Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. P-07-2330 June 12, 2008
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. P-03-1538-P)
LUDOVICO RAFAEL, complainant,
vs.
BERNARDO G. SUALOG, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Bernardo G. Sualog, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan, charging him with grave abuse of authority relative to the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 3300 for partition and/or recovery of real property and accounting with damages, filed by Ludovico Rafael.
In his letters dated December 18, 2002 and July 10, 2003 addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), complainant alleged that on September 8, 1993, respondent, accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police of Nabas Police Station, Nabas, Aklan, arrived at his residence informing him and his co-plaintiffs that they have lost their case and, consequently, they have to place their houses under legal custody; respondent warned them that they would be liable for moral damages if they would resist; respondent further forced them to sign a document but they refused to do so since they could not understand its contents, which were written in English language; as a result, respondent directed them to go to the Municipal Hall of Nabas, Aklan, which, due to fear and in order to avoid any trouble, complainant and some of his co-plaintiffs did; upon arriving thereat, they were surprised to be detained; while not actually imprisoned, their movements were guarded by the police so that they could not go back to their houses; upon the instance of the Mayor of Nabas, complainant and his sister Arsula1 Rafael-Janoya were released from detention after two (2) days while his son Jim and nephew Salcedo Janoya were freed five (5) days after; later, respondent returned to their place to instruct them to vacate their houses and remove their things for the demolition; because of lack of education and fear of any violence, they had no choice but to accede to respondent; and that eventually the houses of complainant, Jim, Arsula and Salcedo were demolished even after complainant explained to respondent that their houses were not included in the case.2
Respondent, in his Comment dated March 5, 2003,3 countered that the instant complaint stemmed from Civil Case No. 3300 entitled "Ludovico Rafael, et al. versus Mamerto Rafael, et al.," which was decided by the RTC of Aklan on September 4, 1990 in favor of the defendants; on December 14, 1990, when respondent served the writ of execution dated December 6, 1990, he explained to complainant and his co-plaintiffs that the case was dismissed and that there is a need for them to vacate the contested lots; complainant refused to vacate on the ground that he owns the land and has proof in support thereof; for refusing to obey the writ, a motion for contempt of court was thereafter filed by the defendants against complainant, his sons Dione and James, his sister Arsula, and his nephew, Salcedo; on August 2, 1991, the RTC resolved the contempt proceedings and directed the plaintiffs to remove their houses from the disputed lots within thirty (30) days from receipt of the Order, otherwise, the same would be removed and demolished at their expense; the belated appeal of the plaintiffs to the Court of Appeals was dismissed on August 31, 1992, which resolution became final and executory on September 13, 1992; on August 10, 1993, a second alias writ of execution was issued by the RTC; in the execution of the alias writ on August 25 and 27, 1993, respondent served copies thereof to complainant and the other plaintiffs and explained to them in the local dialect its contents with the assistance of the Punong Barangay, but complainant and his co-plaintiffs did not comply; after seeking the assistance of the police authorities of Nabas, Aklan, respondent implemented the writ on September 28, 19934 but complainant and his co-plaintiffs again declined, stating that they would just voluntarily submit themselves to the police authorities and be confined in the Municipal Hall of Nabas rather than witness the demolition of their houses; and that respondent went on to enforce the alias writ and explained to complainant that they could proceed to the Municipal Hall and report whatever complaint they may have against the execution.
Respondent denied complainant's assertion that his house is not included in Civil Case No. 3300 since the latter was the principal plaintiff who actively participated in the case and in the Deed of Undertaking dated September 24, 1993, whereby he and his co-plaintiffs assisted by their counsel bound themselves to remove and demolish their houses at their own expense within thirty (30) days from the date thereof. He asserted that the present case is apparently caused by the miscommunication and strained relations of the plaintiffs and their counsel who failed to apprise them of the September 4, 1990 RTC decision and its effects as well as the subsequent incidents of the case; that he has faithfully adhered to the proper rules of procedure in implementing court orders; and that he has not committed any abuse of authority considering that he made several attempts to effectively and peacefully execute the writs to avoid violence and bloodshed.
On August 13, 2003, the OCA recommended that the case be referred to Hon. Marietta H. Valencia, Executive Judge of RTC Kalibo, Aklan for further investigation, report and recommendation in view of its finding that the case could not be resolved on the basis of the pleadings submitted. The OCA opined that there are conflicting allegations on the part of complainant and respondent as to the manner the latter implemented the writ of execution and that there is also a need to clarify the "nebulous" circumstances leading to the alleged illegal detention of complainants and respondent's purported involvement therein.5
Acting on the referred administrative case, Judge Valencia ordered complainant to file the affidavits of his witnesses within fifteen (15) days from January 7, 2004 and granted respondent the same period within which to file his counter-affidavit. Despite this, complainant never submitted any affidavit up to the time Judge Valencia finally issued her Report on May 20, 2004. In recommending for the dismissal of the case against respondent, Judge Valencia opined:
x x x. It appears that [the complainant] has lost interest in his complaint.
While desistance by the complainant does not necessarily mean that the respondent should be exonerated from the administrative charge, aside from the allegations of the complainant, there is no documentary proof in the records that show that respondent abused his authority while implementing the writs of execution.
Furthermore, respondent, as an officer of the court, is presumed to have regularly performed his official duty. (citation omitted)
The Report was transmitted back to the OCA. On October 27, 2004, it disagreed with Judge Valencia's proposition. Instead, the OCA recommended the ultimate penalty of dismissal from service, with forfeiture of all his benefits and with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch of the Government including government owned and controlled corporations. It ruled:
As borne by the case records, the allegation of respondent that plaintiffs themselves (sic) voluntarily submitted themselves to the police authorities and allowed themselves to be confined in the Municipal Hall rather than witness the demolition of the houses is not credible. Respondent failed to countervail the narration contained in Entry No. 2003, Page 232, dated September 1993 in the Police Blotter of Nabas, Aklan Police Station, that complainant and his family were "arrested by Bernardo Sualog, Sheriff IV For (sic) their refusal to vacate the land in question x x x that said persons was (sic) under police custody for their detention as per request by (sic) Bernardo Sualog, Sheriff IV, SGD Tirazona." The presumption that respondent regularly performed his official duty in the implementation of the writ on 28 September 1994 (sic), therefore, does not apply in the face of contrary evidence presented by the complainant. It is the police officer who recorded the entry in the police blotter who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official function.
In Cruz vs. Dalisay (A.M. No. R-181 P, 152 SCRA 485), the Court held that considering the ministerial nature of (the sheriff's) duty, it is incumbent upon him to ensure that only that portion of a decision ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion should be the subject of execution. No more, no less. Section 10(c) and (d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in hereunder quoted:
"SECTION 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. -
(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. - The officer shall demand of the person against whom the judgment for [the] delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all [persons] claiming rights under him to peacefully vacate the property within three (3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment obligee; otherwise the officer shall oust all such persons therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate police officers, and employing such means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place the judgment obligee in possession of such property x x x. (underscoring supplied)
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. - When the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor x x x, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former had failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court."
In the 02 August 1991 order of Judge Icamina, plaintiffs were ordered to remove their houses from the lots in dispute within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order[;] otherwise, their houses [would] be demolished at their own expense. However, a Deed of Understanding dated 24 September 1993 was executed by complainant and his co-plaintiffs with their counsel and the counsel for the defendants whereby plaintiffs bound themselves to remove and demolish their houses within thirty (30) days from 24 September 1993. Thus, complainant and his family had until 24 October 1993 to remove and demolish their houses.
The actuations of respondent in the implementation of the writ of execution on 28 September 1993 call for disciplinary action. The warrantless arrest made by respondent of complainant and his family members and their subsequent detention are illegal. Complainant's refusal to vacate the property in question is not a legal ground to justify respondent's actions. In fact, these constitute arbitrary detention. Moreover, the writ of execution was prematurely implemented on 28 September 1993 (sic) since complainant and his co-plaintiffs had until 24 October 1993 to demolish their houses. This act certainly erodes public confidence in the fairness of the courts, thus, respondent committed a disservice to the cause of justice.
This Court concurs with the OCA's findings but deems it appropriate to modify the extreme penalty proposed.
Repeatedly, this Court has reminded sheriffs of their mandatory and ministerial duty to execute a writ strictly to the letter such that once the writ is placed in their hands, it is their responsibility, unless restrained by court order, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to enforce the writ according to its mandate, ensuring at all times that the implementation of the judgment is not unduly deferred.6
In this case, the enforcement of the alias writ was speedy but not reasonable; hence, it could not be considered as equitable under the given circumstances. Complainant and his co-plaintiffs were evidently prejudiced by the tempo by which respondent opted to conduct his official duty. This should not be the case since the expeditious and efficient execution of court orders and writs need not be done at the expense of due process and fair play.7
Respondent should have been guided by the precepts this Court set in Balais v. Abuda:8
Respondents, and all Sheriffs for that matter, should be reminded that Writs of Execution should always be served and enforced with prudence and caution, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances. They should bear in mind the injunction in Peñalosa vs. Viscaya (84 SCRA 298 [1978]) that:
"Public Officers, as recipients of a public trust, are under obligation to perform the duties of their offices honestly, faithfully and to the best of their ability. As trustees for the public, they should demonstrate courtesy and civility in their official actuations with the public. Every public officer is bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of his official duties, particularly where rights of individuals may be jeopardized by his neglect. In sum, he is bound virtute offici, to bring to the discharge of his duties that prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their own affairs."9
and our emphasis in Philippine Bank of Communications v. Torio:10
The authority of a sheriff is broad but it is not boundless. In the enforcement of judgments and judicial orders, a sheriff as an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends, must necessarily be circumspect and proper in his behavior. He must know what is inherently right and wrong and is bound to discharge his duties with prudence and caution. Moreover, he must at all times show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of his duties.
A sheriff is required to perform the duties of his office without needless severity or oppression as he is an agent of the law. In enforcing a writ, he must not exercise unnecessary violence or subject the persons on whose premises he enters to indignities and he is liable where process is legally and properly issued but afterwards employed wrongfully and unlawfully by him…. (citations omitted)11
Definitely, like other public officials and employees serving the government, sheriffs should at all times respect the rights of others and act justly; they should necessarily refrain from doing acts contrary to law and public order.12 Respondent, in particular, should have executed the writ in a lawful, prudent and orderly manner, observing the high degree of diligence and professionalism expected of him as an agent of the law. In the exercise of his official actuations, it is his obligation to act with courtesy, self-restraint and civility when dealing with the public even when he is confronted with insolence13 or, as in this case, stubbornness. His extra prompt, overzealous, and premature implementation of the second alias writ, therefore, which resulted in the illegal detention of complainant and some of his co-plaintiffs run counter to this bounden duty. The unlawful act itself is a badge of bad faith and evident intent to defeat the right of complainant and his co-plaintiffs in the face of the Deed of Undertaking, which was mutually agreed upon by the parties to preserve the status quo within thirty (30) days from September 24, 2003.
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,14 respondent is guilty of grave abuse of authority (oppression), which is defined as a "misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury"; it is an "act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority."15 Grave abuse of authority is a grave offense punishable with suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal from service for the second infraction.16 In this case, it appears that respondent has not been previously faulted administratively. So as not to hamper the performance of the duties of his office,17 instead of suspending him, he is fined in an amount equivalent to his six (6) months salary.
WHEREFORE, respondent BERNARDO G. SUALOG, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan, is found GUILTY of grave abuse of authority (oppression) and is FINED in an amount equivalent to his six months salary, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personnel record of respondent in the Office of the Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Carpio, Corona, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Also spelled as "Ursola" and "Ursula" in the pleadings.
2 Rollo, pp. 1-3, 121-124.
3 Id. at 78-82.
4 Records of the Police Blotter of Nabas Police Station of Nabas, Aklan, however, reveal that the incident took place on September 8, 1993. (id. at 125)
5 Id. at 135-138.
6 See Estoque v. Girado, A.M. No. P-06-2250, March 24, 2008, p. 6; Velasco v. Tablizo, A.M. No. P-05-1999, February 22, 2008, p. 5; and Vargas v. Primo, A.M. No. P-07-2336, January 24, 2008, pp. 4-5.
7 Stilgrove v. Sabas, A.M. No. P-06-2257, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 383, 400.
8 A.M. No. R-565-P, November 27, 1986, 146 SCRA 56.
9 Id. at 60. See also Stilgrove v. Sabas, supra at 400.
10 A. M. No. P-98-1260, January 14, 1998, 284 SCRA 67.
11 Id. at 76.
12 Id. at 77.
13 Stilgrove v. Sabas, supra, 401.
14 Promulgated by the Civil Service Commission through Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999 and implemented by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999 (see Aranda, Jr. v. Alvarez, A.M. No. P-04-1889, November 23, 2007).
15 Stilgrove v. Sabas, supra, 394.
16 CSC Res. No. 99-1936, Rule IV, Sec. 52(A)(14) (see Stilgrove v. Sabas, supra, 402).
17 See Estoque v. Girado, supra note 6, citing Sy v. Binasing, A.M. No. P-06-2213, November 23, 2007, p. 4; Jacinto v. Castro, A.M. No. P-04-1907, July 3, 2007, 526 SCRA 272, 279; and Tiu v. Dela Cruz, A.M. No. P-06-2288, June 15, 2007, 524 SCRA 630, 640.
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