Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
(ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. v. Hon. Cesar V. Purisima, et. al)
CONCURRING OPINION
TINGA, J.:
I join Justice Corona’s lucid opinion – one of the more legally significant decisions of this Court of recent years because it concludes for the first time that legislative vetoes are impermissible in this jurisdiction. I fully concur with the majority’s reasoning for declaring legislative veto as invalid. Yet even as the ponencia aligns with most of my views, I write separately to fully explain my viewpoint.
I.
The controversy rests on the so-called "legislative veto", defined by Tribe as "measures allowing [Congress], or one of its Houses or committees, to review and revoke the actions of federal agencies and executive departments."1 Our Constitution specifically neither prohibits nor allows legislative vetoes, unlike presidential vetoes, which are formally authorized under Section 27, Article VI. Until today, Court has likewise declined so far to pass judgment on the constitutionality of a legislative veto.2
The Court is unanimous that a legislative veto, such as that contained in Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 9335 is unconstitutional. Such a ruling would be of momentous consequence, not only because the issue has never been settled before, but also because many of our statutes incorporate a similarly worded provision that empowers members of Congress to approve the Implementing Rules of various particular laws. Moreover, the invalidation of legislative vetoes will send a definite signal to Congress that its current understanding of the extent of legislative powers is awry.
Concededly, our ruling will greatly affect the workings of the legislative branch of government. It would thus be intellectually honest to also consider the question from the perspective of that branch which is the branch most affected by that ruling. Of course, the perspective of the executive should be reckoned with as well since it has traditionally inveighed against legislative vetoes. Still, if we are to consider the congressional perspective of the question, there will emerge important nuances to the question that should dissuade against any simplistic analysis of the issue.
II.
I have previously intimated that the President, in chartering the extent of his plenary powers, may be accorded a degree of flexibility for so long as he is not bound by any specific constitutional proscription. That same degree of deference should be extended to Congress as well. Thus, I wish to inquire into whether there is a constitutionally justifiable means to affirm legislative vetoes.
The emergence of the legislative veto in the United States coincided with the decline of the non-delegation doctrine, which barred Congress from delegating its law-making powers elsewhere.3 Modern jurisprudence has authorized the delegation of lawmaking powers to administrative agencies, and there are resulting concerns that there is no constitutional assurance that the agencies are responsive to the people’s will.4 From that framework, the legislative veto can be seen as a means of limiting agency rule-making authority by lodging final control over the implementing rules to Congress. "But instead of controlling agency policy in advance by laying out a roadmap in the statute creating the agency, Congress now proposes to control policy as it develops in notice-and-comment rulemaking, after the agency’s expert staff and interested members of the public have had an opportunity to assist in its formation."5 It is a negative check by Congress on policies proposed by the agencies, and not a means for making policy directly.6
From the perspective of Congress, the legislative veto affords maximum consideration to the plenary power of legislation, as it bolsters assurances that the legislative policy embodied in the statute will be faithfully executed upon its implementation. The faithful execution of the laws of the land is a constitutional obligation imposed on the President7, yet as a matter of practice, there could be a difference of opinion between the executive and legislative branches as to the meaning of the law. The clash may be especially telling if the President and Congress are politically hostile with each other, and it bears notice that the legislative veto in the United States became especially popular beginning in the early 1970s, when the ties between the Democratic-controlled Congress and the Republican President Richard Nixon were especially frayed.8 More recently, the current U.S. President Bush has had a penchant of attaching "signing statements" to legislation he has approved, such statements indicating his own understanding of the bill he is signing into law. The legislative veto, as a practical matter, allows Congress to prevent a countervailing attempt by the executive branch to implement a law in a manner contrary to the legislative intent.
There is nothing obnoxious about the policy considerations behind the legislative veto. Since the courts, in case of conflict, will uphold legislative intent over the executive interpretation of a law, the legislative veto could ensure the same judicially-confirmed result without need of elevating the clash before the courts. The exercise of the legislative veto could also allow both branches to operate within the grayer areas of their respective constitutional functions without having to resort to the judicial resolution of their potentially competing claims. As the future U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer once wrote:
The [legislative] veto sometimes offers a compromise of important substantive conflicts embedded deeply in the Constitution. How are we to reconcile the Constitution’s grant to Congress of the power to declare war with its grant to the President of authority over the Armed Forces as their Commander in Chief? The War Powers Act approaches the problem, in part, by declaring that the President cannot maintain an armed conflict for longer than ninety days if both Houses of Congress enact a resolution of disapproval. Similar vetoes are embedded in laws authorizing the President to exercise various economic powers during times of "national emergency". To take another example, how are we to reconcile article I’s grant to Congress of the power to appropriate money with article II’s grant to the President of the power to supervise its expenditure? Must the President spend all that Congress appropriates? Congress has addressed this conflict, authorizing the President to defer certain expenditures subject to a legislative veto.9
There are practical demerits imputed as well to the legislative veto, such as the delay in the implementation of the law that may ensue with requiring congressional approval of the implementing rules.10 Yet the question must ultimately rest not on the convenience or wisdom of the legislative veto device, but on whether it is constitutionally permissible.
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court struck a decisive blow against the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha11, a ruling which essentially held the practice as unconstitutional. It appears that the foremost consideration of the majority opinion in Chadha were the issues of bicameralism and presentment, as discussed by the Chief Justice in his Separate Opinion in Macalintal v. COMELEC12. The twin issues of presentment and bicameralism would especially come to fore with respect to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee under Rep. Act No. 9335, composed as it is by seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of Representatives.13
Chadha emphasized that the bills passed by the U.S. Congress must be presented for approval to the President of the United States in order that they may become law.14 Section 27(1), Article VI of our Constitution imposes a similar presentment requirement. Chadha also noted that a bill must be concurred in by a majority of both Houses of Congress. Under our Constitution, Congress consists of a House of Representatives and a Senate, and the underlying uncontroverted implication is that both Houses must concur to the bill before it can become law. Assuming that the approval of the Implementing Rules to Rep. Act No. 9335 by seven Members from each House of Congress is a legislative act, such act fails either the presentment or bicameralism requirement. Such approval is neither presented to the President of the Philippines for consent, nor concurred in by a majority of either House of Congress.
Yet with respect to the implications of Chadha on the principle of separation of powers, there are critical informed comments against that decision. Chadha involved the statutory authority of either House of Congress to disapprove the decision of the executive branch to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States. The majority had characterized such disapproval as a legislative act, since it "had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons".15 Yet that emphasis "on the labels of legislative, executive and judicial" was criticized as "provid[ing] the rhetorical ammunition for a variety of cases seeking judicial reassessment of the constitutionality not only of the great number of statutes that have incorporated some kind of legislative veto mechanism, but of regulatory statutes in general that sought to delegate legislative, executive and judicial power, and various combinations thereof, to the unelected officials that run the various federal agencies."16
Fisher presents a veritable laundry list of criticisms of the Chadha reasoning, replete with accusations that the analysis employed on separation of powers detracted from the intent of the Framers, resulting in giving the "executive branch a one-sided advantage in an accommodation that was meant to be a careful balancing of executive and legislative interests".17 He further observed:
The Court’s misreading of history and congressional procedures has produced some strange results. Its theory of government is too much at odds with the practices developed over a period of decades by the political branches. Neither administrators nor congressmen want the static model proferred by the Court. The conditions that spawned the legislative veto a half century ago have not disappeared. Executive officials still want substantial latitude in administering delegated authority; legislators still insist on maintaining control without having to pass another law. The executive and legislative branches will, therefore develop substitutes to serve as the functional equivalent of the legislative veto. Forms will change but not power relationships and the need for quid pro quo.18
And Tribe himself finds flaw in the Chadha analysis of what constituted a legislative act:
And why, precisely, did the veto of the suspension of Chadha’s deportation have to be deemed legislative? It was "essentially legislative," according to the Court, because it "had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons … outside the legislative branch". Without Congress’ exercise of the legislative veto in his case, Chadha would have remained in America; without the veto provision in the immigration statute, the change in Chadha’s legal status could have been wrought only be legislation requiring his deportation. The difficulty with this analysis is that the same observations apply with equal validity to nearly all exercises of delegated authority, whether by a House of Congress or by an executive department or an administrative agency. Both through rule-making and through case-by-case adjudication, exercises of delegated authority change legal rights and privileges no less than do full-fledged laws.
There was perhaps less need than the Court perceived to squeeze the legislative veto into one of the three pigeonholes envisioned by the Framers. Even if Congress’ action had been deemed "executive" in nature, it presumably would have been unconstitutional, since Congress may make, but not execute the laws. And if the legislative veto had been deemed "judicial," it would still have violated the separation of powers, as Justice Powell recognized in his concurring opinion.19
The majority in Chadha did not address the reality that the U.S. Congress had relied on the legislative veto device for over five decades20, or for that matter, the valid concerns over the executive usurpation of legislative prerogatives that led to the invention of the veto as a countervailing measure. Justice Byron White relied extensively on these concerns in his dissenting opinion in Chadha.
Nonetheless, the invalidation of the legislative veto in Chadha has caused serious discussion as to alternative constitutional means through which Congress could still ensure that its legislative intentions would not be countermanded by the executive branch. On one extreme, a Republican congressman, Nick Smith of Michigan, filed a bill requiring that significant new regulations adopted by administrative agencies be approved by a joint resolution of Congress before they would become effective.21 Less constitutionally controversial perhaps were the suggestions of Justice Breyer in remarks he made after Chadha was decided. He explained that "Congress unquestionably retains a host of traditional weapons in its legislative and political arsenal that can accomplish some of the veto’s objectives."22
These include the power to provide that legislation delegating authority to the executive expires every so often. To continue to exercise that authority, the executive would have to seek congressional approval, at which point past agency behavior that Congress disliked would become the subject of serious debate. Moreover, Congress might tailor its statutes more specifically, limiting executive power. Further, Congress can require the President, before taking action, to consult with congressional representatives whose views would carry significant political weight. Additionally, Congress can delay implementation of an executive action (as it does when the Supreme Court promulgates rules of civil procedure) until Congress has had time to consider it an to enact legislation preventing the action from taking effect. Finally, each year Congress considers the agency’s budget. If a significant group of legislators strongly opposes a particular agency decision, it might well succeed in including a sentence in the appropriations bill denying the agency funds to enforce that decision.23
I raise these points because even with the invalidation of the legislative veto, Congress need not simply yield to the executive branch. The invalidation of the legislative veto can be mistakenly perceived as signal by the executive branch that it can, in the guise of rule-making power, adopt measures not authorized or even forbidden in the enabling legislation. If that happens, undue weight will be shifted to the executive branch, much like what had happened when former President Marcos exercised both executive and legislative powers. One might correctly argue that the judicial branch may still exercise corrective relief against such unauthorized exercise by the executive24, yet the relief may not come for years to come, considering the inherently deliberative judicial process.
I do believe that there is a constitutionally sound mechanism through which Congress may validly influence the approval of a law’s Implementing Rules. Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 9335 may not be such a means, but I maintain that it would be highly useful for the Court to explain how this can be accomplished. In this light, I submit the following proposed framework for invalidating the legislative veto while recognizing the pre-eminent congressional prerogative in defining the manner how legislation is to be implemented.
III.
We can consider that in the enactment and implementation of a law, there is a legislative phase and an executive phase. The legislative phase encompasses the period from the initiation of a bill in Congress until it becomes effective as a law. On the other hand, the executive phase begins the moment the law is effective and falls within the capacity of the executive branch to enforce.
Notably, as such, it is only upon the effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Now, subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process clause,25 the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress.26 As such, it is only upon effectivity that the law may be executed, and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute that law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly the President, is limited to signing or vetoing the law. All other powers of government that attach to the proposed law are exercised exclusively by Congress and are hence, legislative in character. In fact, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Black, has gone as far as to hold that the Constitution "limits [the President’s] functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad."27
It is viable to hold that any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law after the execution phase has begun violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the Implementing Rules after the law has already taken effect is unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by those members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.
This time or phase demarcation not only affords a convenient yardstick by which to assess the constitutionality of a legislated role for Congress vis-à-vis a law, it also hews to the proper allocation of governmental powers. Again, the exercise of executive powers relative to a statute can only emanate after the effectivity of the law, since before that point, said law cannot be executed or enforced. Until a law becomes effective, there are no executive functions attached to the law.
Of course, following this rationale, Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 9335 will have to be invalidated. To cite one outstanding example of what else would be invalidated as a result is the Joint Congressional Power Commission established in the EPIRA (Rep. Act No. 9136), where the Commission composed of several members of Congress exercises a continuing role in overseeing the implementation of the EPIRA.28 The functions of the Joint Congressional Power Commission are exercised in the execution phase, and thus beyond the pale of legislative power. There are many other provisions in our laws, such as those similar to Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 9335, that will similarly not pass muster after this ruling, and the Court will have to reckon with the real problem as to whether this decision effectively nullifies those provisions as well. Nonetheless, the Court need not invalidate those provisions in other laws yet and await the appropriate cases to do so, similar to the approach previously taken on the invalidation of municipalities created by the President in Pelaez v. Auditor General.29
IV.
I seriously disagree with Justice Carpio’s assertion that the power to formulate or adopt implementing rules inheres in the executive function. That power is a legislative function traditionally delegated by Congress to the executive branch. The ponencia satisfactorily asserts this point through its Footnote No. 63, and I need not belabor it.
One option for congressional control over executive action is to be very specific and limiting in the delegation of power to agencies, so that their rulemaking power will in turn be limited.30 The power to make rules and regulation is that kind of legislative power which may be delegated.31 In practice, the United States Congress has engaged frequently in broad delegations that in effect require agencies to make specific sub-rules ─ i.e., to exercise legislative power.32 This practice has drawn some criticism that power is now concentrated in the executive branch and that it is thus necessary to restore Congress to its original status of preeminence.33 The growth of an enormous national bureaucracy, operating for the most part within the executive branch, may have fundamentally altered the original constitutional framework and requires some sort of response if the original constitutional concerns are to be satisfied.34
Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 9335, or any other provision of law granting components of the executive branch the power to formulate implementing rules, is a delegation of legislative power belonging to Congress to the executive branch. Congress itself has the power to formulate those particular rules and incorporate them in the law itself. What I believe Congress is precluded from doing is to exercise such power after the law has taken effect, in other words, after the execution phase has begun. Unless such a limitation were laid down, there would ensue undue encroachment by Congress in the exercise of legislative power.
This delegable rule-making power may be classified into two types: (1) rules intended to regulate the internal management of the agencies themselves; and (2) rules supplementing a statute and intended to affect persons and entities outside the government made subject to agency regulation.35 Either case, the power of the executive branch to promulgate such rules springs from legislative delegation. In the Philippines, the power of executive officials to enact rules to regulate the internal management of executive departments was specifically allocated to them by a statute, the Administrative Code of 1987, promulgated by President Aquino in the exercise of her then extant legislative powers. With respect to supplementary rules to particular legislation, the power of executive officials to formulate such rules derives from the legislation itself. But in no case does such power emanate actually from inherent executive power.
The rule need not be hard and fast. We may as well pay heed to Blackstone’s practical observation that the "manner, time and circumstances of putting laws in execution must frequently be left to the discretion of the executive magistrates".36 But by and large, any problem left by the absence of clear and explicit statutory language is avoided in turn by the statutory delegation of legislative power to executive officials to vest them sufficient discretion to fill in the details.37
We thus cannot detract from the fundamental principle that rule-making power is legislative in character and exercised by executive officials only upon a statutory delegation of legislative power. As Fisher summarizes the peculiar dynamic:
Presidents are obligated under the Constitution to take care that the laws be "faithfully executed." The often conflicting and ambiguous passages within a law must be interpreted by executive officials to construct the purpose and intent of Congress. As important as intent is the extent to which a law is carried out. President Taft once remarked, "Let anyone make the laws of the country, if I can construe them."
To carry out the laws, administrators issue rules and regulations of their own. The courts long ago appreciated this need. Rules and regulations "must be received as the acts of the executive, and as such, be binding upon all within the sphere of his legal and constitutional authority. Current law authorizes the head of an executive department or military department to prescribe regulations "for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property.
These duties, primarily of a "housekeeping" nature, relate only distantly to the citizenry. Many regulations, however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policymaking that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws. Agency rulemaking must rest on authority granted directly or indirectly by Congress.38
The Court’s rightful rejection of Justice Carpio’s premise that the power of the President of promulgate Implementing Rules and Regulations is inherently executive provides a necessary clarification that is critical to the understanding of the Court’s ruling today. Had Justice Carpio’s position been adopted by the Court, the result would have been a presidency much stronger than the Constitution envisioned. Acceding to the President the power to craft Implementing Rules to legislation even if Congress specifically withholds such power to the Chief Executive would have upset the finely measured schematic of balanced powers, to the benefit of the President. Fortunately, with the disavowal of that theory, greater consideration is accorded to legislative prerogatives without compromising the important functions of the presidency.
V.
Thusly, there is nothing inherently unconstitutional in congressional participation in the formulation of implementing rules of legislation since that power is legislative in character. Yet there still are multiple roadblocks impeding a constitutionally valid exercise of that prerogative by Congress. The matters of bicameralism and presentment, as expounded in Chadha, are hurdles which I submit should bind the Philippine Congress as it exercises its legislative functions. Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 9335 can be struck down on that ground alone.39 Moreover, imposing a rule barring a legislative role in the implementation of a law after the statute’s effectivity will sufficiently preserve the integrity of our system of separation of powers.
At the same time, the concerns of Congress that may have animated the rise of the legislative veto should not be disrespected by simply raising formalistic barriers against them. In practice, the legislative veto is an effective check against abuses by the executive branch. The end may not justify unconstitutional means, yet we should leave ample room for Congress to be able to address such concerns within broad constitutional parameters.
There are a myriad of creative ways by which Congress may influence the formulation of Implementing Rules without offending the Constitution. If there are especially problematic areas in the law itself which Congress is not minded to leave any room for interpretative discretion by executive officials, then the provision involved can be crafted with such specificity to preclude alternative interpretations. At the same time, commonly, legislators and their staffs may lack the expertise to draft specific language.40 Speaking from my own legislative experience, it is in the drafting of the Implementing Rules, rather than in the statute itself, that the particular expertise of the agency officials and experts tasked with the implementation of the law become especially vital.
Also, Congress can dictate which particular executive officials will draft the implementing rules, prescribe legal or factual standards that must be taken into account by such drafters, or otherwise impose requirements or limitations which such drafters are bound to comply with. Again, because the power to draft implementing rules is delegated legislative power, its exercise must be within the confines of the authority charted by Congress.
And because executive functions cannot commence until after the effectivity of the law, Congress may very well adopt creative but constitutional measures that suspend the effectivity of the law until implementing rules to its liking are crafted. There is nothing unconstitutional with suspending the effectivity of laws pending the occurrence of a stipulated condition. "[I]t is not always essential that a legislative act should be a completed statute which must in any event take effect as a law, at the time it leaves the hands of the legislative department. A statute may be conditional, and its taking effect may be made to depend upon some subsequent event."41
The requirements of bicameralism and especially presentment may pose insurmountable hurdles to a provision that plainly suspends the effectivity of a law pending approval by Congress or some of its members of the implementing rules.42 At the same time, it should be recognized that Congress does have the prerogative to participate in the drafting of the rules, and if it finds a means to do so before the execution phase has begun, without offending bicameralism or presentment, such means may be upheld.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 L. Tribe, I. American Constitutional Law 142 (3rd ed., 2000.) , at 142.
2 See, e.g., PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, 113888, 19 August 1994, 234 SCRA 506. Neither was the question considered by the majority opinion in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 453 Phil. 586 (2003).
3 See., e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). See also H. Bruff & E. Gellhorn, "Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes", 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1372-1373 (1977).
4 Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 1373.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 See Sec. 17, Article VII, Constitution.
8 "One survey found five such [legislative veto clauses] enacted between 1932 and 1939, nineteen in the 1940’s, thirty four in the 1950’s, forty-nine in the 1960’s, and eighty-nine enacted between 1970 and 1975." S. Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 Geo. L.J. 785, 786 (1984)
9 Breyer, supra note 8, at 789.
10 Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 1379.
11 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
12 453 Phil. 586 (2003). "[T]he Court [in Chadha] shied away from the issue of separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President.xxx" Id., at 763 (J. Puno, Separate Opinion)
13 See Section 12, Rep. Act No. 9335.
14 "The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that the requirement that all legislation be presented to the President before becoming law was uniformly accepted by the Framers. Presentment to the President and the Presidential veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure that these requirements could not be circumvented." INS v. Chadha, supra note 11, at 946-947.
15 Id., at 952.
16 A. Aman & W. Mayton, Administrative Law (2nd ed., 2001), at 594.
17 L. Fisher. Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President. (4th ed., 1997), at 153.
18 Id., at 155.
19 Tribe, supra note 1, at 144. Citations omitted.
20 See note 8.
21 N. Smith, "Restoration of Congressional Authority and Responsibility Over the Regulatory Process. 33 Harv. J. on Legis. 323 (1996).
22 S. Breyer, supra note 8, at 792.
23 Ibid.
24 See, e.g., John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim, 460 Phil. 530 (2003).
25 See Section1, Article III, Constitution. In Tañada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528 (1986), the Court also cited Section 6 of the Bill of Rights, which recognized "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern", as a constitutional basis for mandating publication of laws.
26 As much is recognized in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which states that "Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided." The Court in Tañada recognized that "unless it is otherwise provided" referred to the date of effectivity. Simply put, a law which is silent as to its effectivity date takes effect fifteen days following publication, though there is no impediment for Congress to provide for a different effectivity date.
27 Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)
28 See Section 62, Rep. Act No. 9136, which provides:
Section 62: Joint Congressional Power Commission.
Upon the effectivity of this Act, a congressional commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Power Commission", is hereby constituted. The Power Commission shall be composed of fourteen (14) members with the chairmen of the Committee on Energy of the Senate and the House of Representatives and six (6) additional members from each House, to be designated by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, respectively. The minority shall be entitled to pro rata representation but shall have at least one (1) representative in the Power Commission.
The Commission shall, in aid of legislation, perform the following functions, among others:
a. Set the guidelines and overall framework to monitor and ensure the proper implementation of this Act;
b. Endorse the initial privatization plan within one (1) month from submission of such plan to the Power Commission by PSALM Corp. for approval by the President of the Philippines;
c. To ensure transparency, require the submission of reports from government agencies concerned on the conduct of public bidding procedures regarding privatization of NPC generation and transmission assets;
d. Review and evaluate the performance of the industry participants in relation to the objectives and timelines set forth in this Act;
e. Approve the budget for the programs of the Power Commission and all disbursements therefrom, including compensation of all personnel;
f. Submit periodic reports to the President of the Philippines and Congress;
g. Determine inherent weaknesses in the law and recommend necessary remedial legislation or executive measures; and
h. Perform such other duties and functions as may be necessary to attain its objectives.
In furtherance hereof, the Power Commission is hereby empowered to require the DOE, ERC, NEA, TRANSCO, generation companies, distribution utilities, suppliers and other electric power industry participants to submit reports and all pertinent data and information relating to the performance of their respective functions in the industry. Any person who willfully and deliberately refuses without just cause to extend the support and assistance required by the Power Commission to effectively attain its objectives shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years or a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) or both at the discretion of the court.
The Power Commission shall adopt its internal rules of procedures; conduct hearings and receive testimonies, reports and technical advice; invite or summon by subpoena ad testificandum any public official, private citizen or any other person to testify before it, or require any person by subpoena duces tecum to produce before it such records, reports, documents or other materials as it may require; and generally require all the powers necessary to attain the purposes for which it is created. The Power Commission shall be assisted by a secretariat to be composed of personnel who may be seconded from the Senate and the House of Representatives and may retain consultants. The secretariat shall be headed by an executive director who has sufficient background and competence on the policies and issues relating to electricity industry reforms as provided in this Act. To carry out its powers and functions, the initial sum of twenty- five million pesos (P25,000,000.00) shall be charged against the current appropriations of the Senate. Thereafter, such amount necessary for its continued operation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
The Power Commission shall exist for period of ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act and may be extended by a joint concurrent resolution.
29 122 Phil. 965 (1965).
30 K. Sullivan & G. Gunther, Constitutional Law (14th ed., 2001), at 351.
31 State ex .rel. Wis. Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 427, 220 N.W. 929 (1928)
32 Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 30, at 351.
33 G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein, and M. Tushnet, Constitutional Law (4th ed., 2001), at 334.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 1, 270.
37 "The nature of government often requires Congress to pass general legislation and leave to other branches the responsibility to fill in the details". Fisher, supra note 17, at 90, citing Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 46 (1825).
38 Id., at 106-107. Citations omitted.
39 The twin issues of presentment and bicameralism would especially come to fore with respect to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee under Rep. Act No. 9335, composed as it is by seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of Representatives. Chadha emphasized that the bills passed by the U.S. Congress must be presented for approval to the President of the United States in order that they may become law.[39] Section 27(1), Article VI of our Constitution imposes a similar presentment requirement. Chadha also noted that a bill must be concurred in by a majority of both Houses of Congress. Under our Constitution, Congress consists of a House of Representatives and a Senate, and the underlying uncontroverted implication is that both Houses must concur to the bill before it can become law. Assuming that the approval of the Implementing Rules to Rep. Act No. 9335 by seven Members from each House of Congress is a legislative act, such act fails either the presentment or bicameralism requirement. Such approval is neither presented to the President of the Philippines for consent, nor concurred in by a majority of either House of Congress.
40 Fisher, supra note 17, at 91.
41 4 Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, cited in Ex parte Mode, 77 Tex. Crim. 432, 441, 180 S.W. 708, Am. Ann. Cas. 1918E (1915).
42 Of course, the problem of presentment would be avoided if the implementing rules would also be submitted for approval to the President, but this roundabout manner should be discouraged, since it could be avoided simply by having those rules previously incorporated in the law earlier presented to the President.
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