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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 152859             June 18, 2008

EUFROCINO C. IBAÑEZ and FELIPE R. LARANGA, petitioner,
vs.
AFP RETIREMENT AND SERVICE BENEFIT SYSTEM, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

At the core of this agrarian case is a 1.5523-hectare property that once formed part of Lot No. 1973 situated at Barangay Dita, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Lot No. 1973 was formerly registered in the name of Fermina Z. Bailon, married to Tomas M. Gan, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3939 (13443). Shortly after Fermina's death on April 25, 1973, her heirs, namely, husband Tomas and their four (4) children, executed an Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate under which Lot No. 1973 was ceded to son Eduardo Gan.

On November 26, 1981, the municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna passed an ordinance classifying Lot No. 1973, among others, as residential. A week later, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board approved the ordinance.

It would appear that, shortly after the enactment of the said ordinance, Lot No. 1973 was brought under Operation Land Transfer of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 dated September 21, 1972, otherwise known as the Tenants' Emancipation Decree. This development paved the way for the subdivision of Lot No. 1973 and the eventual issuance of the corresponding certificate of land transfer (CLT) and emancipation patent to farmer-beneficiaries. Among them was Angel Ibañez, who was issued, on May 3, 1982, CLT No. D-052665 covering 1.5523 hectares of Lot No. 1973. Disputed in this case is the portion awarded to Angel.

Petitioners Eufrocino C. Ibañez and Felipe R. Laranga claim to be the son and cousin, respectively, of Angel. Both assert tenancy rights over the disputed lot on the strength of their allegedly having taken over the tillage thereof since after Angel's demise on August 3, 1992. Angel, so petitioners alleged, had been tilling the lot from 1965 until her death.

Respondent AFP Retirement Service Benefit System (AFP-RSBS) is a pension fund organized by virtue of PD 361, as amended, entitled Providing for an Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System.

On April 29, 1992, then Undersecretary Renato Padilla of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), acting on the request of a certain Engr. Alberto F. de Jesus, issued an "exemption clearance" from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage to Lot No. 1973 and 26 other parcels of land situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.¹ In his covering action-letter, Padilla categorically stated that the disputed land was beyond the coverage of Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL) and, therefore, actually no longer needed any conversion clearance.²

After the death of landowner Eduardo Gan in 1993, his heirs sold the 1.5523-hectare portion of Lot No. 1973 to San Lorenzo Development Corporation (SLDC) which, in turn, later sold the same portion to AFP-RSBS.

On May 20, 1994, petitioners filed before the Region IV office of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) a Verified Petition³ for Enforcement of Presidential Administrative Order No. 20 against AFP-RSBS and SLDC, with a plea to enjoin AFP-RSBS and SLDC from bulldozing their tenanted property and driving them out of the area. The petition, docketed as DARAB Case No. IV-LA-0366-'94, only bore petitioner Laranga's signature.

On May 27, 1994, Laguna Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Rosalina M. Vergel de Dios issued a 20-day temporary restraining order (TRO)⁴ to petitioners. Thereafter, on June 21, 1994, PARAD Vergel de Dios granted petitioners' motion for inhibition and transferred the records of the case to the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for further disposition.⁵

On June 27, 1994, AFP-RSBS filed with the PARAD a Motion to Dismiss the verified petition on jurisdictional ground, it being alleged that DARAB, or its provincial or regional adjudicator, is bereft of jurisdiction over the disputed lot. As argued, Lot No. 1973 had already been classified as residential before the CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. AFP-RSBS raised too the petition's failure to state any cause of action as to petitioner Laranga who, as pointed out, was not a tenant of the area in question. AFP-RSBS also cited petitioners' non-compliance with the circular on forum shopping as added reason for the desired dismissal.

In due time, petitioners filed their Opposition to the AFP-RSBS Motion to Dismiss.

It would appear that the motion to dismiss was forwarded to the RARAD for Region IV, for, on February 13, 1995, RARAD Fe Arche-Manalang issued an Order,⁶ denying AFP-RSBS' motion to dismiss and granting petitioners' plea for preliminary injunction.

Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration per the RARAD's Order of August 8, 1995, AFP-RSBS went to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 38392. On September 29, 1995, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the proper recourse under the premises was for AFP-RSBS, as petitioner therein, to challenge the interlocutory dismissal orders of the RARAD by certiorari before the DARAB pursuant to its primary jurisdiction.

Properly guided, AFP-RSBS lost no time in filing before the DARAB a petition for certiorari, docketed as DARAB Case No. DSCA 0028, assailing the adverted RARAD orders dated February 13, 1995 and August 8, 1995.

On January 18, 2000, in DARAB Case No. DSCA 0028, the DARAB issued a Resolution⁷ which, while positing its or its adjudicators' jurisdiction over the agrarian dispute at hand, dismissed AFP-RSBS' petition for certiorari on the ground of prematurity. As held, the issue of whether or not the subject lot is within the coverage of the CARP is yet to be determined by the PARAD.

PARAD Dismissed the Verified Petition

Meanwhile, on June 9, 1999, the new PARAD for Laguna, Virgilio Sorita, issued an Order,⁸ dismissing petitioners' basic petition for the reasons that: (1) only petitioner Laranga--a mere helper in the cultivation of the subject lot and, hence, had no standing to maintain the action--signed the initiatory petition; and (2) petitioner Ibañez, not having signed the petition, could not be considered as a party in the instant case.

The PARAD likewise rejected petitioners' motion for reconsideration with finality on August 2, 1999.⁹

The DARAB Ruled Tenant-Farmers may not be Divested of Their
Tenurial Rights Despite Reclassification of Land as Residential

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the DARAB, the appeal docketed as DARAB Case No. 9266. In their appeal memorandum, petitioners raised several issues set out in six assignments of errors. There, they faulted PARAD Sorita for, among other things, failing to render judgment on the merits on the verified petition despite their having filed their position paper on June 7, 1994 and their formal offer of documentary evidence on June 9, 1994.

On February 7, 2001, the DARAB rendered a Decision, finding for petitioners Ibañez and Laranga, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated 09 June 1999 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners-Appellants Eufrocino C. Ibañez and Felipe R. Laranga are entitled to security of tenure under the law and should be maintained in peaceful possession and cultivation.

SO ORDERED.¹⁰ (Emphasis added.)

The DARAB predicated its ruling on the interplay of the following premises:

1. DARAB and its provincial adjudicators have jurisdiction over matters involving the security of tenure of an agrarian tenant pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order No. (EO) 229 and Sec. 50 of RA 6557, as follows:

Sec. 17 of EO 229

Sec. 17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.--The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate [through the DARAB] agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA).

Sec. 50 of RA 6557

Sec. 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR.-The DAR is hereby vested within primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

2. Petitioners cannot be divested of their tenancy rights over the disputed lot despite its reclassification as residential land since a leasehold relationship had already been established even before the reclassification was made. DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1999, stated: "The reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate to divest tenant-farmers of their rights over lands covered by [PD 27], which have been vested prior to 15 June 1998."

3. The agrarian relationship between petitioners and the landowner is not extinguished by the sale, alienation, or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding as the transferee or vendee is subrogated to the obligations of the agricultural lessor relative to the rights of the agricultural lessee.

The CA Reversed and Set Aside the
February 7, 2001 DARAB Decision

Disagreeing with the DARAB's Decision of February 7, 2001, AFP-RSBS repaired to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65203, the petition urged the reversal of the DARAB ruling on the ground that the board resolved only one issue and ignored the other issues Ibañez and Laranga, as petitioners before the DARAB, raised in their appeal, such as the effect of Ibanez's failure to sign the basic petition filed before the PARAD and Laranga's legal standing to sign the same petition.

The CA, agreeing with the arguments of AFP-RSBS, rendered on November 15, 2001 the assailed Decision,¹¹ reversing and setting aside the February 7, 2001 DARAB Decision, disposing as follows:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Public Respondent [DARAB] x x x is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The Public Respondent is hereby ordered to resolve the aforequoted First Five Issues posed by the Private Respondents [Ibañez and Laranga] in their "Appeal-Memorandum."

SO ORDERED.

The appellate court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The Issues Before Us

Hence, petitioners' instant recourse on the following grounds that the CA's assailed decision, if not set aside:

-I-

x x x WOULD DEPRIVE THE HEREIN PETITIONERS EUFROCINO C. IBAÑEZ AND FELIPE R. LARANGA x x x OF THEIR RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE, POSSESSION, TILLAGE AND CULTIVATION OF THE SUBJECT LANDHOLDING HENCE, SAID CA DECISION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST THE EXISTING AGRARIAN LAWS BUT AGAINST THE DOCTRINE CITED HEREUNDER LAID DOWN BY THE HON. SUPREME COURT;

-II-

x x x WOULD GIVE VALIDITY TO THE ORDERS x x x DATED JUNE 09, AND AUGUST 2, 1999 OF PARAD VIRGILIO M. SORITA, WHICH ARE NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION AND/OR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE PREVIOUS ORDERS x x x RENDERED BY RARAD FE ARCHE-MANALANG VESTED WITH EQUAL JURISDICTION IN SAID DCN IV-LA-0366-'94 UPHOLDING THE DARAB'S JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE AND OF PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE WHICH WAS AFFIRMED BY THE [CA] IN [ITS] DECISION PROMULGATED ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1995 x x x IN CA-GR SP. NO. 38392;

-III-

x x x WOULD UNLAWFULLY AND UNJUSTLY DISREGARD THE TRO xxx DATED MAY 27, 1994 ISSUED BY PARAD ROSALINA AMONOY VERGEL DE DIOS, AND THE ORDERS x x x DATED FEBRUARY 13, 1995 AND AUGUST 8, 1995 ISSUED BY RARAD FE ARCHE-MANALANG BOTH OF WHICH ARE ALREADY FINAL UPHOLDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB OVER THIS CASE AND UPHOLDING [PETITIONERS'] x x x RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE OVER THE SUBJECT LANDHOLDING AND DENYING THE CLAIM OF RESPONDENT AFP RSBS OF FORUM SHOPPING ON THE PART OF SAID PETITIONERS, AND GRANTING THE WRIT OF INJUNCTION PENDENTE LITE PRAYED FOR IN PETITIONERS' VERIFIED PETITION;

-IV-

x x x [WOULD BE] CONTRARY TO THE EXPRESS MANDATE [OF] SECTION 3 (c) OF RA NO. 6657 PROVIDING THAT THE RECLASSIFICATION OF LANDS TO NON-AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES SHALL NOT OPERATE TO DIVEST TENANT-FARMERS COVERED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27, WHICH HAVE BEEN VESTED PRIOR TO 15 JUNE 1988;

-V-

x x x IS PREMATURE AND WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW, WITHOUT SAID DARAB RESOLVING FIRST THE FOLLOWING ISSUES POSTED BY THE PETITIONERS IN THEIR APPEAL MEMORANDUM DATED OCTOBER 20, 1999 FILED IN DARAB CASE NO. IV-LA-0366-'94 TO WIT:

I

In ruling that because petitioner-appellant Eufrocino C. Ibañez did not sign the Petition he cannot be a party in this instant Petition for Enforcement of Presidential Order No. 20, and for Violation of Sec. 73 (c) of RA 6657 and that his participation in the succeeding proceedings can not make him a party to the instant case and does not operate to cure the lack of his signature in the petition; and in categorizing the same as a fatal defect;

II

In ruling that petitioner-appellant Felipe R. Laranga (sic) being a mere helper in the cultivation of the subject land, had no right under the Agrarian Law to maintain this instant action, and that he is not a real party-in-interest;

III

In dismissing this instant case and in denying petitioners-appellants' motion for the reconsideration of said Order dated June 09, 1999 on the ground that he (Eufrocino C. Ibañez) is not a party in this case and that the Hon. Board had not acquired jurisdiction over his person and this petition, and that said Order dismissing this case is not on technicality but on the authority of the PARAD to decide this case on the merits;

IV

In not making a liberal construction of Sec. 1, Rule IV, of the DARAB's New Rules of Procedure and in not considering petitioner-appellant Eufrocino C. Ibañez as a party in this case, and in not applying the doctrine of laches against the Provincial A.R. Adjudicator Rosalina Vergel de Dios, the Regional A.R. Adjudicator Fe Arche-Manalang, Justices Jaime M. Lantin, Ricardo P. Galvez, and Antonio P. Solano of the Eighth Division, [CA] who took cognizance and jurisdiction over this instant case, over all the parties, cause of action and subject matter involved from May 27, 1994 when the [CA] rendered its Decision of respondent-appellee [SLDC] which failed to question the lack of the signature of petitioner-appellant Eufrocino C. Ibañez, on the Verified Petition, and the capacity of petitioner-appellant Felipe R. Laranga to file this instant case being only a farm helper of the former of the subject irrigated riceland;

V

In arrogating, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, on the part of the said Provincial A.R. [Adjudicator] Virgilio M. Sorita upon himself the appellate power, discretion and authority to disregard, render worthless, and ineffective or nullify in effect the RARAD Order dated February 13, 1995 and Order dated August 8, 1995 rendered in this case by the RARAD directing the respondents-appellees and all persons acting under their command to cease and desist from undertaking and further bulldozing development of conversion activities on the property in question pending termination of this case and the Decision of the [CA] rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 38392, affirming the said RARAD Order and utterly disregarding the fact that the DARAB thru the RARAD and the [CA] had taken cognizance of, gave due course to and jurisdiction over this instant case, and of the parties petitioners-appellants and subject matter.¹²

The petition is bereft of merit.

Tenurial Issue Cannot be Resolved on Appeal

Petitioners argue that the CA committed reversible error in setting aside and reversing the February 7, 2001 DARAB Decision since the CA Decision deprived them of their tenurial rights over the lot in question and other rights flowing therefrom.

Petitioners do not know whereof they speak.

As couched, the assailed CA Decision did not divest petitioners of their right to security of tenure, possession, and cultivation of the land, assuming for the nonce that they possess such right. As it were, the CA did not even attempt to resolve one way or the other the issue of tenurial rights and tillage. For perspective, the CA did no more than to order the DARAB to resolve the first five issues raised by petitioners in their appeal from the orders of PARAD Sorita, who, parenthetically, did not even make a perfunctory reference on the tenurial issue in his orders.

Before the office of the PARAD in DARAB Case No. IV-LA-0366-'94, respondent AFP-RSBS raised the issue of DARAB's jurisdiction over the verified petition which depicted the disputed lot as a tenanted agricultural land. Instead of addressing the jurisdictional challenge by either upholding or dismissing the same, then proceeding, in the latter instance, to resolve the case on the merits, PARAD Sorita disposed of DARAB Case No. IV-LA-0366-'94 by dismissing it on technical grounds. Subsequently, in DARAB Case No. 9266, petitioners impugned before the DARAB the dismissal of their petition on the grounds indicated in the orders of PARAD Sorita.

Given the foregoing consideration, it was erroneous for the DARAB to resolve, on appeal, a key determinative issue of the case when the PARAD had not yet ruled on such issue on the merits. The CA graphically narrated the anteceding factual situations and made the following apt observations:

The PARAD did not, under his Orders [dated June 9, 1999 and August 2, 1999] resolve the "Petition" of Private Respondents [Ibañez and Laranga] on its merits because, at the time, the "Petition" was not yet ripe for [his] decision on the merits x x x [since] the Petitioner [AFP-RSBS] had not yet submitted its "Position Paper" and "Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence" and even if it had, there was still a need for the PARAD, under Rule VIII, Section 5 of the New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, to determine whether there was a need for a formal hearing or investigation and if he found no more need for said formal hearing or investigation, he was mandated under Section 6 of Rule VIII of said Rules, to issue an Order informing the parties of his resolution:

SECTION 5. Submission of Sworn Statements of Affidavits. During the initial hearing or conference, or immediately thereafter, the adjudicator shall require the parties to submit simultaneously their respective sworn statements or affidavits and the supporting documentary evidence, if any, and the affidavits of their witnesses which shall take the place of their direct testimony. The parties may x x x present evidence to prove facts not alleged or referred to previously, but which are relevant to the determination of the main issue or issues and are included in their claim or defense.

SECTION 6. Determination of Necessity of Hearing. Immediately after the submission by the parties of their sworn statements and supporting documentary evidence, the adjudicator shall determine whether or not there is a need for a formal hearing or investigation. At this stage, he may x x x elicit the pertinent facts or information, including documentary evidence if any, from any party or witness to complete, as far as possible, the facts of the case. Facts or information so elicited may serve as the basis for clarification, simplification and limitation of the issues. x x x

However, the PARAD had not issued any such Order. In point of fact, on the day that the Private Respondents filed their "Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence," x x x the PARAD issued motu proprio his oppugned Order x x x dismissing the "Petition." It was, thus, egregious error for the [DARAB] to resolve the "Petition" on its merits, on appeal, by [Ibañez and Laranga], from the Orders of the PARAD x x x. Patently, by appealing from the Orders of the PARAD x x x, [Ibañez and Laranga], in the process, sought to short-cut the proceedings before the PARAD by raising, as an issue, in their appeal, to the [DARAB], the issues raised by them in their "Petition" before the PARAD, on their merits, even before the case had been submitted for the Decision of the PARAD. [DARAB] knew no better and x x x took the bait and resolved the "Petition" of [Ibañez and Laranga] with the PARAD on its merits. The [DARAB] thereby ran roughshod over the basic principles of fair play.¹³ x x x

In net effect, the DARAB's decision, apart from virtually violating AFP-RSBS' right to due process, left so many factual questions and issues unanswered and assumed the existence of certain material facts. Among the facts assumed as established were the status of petitioner Ibañez or Laranga as successor-in-interest of Angel and the susceptibility of the disputed lot to CARP coverage. Lest it be overlooked, the DARAB itself, in its Resolution¹⁴ of January 18, 2000 in DARAB Case No. DSCA No. 0028, stated: "The contention of the Petitioner [AFP RSBS] that the landholding in dispute is not within the coverage of CARP is yet to be determined by the Board a quo."

The Issue on the Jurisdiction of the PARAD to Rule on the
Tenurial Rights of Petitioners Has Yet to be Resolved

Petitioners contend that the assailed CA Decision would lend validity to the June 9 and August 2, 1999 Orders of PARAD Sorita which, to the petitioners, violated the previous orders issued by the RARAD upholding the DARAB's jurisdiction over the instant case.

Petitioners are mistaken.

The issue on the jurisdiction of the PARAD to rule on the tenurial rights of petitioners has yet to be resolved. Evidence still has to be adduced to prove petitioner Ibanez's father's leasehold right and CLT and the effect, if any, of the reclassification of the disputed lot on the clashing rights of the parties concerned.

It may be that the RARAD took cognizance of the underlying verified petition and denied AFP-RSBS' motion to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional ground, a denial which the DARAB affirmed per its Decision of January 18, 2000 in DARAB Case No. DSCA 0028.

It should be stressed, however, that the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 38392, did not uphold nor deny the jurisdiction of the PARAD to take cognizance of the case. The CA merely adverted to its own lack of competence to resolve the petition for certiorari filed before it by AFP-RSBS assailing the RARAD's orders. As the CA explained, it was the DARAB which had exclusive jurisdiction to resolve an action for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders of the PARAD/RARAD in accordance with Sec. 3 of Rule VIII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Totality of Case Assigned.--When a case is assigned to a RARAD or PARAD, any or all incidents thereto shall be considered assigned to him, and the same shall be disposed of in the same proceedings to avoid multiplicity of suits or proceedings.

The order or resolution of the Adjudicators on any issue, question, matter or incident raised before them shall be valid and effective until the hearing shall have been terminated and the case is decided on the merits, unless modified and reversed by the Board upon a verified petition for review on certiorari. Such interlocutory orders shall not be the subject of an appeal. (Emphasis ours.)

Note that under Sec. 3, Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the remedy of certiorari to nullify interlocutory orders has been removed and orders or resolutions of the adjudicator on any issue, question, matter, or incident raised before him shall be valid and effective until the hearing of the case has been terminated and resolved on the merits.

At any rate, assuming that the DARAB did not resolve the issue of jurisdiction in DARAB Case No. DSCA 0028, PARAD Sorita would still be competent to act on and resolve petitioners' verified petition on other grounds, like issues of technicality, as no law or rule disallows him from doing so in this instance. Upon this consideration, it cannot be said that the ruling of PARAD Sorita was contrary to the previous orders of RARAD Arche-Manalang who, by denying AFP-RSBS' motion to dismiss the verified petition, asserted the jurisdiction of the PARAD and DARAB over the instant case.

Order of Dismissal not Contrary to Prior
Grant of Injunction Pendente Lite

Petitioners also assert that the assailed CA Decision unlawfully disregarded the TRO and writ of injunction issued pendente lite.

We are not persuaded.

A cursory review of the orders of PARAD Vergel de Dios and RARAD Arche-Manalang separately granting injunctive relief shows that the orders did not rule on petitioners' right to security of tenure, an issue that, to reiterate, still has to be resolved on the merits. The PARAD and RARAD orders in question were issued precisely to maintain the status quo pending the resolution of the instant case on its substantive merits. The purpose of the injunctive writ is "[t]o prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the parties seeking the writ by preserving the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully."¹⁵ Certainly, during the hearing for the grant of an injunctive writ, preliminary evidence would be received so the court could assess the justifications for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits."¹⁶

Thus, it cannot seriously be asserted that the assailed CA Decision-- directing the DARAB to resolve the issues before it, and not to preempt the PARAD in resolving the case on the merits, if and when the matter of the dismissal on technical grounds is resolved in petitioners' favor--runs counter to the restraining or enjoining orders issued by PARAD Vergel de Dios and RARAD Arche-Manalang. PARAD Sorita's order dismissing the basic verified petition on technical grounds is not necessarily inconsistent with the orders of PARAD Vergel de Dios and RARAD Arche-Manalang relied on by petitioners.

Consequently, the assailed CA Decision cannot be contrary to the orders of the PARAD/RARAD as the DARAB was merely required to resolve issues tendered on appeal, eschewing issues not related to the appeal before it.

Assailed CA Decision on Due Process, Not Contrary to Law

Petitioners submit that the assailed CA Decision violated Sec. 73(c)¹⁷ of RA 6657 and, in the process, effectively deprived them of their claimed landholding without due process of law. Petitioners are again mistaken. They are putting the cart before the horse. The assailed CA Decision only corrected the lapses the DARAB committed which tended to disregard the imperatives of due process and fair play. The CA merely pointed out that the DARAB prematurely, improperly, and erroneously resolved the merits of petitioners' appeal from the orders of PARAD Sorita. Nowhere in the CA assailed Decision can it be reasonably be deduced that the appellate court dispossessed petitioners of whatever right they may have over the disputed lot under agrarian laws.

Clearly, the legal provision cited and relied upon by petitioners was not violated let alone put to naught by the assailed CA Decision.

DARAB Decision on the Merits Premature

Petitioners' lament about the CA gravely abusing its discretion in setting aside the February 7, 2001 DARAB decision is untenable. Equally untenable, for the adverted reasons articulated in the assailed CA Decision, is petitioners' stance regarding the correctness of the DARAB's action reversing PARAD Sorita's decision and effectively recognizing petitioners' tenurial right despite the fact that the PARAD has not yet passed upon the merits of petitioners' claim of security of tenure. Recall that AFP-RSBS, before the PARAD, was not able, through no fault of its own, to present its evidence to prove the non-agricultural nature of the disputed lot or, with like effect, to prove that the same lot is not subject to petitioners' tenurial right.

To obviate misunderstanding, we wish to stress, at this juncture, that this disposition does not purport to pass upon the correctness of, much more affirm, PARAD Sorita's June 9, 1999 order. Neither should this Decision be taken as defining or declaring the rights of the parties vis-à-vis the disputed lot. That could come later should any aggrieved party pursue the case after certain factual and evidentiary issues shall have been duly determined by the proper forum. For the moment, we are mainly concerned with what is raised before us: the propriety of the assailed CA Decision. And we find it proper and correct.

WHEREFORE, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The November 15, 2001 Decision and April 3, 2002 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 65203 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson
*CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice	DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On leave.

¹ Rollo, pp. 354-356.

² Id. at 356.

³ Id. at 216-224.

⁴ Id. at 225-227.

⁵ Id. at 228-230.

⁶ Id. at 250-255.

⁷ Id. at 272-277.

⁸ Id. at 279.

⁹ Id. at 280.

¹⁰ Id. at 290.

¹¹ Id. at 56-67. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now a retired member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Josefina Guevara-Salonga.

¹² Id. at 5-8.

¹³ Id. at 64-66.

¹⁴ Supra note 7.

¹⁵ First Global Realty and Development Corp. v. San Agustin, G.R. No. 144499, February 19, 2002, 377 SCRA 341, 349; citing Republic of the Philippines v. Silerio, G.R. No. 108869, May 6, 1997, 272 SCRA 280, 287. See also Tayag v. Lacson, G.R. No. 134971, March 25, 2004, 426 SCRA 282.

¹⁶ Syndicated Media Access Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106982, March 11, 1993, 219 SCRA 794, 798; citing Olalia v. Hizon, G.R. No. 87913, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA 665.

¹⁷ SEC. 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions.--The following are prohibited: x x x (c) The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into non-agricultural use with intent to avoid the application of this Act to his landholdings and to dispossess his tenant farmers or the land tilled by them.

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