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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 175316             March 28, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ROGER DURANO, Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us for review is the Decision¹ dated April 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00204-MIN affirming the Judgment² rendered by Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City convicting the appellant of two counts of rape.

On July 9, 1999, appellant was charged with four counts of rape and one count of robbery³ docketed as Crim. Case Nos. 43505-99 to 43509-99. He was acquitted of two counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 43507-99 and 43508-99 for insufficiency of evidence, and of robbery in Crim. Case No. 43509-99. However, he was convicted of two counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 43505-99 and 43506-99.

The Information in Criminal Case No. 43505-99 reads as follows:

The undersigned Prosecutor, at the instance of the complainant, AAA, whose affidavit is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof, accuses the above-named accused of the crime of RAPE under Article 266-A, par. 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act 8353, committed as follows:

That on or about April 13, 1999, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring and confederating with each other, by force, threat and intimidation, with Roger N. Durano, as principal by direct participation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with AAA, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.⁴

while the Information in Criminal Case No. 43506-99 states:

The undersigned Prosecutor, at the instance of the complainant, AAA, whose affidavit is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof, accuses the above-named accused of the crime of RAPE under Article 266-A, par. 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act 8353, committed as follows:

That on or about April 13, 1999, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring and confederating with each other, by force, threat and intimidation, with Roger N. Durano, as principal by direct participation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with AAA, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.⁵

Appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.

The facts as summarized by the Solicitor General:

Private complainant is a working student who stays at the convent of the BBB Sisters at Ulas, Davao City (TSN, p. 4, May 10, 2000).

At 3:45 in the afternoon of April 13, 1999, private complainant left the convent and proceeded to Fuji Photograph Center located at San Pedro Street, Davao City for the copying of some pictures. Since the process would take an hour, she decided to watch a movie at Queens Theater (TSN, p. 9, May 10, 2000).

After leaving the movie theater and while she was nearing a gasoline station along Bonifacio Street, private complainant noticed that appellant was following her. She continued walking but she was surprised to see that appellant was already beside her. (TSN, p. 23, May 11, 2000; p. 32, June 30, 2000). Appellant, then, held her right shoulder. He identified himself as a member of the police and junior drug buster and showed private complainant his identification card (TSN, p. 7, 23, May 11, 2000). Appellant told her that she was Grace of Maa, a drug user and a "buntog" (prostitute) and for which reason he had to arrest her (TSN , p. 7, May 10, 2000; p. 32, June 30, 2000).

Private complainant insisted that she was not Grace of Maa and she was neither a drug user nor a prostitute (TSN, p. 8, May 10, 2000). When appellant insisted on arresting her, private complainant agreed to go with appellant to Rizal Park near the Legislative Building to prove that she was not the person of loose morals appellant claimed her to be (TSN, p. 8, May 10, 2000; p. 33, June 30, 2000). In the park, they sat on the grass and talked. She freely talked about her life and even gave her telephone number to appellant to prove to him that she was not Grace of Maa (TSN, p. 37, June 30, 2000).

Appearing to be convinced that she was not Grace of Maa, appellant told her that before she could be released, she needed to sign some release papers. Eager to be released and gripped with fear, she went with appellant and they proceeded to Talisay Lodge (TSN, p. 6, June 30, 2000). She noticed that two men, referred to as "Ricky" and "Dante" by appellant, followed them (TSN, p. 10, May 10, 2000).

At Talisay Lodge, appellant requested for a room. Once inside the room, complainant asked where the release papers were. Appellant replied that before she could sign the papers, she must have sex with him (TSN, p. 11, May 10, 2000). Thus, instead of handing her the papers, appellant forced her to undress. Thereafter, appellant pushed her toward the bed. He kissed her shoulder, chest and inserted his penis into her vagina. When he could not penetrate his (sic) vagina, he spit on it. He made push-and-pull movements and after ejaculating, he leaned on the floor. He pulled her by the shoulder and while lying on the floor, he inserted his penis on her mouth and made push-and-pull movements. Then he pulled her again to the bed. In the bed, she was made to lie on her back so appellant could insert his penis into her anus. Since he could not penetrate her anus, he went on top of her and made push-and-pull movements for the second time (TSN, pp. 13-17, May 10, 2000). After appellant finished, he went outside. She remained in bed crying. Later, two other men ravished her (TSN, p. 18, May 10, 2000). They left the lodge afterwards.

Initially, private complainant hesitated to report the rape incidents because appellant had threatened her that he would tell the sisters at the convent that she was a "buntog" or prostitute (TSN, p. 21, May 10, 2000). However, she later confided the rape incident to her best friend, CCC, a co-intern in the convent (TSN, p. 7-8, May 14, 2000). Two days after the incident or on April 15, 1999, CCC accompanied her to the Toril Police Station. They were told to proceed to the Women and Child Desk in Davao City, where SPO1 Christine Bitgue attended to them (TSN, pp. 22-24, May 10, 2000).⁶

AAA decided to report the incident upon the advice of CCC because on April 15, 1999, appellant showed up at their house on the pretext that complainant has to sign some papers. He also ordered AAA to meet him at the Mercury Drug Store the following day. AAA felt shame and fear upon seeing the appellant.⁷

CCC testified that on the night of April 13, 1999, complainant confided to her the rape incident. Complainant appeared agitated and afraid as she was crying and shivering while recounting the incident. The following day, complainant was not her usual self at work. Thus, she advised and accompanied complainant to report the incident to the authorities at the Toril Police Station.⁸

Sis. DDD, Treasurer and In-charge of working scholars at the BBB Sisters’ Convent, testified that she had known complainant since 1986; that complainant is responsible, honest, open and receptive to advices because of her desire to finish her studies; that complainant never manifested bad behavior during her stay in the convent; that sometime in April 1999, she noticed a change in complainant’s behavior as she was always crying and isolating herself from the rest of the group; that complainant eventually confided to her the rape incident.⁹

SPO1 Bitgue testified that on April 15, 1999, complainant went to the Women and Child Desk in Davao City crying and trembling. She moved from one table to another and stared at the window from time to time. Thus, she transferred her in a closed room to make her feel safe and comfortable. She then transcribed the narrations made by complainant in the blotter report marked as Exhibit B.¹⁰

Dr. Samuel Cruz, Medical Officer of the City Health Office, examined complainant the following day. He found purplish contusions on her breast and a deep hymenal laceration.¹¹ He testified that the age of the physical injuries is consistent with the alleged date of infliction.¹²

Dr. Marilou Villanueva, a psychiatrist connected with the Davao Medical School Foundation, diagnosed complainant on April 19, 1999. In her psychiatric report,¹³ she found complainant as suffering from acute stress disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and major depression, moderate. She testified that during the rape incident, complainant was experiencing acute stress disorder which impaired her consent.¹⁴

Appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with complainant on April 13, 1999 but alleged that it was consensual. His version of the events was summarized in Appellant’s Brief¹⁵ as follows:

Accused-appellant ROGER DURANO is 21 years of age, single and a resident of Sasa, Davao City. He was a student of Criminology at the University of Mindanao. On April 13, 1999 at around 3:00 to 3:30 in the afternoon, while he was crossing San Pedro Street, he accidentally bumped AAA, private complainant in the instant case, while the latter was coming out of Fuji Film Center. He immediately apologized to her and she readily accepted his apologies. Thereafter, they parted ways. When accused-appellant passed by San Pedro Church, he saw the private complainant sitting in front of the Legislative Building. Upon seeing her, accused-appellant smiled at her and the latter smiled back. He approached private complainant, who at that time was looking at the pictures she got from the Fuji Film Center. Accused-appellant asked her permission to take a look at those pictures to which private complainant agreed. It was at this point when the two of them introduced each other. Accused-appellant came to know that private complainant was also known as AAA to her friends. Thereafter, accused appellant accompanied AAA to a convent but the nun she was supposed to meet at that time was not around. He asked AAA if the two of them can have a talk at the Osmena Park near the Legislative Building. Although she did not answer, AAA nevertheless went with the accused-appellant. The two of them sat on the park and talked about each other’s lives. She told [him] that she was a graduate of x x x with a course in Education. AAA admitted that she had a boyfriend at that time. She likewise told him about her sickly mother and the financial problem she was undergoing at that time. She further confided to him that due to financial distress, her mother has tolerated an affair that she had with a married man. Accused-appellant advised her to stop the relationship with the said married man for she might be charged in court later on. He even offered help to her financial problems.

As the hours went by, their conversation turned serious. Accused-appellant found himself attracted to the private complainant. Right there and then, he expressed his feelings for her, which she accepted. He proposed that they check-in at a lodge that evening. At first, she was hesitant because she was afraid that accused-appellant would just abandon her afterwards. He told her that her fears will not happen and as proof, he promised to visit her after two days. AAA seemed convinced hence she agreed to go to the lodge. The new lovers left the park and later boarded a passenger jeep. The couple alighted at Talisay Lodge and entered the building. Upon reaching the counter, accused-appellant talked to the one in-charged therein and asked for a room. Before entering the room however, AAA told the accused-appellant to go ahead because she wanted to go to the bathroom first. He lied in bed and in less than a minute, AAA knocked at the door and came in. They embraced and kissed each other. After removing her upper clothing, accused-appellant removed his own shirt. They continued kissing until both of them removed their pants. They were still standing at that time wearing only their underwears (sic). Thereafter they both jumped into bed and made love. They had several rounds of sexual intercourse experimenting on different positions. When they finished, they laid at each other’s side and AAA told him that she was indeed very happy with what happened to them. Moments later, they dressed up and went out of the room passing by the same counter. AAA held the arms of the accused-appellant with her face on his back as she was a little bit ashamed of being identified by the people therein.

The couple went out of the lodge and crossed the street. They waited for a passenger jeep and when they saw one, accused-appellant volunteered to bring AAA home. However, AAA told him that she can manage to go home on her own. Accused-appellant promised her though that he would visit her at her house after two days.

On April 15, 1999 at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, accused-appellant visited AAA as promised. AAA brother was outside the house at that time. He introduced himself and he was told to proceed inside. A woman met him inside and asked for his name. He told him he was Roger Durano, a former classmate of AAA. The two have agreed beforehand that they would introduce each other as former classmates. Thereafter, AAA came out of her room together with her mother, who went towards the balcony. The two of them had a short talk and accused-appellant apologized for not bringing the medicines that he promised for her mother. He said he would visit her again on Sunday. AAA told him to call her at the BBB Convent instead. Accused-appellant was not sure if he could call AAA at the convent, so he asked her to see him at the Mercury Drug Store at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon on Sunday. Nevertheless, he was able to call her up and told her he would wait at the said drug store up to 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. Accused-appellant waited but AAA did not arrive. To his great surprise, AAA accused him of raping her. (TSN, August 29, 2000, pp. 2-36; TSN, August 30, 200, pp. 2-36.)¹⁶

On March 15, 2001, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting the appellant of two counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution, more than sufficient, to prove, the guilt of accused, Roger Durano only in Crim. Case No. 43,505-99, and Criminal Case No. 43,506-99, in two counts of rape pursuant to Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659, under Art. 9 of said amendatory act without any aggravating circumstances, proved by the prosecution against accused, Roger Durano, in the commission of the offense charged, said above-mentioned accused, is sentenced to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the above-criminal cases together with all accessory penalty as provided for by law.

In Criminal Case No. 43,507-99, Crim. Case No. 43-508-99, both for rape against accused, Roger Durano and alias Ricky and alias Dante, accused, Roger Durano is ordered acquitted, said cases are odered dismissed, for lack of sufficient identification of the two other accused, in the commission of the offense charged, along with accused Roger Durano and for their non-arrest, without jurisdiction of this court against both accused, designated only in their alias, Dante and Ricky.

In Criminal Case No. 43,509-99 for robbery against Roger Durano and his co-accused, is likewise ordered dismissed, for lack of any evidence, to prove the commission against all the above-mentioned accused.

However, in accordance with Art. 100 in relation to 104 of the Revised Penal Code in Crim. Case No. 43,505-99, and another Crim. Case No. 43,506-99, accused, Roger Durano is furthermore ordered, to pay complainant, AAA, the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and another amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of moral damages and still another amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, in both above-criminal cases, for all the sorrows, humiliation, worry and sufferings of complainant, AAA, brought about in the commission and filing of the above-criminal cases against said accused. x x x

SO ORDERED.¹⁷

The case was brought before this Court on automatic review, however, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,¹⁸ the case was referred to the Court of Appeals.

On April 28, 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision affirming the appellant’s conviction with modification as to damages. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Judgment rendered by the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that the Appellant is further ordered to pay the Appellee the amount of Php 50,000.00 as moral damages, Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another Php 25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape.

SO ORDERED.¹⁹

Hence, this appeal.

Appellant assails the credibility of the complainant’s testimony. He claims that her account of the alleged rape is unbelievable considering her conduct before, during and after the incident. He argues that complainant’s claim that she was arrested or mistaken for a drug user is highly improbable considering that he never employed force, intimidation, or threat on complainant or used deadly weapon upon her person. On the contrary, she went with him voluntarily to the park and during their lengthy conversation even gave her telephone number to him. She willingly talked to him and told him about her life and family, including her financial woes. More importantly, she voluntarily accepted his invitation to go to Talisay Lodge.²⁰

According to appellant, complainant who is a college graduate should know that Talisay Lodge is a lovers’ rendezvous. Yet, she never resisted or attempted to seek the help of other people despite opportunities to do so.

We are not persuaded.

Rape is committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of the victim by force or intimidation and without consent. Having admitted the sexual intercourse between him and complainant, the determination of appellant’s innocence or guilt hinges on whether such act was voluntary or was attended with force or intimidation. Crucial in this respect is the credibility of the testimony of the complainant, for the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided that it meets the test of credibility. The testimony should not only come from the mouth of a credible witness, it should likewise be credible and reasonable in itself, candid, straightforward and in accord with human experience.²¹

We find no reason to disturb the trial court’s finding on the credibility of complainant’s testimony, for it is in a better position to properly evaluate testimonial evidence having the full opportunity to directly observe the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying. Well-settled is the rule that unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the outcome of the case, its findings carry great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal.²²

A rape victim, who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness.²³ When the testimony of a rape victim is simple and straightforward, unshaken by rigorous cross-examination and unflawed by any serious inconsistency or contradiction, the same must be given full faith and credit.²⁴ The Court Appeals found her narration candid, straightforward, and credible.²⁵ It likewise found it incredible that an innocent girl like the private complainant, who practically grew up in a religious institution would concoct a tale of defloration, publicly admit having been ravished, allow the examination of her private parts, and endure the pain and trauma of public trial had she not in fact been truly violated. ²⁶

There is likewise no reason shown on the part of complainant to testify against the appellant and impute to him so grave a crime as rape making her testimony worthy of full faith and credit. As consistently ruled by this Court:

(W)hen a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed. Her testimony is credible where she has no motive to testify against the appellants, as in the case at bar. Verily, a rape victim would not publicly disclose that she had been raped and undergo the trouble and humiliation of a trial if her motive was not to bring to justice the persons who had abused her. More specifically, no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has been criminally abused and ravished unless it is the truth. It is her natural instinct to protect her honor.²⁷ (Emphasis supplied)

Appellant’s claim that the sexual act between him and complainant was consensual must fail. The bruises²⁸ found on complainant’s body corroborate her testimony that she resisted appellant, albeit unsuccessfully.²⁹ Physical evidence of bruises or scratches eloquently speaks of the force employed upon the rape victim.³⁰ Besides, the trial court observed that complainant was naïve and can be easily manipulated or influenced by others, to wit:

Moreover, other than her shy personality and appearing without firm judgment of herself, as could easily be drag by strong influence of others, complainant can be an easy victim of accused’s intimidation and clever maneuvering for purely professional and selfish motivation.

As the court observed and gathered, tediously during the appearance and lengthy testimony of complainant, in court, she appears indeed lacking of firmness and rigid personality, to stand on her own decision, even if the court also found her naturally humble and simple, honest in her disposition and apparently modest in her speech and expressions.

She is submissive and prone easily to suggestion and easy victim of exploitation, as that described by Dr. Marilou Villanueva, who examined and subjected the complainant, in a psychological analysis, when she voluntarily come to her for assistance on account of her emotional stress and disturbances brought about by the rape incident committed by accused.³¹

Moreover, she believed that appellant was a person in authority who mistook her for another person, and that appellant had companions who were watching her thereby making any resistance or escape futile.

At any rate, resistance is not an element of rape as rape could be perpetrated through the use of force or intimidation. Lack of physical resistance can not be considered consent. In People v. Loyola,³² this Court held that:

The test is whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out. Where resistance would be futile, offering none at all does not amount to consent to the sexual assault. It is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death or sustained physical injuries in the hands of the rapist. It is enough if the intercourse takes place against her will or if she yields because of genuine apprehension of harm to her if she did not do so. Indeed, the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance.³³

In the instant case, complainant believed that her life was in danger; that appellant was a person in authority determined to arrest or even salvage her; and that appellant had other companions looking after her which would make her escape impossible.³⁴ Indeed, all these led her to believe that it would be futile for her to resist appellant. Failing to resist the advances of her malefactor is not a manifestation of consent, but rather an indication of involuntary submission.³⁵

Behavioral psychology teaches that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. Most women would resist sexual assault with a wild struggle. Others become virtually catatonic because of the mental shock they experience. Yet it can never be successfully argued that the latter are any less sexual victims than the former.^36]

The trial court gave weight to the explanation of Dr. Villanueva, the psychiatrist who treated complainant, that she had been suffering from an acute stress disorder caused by her traumatic experience. Dr. Villanueva testified that complainant’s consent was affected by the stress and the trauma which made her more submissive, for it was easier for her to follow than to fight. Her psychiatric history also showed the same response when faced with a traumatic experience such as when she stayed motionless inside the Davao church during its bombing.³⁷

The "sweetheart defense" is also unavailing. Appellant failed to present convincing proof that he and complainant had an affair.³⁸ Complainant vehemently denied that they were lovers. The fact that appellant visited complainant two days after the incident did not prove that they are sweethearts. In fact, it was the realization on the part of the complainant that appellant knew her whereabouts which prompted her to report the incident to the police authorities.³⁹ As correctly observed by the trial court:

If indeed complainant became a sweetheart of accused as vigorously invoked by the latter, complainant would not have immediately, two days after the rape incident, on April 15, 1999, from April 13, 1999, reported the rape incident at Toril Police Station, then formally filed her complaint with the child and women’s desk of Davao City Police Station, after she submitted herself, in a thorough physical examination by Dr. Samuel Cruz of the City Health of Davao City.

The immediate and spontaneous action of complainant in reporting the rape incident with the authorities, clearly shows; she is aggrieve of what accused did, in violating her honor and person on what she furiously testified, she was treated by accused like a pig, in the visayan, "binaboy niya ako." The very word of complainant, showing in no equivocal terms, complainant’s manifestation, of how she was seriously offended, as a result she wanted, to find vindication, of a wrong done to her.

The allegation of accused, precisely because he believe, he and complainant were already sweetheart, he readily visited her in their house, on April 15, 1999, at about 8:00 p.m., to confirmed his alleged promise to complainant but despite all his pretensions that complainant attended to him, complainant in fact was afraid accused came to know their house and to provide her security, she courageously decided to report the rape incident that very night, with the Police, to prevent accused from further molesting her.⁴⁰

Besides, even granting that appellant and complainant were sweethearts, it does not necessarily negate rape. "A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancée and, worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust."⁴¹

As regards the amount of damages, this Court has consistently held that civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of rape while moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further proof because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award.⁴² Hence, complainant is entitled to ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape consistent with existing jurisprudence on the matter.⁴³

However, with respect to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that it may be imposed as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Considering that no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the award of exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 is without basis and should be deleted.⁴⁴

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00204-MIN which affirmed the March 15, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court Davao City, Branch 17 finding Roger Durano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award for exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Foonotes

¹ Rollo, pp. 5-23. Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal.

² CA rollo, pp. 25-53. Penned by Judge Renato A. Fuentes, dated March 15, 2001.

³ Id. at 9-13.

⁴ Id. at 9.

⁵ Id. at 10.

⁶ Id. at 144-148.

⁷ TSN, May 10, 2005, pp. 22-25.

⁸ TSN, March 14, 2000, pp. 7-12.

⁹ CA rollo, p. 32; TSN, May 10, 2000, pp. 4-12.

¹⁰ TSN, March 24, 2000, pp. 4-6.

¹¹ Exhibit "A;" Annex "B," records, p. 10.

¹² TSN, March 21, 2000, p. 12.

¹³ Exhibit "C," records, pp. 74-75.

¹⁴ TSN, July 5, 2000, pp.12-15, 36-38.

¹⁵ CA rollo, pp. 74-94.

¹⁶ Id. at 83-86.

¹⁷ Id. at 52-53.

¹⁸ G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

¹⁹ Rollo, p. 22.

²⁰ CA rollo, p. 88.

²¹ People v. Cantila, Jr., 442 Phil 641, 650-651 (2002).

²² People v. Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236, August 31, 2006.

²³ People v. Vedra, G.R. No. 108615, October 9, 2000, 342 SCRA 317, 324.

²⁴ People v. Suyu, G.R. No. 170191, August 16, 2006.

²⁵ Rollo, pp. 16-17.

²⁶ Id.

²⁷ People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 97921, September 8, 1993, 226 SCRA 156, 174.

²⁸ TSN, March 21, 2000, p. 12.

²⁹ TSN, May 10, 2000, pp. 14-17; June 30, 2000, pp. 47-48.

³⁰ See People v. Cantila, Jr., supra note 21.

³¹ CA rollo, p. 41.

³² 404 Phil. 71 (2001).

³³ Id. at 78.

³⁴ TSN, May 10, 2000, p. 8-10; June 30, 2000, pp. 32-35.

³⁵ People v. Domingo, supra note 27 at 169.

³⁶ People v. Ibay, G.R. No. 101631, June 8, 1994, 233 SCRA 15, 25.

³⁷ TSN, July 5, 2000, pp. 36-38.

³⁸ People v. Loyola, supra note 32 at 77.

³⁹ TSN, May 10, 2005, pp. 22-25.

⁴⁰ CA rollo, p. 49.

⁴¹ People v. Loyola, supra note 32 at 77.

⁴² People v. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566, March 3, 2006, 484 SCRA 76, 88.

⁴³ Id.

⁴⁴ Id. at 88-89.

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