Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160474 July 9, 2008
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO T. REUS Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. (petitioner). It seeks to set aside:
(a) the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 28, 2003 which granted Antonio T. Reus’ (respondent) petition for mandamus and ordered the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated July 24, 1991, as modified by the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated October 7, l993; and,
(b) the CA Resolution dated October 17, 2003 denying the motion for
reconsideration that the petitioner subsequently filed.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The dispute has its roots in a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for moral and exemplary damages filed in 1990 by the respondent against the petitioner. The respondent had been in the petitioner’s employ for sixteen (16) years and three (3) months when he was dismissed from employment on October 31, 1990 for shortages in his collections.1 He was at that time a long distance booth attendant assigned to the petitioner’s Taft Avenue Office.
On July 24, 1991, Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan upheld the respondent’s dismissal, but required the petitioner to pay the respondent Php 2,000.00 as indemnity for the failure to afford the respondent a hearing. While he sustained the dismissal, the Labor Arbiter noted that the petitioner had an existing retirement plan and ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent "any retirement benefit complainant may be entitled under the plan."2
Both the petitioner and the respondent appealed to the NLRC. On October 7, 1993, the NLRC promulgated its decision (1993 NLRC decision) modifying the decision of Arbiter Linsangan (Linsangan decision). It affirmed the respondent’s dismissal, but ordered him paid benefits under the petitioner’s retirement plan, less the amount of the lost collection and other outstanding obligations of respondent.3
The parties’ attempt to secure a reconsideration of the 1993 NLRC decision both proved fruitless, prompting them to elevate the case to this Court through their respective petitions for certiorari. We dismissed the respondent’s petition – G.R. No. 113737 – for nonpayment of sheriff’s fees and clerk’s commission as required by Revised Circular 1-88 and for the petition’s failure to show that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in its ruling.4 We likewise dismissed the petitioner’s petition – G.R. No. 113335 –for its own failure to establish that the assailed decision was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The Court’s resolutions of dismissal became final on March 15, 1995 and were entered in the Book of Entry of Judgment.5
The respondent forthwith moved for the execution of the 1993 NLRC decision. On November 2, 1995, Arbiter Linsangan issued an order directing the petitioner to pay the respondent retirement benefits in the amount of Php 158,849.60 based on the computation made by the Research and Information Unit of the NLRC.6 In issuing the order, Arbiter Linsangan relied on the 1993 NLRC decision that he had found to have become final and executory. The respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution which the petitioner opposed on the contention that it had not received a copy of Arbiter Linsangan’s November 2, 1995 Order.
Arbiter Linsangan issued the requested writ on December 12, 19957 while Labor Arbiter Ramon Reyes (who took over the case upon the retirement of Arbiter Linsangan) issued on May 14, 1996 an order directing the sheriff of the NLRC to proceed with the execution of the award.8 On September 27, 1996, Sheriff Conrado O. Gaddi issued a Notice of Garnishment to the PCI Bank, Makati Branch.
On May 28, l996, the petitioner appealed Arbiter Reyes’ order to the NLRC with the submission that it never received a copy of the November 2, 1995 Order of Arbiter Linsangan, and that the respondent was not entitled to the benefits program of the company because he was only 36 years old and had rendered only 16 years of service at the time of his dismissal.9
The NLRC found merit in the petitioner’s appeal and resolved on July 29, 1998 to vacate Arbiter Linsangan’s Order of November 2, 1995. It ordered that the records of the case be remanded for the computation of the respondent’s benefits under the retirement plan and that a Writ of Execution be issued if he is entitled to benefits thereunder.10 The respondent did not question this July 29, 1998 NLRC decision (the 1998 NLRC decision).
On October 27, 1998, the respondent filed a motion for the issuance of a third alias writ of execution of the 1993 NLRC decision.11 After the parties’ submissions, Arbiter Reyes granted the motion on September 3, 1999 and ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent retirement benefits as computed by the NLRC. He declared as null and void the 1998 NLRC decision.
On February 14, 2000, the petitioner appealed the Order of Arbiter Reyes to the NLRC, contending that Arbiter Reyes had acted in excess of authority and without jurisdiction in declaring the 1998 NLRC decision null and void; had committed palpable error in granting the motion for issuance of the third alias writ; and had gravely erred in ordering the petitioner to pay the respondent retirement benefits.121avvphi1
Again, the respondent moved for the execution of the 1993 NLRC decision and the September 3, 1999 Order of Arbiter Reyes. The Labor Arbiter this time refused to issue the writ, consequently forcing the respondent to seek relief from the CA via a petition for mandamus and prohibition.13
On December 14, 2001, while the respondent’s petition for mandamus was pending before the CA, the NLRC granted the petitioner’s appeal and annulled the September 3, 1999 Order of Arbiter Reyes.14 The NLRC reiterated the modifications it made in its 1993 NLRC decision, clarifying that the respondent’s retirement benefits are to be paid after determination of his qualification to receive these benefits under the company retirement plan. Again, the respondent did not appeal.
In the meantime, the CA, in a Decision dated March 28, 2003, granted the respondent’s petition for mandamus.15 It directed the Labor Arbiter to execute the Linsangan decision as modified by the 1993 NLRC decision. The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CA Decision, but the CA denied this motion.16
On July 18, 2003, the respondent filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution17 which Labor Arbiter Joselito C. Villarosa granted in an Order dated September 2, 2003.18 On September 23, 2003, Arbiter Ramon Reyes issued a third alias writ of execution.19 The sheriffs of the NLRC garnished on October 13, 2003 the petitioner’s supersedeas bond corresponding to the computed award of Php 158,849.40.20 On October 16, 2003, the petitioner moved to quash the writ.
The surety company issued and deposited in the NLRC’s account RCBC Check No. 000711787 dated November 3, 2003 for the full awarded amount.21 In an Order dated December 16, 2003, Arbiter Reyes directed the Cashier of the NLRC to release to the respondent the garnished award.22 On January 26, 2004, respondent manifested before this Court23 that pursuant to the Order of Arbiter Reyes, the NLRC released to him (the respondent) the check representing the awarded benefits.
THE PETITION
Petitioner submits that in the absence of a showing that the respondent had a clear right to the payment of retirement benefits, the CA seriously erred in granting the respondent’s petition for mandamus and in ordering the Labor Arbiter to issue a writ of execution. It contends that the respondent is clearly not entitled to benefits under the plan and hence should not be paid benefits thereunder.
The petitioner likewise argues that the assailed CA Decision and Resolution are null and void for having been issued in excess of the Linsangan decision, as modified by the 1993 NLRC decision. It admits though that the 1993 NLRC decision had already attained finality and the CA Decision of March 28 2003, as well as the subsequent Orders of the Labor Arbiter, was mainly intended to implement the 1993 NLRC decision. It posits that the execution of the judgment should conform strictly with the decision being implemented24 and asks the question "what is the decision to be executed and how should it be implemented?"
In answering this question, the petitioner points out that the Linsangan decision ordered payment under the retirement plan if the respondent is entitled to benefits under the plan, while the 1993 NLRC decision modified this aspect of the Linsangan decision by simply ordering the petitioner to pay the respondent benefits under the company retirement plan.25 Under this reading, the petitioner claims that the respondent must be qualified for retirement benefits under the plan in order to be entitled to payment. It then proceeds to show that the respondent, who was 36 years old and had served for 16 years, was not qualified under the plan which required that an employee be 65 years of age for compulsory retirement, or at least 50 years of age or has completed 30 years of service for optional retirement.
The petitioner adds that the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter pursuant to the March 28, 2003 CA Decision should not be allowed because it was issued in excess of the terms of the decision being implemented; otherwise, the CA would have effectively amended or reversed the Linsangan decision that had lapsed to finality.
Finally, the petitioner submits that the anomalous situation could have been avoided had the CA simply considered the two (2) final Resolutions of the NLRC dated July 29, 1998 and December 14, 2001 which both ruled that the respondent is not entitled to a writ of execution because his right to payment of retirement benefits has yet to be determined in accordance with the petitioner’s retirement plan. The petitioner stresses that the two Resolutions became final when the respondent did not question them before the NLRC or the higher courts.
In its Comment with Motion to Dismiss the Petition dated January 15, 2004,26 the respondent points out that this Court has long ruled on the 1993 NLRC decision, and that this Court’s Decision of February 6, 1995 had long become final and executory as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment dated March 15, 1995. He thus insists that his legal right to the benefits under the petitioner’s retirement plan has been clearly recognized by this Court. He contends that the 1998 NLRC decision that modified the 1993 NLRC decision is null and void and should have no legal effect.
The respondent bewails that the NLRC took cognizance of the petitioner’s appeal from the Order of Labor Arbiter Ramon Reyes of May 14, 1996 when this order was interlocutory and was therefore not an appealable ruling. He points out that the only issue raised in the appeal was whether Labor Arbiter Ramon Reyes gravely abused his discretion in holding that petitioner actually and physically received the Order of Arbiter Linsangan dated November 2, 1995.
OUR RULING
We deny the petition as the CA committed no reversible error in granting the respondent’s petition for mandamus. The execution of the 1993 NLRC decision has long been overdue; it became final and executory more than a decade ago when this Court dismissed the petitions for certiorari filed by both the petitioner and the respondent to assail this decision. To reiterate, this Court’s own resolutions of dismissal that upheld the 1993 NLRC decision were entered in the Book of Entry of Judgment on March 15, 1995 or more than thirteen (13) years ago.
We find it significant that the petitioner itself admits that the 1993 NLRC decision to be implemented in this case is already final. The petition itself states:
There is no dispute that the October 7, 1993 Resolution of the NLRC is already final. It is likewise clear that the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 28, 2003, as well as the implementing Order of Labor Arbiter Villarosa dated September 2, 2003, is mainly intended to implement the aforementioned Resolution (October 07, 1993) of the NLRC. Such being the case, the execution of the judgment should conform strictly with the October 7, 1993 Resolution of the NLRC.27
Thus, the only question to be resolved is: how should this Decision be implemented? The dispositive portion of this decision decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, the assailed decision is hereby modified, ordering the respondent to pay complainant benefits under its company retirement plan, less the amount of the loss collection and other outstanding obligations of the complainant with the company as of date, and the appeals are hereby dismissed for lack of merit x x x.28 [emphasis supplied]
The modification it adverts to is in turn based on the Linsangan decision which provided:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the complaint for illegal dismissal should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent is, however, ordered to pay complainant the amount of Php 2,000.00 as indemnity, any retirement benefit complainant may be entitled to under the company’s retirement plan and attorney’s fees of 10% of the monetary award x x x. 29
Petitioner reads the decretal portion of the 1993 NLRC Decision to mean that the respondent should be entitled to benefits under the terms of the plan in order to be paid under the decision. Interestingly, the petitioner is not alone in this view as the public respondent NLRC, through the OSG, in G.R. No. 113335 explained to the Court that "x x x it is but just and equitable, as respondent NLRC and the Labor Arbiter correctly pointed out, to award retirement benefits to said employee, if qualified under the retirement plan of petitioner."30 Petitioner then points out that since respondent was only 36 years old and had rendered only 16 years of service, he was not qualified to receive retirement benefits under the company’s retirement plan. It thus concludes that the March 28, 2003 Decision of the CA, as well as the Order of Labor Arbiter Villarosa dated September 2, 2003 that granted the respondent’s motion for execution, is null and void for having been issued beyond and in excess of what is mandated under the 1993 NLRC decision.
We disagree with these submissions.
The 1993 NLRC decision whose execution is disputed has long been final and executory. This case is now almost eighteen (18) years old counted from the filing of the original complaint before the Labor Arbiter. It has gone to this Court once before and has been acted upon with finality. Thus, the termination of the present controversy is now long overdue. In the words of the CA Decision:
Litigation must at some time be terminated, even at the risk of occasional errors, for public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory, and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.31
All these we emphasize at the outset as we will not be diverted by arguments that will effectively reopen the 1993 NLRC decision to further litigation unless this is the only clear way to do justice to the parties. One such mode of reopening the case to further litigation is to recognize and put into issue the eligibility terms of the petitioner’s retirement plan as done in the 1998 NLRC decision that attempted to correct the 1993 NLRC decision long after the latter had lapsed to finality. Fortunately, the CA laid this question to rest when it ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 58629 that:
We note that the NLRC was in error in rendering the resolution dated July 29, 1998, correcting an already final judgment. Worse, they were trying to correct the already final judgment by using, as basis, the decision of Labor Arbiter Linsangan which they have previously modified. Worst, it was never prayed for by private respondent in its appeal dated May 28, 1996. Private respondent merely prayed that the Order dated May 14, 1996 of Labor Arbiter Reyes be set aside and a new on entered declaring that no valid service of the Order dated November 02, 1995 was made upon respondent PLDT. Thus, we rule that the decision dated July 29, 1998 of the NLRC was rendered with grave abuse of discretion in excess of its jurisdiction, hence null and void and without legal effect.32
To our mind, the only question now before us is the interpretation of the 1993 NLRC decision, that is, how this decision should be read and implemented in order to finally lay this long drawn out labor dispute to rest.
A critical point in appreciating the 1993 NLRC decision is the fact that it MODIFIED the Linsangan decision directing the petitioner to pay complainant Php 2,000.00 as indemnity and any retirement benefit he may be entitled to under the company’s retirement plan.
An undisputed modification that the 1993 NLRC decision decreed is the deletion of the order for the payment of indemnity and attorney’s fees. The deletion is based apparently on the lack of finding relating to any due process violation or to any ground for entitlement to attorney’s fees.
A second obvious change, and the one most material to the present dispute, is the removal of the order for payment of retirement benefits that the complainant "may be entitled" to under the company’s retirement plan. The NLRC simply ordered "the respondent to pay complainant benefits under its company retirement plan, less the amount of the lost collection and other outstanding obligations of the complainant with the company as of date"; thus, removing the condition of "entitlement" found in the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Why the NLRC so worded the dispositive portion of its decision is clarified by its own penultimate paragraph where the NLRC explained the basis for the modification, thus:
Mindful however of the length of service of herein complainant with respondent company and considering further that the proximate cause of the loss of the collection is not solely attributable to him, the equitable solution would be for Mr. Reus to be entitled to the retirement benefits under the retirement plan.33
With this explanation, it immediately becomes clear that the NLRC was not ordering the payment of benefits under the plan because the respondent was entitled thereto under the terms of the plan, or that it entertained doubts about entitlement and was ordering payment if entitlement could be established. The NLRC apparently had other thoughts in mind; it wanted to order payment – not strictly based on the law for there was a cited cause for dismissal, nor on the eligibility terms of the company’s retirement plan for he was not being retired – but on the basis of equity; it was simply applying the benefits of the plan as a measure of what should be paid as "equitable solution," to quote directly from the words of the 1993 NLRC decision. Thus, its order for payment was clear, direct, and unfettered by any condition of entitlement or eligibility.
Significantly, whether such equitable grant is justified or not, legally correct or in error, or whether it is wise or unwise, are issues that are beyond the parties’ reach at this time. We hasten to add that the NLRC decision and our affirmation of this decision cannot and should not be used as authority for issues relating to the terms of the company retirement plan; what we hereby affirm is the finality of the NLRC’s equitable award and its terms, not any issue on the interpretation or application of, or the entitlement under, the terms of the plan. With the NLRC decision now fully implemented through the garnishment of the supersedeas bond posted by the petitioner and the release of the proceeds to the respondent, this case is ready to be declared fully closed and terminated upon the finality of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for its failure to show any reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals Decision of March 28, 2003 and Resolution of October 17, 2003, both of which are hereby declared AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES*
Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO**
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated as additional member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 504 dated May 15, 2008.
** Designated as additional member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 505 dated May 15, 2008.
1 Rollo, p. 33.
2 Id., pp. 58-62.
3 Id., pp. 63-72.
4 Id., p. 46.
5 Id.
6 Id., pp. 138-140.
7 Id., pp. 141-143.
8 Id., pp. 144-147.
9 Id., pp. 148-156.
10 Id., pp. 168-177.
11 Id., pp. 178-181.
12 Id., pp. 211-226.
13 CA-G.R. SP No. 58629, id., pp. 232-243.
14 Id., pp. 244-247.
15 Id., pp. 44-55.
16 Id., pp. 248-265.
17 Id., pp. 266-269.
18 Id., pp. 271-276.
19 Id., pp. 333-337.
20 Id., p. 341.
21 Id., p. 342.
22 Id., pp. 357-360.
23 Id., pp. 389-393.
24 Supra, note 1, p. 30.
25 Id., pp. 30-31.
26 Id., pp. 363-378.
27 Id., p. 30.
28 Id., p. 71.
29 Id., p. 62.
30 Id., p. 119.
31 Nasser v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115829, June 5, 1995, 245 SCRA 20.
32 Rollo, pp. 50-51.
33 Id., p. 71.
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