Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 155450 August 6, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Regional Office No. 2, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND VICTORIA TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the 21 May 20012 and 25 September 20023 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The
21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ (petitioner) amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No. 3819284 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 115855 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag.
On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,6 issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,7 issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.
On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.
The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.
The investigating team reported that:
A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.
B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.8
Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982."
In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation.
On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles9 on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable.
On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss.10 Private respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496.11 Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against private respondents.12
On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.13
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared:
The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which this court may annul are those which the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." The Amended Complaint contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.14 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer available;
2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction;
3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss;
4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan;
5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance over the land;
6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and
7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.
The Ruling of the Court
While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit.
Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree.15
We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:
11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area is null and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution.
x x x x
15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect whatsoever.16 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable and disposable.
Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioner’s failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available."
In Ancheta v. Ancheta,17 we ruled:
In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.18
Since petitioner’s complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.
Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioner’s complaint were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.19
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the complete and proper determination of the case.
However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits.
Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit
Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.
Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.20 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.21
Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government,22 we ruled:
From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x x x23 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.
In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps24 petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.25
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,26 which provides:
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and disposition.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law.
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,27 the Republic sought to annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 92628 and 2874. The Court ruled:
We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)
As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review.
The finality of the trial court’s decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution."29 When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson |
*MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice |
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* As replacement of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna who is on official leave per Special Order No. 510.
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Rollo, pp. 40-45. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring.
3 Id. at 46-47. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring.
4 CA rollo, p. 8. The case was docketed as Cadastral Case No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 437.
5 Id. at 9.
6 Id. at 10-11.
7 Id. at 12-13.
8 Rollo, p. 52.
9 Id. at 48-54.
10 Id. at 55-65.
11 Section 38, Act No. 496 provides:
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after the entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrance for value.
12 The certification from the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, attached by petitioner as Annex "F," stated that it was issued "upon the request of Atty. Janette B. Chua." LC Map 2465, attached by petitioner as Annex "G-1," also stated that it was issued "at the request of Atty. Janette Bassig Chua of Tuguegarao, Cagayan." Private respondents maintained that Atty. Chua is the daughter of Alfonso Bassig.
13 Rollo, pp. 66-72. Petitioner only changed the title of the complaint from "annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles" to "reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles."
14 Id. at 44-45.
15 Rules of Court, Section 2, Rule 47.
16 Rollo, pp. 51-53, 69-71.
17 468 Phil. 900 (2004).
18 Id. at 911.
19 Section 101 of the Public Land Act provides:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public domain, or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper court, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
20 Republic v. "G" Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 141241, 22 November 2005, 475 SCRA 608.
21 Erectors, Inc. v. NLRC, 326 Phil. 640 (1996).
22 13 Phil. 159 (1909).
23 Id. at 165-166.
24 CA rollo, pp. 16-18. Petitioner attached LC Map 2465 dated 22 June 1961 and LC Map 2999 dated 22 February 1982.
25 Id. at 14. The certification from the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority signed by USEC Jose G. Solis stated:
a. Area enclosed in red and marked 1 falls within Alienable or Disposable Block-I, LC Project No. 13 of the Provinces of Cagayan, Isabela and Mt. Province certified on February 27, 1923 per Map LC No. 30-C; and
b. Area enclosed in red and marked 2 falls within Alienable or Disposable Block, LC Project No. 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan certified on February 22, 1982 per Map LC-2999.
26 Entitled "An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relative to Lands of the Public Domain, and for Other Purposes" which took effect on 1 July 1919. Also known as "The Public Land Act."
27 G.R. No. 127245, En Banc Resolution dated 30 January 2001.
28 Entitled "An Act Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Homesteading, Selling, and Leasing of Portions of the Public Domain of the Philippine Islands, Prescribing Terms and Conditions to Enable Persons to Perfect their Titles to Public Lands in said Islands, Providing for the Issuance of Patents Without Compensation to Certain Native Settlers upon the Public Lands, Providing for the Establishment of Town Sites and Sale of Lots therein, and Providing for the Determination by the Philippine Courts of Land Registration of all Proceedings for Completion of Imperfect Titles and for the Cancellation or Confirmation of Spanish Concessions and Grants in said Islands, as Authorized by Sections 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, Entitled ‘An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes’" which took effect on 7 October 1903. Also known as "The Public Land Act."
29 Constitution (1935), Article XIII, Sec. 1.
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