Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 164166 & 164173-80 October 17, 2007
RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks the annulment of the Resolution1 dated March 2, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 27894-27902, denying the motion to quash and its Resolution2 dated June 11, 2004, denying the motion for reconsideration.
Public respondent Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) filed with the Sandiganbayan nine informations charging petitioner Rodolfo S. de Jesus and one Edelwina DG Parungao with falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.3 These informations, except for the appointees’ names,4 dates of appointment and salaries, similarly read as follows:
x x x x
That on December 12, 2001, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused RODOLFO S. DE JESUS a high ranking public officer with Salary Grade 28, and EDELWINA DG PARUNGAO, a low ranking public officer with Salary Grade 26, being the Deputy Administrator and the Manager, HRMD, respectively, of the [Local] Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), Katipunan Road, Balara, Quezon City, conspiring and confederating together and helping each other, while in the performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation to their office, and taking advantage of their official positions, with legal obligation to disclose the truth, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify, or cause to be falsified the appointment of one JESUSITO R. TOREN, a confidential staff of the Trustees of the said LWUA, which is a public document, by making it appear that the said appointment paper was prepared, approved and issued on October 15, 2001 and that the said appointee assumed office on the same date, thereby allowing the said appointee to withdraw or receive the salaries and allowances for the period from October 15, 2001 to December 31, 2001, when in truth and in fact the accused had known fully well that said appointee was officially appointed only on December 12, 2001, as shown by another set of appointment paper of said JESUSITO R. TOREN, endorsed and subsequently approved by the Civil Service Commission, thus making untruthful statement in a narration of facts.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The arraignment was originally set for December 10, 2003.6 But, on December 1, 2003, petitioner and Parungao jointly filed a motion to quash.7 They contended that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged which was not committed in relation to their office. More so, the allegations of fact did not constitute the offense charged.
The prosecution in its comment contended that the informations were sufficient in form and substance considering that they constituted the various elements of the crime of falsification.8 In its rejoinder, it also claimed that the appointing power and the function to prepare the documents were inherent in their position.9
The Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 2, 2004, denied the motion to quash and re-set the arraignment on April 28, 2004. It ruled that it was inherent in the positions of petitioner and Parungao as Deputy Administrator and Manager of Human Resource Management Department (HRMD), respectively, to issue and approve appointment papers. Petitioner sought reconsideration but was likewise denied.
Hence this petition where petitioner contends:
I.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
II.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING IT IS INHERENT IN BOTH POSITIONS OF ACCUSED-PETITIONER DE JESUS AS DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, AND CO-ACCUSED PARUNGAO AS HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT MANAGER TO APPROVE APPOINTMENTS OF LWUA EMPLOYEES, PARTICULARLY THE CONFIDENTIAL STAFF OF THE LWUA BOARD OF TRUSTEES.
III.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN AMENDING BY JUDICIAL LEGISLATION THE PROVISIONS OF P.D. 198, AS AMENDED, AND EXEC. ORDER NO. 286, S. 1995, RELATIVE TO APPOINTING AUTHORITIES.
IV.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE FACTS CHARGED IN THE NINE (9) INFORMATIONS CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE.
V.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER DE JESUS [WAS] DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF BACK SALARIES, ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS OF THE BOARD’S CONFIDENTIAL STAFF.10
Simply, the issue in this case is whether the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner’s motion to quash were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged since the informations did not show that his position as Deputy Administrator and Parungao’s position as Manager of HRMD had a connection with the offense. According to him, the material facts proving the close intimacy of the offense charged and his official functions must be set forth in the informations and not mere conclusions of law.11 More so, the informations were based on the Ombudsman’s erroneous belief that the power to appoint was inherent in the positions of petitioner and Parungao when in fact he could only sign appointment papers already approved by the appointing authority, in this case, the LWUA Trustees and Administrator.
Further, petitioner avers that the informations failed to disclose material facts with regard to the other set of appointment papers sent to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Lastly, petitioner claims that the allegations do not constitute an offense such that he does not have any legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated in the alleged fraudulent appointment papers and that the narration of facts therein is not false. He also asserts that he is not directly responsible for the payment of the back salaries, allowances and other benefits received by the appointees.
For its part, public respondent Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, counters that the present petition is premature, considering that the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation.
It also avers that the very nature of the positions of petitioner and Parungao mandates them to disclose the truth when the nine confidential employees of the LWUA Board were officially appointed and when they actually assumed office.
Further, it maintains that petitioner can, under a delegated authority, sign the appointments previously approved by the Administrator or the Board of Trustees; he can advise the Administrator and the Board of Trustees on the legality of the appointments; and he was bound to prepare, approve and issue only correct appointments. Upon investigation, it was established that he had prepared, approved and issued the appointment papers with dates of appointment different from those when the appointees actually assumed office.12 It further claims that petitioner’s admission that there are two sets of appointment papers more than sustains the prosecutorial indictments against him and Parungao.
Moreover, it maintains that the Ombudsman determined the existence of probable cause after it had evaluated the documents submitted by the parties. It could not have gone beyond its function of determining probable cause and filing the informations. The alleged failure of the Ombudsman in its investigation would not affect the validity of the informations since the absence of preliminary investigation neither affects the court’s jurisdiction over the case, nor impairs the validity of the informations.13
Lastly, it contends that the allegations in the informations constitute an offense since petitioner and Parungao, in view of their positions, are required to disclose the truth of the facts they had narrated in the fraudulent documents, and such narration of facts in the appointment papers was false. For issuing the appointment papers, petitioner and Parungao are also directly responsible for the payment of back salaries, allowances and other benefits of the appointees.
At the outset, we stress the settled rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, except in the following instances:
(1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(3) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice;
(4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(8) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(9) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance;
(10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied;
(11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.14
Thus, while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is an abuse of discretion, in which case Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may exceptionally be invoked pursuant to Section 1,15 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, where the finding of the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we have held that while there is no appeal, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.16
Considering the circumstances of this case, we find for petitioner.
It appears that petitioner, under Office Order No. 205.01 dated September 25, 2001, was "authorized under delegated authority to act on and sign for and in behalf of the Administrator" documents, including appointment papers "previously cleared/approved in writing by the Administrator, or by the Board of Trustees, as the case may be."17
In a letter18 dated August 27, 2001, Administrator Lorenzo Jamora requested authority from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to hire the confidential staff of the members of the Board of Trustees (Board). Pending approval of the DBM, Jamora issued Inter-Office Memorandum dated October 23, 2001, directing the payment of salaries and allowances of his confidential staff Ma. Susana G. Facto and Jesusito R. Toren, appointed on October 10, 2001 and October 15, 2001, respectively, with the undertaking that in case the DBM or the Commission on Audit disallowed the payment, it shall be "his personal responsibility or accountability."19
The LWUA received a letter20 from the DBM on December 11, 2001 which approved the hiring of the confidential staff of the members of the Board. On December 11, 2001, Chairman of the Board Francisco Dumpit issued a memorandum21 appointing, effective August 20, 2001, Michael M. Raval and Ma. Geraldine Rose D. Buenaflor. On the same date, members of the Board Bayani Dato, Sr. and Solomon Badoy issued their respective memoranda appointing Albino G. Valenciano, Jr., effective August 20, 2001;22 and Kristina Joy T. Badoy and Noelle Stephanie R. Badoy, effective June 19, 2001,23 respectively. On December 18, 2001, Normando Toledo, also a member of the Board, issued a memorandum24 appointing, effective August 20, 2001, Marc Anthony S. Verzosa and Ma. Lourdes M. Manaloto.
Consequently, petitioner and Parungao prepared, approved and signed the appointment papers, that is, CSC Form No. 33, bearing retroactive dates of appointment. Thereafter, Jamora issued a memorandum25 dated December 20, 2001 ordering the release of back salaries and other remunerations of the Board’s confidential staff. The members of the Board issued certifications on their confidential staff’s dates of assumption of office.1âwphi1
However, another set of CSC Form No. 33 relating to the nine aforementioned appointees was prepared with December 12, 2001 as the date of appointment to comply with the CSC reportorial requirement under Section 11, Rule V of the CSC Omnibus Rules.26
The Ombudsman allegedly found a prima facie case of falsification of public documents under Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner because he prepared and signed the appointments of the nine confidential staff with dates earlier than the actual date of appointment which was December 12, 2001.
We disagree with the findings of the Ombudsman. The elements of the offense are:
1. That the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of facts;
2. That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;
3. That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
4. That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.27
Criminal intent must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification. In this case, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent or mens rea was present.28 The Ombudsman assails the first set of documents with dates of appointment earlier than December 12, 2001. Clearly, the first set of CSC Form No. 33 was prepared earlier as shown by the serial numbers.29 The first set has serial numbers 168207, 168210, 168213, 168214, 168215, 168216, 168217, 168287 and 168288; while the second set has serial numbers 168292, 168293, 168294, 168295, 168297, 168298, 168299, 168301 and 168304. The Ombudsman also admits this fact.30 Indeed, petitioner admits having signed two sets of appointment papers but nothing in said documents constitutes an absolutely false narration of facts. The first set was prepared and signed on the basis of the inter-office memoranda issued by the members of the Board appointing their respective confidential staff conformably with the DBM approval. There was no untruthful statement made on said appointment papers as the concerned personnel were in fact appointed earlier than December 12, 2001. In fact, the DBM also clarified that the authority to hire confidential personnel may be implemented retroactive to the date of actual service of the employee concerned.31 In any case, Jamora authorized the issuance of the second set of appointment papers.32 Following the CSC Rules, the second set of appointment papers should mean that the first set was ineffective and that the appointing authority, in this case, the members of the Board, shall be liable for the salaries of the appointee whose appointment became ineffective.33 There was nothing willful or felonious in petitioner’s act warranting his prosecution for falsification. The evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case and it is evident that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the petitioner’s guilt.34
We note that the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation.35 By allowing the reinvestigation, the Sandiganbayan thus deferred to the authority of the Ombudsman to further re-assess or re-examine the facts. In short, the Sandiganbayan was willing to accept and adopt the final resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman on the issue of whether or not the offense charged was in fact committed by petitioner. But, the Sandiganbayan was not bound by such quasi-judicial findings. In fact, under the principles governing criminal procedure, the Sandiganbayan, or any trial court for that matter, is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the prosecutor. Hence, the logical thing for us to do would be to remand this case to the Sandiganbayan. Nevertheless, where the innocence of an accused is manifest from the evidence, as here, we find neither reason nor logic to merely remand the case.36
The effort to eradicate graft and corruption and remove scalawags in government is commendable. But we cannot overemphasize the admonition to agencies tasked with the preliminary investigation and prosecution of crimes that the very purpose of a preliminary investigation is to shield the innocent from precipitate, spiteful and burdensome prosecution. They are duty-bound to avoid, unless absolutely necessary, open and public accusation of crime not only to spare the innocent the trouble, expense and torment of a public trial, but also to prevent unnecessary expense on the part of the State for useless and expensive trials. Thus, when at the outset the evidence cannot sustain a prima facie case or the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from inflicting on any person the trauma of going through a trial.37
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 2, 2004 and June 11, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan are ANNULLED. For lack of reasonable ground to believe that petitioner violated Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, or for absence of probable cause therefor, the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to forthwith DISMISS Criminal Cases Nos. 27894-27902, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo de Jesus and Edelwina DG Parungao."
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 48-56. Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi, with Associate Justices Raoul V. Victorino and Roland B. Jurado concurring.
2 Id. at 57.
3 ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.—The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
x x x x
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
x x x x
4 The other eight appointees are Ma. Susana G. Facto, Ma. Geraldine Rose D. Buenaflor, Michael M. Raval, Albino G. Valenciano, Jr., Marc Anthony S. Verzosa, Ma. Lourdes M. Manaloto, Kristina Joy T. Badoy and Noelle Stephanie R. Badoy.
5 Rollo, pp. 146-163.
6 Sandiganbayan rollo, Vol. I, pp. 62 & 65.
7 Rollo, pp. 164-176.
8 Sandiganbayan rollo, Vol. I, p. 100.
9 Rollo, p. 179.
10 Id. at 13-14.
11 Id. at 393-394.
12 Id. at 454-456.
13 Id. at 463.
14 Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 129904, March 16, 2000, 328 SCRA 292, 298-299.
15 Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
16 Cabahug v. People, G.R. No. 132816, February 5, 2002, 376 SCRA 113, 124.
17 Rollo, p. 68.
18 Id. at 69-70.
19 Id. at 71.
20 Id. at 72-73.
21 Id. at 74.
22 Id. at 75.
23 Id. at 77.
24 Id. at 76.
25 Id. at 88.
26 Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission within thirty (30) days from the date of issuance which shall be the date appearing on the face of the appointment, shall be ineffective. The appointing authority shall be liable for the salaries of the appointee whose appointment became ineffective….
27 L. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Book Two 223 (14th ed., 1998).
28 Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), G.R. No. 149148, April 5, 2002, 380 SCRA 325, 338.
29 Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 96-104.
30 Id. at 471.
31 Id. at 108.
32 Id. at 95.
33 Civil Service Commission Omnibus Rules, Rule V, Sec. 11.
34 Supra note 16, at 133.
35 Sandiganbayan rollo, Vol. II, pp. 119-121.
36 Venus v. Desierto, G.R. No. 130319, October 21, 1998, 298 SCRA 196, 221.
37 Supra note 34.
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