Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171756 March 27, 2007
SPOUSES RICARDO IMBAT and LILIA IMBAT, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES MEDARDO SOLIVEN and FLORENTINA NARVASA and VINEZ HORTALEZA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In an action for forcible entry filed by herein respondents Spouses Medardo Soliven and Florentina Narvasa against herein petitioner Ricardo Imbat and his brother Federico Imbat, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 700 (SF-94), the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan rendered judgment, by Decision of March 29, 1995,1 in favor of respondents, ordering the brothers Imbat to, among other things, vacate the therein subject two parcels of riceland, one with an area of 9.521 sq.m., and the other with an area of 4,653 sq.m., "located [in] Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan."
On appeal, Branch 40 of the Dagupan Regional Trial Court (RTC), noting that herein petitioners "merely denied all the allegations in the complaint with counterclaim for damages" without proffering any affirmative defenses, and that "[d]uring the pre-trial conference before the MCTC, both parties agreed on, inter alia, the "identities of . . . the land[s]" subject of the case, affirmed the MCTC’s decision.2
The MCTC decision became final and executory. A writ of execution was issued and enforced, but the Imbat brothers re-occupied the questioned premises, drawing the trial court to declare them in contempt. An alias writ of execution was issued and the two eventually vacated the premises.
On July 24, 1998, petitioner Ricardo Imbat and his co-petitioner wife filed before the RTC of Dagupan a complaint for quieting of title against respondents after a similar complaint was dismissed by the MCTC for lack of jurisdiction. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-02478-D, alleged as follows:
3. That the plaintiffs are the absolute owners and in actual possession from the time it was donated by their parents, the following described real property to the exclusion of anyone including the defendants-spouses herein, to wit:
"A parcel of irrigated Riceland at [B]arangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan containing an area of TEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY NINE (10,439) square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North by Zanja; on the South by Francisco Agsaoay; on the East by J. Corabat; and on the West by Lorenza Ferdamil. It is declared under Tax Declaration No. 0868 and assessed at ₱3,230.00 as per the land records of San Fabian, Pangasinan. The said property is not registered under Act 496 as amended nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law but registerable under Act 3344, as amended."
x x x x
6. That the defendants are disturbing the plaintiffs in their peaceful possession and absolute ownership over the land in question by attempting to implement a writ of execution issued pursuant to a decision issued which is already become final and executory in an ejectment case over a certain land, which is different land herein described; the land defendants bought from spouses Alejandro Suratos and Rufo Gatchalian is located at [B]arangay Binday, San Fabian, Pangasinan;
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)3
After trial, Branch 41 of the Dagupan RTC found that respondents’ claim of ownership of the subject property is anchored on an Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land dated December 22, 19754 executed by the Spouses Rufo Gatchalian and Alejandra Suratos in their favor, possession of which property was taken by respondents until they were dispossessed by the brothers Imbat sometime in May 1994; and that petitioners’ claim is anchored on a Deed of Donation5 executed by the brothers Imbat’s father, Florentino Imbat, in favor of herein petitioner Ricardo Imbat only on January 25, 1995 during the pendency of the forcible entry case.
The trial court thus rendered judgment in respondents’ favor by Decision of April 12, 2002,6 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants Sps. Medardo Soliven and Florentina Narvasa and against the plaintiffs as follows:
1). Dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action.
2). Declaring defendants Sps. Medardo Soliven and Florentina Narvasa [sic] the land in question, and quieting their title over the same and removing all clouds thereon.
3). Dismissing all other claims of the plaintiffs for lack of basis.
4). Ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants the amounts of ₱20,000.00 as and attorney’s fees and ₱10,000.00 as litigation expenses, and to pay the cost of suit.7 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the issue of
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONOURABLE COURT A QUO’S DECISION IS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CASE CONSIDERING THE QUESTIONED PROPERTY WHICH WAS CLAIMED BY THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WAS LOCATED AT BARRIO BINDAY, SAN FABIAN, PANGASINAN NOT [AT] BARRIO ANONANG, SAN FABIAN, PANGASINAN, THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CASE.8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Before the appellate court, petitioners argued in the main that the land claimed to be owned by respondents is located at Barrio Binday, and not at Barrio Anonang, which is where the land subject of the case and which was donated to petitioner Ricardo Imbat by his father Florentino Imbat is located; and that the land located in Anonang was purchased by Florentino Imbat in 1949, taxes for which were religiously paid.
The appellate court found that the documentary evidence showed that the land in question is the same land subject of the forcible entry case, and that respondents are the owners thereof. Explained the appellate court:
. . . [T]he Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land dated December 22, 1975 refers to a property situated at Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan. Likewise, the SOLIVENs’ Declaration of Real Property and the Certification issued by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) refer to the land located in Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan. The "Recibo Ti Panangawat Ti Cuarta Nga Ingatang Ti Daga" to which appellants anchor their claim is no more than just a receipt – an acknowledgment of payment. It does not establish with certainty the particulars of the property involved therein. Among the Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land, the NIA Certification and the "Recibo Ti Panangawat Ti Cuarta Nga Ingatang Ti Daga," the first two documents are determinative of the identity of the land.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
After receipt on November 19, 2003 by petitioners of a copy of the appellate court’s decision or on December 4, 2003, the 14th day of the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time (10 days) to file a motion for reconsideration.10
On December 9, 2003, petitioners did file a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision.11
By Resolution of July 27, 2004,12 the appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration being prohibited, except in the Supreme Court.13
On August 20, 2004, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 27, 2004 Resolution of the appellate court which was denied by Resolution of February 28, 2006.
Hence, the present Petition for Review,14 petitioners faulting the appellate court for
1. . . . AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE PROPERTY SOLD BY SPOUSES RUFO GA[T]CHALIAN AND ALEJANDRA SURATOS IS A DIFFERENT PROPERTY AND NOT THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
2. . . . AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISREGARDING THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY AND BETWEEN PEDRO J. BALARBAR (SELLER) AND FLORENTINO IMBAT (BUYER) AS EARLY AS MAY 28, 1949.15 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners are glaringly silent on the procedural faux pas they committed before the appellate court. They merely focus on their above-quoted assigned errors.
The records of the case before the Court of Appeals show that in petitioners’ August 20, 2004 motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s denial of their motion for reconsideration of its decision affirming that of the trial court, which August 20, 2004 motion partakes of the nature of a proscribed second motion for reconsideration,16 they proffered that "there was no way for their new counsel to file a motion for reconsideration [of the decision] on time except to file the motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration to go over the whole records of the several cases filed in court by both parties against each other,"17 hence, the filing of the motion for extension. The proffered ground is a patent lie, however. Petitioners-appellants’ brief18 filed on March 5, 2003 before the appellate court is exhaustive, reflecting that their counsel had had ample opportunity to go over all pertinent records of related cases.
Technicality aside, on the merits, petitioners’ petition miserably fails.
In its decision in the forcible entry case, the MCTC noted as follows:
During the scheduled preliminary conference held on January 18, 1995, only the parties and Atty. Fernando Cabrera, plaintiff’s counsel appeared. For failure of Atty. Carlos Taminaya, defendant’s counsel to appear on said date and upon motion by Atty. Cabrera, the facts previously stipulated by the parties during the hearing of the motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction was adapted as the stipulation facts in the main case particularly on the following points:
1. Identities of the parties and of the land subject of this case;
2. The plaintiffs have been in prior possession of said land and it was only sometime in May 1994 that the defendants took over its possession.19
On appeal, the RTC noted that "[d]uring the pre-trial [sic] conference," both parties stipulated on the two above-mentioned facts.20
Petitioners nevertheless insist that the land being claimed by respondents is a different one, that which is located at Barangay Binday. In support of this position, petitioners rely on a December 8, 1975 Recibo Ti Panangawat Ti Cuarta Nga Ingatang Ti Daga executed by above-mentioned Spouses Gatchalian from whom respondents acquired the property in question.
This Recibo was not offered in evidence during the trial of the case, however.21 Nonetheless, respondents creditably explain that there was a mistake in indicating the location of the subject land, the vendors being residents of Binday, a neighboring barangay of Anonang.
As for the Deed of Absolute Sale ─ Exhibit "C" which appears to cover the subject land purportedly executed on May 28, 1949 in favor of petitioner Ricardo Imbat’s father, respondents objected to its admission on the ground that, among other things, it was not properly identified and, in any event, it refers to another parcel of land.22 While petitioners presented the Joint Affidavit dated June 10, 1949 executed by Pantaleon Terre23 and Melchor Orte24 stating that Pedro Balarbar sold the subject property to
Florentino Imbat, the affiants were not presented in court, hence, the statements in the affidavit remain hearsay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA
Asscociate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Foonotes
1 Exhibit "11," Folder of Exhibits, pp. 24-29.
2 Exhibit "12," id. at 30-31.
3 Records, pp. 1-2.
4 Exhibit "2," Folder of Exhibits, p. 14.
5 Exhibit "A," id. at 1.
6 Records, pp. 156-162.
7 Id. at 162.
8 CA rollo, p. 17.
9 Id. at 75-76.
10 Id. at 78-79.
11 Id. at 80-85.
12 Records, pp. 89-93.
13 Suarez v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 124512, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 74, 83; vide Apex Mining Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 122475, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 490, 496.
14 Rollo, pp. 7-19.
15 Id. at 10.
16 Vide Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138526, August 16, 2006, 499 SCRA 43, 52. Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. ─ No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.
17 Reply (to the Stiff Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration), CA rollo, pp. 98-100.
18 Id. at 15-30.
19 Exhibit "1," Folder of Exhibits, pp. 24-25.
20 Exhibit "2," id. at 31.
21 Vide Plaintiff’s Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits, records, pp. 85-87.
22 Records, p. 89.
23 In the TSN, October 5, 1998, Ricardo Imbat identified him as "Pantalion Torres."
24 Exhibit "H," Folder of Exhibits, p. 10.
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