Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160467 April 7, 2009
SOLEDAD MUÑOZ MESA, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and PHILROCK INCORPORATED, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On appeal is the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated January 16, 2003 sustaining the Decision2 dated August 24, 2001 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. MS-12322-501, as well as its Resolution3 dated October 3, 2003 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Teodoro Mesa (Mesa), the deceased husband of petitioner Soledad Muñoz Mesa, was an employee of respondent Philrock Incorporated (Philrock), from April 1966 to November 1998.4
In the course of his employment, Mesa was diagnosed to be afflicted with diabetes mellitus, pulmonary tuberculosis, and ischemic heart disease5 for which he was confined from September 23 to 30, 1988 at St. Martha’s Specialty Clinic in Tarlac City. Upon his discharge from the hospital, he continued to work for Philrock until he succumbed to myocardial infarction on November 19, 1988. He last held the position of Project General Superintendent.
Close to 12 years later or in October 2000, Mesa’s wife, herein petitioner, claimed for employees’ compensation benefits under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626 or the Employees’ Compensation Law, as amended.
By pro-forma letter6 dated January 18, 2001, the Social Security System (SSS) denied petitioner’s claim on the ground of prescription. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, alleging that the filing of the claim was delayed because she was not aware that her husband was entitled to employees’ compensation until she heard it from a friend who was able to claim a similar benefit, and that she could not file the claim immediately because she herself was in and out of the hospital. The motion was elevated by the SSS to the ECC per memorandum7 dated April 17, 2001.
By Decision dated August 24, 2001, the ECC held that petitioner’s claim had prescribed on November 26, 1991, following Article 2018 of P.D. 626, as amended, which provides that claims under said law should be brought within three years from the time the cause of action accrued. Even if Art. 11449 of the Civil Code were applied, the ECC posed, the claim would still be barred by prescription since the period is reckoned from the date of contingency or November 25, 1998 to the date of filing of the claim in October 2000 which entailed a period of almost 12 years.
Petitioner thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the three-year period in P.D. 626 should not be construed as a prescriptive period but more of a requisite for the exercise of a right granted by law, and pleading for the application of the social justice precepts in resolving the controversy in her favor.
Via a Supplement to the Petition,10 petitioner submitted the Online Inquiry System-generated "D[eath] D[isability and] R[etirement] Claims Information" sheet11 showing that she filed a claim for death and funeral benefits with the SSS on December 12, 1988.
By the challenged Decision dated January 16, 2003, the appellate court dismissed petitioner’s petition and affirmed the ECC Decision. Citing Vda. De Hornido v. ECC, Art. 201 of P.D. 626, and Art. 1144 of the Civil Code, the appellate court held that at the time petitioner instituted the claim for employees’ compensation benefits, almost 12 years had elapsed, hence, it had prescribed.
On petitioner’s filing before the SSS of a claim for death and funeral benefits on November 25, 1988, the appellate court held that the same did not operate as constructive notice to the ECC for purposes of employees’ compensation, hence, it did not toll the running of the prescriptive period. Additionally, it held that this issue was not presented before the lower tribunals and was raised for the first time on appeal, hence, it could not be entertained; and that although the November 25, 1988 claim was denominated as "SSS Death and Funeral Benefit," what petitioner actually claimed was funeral or burial benefits alone, not death benefits resulting from compensable injury or illness, and it was only in 2000 that she filed for death benefits, hence, the said claim for funeral benefits could not operate as constructive notice on the part of SSS within the purview of the rules on employees’ compensation.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated October 3, 2003, the present appeal was filed.1avvphi1
Petitioner reiterates her contention that her claim has not prescribed and that the funeral claim served as constructive notice to the SSS/ECC to toll the running of the prescriptive period pursuant to ECC Resolution No. 90-03-0022 and 93-08-0068. And she requests the Court to apply social justice precepts and humanitarian considerations.
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Apropos is the ruling in Buena Obra v. SSS12 in which the Court, speaking through then Associate, now Chief Justice Puno, held that the claim for funeral benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, which was filed after the lapse of 10 years by the therein petitioner who had earlier filed a claim for death benefits, had not prescribed,
The issue of prescription in the case at bar is governed by P.D. No. 626, or the Law on Employees' Compensation. Art. 201 of P.D. No. 626 and Sec. 6, Rule VII of the 1987 Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation both read as follows:
"No claim for compensation shall be given due course unless said claim is filed with the System within three years from the time the cause of action accrued."
This is the general rule. The exceptions are found in Board Resolution 93-08-0068 and ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of Employees’ Compensation Claims. Board Resolution 93-08-0068 issued on 5 August 1993, states:
"A claim for employee's compensation must be filed with System (SSS/GSIS) within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued, provided however, that any claim filed within the System for any contingency that may be held compensable under the Employee's Compensation Program (ECP) shall be considered as the EC claim itself. The three-year prescriptive period shall be reckoned from the onset of disability, or date of death. In case of presumptive death, the three (3) years limitation shall be counted from the date the missing person was officially declared to be presumptively dead." (emphasis supplied)
In addition, Section 4(b), Rule 3 of the ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of Employees’ Compensation Claims, reads:
"RULE 3. FILING OF CLAIM
Section 4. When to file.
(a) Benefit claims shall be filed with the GSIS or the SSS within three (3) years from the date of the occurrence of the contingency (sickness, injury, disability or death).
(b) Claims filed beyond the 3-year prescriptive period may still be given due course, provided that:
1. A claim was filed for Medicare, retirement with disability, burial, death claims, or life (disability) insurance, with the GSIS within three (3) years from the occurrence of the contingency.
2. In the case of the private sector employees, a claim for Medicare, sickness, burial, disability or death was filed within three (3) years from the occurrence of the contingency.
3. In any of the foregoing cases, the employees’ compensation claim shall be filed with the GSIS or the SSS within a reasonable time as provided by law. [Emphasis supplied.]"
We agree with the petitioner that her claim for death benefits under the SSS law should be considered as the Employees’ Compensation claim itself. This is but logical and reasonable because the claim for death benefits which petitioner filed with the SSS is of the same nature as her claim before the ECC. Furthermore, the SSS is the same agency with which Employees’ Compensation claims are filed. As correctly contended by the petitioner, when she filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS under the SSS law, she had already notified the SSS of her employees’ compensation claim, because the SSS is the very same agency where claims for payment of sickness/disability/death benefits under P.D. No. 626 are filed.
Section 4(b)(2), Rule 3 of the ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of the Employees’ Compensation Claims, quoted above, also provides for the conditions when EC claims filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period may still be given due course. Section 4(b)(2) states the condition for private sector employees, requiring that a claim for Medicare, sickness, burial, disability or death should be filed within three (3) years from the occurrence of the contingency. In the instant case, the petitioner was able to file her claim for death benefits under the SSS law within the three-year prescriptive period. In fact, she has been receiving her pension under the SSS law since November 1988.
It is true that under the proviso, the employees’ compensation claim shall be filed with the GSIS/SSS within a reasonable time as provided by law. It should be noted that neither statute nor jurisprudence has defined the limits of "reasonable time." Thus, what is reasonable time depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. In the case at bar, we also find petitioner’s claim to have been filed within a reasonable time considering the situation and condition of the petitioner. We have ruled that when the petitioner filed her claim for death benefits under the SSS law, her claim for the same benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Law should be considered as filed. The evidence shows that the System failed to process her compensation claim. Under the circumstances, the petitioner cannot be made to suffer for the lapse committed by the System.13 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light of the immediately-quoted portions of the Court’s decision in Buena Obra, the Court holds that petitioner’s filing of a claim before the SSS, even arguendo that it was only for funeral benefits, on November 25, 1988 served as constructive notice on the part of the SSS/ECC pursuant to the ECC Board Resolution 93-08-0068 vis a vis ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of Employees’ Compensation Claims, that she was claiming before the SSS for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, effectively tolling the running of the prescriptive period. The term "funeral benefits" certainly connotes benefits arising from death. Petitioner’s claim is thus not barred.
At this juncture, the Court reiterates its oft-repeated ruling that pursuant to the Constitutional guarantee of social justice, a liberal attitude in favor of the employee should be adopted.1avvphi1
[C]laims falling under the Employees’ Compensation Act should be liberally resolved to fulfill its essence as a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman in our society. It is only this kind of interpretation that can give meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code, which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor.14 (Underscoring supplied)
The issue of whether Mesa’s death is compensable was never, however, fully raised nor discussed in any of the proceedings below, nor is it ventilated in the present petition, and the records are bereft of adequate evidence to enable the Court to rule thereon. A remand of the case to the ECC for the resolution of such issue is thus in order.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Court of Appeals Decision dated January 16, 2003 and Resolution dated October 3, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the Employees Compensation Commission which is DIRECTED to rule with dispatch on the merits of petitioner’s claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 85-91. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Eloy R. Bello, Jr.
2 CA rollo, pp. 37-40. Penned by ECC Executive Director Elmor D. Juridico.
3 Rollo, p. 104. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Eloy R. Bello, Jr.
4 See Certification, Annex "B," CA rollo, p. 29.
5 See Medical Certificate, Annex "C," id. at 30.
6 See Annex "E," id. at 33.
7 See Annex "G," id. at 35.
8 Art. 201.
"No claim for compensation shall be given due course unless said claim is filed with the System within three years from the time the cause of action accrued."
9 Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
1) Upon a written contract;
2) Upon an obligation created by law;
3) Upon a judgment;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
10 CA rollo, pp. 48-56.
11 Id. at 61.
12 G.R. No. 147745, April 9, 2003, 401 SCRA 206.
13 Id. at 211-213.
14 GSIS v. Cuanang, G.R. No. 158846. June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 639, 649.
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