municipalities are to form a single tourist zone.

There is nothing in Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 to support the position of KAMAHARI, DAMBA-NFSW, and DAR, that the tourist zone should be limited to the specific areas within the three Municipalities identified by the PTA to have potential tourism value. In such a case, there could not just be one tourism zone, but several tourism zones. Even a cursory reading of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 readily reveals that it never used the plural term "tourism zones." Notice should also be given to the fact that according to Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, PTA is to identify "well-defined geographic areas within the zone;" which connotes that the well-defined geographic areas, which PTA must identify, is different from, and are actually smaller areas that are supposed to be part of, the tourist zone. What is the sense of first declaring the larger area as a tourist zone, and only thereafter identifying certain well-defined areas with potential tourism value within the zone?

The only rationale behind the directive in the fourth paragraph of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, for PTA to identify such well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value, is explained in the very same paragraph. It is so that the "optimum use of natural assets and attractions, as well as existing facilities and concentration of efforts and limited resources of both government and private sector may be affected and realized in order to generate foreign exchange as well as other tourist receipts." Otherwise and more simply stated, PTA is to identify the well-defined geographic areas where the facilities, efforts, and limited resources of the Government and the private sector may be concentrated, focused, and optimized, so as to generate profit from tourism. These areas will only enjoy priority, but it does not mean that all other areas in Maragondon, Ternate, and Nasugbu, will no longer be developed for tourism purposes. Going back to the chief intent of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, it is to make all three Municipalities a tourist zone, not just certain areas thereof.

Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the Court is left with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language. There cannot be any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the law. This Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.⁵⁵

The reference of KAMAHARI, DAMBA-NFSW, and DAR to the "Whereas clauses" or the preamble of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 does little to support their case. First, the preamble is not an essential part of a statute. Hence, where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. Nor can a preamble be used as basis for giving a statute a meaning not apparent on its face.⁵⁶ It neither enlarges nor confers powers.⁵⁷ Second, the preamble is not really inconsistent with the body of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520. The certain geographic areas with potential tourism value which needed to be segregated, according to the preamble; are the same well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value that the PTA must identify, per the directive in the body of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520. And, there is still nothing in the preamble to establish that the intent of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 is to make only such geographic areas, rather than the whole of the three Municipalities, the tourist zone.

Furthermore, Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 has only one express exclusion from its coverage, i.e., duly established military reservation existing within the zone. Such a military reservation is to remain as such and not to be developed for tourism purposes. This also means that the rest of the lands in Maragondon, Ternate, and Nasugbu, other than an established military reservation, are subject to tourism development. A maxim of recognized practicality is the rule that the expressed exception or exemption excludes others. Exceptio firmat regulim in casibus non exceptis. The express mention of exceptions operates to exclude other exceptions; conversely, those which are not within the enumerated exceptions are deemed included in the general rule.⁵⁸

A closer scrutiny of the Letter of Instructions No. 352, issued by former President Marcos on 23 December 1975, divulges an intent that is quite opposite what Associate Justice Aliño-Hormachuelos ascertained in her dissent in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131. Letter of Instructions No. 352, in actuality, confirms that the entire three Municipalities of Maragondon, Ternate, and Nasugbu are to be devoted, as a tourist zone, to tourism development, not just certain areas thereof.

Letter of Instructions No. 352 fully reads:

TO: All Concerned

The Director of Lands shall survey and prepare a technical description of the tourist zone, which survey and technical description shall be considered an integral part of Proclamation No. 1520 dated November 28, 1975 declaring the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu Tourist Zone.

The Philippine Tourism Authority shall formulate a development plan, in coordination with the Department of Tourism and other government agencies and the local governments exercising political jurisdiction, or preparing sectoral plans, over the area; formulate and implement zoning regulations, including building codes and other restrictions as may be necessary within a tourist zone to control its orderly development; and enforce adherence to the approved zone development plan, subject to the penalties provided in Sec. 39 of P.D. 564.

The Philippine Tourism Authority shall submit the zone development plan through the Department of Tourism and the National Economic & Development Authority to the President for review and approval before the same is enforced and/or implemented.

Department Heads and heads of Government-owned and controlled corporations, Government agencies and instrumentalities directed to cooperate with and assist the Philippine Tourism Authority in making comprehensive technical, financial, market, socio-economic, regional development and other studies of the Tourist Zone within the limits of their capability and authority. (Emphases ours.)

The very first sentence of the first paragraph of Letter of Instructions No. 352 mandates the Director of Lands to survey and prepare a technical description of the tourist zone, which it specifically identified as the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu Tourist Zone. It must be stressed that the directive here is addressed to the Director of Lands, not the PTA; and it is to survey and prepare a technical description of the whole zone, not just well-defined geographical areas within the zone with potential tourism value.

What the second and third paragraphs of Letter of Instructions No. 352 essentially require the PTA to do is to formulate and submit a zone development plan. The zone, which such development plan shall cover, is none other than the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu Tourist Zone, consistent with the first paragraph of the said letter of instructions.

The fourth paragraph of Letter of Instructions No. 352 affirms the authority and control of the PTA over the entire tourist zone, explicitly directing "Department Heads and heads of Government-owned and controlled corporations, Government agencies and instrumentalities" to cooperate with and assist the PTA in the development of the zone.

Letter of Instructions No. 352 is obviously concerned with the development of the whole Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu Tourist Zone, there being no mention at all of well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. The identification and segregation of such geographic areas – which shall be the priority, but not the only, areas for tourism development – can already be included by the PTA in the zone development plan which it is required by Letter of Instructions No. 352 to prepare and submit to the President, through the DOT.

The clear and unambiguous words of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, establish that the entire Municipalities of Maragondon, Ternate, and Nasugubu, have been declared a tourist zone; and all lands within the tourist zone, excluding only established military reservation, are to be developed for tourism purposes. This consequently means that even agricultural lands – which are not expressly exempted by Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 – are to be devoted to tourism, hence, non-agricultural uses.

Closely similar to the circumstances of the present Petitions are the cases of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR⁵⁹ and NHA v. Allarde.⁶⁰ In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, which was issued on 18 April 1977, identified parcels of land that were added to a townsite reservation in the Municipalities of Antipolo and San Mateo in Rizal Province, established for the purpose of providing additional housing to the burgeoning population of Metro Manila. In NHA v. Allarde, Presidential Proclamation No. 843, which was issued on 26 April 1971, reserved parcels of land in the Tala Estate for the housing and resettlement program of the NHA. In both Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde, the Court deemed the erstwhile agricultural lands to have been reclassified to non-agricultural uses by the mere issuance of the foregoing presidential proclamations. Since said parcels of land were already reclassified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL on 15 June 1988, then they were exempt from CARP coverage.

KAMAHARI, DAMBA-NFSW and DAR attempt to bring the Petitions at bar out of the ambit of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde by arguing that Presidential Proclamations No. 1637 and No. 843 identified the parcels of land in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde, respectively, by their technical descriptions; and in contrast, Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 generally declares the Municipalities of Maragondon, Ternate, and Cavite, as a tourist zone, leaving it to the PTA to identify and delineate the specific areas with potential tourism value.

The foregoing argument is hardly persuasive.

Yet again, a more thorough review of the two judicial precedents will disclose that only Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR strictly provided a technical description of the parcels of land it added to the townsite reservation. The technical description in Presidential Proclamation No. 843 in NHA v. Allarde covers the entire Tala Estate, but the parcels of land subject matter of the case, which were reserved for housing and resettlement sites, were described no more particularly than the "remaining five hundred ninety eight (598) hectares" after prior allocation of the other areas of the Estate for the leprosarium and settlement site of the hansenites and their families, National Housing Corporation plant, civic center, and welfare projects of the Department of Social Welfare. Indeed, Presidential Proclamation No. 843 includes a statement that the "[m]ore precise identities of the parcels of land allocated above will be made after a final survey shall have been completed, x x x"

More importantly, Letter of Instructions No. 352, in furtherance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, mandates the Director of Lands to survey and prepare the technical description of the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu Tourist Zone, "which survey and technical description shall be considered an integral part of Proclamation No. 1520 dated November 28, 1975." Hence, just like Presidential Proclamation No. 843 in NHA v. Allarde, the technical description of the tourist zone declared by the Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 is still to follow. It does not detract or prevent though the reclassification of the agricultural lands undeniably located within the tourist zone to non-agricultural uses.

Failure of the Director of Lands to provide the technical description of the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu Tourist Zone should not affect the effectivity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520. Letter of Instructions No. 352 only said that the technical description of the Tourist Zone shall form part of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, but it did not say that the lack of the former shall suspend the effectivity of the latter. And even absent the technical description of the tourist zone, it is undisputed that it includes the whole Municipality of Nasugbu, and that the three haciendas of Roxas & Co. are located within Nasugbu; ergo, the three haciendas are part of the tourist zone.

KAMAHARI, DAMBA-NFSW, and DAR, in addition, call attention to the definition of reclassification as the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial.⁶¹ They contend that the lands involved in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde were reserved for specific non-agricultural uses, unlike in Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 which merely declared the three Municipalities a tourist zone.

KAMAHARI, DAMBA-NFSW, and DAR fail to understand that the essential point in reclassification is that agricultural lands are henceforth to be specifically utilized for non-agricultural uses, regardless of whether such uses be residential, industrial, or commercial. When parcels of land are declared to be in a tourist zone, they are already specially devoted to tourism purposes, which unmistakably constitute non-agricultural, rather than agricultural, uses.

Lands devoted to agricultural uses are subject to CARP, and owners of such lands need to consider the rights of tenants, farmers, and farmworkers. These are burdens not imposed upon owners of lands devoted to non-agricultural uses. As these cases demonstrate, the existence of agricultural lands are incompatible with tourism development, for it limits and delays the latter, which may ultimately discourage investors; thus, defeating the purpose for establishing a tourist zone.

Now as to whether particular parcels of land within the tourist zone are to be used as residential, industrial, or commercial (but still in furtherance of tourism purposes), it can be subsequently determined under the zone development plan which, according to Letter of Instructions No. 352, the PTA must formulate in coordination with the DOT, LGUs, and other government agencies.

While Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde may be applied as judicial precedents in this case, the same cannot be said for DAR v. Franco.⁶²

DAR v. Franco involved Presidential Proclamation No. 2052 that declares as a tourist zone the Barangays of Sibugay, Malubog, Babag and Sirao, including the proposed Lusaran Dam in the City of Cebu, and the Municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete in the Province of Cebu. Franco, the landowner, protested the MARO and PARO orders fixing provisional leasehold rentals for his 36.8-hectare land in Babag, Cebu City. Franco argued that by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 2052, issued on 30 January 1981, his land was already reclassified as non-agricultural, prior to the effectivity of the CARL on 15 June 1988, thus, exempting said property from CARP coverage. The DARAB ruled in Franco’s favor, but one DARAB member made a handwritten note under his signature stating that Franco would still have to apply for conversion and if granted, the occupants of his land would be entitled to disturbance compensation. Franco appealed to the Court of Appeals questioning the handwritten note of the DARAB member. The Court of Appeals ruled that Franco did not have to apply for conversion of his land, but should still apply for exemption clearance from the DAR. On the matter of compensation, the appellate court held that the occupants of the land are not entitled to disturbance compensation absent any proof that they are tenants, farmers, or bona fide occupants thereof. The DAR then brought the case on appeal to this Court.

The Court pronounced in DAR v. Franco that:

A separate opinion cannot be a proper subject of an appeal. More so in this case where what was appealed in the appellate court was a one-sentence handwritten note of a DARAB member. It is not even the opinion of the DARAB but is merely the personal view of a DARAB member. The appellate court should have dismissed the petition which appealed not the DARAB decision itself but a mere note of a DARAB member which is not part of the DARAB decision. As held in Bernas v. Court of Appeals, "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue and that a judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something upon which the parties were not heard is not merely irregular, but extrajudicial and invalid."

Indeed, the ruling of the appellate court that private petitioners have no right to disturbance compensation because they have not proven that they are tenants of Franco’s land went beyond the DARAB decision being appealed. The determination of entitlement to disturbance compensation is still premature at this stage since this case originally involved only the issue of nullity of the Provisional Lease Rental Orders. Further, it is the DAR that can best determine and identify the legitimate tenants who have a right to disturbance compensation.

The Court then proceeded to mention that the DAR Secretary issued an Order on 30 August 1994, finding that "the specific intent of Proclamation No. 2052 is the identification of areas for tourism with the implication that the other areas within the proclamation but no longer necessary for tourism development as determined by the PTA, in this case, could be transferred for agrarian reform purposes to the DAR." After mention of the DAR Secretary’s Order, the Court wrote:

Thus, the DAR Regional Office VII, in coordination with the Philippine Tourism Authority, has to determine precisely which areas are for tourism development and excluded from the Operation Land Transfer and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. And suffice it to state here that the Court has repeatedly ruled that lands already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988 do not need any conversion clearance. (Emphasis ours.)

Apparently, the Court, in the first sentence in the afore-quoted paragraph from Franco, was not making a ruling, but only taking note of the contents of the 30 August 1994 Order of the DAR Secretary. Even if the Court was making a judicial determination with said statement, it must be remembered that Franco’s appeal to the Court of Appeals raised the sole issue of the handwritten note of the DARAB member, and it was the only issue which the Court can take cognizance of on appeal in DAR v. Franco. Any declaration by the Court in said case, unrelated to the issue raised on appeal, is but obiter dictum.

An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.⁶³

The DAR objects to the mention by Roxas & Co. of the neighboring hacienda in Nasugbu, owned by the Group Developers and Financiers, Inc. (GDFI), which has not been subjected to CARP and is already being developed into a resort complex. The DAR explains that Roxas & Co. cannot claim unequal protection of the law since it is not similarly situated as GDFI. The hacienda of GDFI was covered by an application for conversion, not exemption, and it was approved by the DAR Secretary way back on 27 March 1975, even before the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 on 28 November 1975. The approval of the conversion was based on the finding that the hacienda of GDFI was not suitable for agricultural purposes. Although the succeeding Order dated 22 January 1991 of the DAR Secretary, denying the Motion for Reconsideration therein, did mention Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, the more important thing is that the original disposition granting the conversion, rendered more than 16 years earlier, did not rely at all on said proclamation.

Still, the case of GDFI was not only brought up to support the argument that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 already reclassified all agricultural lands in Nasugbu to non-agricultural uses; but also to hold the DAR to its finding that the hacienda of GDFI is unsuitable for agricultural purposes because of soil and topographical characteristics.⁶⁴ If such is the condition of the hacienda of GDFI, then how far different can it be from those of the adjoining Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, and Palico of Roxas & Co.? Nevertheless, the actual condition of the three haciendas is already immaterial in light of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, which declared the whole of Nasugbu part of a tourist zone, consequently, reclassifying all agricultural lands therein, whether actually suited for agriculture or not, to non-agricultural uses.

There is no dispute that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 has the force and effect of law, since "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the former President (Ferdinand E. Marcos) are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President."⁶⁵

It cannot be said that the CARL repealed Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, whether expressly or impliedly.

Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 is not among the laws expressly repealed by the CARL in the latter’s Section 76:

Section 76. Repealing Clause. – Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, Presidential Decree No. 316, the last two paragraphs of Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, Presidential Decree No. 1038, and all other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, issuances or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Neither can it be said that the CARL impliedly repealed Presidential Proclamation No. 1520. As a rule, repeal by implication is frowned upon, unless there is clear showing that the later statute is so inconsistent and repugnant to the existing law that they cannot be reconciled and made to stand together.⁶⁶ The CARL is not inconsistent with or repugnant to Presidential Proclamation No. 1520. In truth, there is no point at which the two laws pertain to the same thing for them to be in conflict with each other. Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 was issued on 28 November 1975 declaring the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province as a tourist zone, thus, reclassifying all agricultural lands located therein to non-agricultural uses. When CARL took effect on 15 June 1988, its scope was limited to public and private agricultural lands,⁶⁷ which no longer include the previously reclassified parcels of land in Maragondon, Ternate, and Nasugbu. It is this very reason that entitles Roxas & Co. to an exemption clearance for Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, and Palico, under DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994.

Irrefragably, a finding that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, in declaring the whole of Nasugbu part of a tourist zone, had also reclassified all of the agricultural lands therein to non-agricultural uses, will have significant impact on the resolution of the other five Petitions at bar.

B. CARP Exemption of Certain Lots in Hacienda Palico, based on Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982 (G.R. No. 149548, No. 179650, and No. 167505)

Prior to the filing of its application for exemption of the three haciendas from CARP Coverage based on Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, Roxas & Co. had already filed applications for exemption of certain lots, all located within Hacienda Palico: (1) DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 covered six lots, with an aggregate area of 51.54 hectares, now the subject of both G.R. No. 149548 and No. 179650; and (2) DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 covered nine lots, with an aggregate area of 45.977 hectares, now the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co. filed the applications under DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, based on the claim that said lots have been reclassified to non-agricultural uses by virtue of Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu on 18 April 1982, and approved by the HSRC, now HLURB, under Resolution No. 123, dated 4 May 1983.

The Petitions of DAMBA-NFSW in G.R. No. 179650 and No. 167505 separately assail the grant by the DAR Secretary of the applications for exemption of Roxas & Co. in DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98, respectively, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Without directly challenging the validity of Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance, No. 4, series of 1982, which admittedly enjoys the presumption of validity, DAMBA-NFSW disputes instead the grant of the two applications for exemption on the ground that the provisions of said Municipal Zoning Ordinance were "too vague" to support the claim of Roxas & Co. that its lots are within the non-agricultural zones. DAMBA-NFSW also points out that since the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, failed to specify the area size covered by the residential, industrial, and commercial zones, it is difficult to determine whether the lots of Roxas & Co. could actually be found therein. DAMBA-NFSW finally questions the lack of notice to its members of the filing by Roxas & Co. of the applications for exemption in DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98.

I reiterate my stance in G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543 that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, issued on 28 November 1975, had declared the whole Municipality of Nasugbu as part of a tourist zone, thereby devoting all lands therein to tourism development, and consequently reclassifying all agricultural lands therein to non-agricultural uses. This renders the Petitions of DAMBA-NFSW in G.R. No. 179650 and No. 167505 moot and academic, since the exemption of the whole necessarily includes the exemption of the parts constituting the same.

The lots involved in G.R. No. 179650 and No. 167505, being undisputedly located within Hacienda Palico in Nasugbu, were already reclassified to non-agricultural uses by Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 upon its issuance on 28 November 1975. The subsequent enactment of Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu on 18 April 1982 no longer served to reclassify the lots in G.R. No. 179650 and No. 167505 from agricultural to non-agricultural, but merely identified the particular non-agricultural use (i.e., residential, industrial, or commercial) for the same according to the zone or district in which they are located.

That a court will not sit for the purpose of trying moot cases and spend its time in deciding questions the resolution of which can not in any way affect the rights of the person or persons presenting them is well settled. Where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.⁶⁸

As for the Petition of Roxas & Co. in G.R. No. 149548, its resolution relies on the outcome of the Petitions in G.R. No. 167845 and No. 169163, involving the partial and complete cancellations of CLOA No. 6654.

To recall, the Court of Appeals, in its 30 May 2001 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 63146, did not divest Roxas & Co. of the latter’s right to present additional evidence before the DAR in support of its claim in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97, that the six lots in Hacienda Palico, with an aggregate area of 51.54 hectares, are exempt from CARP coverage pursuant to the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982. At the same time, in view of the ruling of this Court in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, recognizing the rights of farmer-beneficiaries to possess and till the parcels of land awarded to them under CLOA No. 6654, the appellate court allowed the DAR to proceed with installing the farmer-beneficiaries on the six lots, without prejudice to the final determination of the right of Roxas & Co. over the said properties. Thus, in its Petition in G.R. No. 149548, Roxas & Co. is appealing the alleged premature installation of the farmer-beneficiaries on the six lots.

Vital herein is the ruling of the Court in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, wherein it refused to short-circuit the administrative process and did not nullify the CLOAs issued to the farmer-beneficiaries. It gave the DAR a chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. The Court took note that since 1993 until the present, the farmer-beneficiaries have been cultivating their lands; and it goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till. The Court, though, also stated that the farmer-beneficiaries should hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land.

Stated otherwise, the Court, in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, left the matter of cancellation of the CLOAs issued to farmer-beneficiaries to the determination by the DAR in the proper administrative proceedings. Unless and until such CLOAs are cancelled, the farmer-beneficiaries have a right to the possession of the parcels of land covered by said certificates.

The six lots subject of G.R. No. 149548 (as well as G.R. No. 179650) are covered by CLOA No. 6654. As a result, the question of the right of the farmer-beneficiaries to the possession of said six lots in G.R. No. 149548 is inextricably entwined with the issues on the partial and complete cancellations of CLOA No. 6654 raised in G.R. No. 167845 and No. 169163.

C. Petitions for Partial and Complete Cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 (G.R. No. 167845 and No. 169163)

DAMBA-NFSW maintains that the petitions of Roxas & Co. in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 and No. 401-239-2001, for the partial and complete cancellations, respectively, of CLOA No. 6654, are in violation of the ruling of the Court in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals that the issued CLOAs "cannot and should not be cancelled." It anchors its argument on the penultimate paragraph in the 17 December 1999 Decision of the Court in said case, which reads:

Finally, we stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA’s already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993.92 Since then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands.93 It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land.

DAMBA-NFSW evidently misunderstood the afore-quoted paragraph in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals. There is nothing therein categorically prohibiting the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to the farmer-beneficiaries. What the Court plainly said was that despite its finding that the DAR failed to comply with due process in the acquisition proceedings, the Court still had no power to nullify the CLOAs because such matter lies within the primary jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DARAB, which has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for cancellation of CLOAs, cannot be precluded from acting on and granting such petitions filed by Roxas & Co.

The farmer-beneficiaries did not acquire vested rights over the lands covered by their CLOAs, by virtue of Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals. The Court only recognized in said case their rights to continue to possess and till the parcels of land covered by their CLOAs until the DAR has undertaken proper acquisition proceedings. But the Court, in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, did not (1) guarantee the success of the acquisition proceedings over all the lands covered by the CLOAs; (2) affirm the validity of the CLOAs and the absolute right of the farmer-beneficiaries thereunder; nor (3) discount the possibility that in the course of the acquisition proceedings, the DAR would decide to exempt all or certain parcels of land from CARP coverage, cancel some or all of the CLOAs, or disqualify some or all of the farmer-beneficiaries. The Court merely left all of these matters to the determination of the DAR, which has primary jurisdiction over the same.

In her 21 May 2001 Joint Order in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001, the PARAD granted the partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 insofar as it covered three lots, Lot 125-K, Lot-125-M, and Lot-125-L, located within Hacienda Palico, and with a total area of 103.1436 hectares. Similarly, in her 27 May 2001 Decision in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001, the PARAD granted the complete cancellation of CLOA No. 6654. The PARAD denied the Motions for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NSFW for being filed one day beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The PARAD also refused to give due course to the Notice of Appeal of DAMBA-NFSW for again being filed beyond the reglementary period.1avvphi

The reglementary periods for the filing of a motion for reconsideration and the succeeding appeal are governed by Section 12 of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, which stated:

Section 12. Motion for Reconsideration. – Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the order, resolution or decision of the Board or Adjudicator, a party may file a motion for reconsideration of such order or decision , together with proof of service of one (1) copy thereof upon the adverse party. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed a party which shall be based on the ground that: (a) the findings of fact in the said decision, order or resolution was not supported by substantial evidence, or (b) the conclusions stated therein are against the law or jurisprudence.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period within (which) the appeal must be perfected. If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right of perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal.

DAMBA-NFSW received both the 21 May 2001 Joint Order in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 and 27 May 2001 Decision in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 on 13 June 2001. It had until 28 June 2001 to file its Motions for Reconsideration. DAMBA-NFSW claims to have filed via registered mail on 28 June 2001 its Motions for Reconsideration, and filed by personal delivery on 29 June 2001 additional copies of said Motions. The PARAD, in her 10 July 2001 Joint Resolution, dismissed both Motions for Reconsideration, finding that they were filed one day late, on 29 June 2001. Apparently working against the claim of DAMBA-NFSW was its failure to attach the actual registry receipt to prove that it sent its Motions for Reconsideration by registered mail on 28 June 2001, instead of a mere handwritten notation of the registry receipt number on the said Motions.

Even conceding that the said Motions for Reconsideration were filed on 28 June 2001, the Notice of Appeal of DAMBA-NFSW was unmistakably filed beyond the reglementary period for appeal. DAMBA-NFSW received a copy of the 10 July 2001 Resolution of the PARAD denying its Motions for Reconsideration on 21 August 2001. Considering that DAMBA-NFSW filed its Motions for Reconsideration on the 15th day of the reglementary period, pursuant to Section 12 of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, it had only one more day from receipt of the denial of its Motions to file its appeal, which, in this case, would be on 22 August 2001. This is in accord with the rule that says a motion for reconsideration only suspends the period within which the appeal should be perfected. In case of denial of the motion for reconsideration, as in these cases, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. Erroneously believing it had a fresh 15-day reglementary period though, DAMBA-NFSW filed its Notice of Appeal on 5 September 2001.

In Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals,⁶⁹ this Court declared that:

The filing of a notice of appeal is no idle ceremony. Its office is to elevate the case on appeal to DARAB without which appellate jurisdiction is not conferred. Neither PARAD nor DARAB is permitted to enlarge the constricted manner by which an appeal is perfected. Liberal construction of DARAB rules is unavailable to produce the effect of a perfected appeal.

Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal as required by the Rules had the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. This doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice (Filcon Manufacturing Corp. v. NLRC, 199 SCRA 814). And nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable (Nuñal v. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 26; Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250). Failure to meet the requirements of an appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain any appeal. This principle applies to judgments of courts and of quasi-judicial agencies (Vega v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 89 SCRA 140).

Since the decision of the PARAD had become final and executory, the same could no longer be altered, much less, reversed by the DARAB. Hence, the DARAB had no appellate jurisdiction over the petitioner’s appeal. A substantial modification of a decision of a quasi-judicial agency which had become final and executory is utterly void.

The counsel for DAMBA-NFSW admits that she had misread the rules on the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal before the DARAB, but she pleads for the relaxation of technical rules so as to prevent the miscarriage of justice for the hundreds of farmer-beneficiaries of CLOA No. 6654 and their families.

While it may be acknowledged that there are exceptional circumstances warranting the acceptance of the appeal despite its late filing,⁷⁰ none exists at the case at bar. Quite beyond cavil, the delay incurred by the counsel of DAMBA-NFSW in filing the Notice of Appeal, totaling 14 days, was simply inexcusable. This Court had already held that "(a)n erroneous application of the law or rules is not excusable error."⁷¹

There is also little merit to the appeals of DAMBA-NFSW in both DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 (G.R. No. 167845) and DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 (G.R. No. 169163) as to warrant being given due course, despite their belated filing.

DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001, in particular, involve the applications for partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 as regards three lots. The basis for said application is the final and executory Decision dated 2 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299, which adjudged the three lots to be exempt from CARP coverage, having been reclassified by the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, to residential use, and which should have been excluded from CLOA No. 6654.

Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.⁷²

Litigation must at some time be terminated, even at the risk of occasional errors. Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality.⁷³

Apparent from the foregoing are the two-fold purposes for the doctrine of the immutability and inalterability of a final judgment: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Obviously, the first purpose is in line with the dictum that justice delayed is justice denied. But said dictum presupposes that the court properly appreciates the facts and the applicable law to arrive at a judicious decision. The end should always be the meting out of justice. As to the second purpose, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. It must be adjudicated properly and seasonably to better serve the ends of justice and to place everything in proper perspective. In the process, the possibility that errors may be committed in the rendition of a decision cannot be discounted.⁷⁴

The only recognized exceptions to the foregoing doctrine are the corrections of clerical errors or the making of the so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no prejudice to any party, and, where the judgment is void.⁷⁵ Void judgments may be classified into two groups: those rendered by a court without jurisdiction to do so and those obtained by fraud or collusion.⁷⁶ None of these exceptions can be applied to the final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299.

It can be said herein that the questions relating to the exemption of the three lots from CARP coverage and their exclusion from CLOA No. 6654 had been settled with finality by the Court of Appeals in its 2 April 1996 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299. Therefore, the PARAD was correct in saying in her 21 May 2001 Joint Order in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 that it had become merely ministerial on her part to order the partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654. The directive of the Court of Appeals in its 10 September 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72198 for DARAB to still give due course to the appeal of DAMBA-NFSW of the partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, no longer serves any practical purpose since the DARAB can no longer modify in any way the findings and conclusions made by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299, nor sidestep the inevitable consequences thereof, i.e., partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654.

On the other hand, in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001, the PARAD ordered the complete cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 after finding technical defects in the subdivision survey used for the said certificate, which rendered the survey null. These technical defects became apparent only after the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299, ordered the exemption from CARP coverage of the three lots and their exclusion from CLOA No. 6654.

When Hacienda Palico was compulsorily placed under the CARP, a segregation and subdivision survey was conducted by Engr. Miguel V. Pangilinan (Pangilinan) on 22 April to 24 June 1993. Engr. Pangilinan incorrectly plotted his survey using the old subdivision plan, Psd-04-016141 (OLT), which was already cancelled and superseded on 10 July 1991 by subdivision plan Psd-04-6912, LRC Record 102. And, based on the result of Engr. Pangilinan’s defective survey, a new subdivision plan, Bsd-041019-003090 (AR), was approved on 6 October 1993, segregating the 513.9863 hectares subsequently awarded to the farmer-beneficiaries under CLOA No. 6654.

Moreover, my resolution of the Petitions in G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543 already renders nugatory the giving of due course to the appeals of DAMBA-NFSW to the DARAB of the partial and complete cancellations of CLOA No. 6654 by the PARAD.

As previously established herein, Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, and Palico are exempt from CARP coverage, under DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, since Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 had already declared the whole of Nasugbu as part of a tourist zone and reclassified all agricultural lands therein to non-agricultural uses, long before the effectivity of the CARL. Being exempt from CARP coverage, no CLOAs could have been validly issued by the DAR to farmer-beneficiaries over the parcels of land in the three haciendas. Even if the appeals of DAMBA-NFSW in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 (G.R. No. 167845) and DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 (G.R. No. 169163) are given due course before the DARAB, the inescapable fate of CLOA No. 6654 is its complete cancellation because the land it covers is actually exempt from CARP coverage.

With the complete cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, on the basis that the parcels of land covered thereby are exempt from CARP coverage, then there is no more legal obstacle to Roxas & Co., as the rightful owner, from recovering title and possession to the said properties, including the six lots subject of G.R. No. 149548, from the farmer-beneficiaries who have possessed and tilled the same only in trust (save only for the payment of appropriate disturbance compensation, as will be subsequently discussed herein). Hence, the Petition of Roxas & Co. in G.R. No. 149548 – seeking an injunction against the installation by the DAR of the farmer-beneficiaries on the six lots until CLOA No. 6654 covering the said properties is cancelled – has been rendered moot and academic.

D. Forum Shopping

All throughout the seven Petitions presently before this Court, there is the repeated allegation by DAMBA-NFSW that Roxas & Co. committed forum-shopping by the institution of several cases before the DAR Secretary, DARAB, and the courts.

There is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one forum or, it may be added, in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari, raising identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Forum-shopping exists when two or more actions involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances; and raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Yet another indication is when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other case. The test is whether in the two or more pending cases there is an identity of (a) parties, (b) rights or causes of action, and (c) reliefs sought.

After a meticulous study of the all the instant Petitions, I find that there has been no forum-shopping on the part of Roxas & Co., there being substantial differences in the cases it instituted. For the sake of brevity, I have summed up, in table form, the various cases filed by Roxas & Co. as regards its landholdings in Nasugbu:

Case	Original Forum	Subject Matter	Nature
CA-G.R. SP No. 32484 (Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals)	Court of Appeals	Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, Palico	Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, seeking to prevent the DAR from further proceedings to acquire the three haciendas and compel the DAR to approve its application for conversion
DAR Admin. Case No. A-9999-084-00 (G.R. No. 167540)	DAR Regional Office	Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, Palico	Application for exemption from CARP coverage based on Presidential Proclamation No. 1520
DAR Admin. Case No. A-9999-142-97 (G.R. No. 149548 and No. 179650)	DAR Regional Office	Six lots, measuring 51.5472 hectares, part of Hacienda Palico	Application for exemption from CARP coverage based on Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982
G.R. No. 149548	Supreme Court	Six lots, measuring 51.5472 hectares, part of Hacienda Palico	Petition for Review assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63146 allowing DAR to install the farmer-beneficiaries on the six lots, while Roxas & Co. is presenting additional evidence in DAR Admin. Case No. A-9999-142-97
DAR Admin. Case No. A-9999-008-98. (G.R. No. 167505)	DAR Regional Office	Nine lots, measuring 45.977 hectares, part of Hacienda Palico	Application for exemption from CARP coverage based on Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982
Unable to determine docket no. from the records (CA-G.R. SP No. 36299)	DAR Regional Office	Three lots, measuring 103.1436, part of Hacienda Palico and covered by CLOA No. 6654	Protest seeking the exclusion of the three lots from CLOA No. 6654, citing the exemption thereof from CARP Coverage by virtue of Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982
DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 (G.R. No. 167845)	DARAB	Three lots, subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 36299, covered by CLOA No. 6654	Petition for partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, insofar as the three lots are concerned, given the final and executory judgment of the Court of appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299 declaring said property exempt from CARP coverage
DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 (G.R. No. 169163)	DARAB	The remaining 410.8327 hectares, covered by CLOA No. 6654	Petition for total or complete cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 for being null and void given the technical defects in the survey plan on which said certificate was based

There is no basis then for the Court to dismiss any of the foregoing cases on the ground of forum-shopping by Roxas & Co.

It is worthy to note that the seemingly repetitive filing of administrative cases by Roxas & Co. may actually be due to its strict compliance with DAR rules. Even though they may involve the very same landholdings, applications for exemption from CARP coverage and petitions for cancellation of CLOAs fall within the jurisdictions of separate DAR offices: the Office of the DAR Secretary for the former, and the DARAB for the latter.

The DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the administrative implementation of the CARL and other agrarian reform laws, and what would later be referred to as Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases.⁷⁷ Applications for exemptions fall under such cases. According to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, applications for exemptions shall be filed with the DAR Regional Office where the subject parcel of land is located, but only the DAR Secretary shall sign the Order granting or denying the exemption.

On the other hand, petitions for cancellation of issued CLOAs are considered agrarian reform disputes,⁷⁸ since they relate to terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landlord to agrarian reform beneficiaries, the exclusive original jurisdiction over which is vested with the DARAB.⁷⁹ DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994, provides that the land with issued CLOAs found to be exempt from CARP coverage may be cancelled only upon the application of the landowner with the DARAB.

The foregoing distinction was the reason why the DAR Secretary included in the dispositive of his Orders dated 6 November 2002 and 6 January 2003, granting the applications for exemption of Roxas & Co. in DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-008-98 (G.R. No. 167505) and No. A-9999-142-97 (G.R. No. 179650), respectively, the following statement: "The cancellation of the CLOA issued to the farmer-beneficiaries shall be subject of a separate proceeding before the PARAD of Batangas."

E. Supervening Events

The DAR, in its Memorandum, brought to the attention of this Court the following supervening events which transpired during the pendency of the present Petitions:

First, the Sangguniang Bayan ng Nasugbu, Batangas has completed the formulation of its Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Municipal Zoning Ordinance of 2002 which was approved by the HLURB in 2005.

Based on the aforestated documents, the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator/Zoning Administrator of Nasugbu, Batangas certified that Roxas’ properties are within the "Inland Mixed-Use District" of the Comprehensive Land Use Plan.

Second, in Executive Order No. 647 dated August 3, 2007, President Arroyo proclaimed as Special Tourism Zone the areas included in the Nasugbu Tourism Development Plan as prepared by the Municipality of Nasugbu and validated by the Philippine Tourism Authority as tourist priority areas. Section 2 of Executive Order No. 647 states:

Section 2. Creation of a Special Tourism Zone. – Areas included in the Nasugbu Tourism Development Plan prepared by the Municipality of Nasugbu and validated by the Philippine Tourism Authority as Tourism Priority Areas are hereby proclaimed Special Tourism Zone.

Third, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu caused the preparation and approved the Nasugbu Tourism Development Plan which covered thirty-one (31) out of the total forty-two (42) barangays in the municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. In a Certification dated December 10, 2008, PTA informed the President that it had completed the validation of twenty-one (21) barangays in Nasugbu, Batangas as tourism priority areas pursuant to Executive Order No. 647.

x x x x

At present, Congress has enacted Republic Act No. 9593, otherwise known as "The Tourism Act of 2009." It provides that "tourism enterprise zones" shall only be designated after a development plan is approved by Tourism Infrastructure and Enterprise Zone Authority (TIEZA) formerly Philippine Tourism Authority and the local government unit concerned through a resolution. It likewise declared that the lands identified as part of a tourism zone shall qualify for exemption from coverage of RA 6557 of the Agrarian Reform Law.

Now the Court is faced with the question of what is the effect of the afore-mentioned supervening events to the Petitions at bar?

I answer, none.

The Applications for Exemption of Roxas & Co. had been filed pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, which implements DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990. According to said administrative order, the DAR may only exercise its authority to approve conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses from the date of effectivity of the CARL on 15 June 1988. Thus, all lands that were already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential prior to 15 June 1988 need no longer secure conversion clearance from the DAR. Instead, such lands shall be covered by an exemption clearance.

Since all the supervening events recited by the DAR in its Memorandum took place after 15 June 1988, they do not have any impact on how the applications of Roxas & Co. for exemption clearance under Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, should be resolved. The Nasugbu Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Municipal Zoning Ordinance of 2002; Executive Order No. 647, Nasugbu Tourism Development Plan; and the Tourism Act of 2009, can only be applied prospectively, for they do not provide for their retroactivity.⁸⁰ They could not be deemed to have the effect of retroactively reclassifying the landholdings of Roxas & Co. from agricultural to non-agricultural before 15 June 1988, or of reversing the same. Indeed, the construction and implementation of these new laws, development and land use plans, and zoning ordinances, involving Nasugbu, must take into consideration that as early as 28 November 1975, Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 had declared Nasugbu as part of a tourist zone and, resultantly, reclassified all the agricultural land therein to non-agricultural uses.

F. Final Considerations

KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW submits that for the Court to rule that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, in declaring Maragondon, Ternate, and Nasugbu, as a tourist zone, also had the effect of reclassifying all agricultural lands in said Municipalities to non-agricultural uses, would be a huge setback to the CARP and its social justice goals. They provided a survey of several other presidential proclamations and statutes that were similarly worded as Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, and covering even wider expanse of land, such as provinces and whole islands, to wit:

(a) Proclamation No. 1653 (issued July 13, 1977) declared the whole province of Ilocos Norte as a tourist zone because "certain areas" particularly the shorelines in the Province of Ilocos Norte "have potential tourism value after being developed into resorts for its foreign and domestic market."

(b) Proclamation No. 1801 (issued on November 10, 1070 [sic]) declared the whole islands, coves and peninsula – including Camiguin, Puerto Princesa, Siquijor, Panglao Islan in Bohol – as tourist zones because of these areas’ natural beauty and potentials for aquatic spots (sic), tourism, and the interest of marine life preservation.

(c) Proclamation No. 2052 (issued on January 30, 1981), declared four whole barangay of Sibugay, Malubog, Babag and Sirao including the proposed Lusaran Dam in the City of Cebu and the municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete in the Province of Cebu as tourist zones because "certain areas" within the zone have potential tourism value after being developed into resort complexes for the foreign and domestic market;

(d) Proclamation No. 2067 (issued on March 11, 1981), declared the whole province of Bataan as a tourist zone because there is a need to establish an export processing zone in Mariveles, as one would find Dambanang Kagitingan therein, and because Bataan has "untapped scenic and beautiful spots with tourism potential"; and

(e) Republic Act No. 8022 (May 25, 1995) declared the municipalities of Boac, Buenavist (sic) and Torrijos in the province of Marinduque as tourist zones.

KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW alleged that the DAR had already issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries thousands of CLOAs covering parcels of land in the afore-mentioned tourist zones, which would have to be cancelled.

Firstly, while I am aware of the previously-issued CLOAs and the upheaval my position on Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 may cause on the CARP, these must not sway the Court to depart from the plain and obvious meaning of said presidential proclamation. As one authority on statutory construction so satisfactorily explained:

Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. Where the law is clear and free from doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Thus, where what is not clearly provided in the law is read into the law by construction because it is more logical and wise, it would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law, which is judicial legislation. For whether a statute is wise or expedient is not for the courts to determine. Courts must administer the law, not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.⁸¹

Secondly, to be entitled to exemption from CARP coverage under DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, the agricultural lands should have been reclassified to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL on 15 June 1988. Hence, the declaration of the Municipalities of Boac, Buenavista, and Torrijos in Marinduque Province as a tourist zone by Republic Act No. 8022, which lapsed into law on 25 May 1995 without the President’s signature, will not qualify the parcels of land in said Municipalities to CARP exemption under DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994.

Thirdly, petitions for cancellation of CLOAs are governed by DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994. The scope of said administrative order is defined as follows:

II. Scope

These rules shall apply to the Registered CLOAs from the time and date of issuance thereof by the DAR up to the tenth year, when the legal restriction on its conveyance or alienation of the recipient ARB ends in accordance with Sec. 27, R.A. No. 6657. However, if the ARB concerned has not yet fully paid the cost of the land or his obligations pertaining to the land in the case of public lands, beyond the tenth year from the issuance of the CLOA, then these rules shall continue to apply.

However, if the land has been acquired under P.D. No. 27 or E.O. No. 228, ownership may be transferred after full payment of amortization by the ARB.

Insofar as they are applicable, these rules shall likewise cover patents, EPs and CLOAs issued to settlers in resettlement areas under the administration or disposition of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Based on the foregoing, no petition for cancellation of CLOA may be filed anymore if 10 years have already passed from the date of issuance of said certificate by the DAR, unless the beneficiary has not yet fully paid the cost of the land or the obligations pertaining to the land, in case of public land. The reason behind this rule is that the beneficiary may already legally convey or alienate the land to another person after the expiration of the 10-year period of restriction, reckoned from the date of issuance of the CLOA covering said property.

And fourthly, bona fide tenants of the parcels of land are not to be left empty-handed. According to Section 36(1) of Republic Act No. 3844,⁸² as amended by Republic Act No. 6389⁸³:

Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions – An agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years.

The reliance of Roxas & Co. on Bacaling v. Muya⁸⁴ in support of its assertion that farmer-beneficiaries cannot claim disturbance compensation for lots that are not and have never been available for agrarian reform, is unavailing. In Bacaling v. Muya, there is an express finding by the Court that there was no valid agricultural leasehold relationship.⁸⁵ Respondents therein are not agricultural tenants, and are not entitled to the benefits accorded by agrarian law, among which, was disturbance compensation.

It is clear in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals⁸⁶ that agricultural tenants who are dispossessed because of the reclassification of the landholding is entitled to disturbance compensation. Also, in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, under which Roxas & Co. filed its application for CARP exemption, lists among the requirements "[p]roof of payment of disturbance compensation if the area is being occupied by farmers, x x x" Therefore, Roxas & Co. cannot escape payment of disturbance compensation to its agricultural tenants who shall be dispossessed by the reclassification of the three haciendas to non-agricultural uses; and it cannot claim that it is offering to pay said tenants disturbance compensation out of pure liberality.

The proposed compensation and accommodation packages of Roxas & Co. are presented below:

The "beneficiaries" will be grouped according to: (A) former tenants, shareholders and leaseholders of ROXAS; (B) Original CLOA holders/awardees who have no contractual relationship with ROXAS but were merely installed by the DAR in the ROXAS landholdings; and (C) illegal settlers and speculators who, without any CLOA, surreptitiously entered and occupied the subject landholdings and/or may have been assignees of the original CLOA awardees.

GROUP A

For Group A, disturbance compensation shall be paid to qualified beneficiaries in accordance with Section 36(1) of R.A. 3844, as amended by R.A. 6389. Group A members shall not be asked to surrender possession of their awarded lot until and unless disturbance compensation, in accordance with law, has been paid to them.

Moreover, those who have built improvements within the residential clusters shall be allowed to own the lot, not exceeding 100 square meters, upon which the improvement was built, at no cost to them. Any area in excess of 100 square meters shall be surrendered to ROXAS immediately, subject to the preceding paragraph. Group A members who are within the residential clusters are given an option to stay at the residential clusters or to relocate in the relocation areas.

For Group A members who have built improvements on areas outside the residential clusters, they shall be permitted to stay on their home lots (but not exceeding 100 square meters) until a relocation site chosen by ROXAS has been selected and utilities for basic services (right of way, water and electricity) are ready for their use and each shall be entitled to one lot, not exceeding 100 square meters, at no cost to them. Any area in excess of 100 square meters shall be surrendered to ROXAS immediately, subject to the payment of disturbance compensation as discussed above.

Each barangay where ROXAS has landholdings shall have one relocation site in proportion to the number of Group A members residing thereat. This is to minimize, as much as possible, dislocation on the part of the Group A members. Areas in the relocation site shall be uniform. ROXAS reserves the right to cluster the barangay relocation areas to contiguous and accessible sites according to the demands of the development in these areas.

Furthermore, the Roxas Gargollo Foundation, in cooperation with the Technical Skills and Development Authority, shall conduct a series of livelihood and training programs for the benefit of Group A members.

GROUP B

Group B members are not entitled to disturbance or whatever kind of compensation.

For Group B members who have built improvements within the residential clusters, they shall be allowed to buy in installment the lot upon which the improvement was built, but not exceeding 100 square meters, at prevailing market value. Any area in excess of 100 square meters shall be surrendered immediately to ROXAS.

For those who have built improvements on areas outside the residential clusters, they shall be permitted to stay on their home lots (but not exceeding 100 square meters) until a relocation site chosen by ROXAS has been selected and utilities for basic services (right of way, water and electricity) are ready for their use. Each shall be allowed to buy in installment one relocation lot, not exceeding 100 square meters, at prevailing market value. Any area in excess of their home lot shall be surrendered immediately to ROXAS.

Areas in the relocation site shall be uniform. Original CLOA holders/awardees have the option to choose which area to buy. Each barangay, over which ROXAS has landholdings, shall have one relocation site in proportion to the number of original CLOA holders residing thereat. Again, this is to minimize, as much as possible, dislocation on the part of the Group B members. ROXAS reserves the right to cluster the barangay relocation areas to contiguous and accessible sites according to the demands of the development in these areas. Furthermore, the Roxas Gargallo Foundation, in cooperation with the Technical Skills and Development Authority, shall conduct a series of livelihood and training programs for the benefit of the original CLOA holders/awardees.

GROUP C

For those who belong to Group C, they have to vacate immediately the premises and surrender possession of the subject properties, without any compensation. However, they shall be allowed to remove the improvements that they have introduced to the subject landholdings.

Since the afore-quoted proposed compensation and accommodation packages by Roxas & Co. are not only in accord, but even in excess of what the law requires, it is worthy of approval by this Court.

I am not cowed by accusations that my position on the instant Petitions is contrary to social justice, because it is substantially favors Roxas & Co., the landowners. Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution recognize the right of the landowners, alongside the farmers and farmworkers, in the implementation of the CARP. It has been declared, furthermore, that the duty of the Court to protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side.⁸⁷ As this Court unhesitatingly declared in Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (ARBA) v. Nicolas⁸⁸:

This Court can not sit idly and allow a government instrumentality to trample on the rights of bona fide landowners in the blind race for what it proclaims as social justice. As Justice Isagani Cruz succinctly held, social justice is to be afforded to all:

x x x social justice - or any justice for that matter - is for the deserving whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor simply because they are poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to eject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.

IV
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO

Even given the ruling of the majority that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 did not convert all agricultural lands within the Municipality of Nasugbu to non-agricultural uses, I still submit that the we should not sweepingly grant the Petitions and prayers of KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW in the Petitions at bar. It must be remembered that particular properties of Roxas & Co. in G.R. No. 149548, No. 179650, and No. 167505 were already determined in appropriate proceedings before the DAR Secretary, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, to be exempt from CARP pursuant to the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982.

Quoting from McQuillin,⁸⁹ the Court described zoning in Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac⁹⁰ as follows:

Zoning is governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or zones. It is comprehensive where it is governed by a single plan for the entire municipality and prevails throughout the municipality in accordance with that plan. It is partial or limited where it is applicable only to a certain part of the municipality or to certain uses. Fire limits, height districts and building regulations are forms of partial or limited zoning or use regulation that are antecedents of modern comprehensive zoning. (pp. 11-12.)

The term "zoning," ordinarily used with the connotation of comprehensive or general zoning, refers to governmental regulation of the use of land and buildings according to districts or zones. This regulation must and does utilize classification of uses within districts as well as classification of districts, inasmuch as it manifestly is impossible to deal specifically with each of the innumerable uses made of land and buildings. Accordingly, zoning has been defined as the confining of certain classes of buildings and uses to certain localities, areas, districts or zones. It has been stated that zoning is the regulation by districts of building development and uses of property, and that the term "zoning" is not only capable of this definition but has acquired a technical and artificial meaning in accordance therewith. Zoning is the separation of the municipality into districts and the regulation of buildings and structures within the districts so created, in accordance with their construction, and nature and extent of their use. It is a dedication of districts delimited to particular uses designed to subserve the general welfare. Numerous other definitions of zoning more or less in accordance with these have been given in the cases. (pp. 27-28.)

In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,⁹¹ the Court affirmed the authority of the municipal council to issue a zoning classification and to reclassify a property from agricultural to residential, as approved by the HSRC (now the HLURB). Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2264, amending the Local Government Code, specifically empowered municipal and/or city councils, in consultation with the National Planning Commission, to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations.

In its appeals from the grant by the DAR Secretary of the applications for exemptions in DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 (G.R. No. 149548 and No. 179650) and No. A-9999-008-98 (G.R. No. 167505), DAMBA-NSFW was, in effect, questioning the sufficiency of the evidence of Roxas & Co. Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight — all these are issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable by this Court which, as a rule, confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.⁹²

Well-settled in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant.⁹³ If supported by substantial evidence, the factual finding of an administrative body, charged with a specific field of expertise, is conclusive and should not be disturbed.⁹⁴ Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.⁹⁵

There is no reason to disturb the findings of the DAR Secretary that the lots subject of the applications for exemption, in both DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98, are located within non-agricultural zones under the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982; the said findings being supported by substantial evidence.

In both DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98, Roxas & Co. was able to submit the documents in support of its applications for exemption, as required in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, including the certifications from the Deputized Zoning Administrator and the HLURB.⁹⁶ It was on the basis of said documents, together with ocular inspection reports, that the DAR Secretary based its findings that the lots subject of the two applications were indeed reclassified for non-agricultural uses⁹⁷ by Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, prior to the effectivity of the CARL on 15 June 1988, thus, exempting the said properties from CARP coverage.

The Certifications, issued by the appropriate public officers, is prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out. To overcome the presumption of regularity of performance of official functions in favor of such Certifications, the evidence against them must be clear and convincing.⁹⁸ Belief, suspicion, and conjectures cannot overcome the presumption of regularity and legality which attaches to the disputed Certifications. The bare allegations of DAMBA-NFSW that the provisions of Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, were too vague or inexact to be used as bases for determining the zoning classification of the lots of Roxas & Co., failed to defeat the Certifications issued by the Deputized Zoning Administrator and the HLURB – who are charged with the approval, interpretation, and implementation of said zoning ordinance – expressly confirming that the said lots are located in non-agricultural zones. There is also utter lack of basis for the insistence of DAMBA-NFSW that in addition to Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, Roxas & Co. should have also submitted a Land Use Plan approved prior to 15 June 1988. The validity and effectivity of the municipal ordinance is not, in any way, dependent on the existence of a land use plan.

Once more, it should be kept in mind that administrative bodies are given wide latitude in the evaluation of evidence, including the authority to take judicial notice of facts within their special competence. Absent any proof to the contrary, the presumption is that official duty has been regularly performed. Hence, the DAR Secretary is presumed to have performed his duty of studying the available evidence, prior to the grant of the applications for exemption of Roxas & Co.⁹⁹

DAMBA-NFSW is also seeking the nullification of the proceedings in

DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98 for lack of notice to DAMBA-NFSW whose members hold CLOAs over the lots subject of said applications for exemption. DAMBA-NFSW invokes our ruling in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, nullifying the acquisition proceedings for lack of proper notice upon Roxas & Co.

This argument is without merit.

The decision in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals painstakingly presented the specific provisions in the CARL; DAR Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989; DAR Administrative Order No. 9, series of 1990; DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993; and the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure, which explicitly require the service of notice upon the landowner in both voluntary and compulsory acquisition proceedings.

Other than a general averment of its right to due process, DAMBA-NFSW was not able to cite a rule expressly requiring the landowner who is applying for exemption from CARP coverage of his landholding based on Section 3(c) of the CARL and DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, to give notices of the filing of said application and the subsequent proceedings as regards the same to the occupants of the subject property.

It bears to point out that at the time Roxas & Co. filed its applications for exemption in DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98 on 29 May 1997 and 29 September 1997, respectively, only DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, governed such applications.¹⁰⁰ Said administrative order does not contain any provision on notices. Rights of farmers and other occupants of the land subject of the application for exemption could only be presumed to have been taken into consideration by the DAR officials mandated to conduct a joint investigation following the filing of the application for exemption. Part IV of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, prescribes that:

A. Upon filing of the application, the Regional Office shall conduct a joint investigation with the duly authorized representatives of the Provincial and Municipal Offices of the DAR that have jurisdiction over the property. The investigation shall be undertaken and the report prepared within thirty (30) days from the filing of the completed application. x x x

B. The joint investigation report shall concentrate on the presence of potential beneficiaries in the area, the payment of disturbance compensation, the initial activities related to the coverage, and other pertinent information which may be relevant in the grant or denial of the application for exemption.

The joint investigation report shall also contain a certification from the MARO on whether or not the area has been placed under the coverage of Pres. Decree No. 27, or whether Certificates of Land Transfer or Emancipation Patents have been issued over said property.

x x x

Even granting that DAMBA-NFSW should have been given notices of the applications for exemption of Roxas & Co., the lack thereof does not necessarily mean that DAMBA-NFSW was deprived of due process that would render the proceedings in DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98 void. The Court has consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of; and any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.¹⁰¹ DAMBA-NFSW cannot deny that it was able to file Motions for Reconsideration of the Orders of the DAR Secretary granting the applications for exemption of Roxas & Co. in DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98, except that both Motions were subsequently denied by the DAR Secretary for lack of merit.

After the DAR Secretary approved the applications for exemption of Roxas & Co., and denied the Motions for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW in DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98, DAMBA-NFSW then went before the Court of Appeals via Petitions for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the wrong remedy.

In Sebastian v. Morales,¹⁰² the Court provided the following elucidation on the proper remedy from an order of the DAR Secretary and the consequence for availing one’s self of the wrong mode of appeal:

We agree with the appellate court that petitioners’ reliance on Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 "is not merely a mistake in the designation of the mode of appeal, but clearly an erroneous appeal from the assailed Orders." For in relying solely on Section 54, petitioners patently ignored or conveniently overlooked Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657, the pertinent portion of which provides that:

An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, or from any order, ruling or decision of the DAR, as the case may be, shall be by a petition for review with the Supreme Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of said decision.

Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 should be read in relation to R.A. No. 7902 expanding the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to include:

Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions…except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.21

With the enactment of R.A. No. 7902, this Court issued Circular 1-95 dated May 16, 1995 governing appeals from all quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals by petition for review, regardless of the nature of the question raised. Said circular was incorporated in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 61 of R.A. No. 665722 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary. By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode of appeal. Pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, "an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed." Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 51288 for failure of petitioners to pursue the proper mode of appeal.

Even when there may be instances when the Court had chosen to relax its procedural rules in the name of substantive justice, the lack of merit in the opposition of DAMBA-NFSW to the applications for exemption of Roxas & Co. in DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, does not justify the reversal of the dismissal by the appellate court of the Petitions for Certiorari of DAMBA-NFSW in CA-G.R. SP No. 82225 and CA-G.R. No. 82226 for being the wrong mode of appeal.

As for G.R. No. 167845 and No. 169163, proceedings have also been held before the PARAD regarding CLOA No. 6654 (DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 and No. 401-239-2001, respectively), which resulted in the partial and complete cancellations of the said certificates. I accentuate once more that by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.¹⁰³ The Court must also not forget that the 27 May 2001 Decision of the PARAD in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 already became final and executory by failure of DAMBA-NFSW to file an appeal within the reglementary period.

V
MY VOTE

WHEREFORE, premises considered, I concur in some part but dissent for the most part in the ruling of the majority, and vote as follows:

(1) In G.R. No. 167540, to DENY the Petition for Review of KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW, and to AFFIRM the Decision dated 24 November 2003 and Resolution dated 18 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131, which declared the parcels of land comprising Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, and Palico, all in the name of Roxas & Co. and located in Nasugbu, Batangas, to be exempt from CARP coverage pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, making Nasugbu part of a tourist zone. I vote further to DISMISS the Petitions for Intervention of the Sangguniang Bayan and the ABC of Nasugbu for failure to prosecute;

(2) In G.R. No. 167543, to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of DAR, and to AFFIRM the Resolution dated 20 June 2005 of this Court denying the Petition for Review of DAR for the latter’s failure to show that a reversible error had been committed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 24 November 2003 and Resolution dated 18 March 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131;

(3) In G.R. No. 179650 and No. 167505, to DENIED the Petitions for Review of DAMBA-NFSW for being moot and academic, consistent with my vote in G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543. With the exemption from CARP coverage of the entire Hacienda Palico pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, the resolution of the exemption from CARP coverage of smaller lots in the same Hacienda by virtue of the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, serves no practical purpose.

(4) In G.R. No. 167845, to GRANT the Petition for Review of Roxas & Co. Accordingly, I vote to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated 10 September 2004 and Resolution dated 14 April 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72198; and to REINSTATE the Order dated 19 February 2002 of the PARAD in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001, denying due course to the Notice of Appeal of DAMBA-NFSW for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. I further vote to DECLARE AS FINAL AND EXECUTORY, with no appeal having been timely filed therefrom, the Joint Order dated 21 May 2001 of the PARAD in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001, granting the partial cancellation of TCT No. CLOA-6654, insofar as it covers Lot 125-K with an area of 27.4170 hectares situated at Brgy. Bilaran, Nasugbu, Batangas; Lot 125-L with an area of 36.9796 hectares located in Brgy. Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, and Lot 125-M with an area of 37.8648 hectares also located in Brgy. Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, covered by TCT No. T-60028, No. T-60033 and No. T-60032, respectively;

(5) In G.R. No. 169163, to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW, and to AFFIRM the Resolution dated 19 October 2005 of this Court denying the Petition for Review of DAMBA-NFSW, in the absence of reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it dismissed in its Decision dated 28 February 2005 and Resolution dated 3 August 2005 the Petition for Certiorari of DAMBA-NFSW in CA-G.R. SP No. 75952. I vote further to DECLARE AS FINAL AND EXECUTORY, with no appeal having been timely filed therefrom, the 27 May 2001 Decision of the PARAD in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001, ordering the cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, insofar as the remaining 411.7249 hectares are concerned, after the partial cancellation effected in G.R. No. 167845;

(6) In G.R. No. 149548, to DISMISS for being moot and academic the Petition for Review of Roxas & Co. seeking an injunction against the installation by the DAR of the farmer-beneficiaries on Lots No. 21, No. 24, No. 28, No. 31, No. 32 and No. 34, comprising 51.5472 hectares, situated in Brgys. Cogunan and Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, until CLOA No. 6654, which covered the said lots, among other parcels of land, was cancelled. This is pursuant to my vote in G.R. No. 167845 and No. 169163, already affirming the partial and complete cancellations of CLOA No. 6654; and

7. To APPROVE the compensation and accommodation packages proposed by Roxas & Co. for bona fide tenants, shareholders, and leaseholders of Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, and Palico (Group A beneficiaries), and for original CLOA holders/awardees who had no previous contractual relationship with Roxas & Co. but were installed upon the latter’s landholdings by DAR (Group B beneficiaries); with the corresponding directive to Roxas & Co. to faithfully comply with the said compensation and accommodation packages.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

Footnotes

¹ Subject: Guidelines for the Issuance of Exemption Clearances based on Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 6657 and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990.

² A special task force of the DAR which conducts the field investigation and dialogues with the applicants and the farmer beneficiaries to ascertain the information necessary for the processing of an application for conversion of land. The Chairman of the CLUPPI deliberates on the merits of the investigation report and recommends the appropriate action. This recommendation is transmitted to the Regional Director, thru the Undersecretary, or Secretary of the DAR.

³ Rollo (G.R. No. 167540), p. 383.

⁴ Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; and Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, dissenting. Rollo (G.R. No. 167540), pp. 58-68.

⁵ Id. at 64-65.

⁶ G.R. No. 103302, 12 August 1993, 225 SCRA 278.

⁷ 376 Phil. 147 (1999).

⁸ Id. at 66.

⁹ Id. at 67.

¹⁰ Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; and Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, dissenting. Id. at 136-138.

¹¹ Revising the Chapter of the Philippine Tourism Authority Created under Presidential Decree No. 189, dated May 11, 1973.

¹² Initially, CLOA No. 6654 was issued to only 153 regular sugar farms workers at Hacienda Palico; but pursuant to the Decision dated 3 August 1994 of Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Antonio Cabili, 49 more farmer workers were added.

¹³ Rollo (G.R. No. 149548), pp. 95-96.

¹⁴ Id. at 96-97.

¹⁵ The details of which will be subsequently presented herein under G.R. No. 167845.

¹⁶ Rollo (G.R. No. 149548), pp. 101-102.

¹⁷ Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez with Associate Justices Hilarion L. Aquino and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurring. Id. at 54-62.

¹⁸ Id. at 59.

¹⁹ Id. at 59-60.

²⁰ Id. at 61.

²¹ Id.

²² Id. at 66.

²³ Id. at 32.

²⁴ Id. at 47.

²⁵ Rollo (G.R. No. 179650), pp. 125-127.

²⁶ Id. at 128-129.

²⁷ Id. at 130.

²⁸ Id. at 130-131.

²⁹ Penned by Associate Justce Portia Alino-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok, concurring. Id. at 399-413.

³⁰ Id. at 29-30.

³¹ Rollo (G.R. No. 167505), pp. 155-157.

³² Id. at 158.

³³ Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring. Id. at 67-90.

³⁴ Penned by Associate Justice Arturo B. Buena with Associate Justices Angelina S. Gutierrez and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., concurring. Rollo (G.R. No. 167845), pp. 60-80.

³⁵ Id. at 80.

³⁶ Subsequent events concerning CA-G.R. SP No. 63146 were already recounted in the factual background of G.R. No. 149548 and No. 179650.

³⁷ Id. at 103-105.

³⁸ Id. at 105.

³⁹ Id. at 107.

⁴⁰ Id. at 108.

⁴¹ Id. at 109.

⁴² The circumstances pertaining to DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 are presented in more detail under G.R. No. 169163.

⁴³ Id. at 131-132.

⁴⁴ Id. at 133.

⁴⁵ Id. at 166-168.

⁴⁶ Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring.

⁴⁷ Id. at 51.

⁴⁸ Id. at 53.

⁴⁹

⁵⁰ Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, concurring.

⁵¹ Agriculture, agricultural exercise, or agricultural activity is defined, in turn, by Section 3(b) of the CARL as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.

⁵² Section 5(l) of Executive Order No. 129-A, "Modifying Executive Order No. 129 Reorganizing and Strengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and for Other Purposes."

⁵³ Rules of procedure governing the processing and approval of applications for land use conversion were laid down by DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1990.

⁵⁴ The enacting clause is that part of a statute which states the authority by which it is enacted. (Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction [5th edition, 2003], p. 14)

⁵⁵ Security Bank and Trust Company v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61, G.R. No. 113926, 23 October 1996, citing Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-26419, 16 October 1970.

⁵⁶ Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction [5th edition, 2003], p. 80, citing People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 663 (1950).

⁵⁷ See Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 156087, 8 May 2009.

⁵⁸ Spouses Tibay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119655, 24 May 1996.

⁵⁹ Supra. note 4.

⁶⁰ Supra note 5.

⁶¹ Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152085, 8 July 2003.

⁶² G.R. No. 147479, 26 September 2005, 471 SCRA 74.

⁶³ Delta Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121075, 24 July 1997.

⁶⁴ Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, in her concurring and dissenting opinion in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 127876, 17 December 1999), quoted the following findings made by former DAR Secretary, Benjamin T. Leong, in his DAR Order dated 22 January 1991, as regards the state of the GDFI property:

1. Is, as contended by the petitioner GDFI "hilly, mountainous, and characterized by poor soil condition and nomadic method of cultivation, hence not suitable to agriculture."

2. Has as contiguous properties two haciendas of Roxas y Cia and found by Agrarian Reform Team Leader Benito Viray to be "generally rolling, hilly and mountainous and strudded (sic) with long and narrow ridges and deep gorges. Ravines are steep grade ending in low dry creeks."

3. Is found in an area where "it is quite difficult to provide statistics on rice and corn yields because there are no permanent sites planted. Cultivation is by Kaingin Method."

4. Is contiguous to Roxas Properties in the same area where "the people entered the property surreptitiously and were difficult to stop because of the wide area of the two haciendas and that the principal crop of the area is sugar . . .."

⁶⁵ Padua v. Ranada, G.R. No. 141949, 14 October 2002.

⁶⁶ PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 162267, 4 July 2008.

⁶⁷ Section 4 of the CARL describes the scope of said law:

Section 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;

(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;

(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture;

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.

⁶⁸ Delgado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137881, 19 August 2005.

⁶⁹ G.R. No. 111387, 8 June 2004.

⁷⁰ In Secretary of Agrarian Reform v. Tropical Homes, Inc. (G.R. No. 136827, 31 July 2001), the Court held that:

Not having perfected their appeal in the manner and within the period fixed by law, the decision of the Court of Appeals had become final and executory. Such a failure carries with it the result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the case. However, it is true that we have recognized certain exceptions to this rule. In Ramos v. Bagasao, we excused the delay of four (4) days in the filing of a notice of appeal because the questioned decision of the trial court was served upon appellant at a time when her counsel of record was already dead. Her new counsel could only file the appeal four (4) days after the prescribed reglementary period was over. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,²⁴ we allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six (6) days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since it stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for educational purposes. In Olacao v. National Labor Relations Commission, we accepted a tardy appeal considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judicially settled, with finality, in another case. The dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee. x x x

⁷¹ Ditching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109834, 18 October 1996.

⁷² Mayon Estate Corporation v. Altura, G.R. No. 134462, 18 October 2004, 440 SCRA 377.

⁷³ Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 394 Phil. 22 (2000).

⁷⁴ Ginete, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 36 (1998).

⁷⁵ Mayon Estate Corporation v. Altura, supra note 1.

⁷⁶ Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 890 (1997).

⁷⁷ DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 2000.

⁷⁸ Under Section 3(d) of the CARL, "agrarian dispute" includes "any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."

⁷⁹ Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132561, 30 June 2005.

⁸⁰ See Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132073, 27 September 2006.

⁸¹ Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction (5th edition, 2003), p. 125; citing Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 116 SCAD 999, 320 SCRA 279 (1999) and Director of Lands v. Abaya, 63 Phil. 559 (1936).

⁸² An Act to Ordain the Agricultural Land Reform Code and to Institute Land Reforms in the Philippines, including the Abolition of Tenancy and the Channeling of Capital into Industry, Provide for the Necessary Implementing Agencies, Appropriate Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes.

⁸³ An Act Amending Republic Act Numbered Thirty-Eight Hundred and Forty-Four, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, and for Other Purposes.

⁸⁴ G.R. Nos. 148404-05, 11 April 2002.

⁸⁵ The requisites for a valid agricultural leasehold relationship are: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. (Ibid.)

⁸⁶ G.R. No. 152085, 8 July 2003.

⁸⁷ Landbank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118712, 6 October 1995.

⁸⁸ G.R. No. 168394, 6 October 2008,

⁸⁹ Treaties on Municipal Corporations, Volume 8, 3rd ed.

⁹⁰ G.R. No. L-15759, 30 December 1961.

⁹¹ G.R. No. 142359, 25 May 2004.

⁹² Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, 23 March 1990.

⁹³ Lumiqued v. Exevea, G.R. No. 117565, 18 November 1997.

⁹⁴ National Power Corporation v. Philippine Electric Plant Owners Association (PEPOA), Inc., G.R. No. 159457, 7 April 2006.

⁹⁵ Rule 134, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

⁹⁶ According to III(B) of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, the application for exemption should be duly signed by the landowner or his representative, and should be accompanied by the following documents:

1. Duly notarized Special Power of Attorney, if the applicant is not the landowner himself;

2. Certified true copies of the titles which is the subject of the application;

3. Current tax declaration(s) covering the property;

4. Location Map or Vicinity Map;

5. Certification from the Deputized Zoning Administrator that the land has been reclassified to residential, industrial or commercial use prior to June 15, 1988;

6. Certification from the HLURB that the pertinent zoning ordinance has been approved by the Board prior to June 15, 1988;

7. Certification from the National Irrigation Administration that the land is not covered by Administrative Order No. 20, s. 1992, i.e., that the area is not irrigated, nor scheduled for irrigation rehabilitation nor irrigable with firm funding commitment;

8. Proof of payment of disturbance compensation, if the area is presently being occupied by farmers, or waiver/undertaking by the occupants that they will vacate the area whenever required.

⁹⁷ The six (eventually increase to seven) lots in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 were within the industrial zone, while the nine lots in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 were within settlement clusters outside the Poblacion.

⁹⁸ See Spouses Madrigal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129955, 26 November 1999; and Lercana v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. 132286, 1 February 2002.

⁹⁹ National Power Corporation v. Philippine Electric Plant Owners Association (PEPOA), Inc., G.R. No. 159457, 7 April 2006.

¹⁰⁰ On 30 August 2000, the DAR issued DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 2000, which lays down the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases. According to Section 2(g) thereof, the rules govern application for exemption pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, as implemented by DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994. Section 16(h) of DAR Administrative Rule No. 6, series of 2000, on Investigation Procedure, now requires the issuance of notice in the following manner:

(h) Issuance of Notice. – The MARO or investigating officer shall issue a notice of summary investigation to the parties concerned within ten (10) days from termination of mediation/conciliation (if unsuccessful) or from receipt of application, protest or petition. The notice shall be sent by personal delivery with proof of service or by registered mail with return card.

¹⁰¹ Samalio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140079, 31 March 2005.

¹⁰² G.R. No. 141116, 17 February 2003.

¹⁰³ Palele v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138289, 31 July 2001.

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