Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170284 March 16, 2007
BENITO ARATEA and PONCIANA CANONIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
ESMERALDO P. SUICO and COURT OF APPEALS, Cebu City, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision1 dated 5 May 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA)-Cebu City, as reiterated in its resolution2 of 23 September 2005, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60174 which affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, in an action for a sum of money and damages thereat instituted by the herein private respondent Esmeraldo P. Suico (Suico) against, among others, the herein petitioners Benito Aratea (Aratea) and Ponciana Canonigo (Canonigo).
The facts:
Petitioners Aratea and Canonigo are the controlling stockholders of Samar Mining Development Corporation (SAMDECO), a domestic corporation engaged in mining operations in San Isidro, Wright, Western Samar. On the other hand, private respondent Suico is a businessman engaged in export and general merchandise.
Sometime in 1989, Suico entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with SAMDECO. Armed with the proper board resolution, Aratea and Canonigo signed the MOA as the duly authorized representatives of the corporation. Under the MOA, Suico would extend loans and cash advances to SAMDECO in exchange for the grant of the exclusive right to market fifty percent (50%) of the total coal extracted by SAMDECO from its mining sites in San Isidro, Wright, Western Samar.
Suico was enticed into the aforementioned financing scheme because Aratea and Canonigo assured him that the money he would lend to SAMDECO would easily be paid with five percent (5%) monthly interest as the coals in said sites is easier to gather because it is excavated from open-pit mines. Aratea and Canonigo also promised to Suico that the loan the latter would extend to SAMDECO could easily be paid from the profits of his fifty percent (50%) share of the coal produced. Also reserved in favor of Suico was the right of first priority to operate the mining facilities in the event SAMDECO becomes incapable of coping with the work demands. By way of further incentive, Suico was actually appointed SAMDECO’s Vice-President for Administration.
Pursuant to the same MOA, Suico started releasing loans and cash advances to SAMDECO, still through Aratea and Suico. SAMDECO started operations in its mining sites to gather the coal. As agreed in the MOA, fifty percent (50%) of the coals produced were offered by Suico to different buyers. However, SAMDECO, again through Aratea and Canonigo, prevented the full implementation of the marketing arrangement by not accepting the prices offered by Suico’s coal buyers even though such prices were competitive and fair enough, giving no other explanation for such refusal other than saying that the price was too low. Aratea and Canonigo did not also set any criterion or standard with which any price offer would be measured against. Because he failed to close any sale of his 50% share of the coal-produce and gain profits therefrom, Suico could not realize payment of the loans and advances he extended to SAMDECO.
SAMDECO, on the other hand, successfully disposed of its 50% share of the coal-produce. Even with said coal sales, however, SAMDECO absolutely made no payment of its loan obligations to Suico, despite demands.
Aratea and Canonigo eventually sold the mining rights and passed on the operations of SAMDECO to Southeast Pacific Marketing, Inc. (SPMI). They also sold their shares in SAMDECO to SPMI’s President, Arturo E. Dy without notice to, or consent of Suico, in violation of the MOA.
Hence, in the RTC of Cebu City, Suico filed a complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages against SAMDECO, Aratea, Canonigo, and Seiko Philippines, Inc. (SEIKO, which was later substituted by SPMI and Arturo E. Dy). The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10618 and raffled to Branch 24 of the court.
On 5 January 1998, the trial court came out with its decision rendering judgment for Suico as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the plaintiff has meritorious cause of action against the defendants, this Court hereby orders all the defendants SAMDECO, SPMI, Dy, SEIKO, Benito Aratea, Ponciana Canonigo to solidarily pay the plaintiff the principal obligation of ₱3.5 million plus 5% interest per month reckoned from March 1989 until fully paid; while defendants Aratea & Canonigo should solidarily pay plaintiff the balance on the principal amounting to ₱978,440.00 plus 5% interest per month reckoned from March 1989 until fully paid. In addition all defendants are hereby ordered solidarily to pay plaintiff ₱2,000,000.00 million (sic) as moral damages, ₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱250,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and ₱100,000.00 as litigation expenses. All counterclaims and cross-claims are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
On 9 February 1998, SAMDECO, SPMI, Dy, and SEIKO filed their common notice of appeal, while Aratea and Canonigo filed theirs on 16 February 1998. All appeals were docketed in CA-Cebu City as CA-G.R. CV No. 60174.
After review of the records of the case, CA-Cebu City, in its decision of 5 May 2005, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the appealed decision of the trial court, to wit::
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision dated January 5, 1998 of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 24 in Civil Case No. CEB-10618.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners Aratea and Canonigo filed their common motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the appellate court in its resolution of 23 September 2005.1ªvvphi1.nét
Hence, this recourse by the two on the following assigned errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS BENITO ARATEA AND PONCIANA CANONIGO AND CONDEMNING THEM TO PAY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY THE LOANS, CASH ADVANCES AND CAPITAL INFUSION MADE BY PLAINTIFF TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT SAMDECO.
THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED AND MISINTERPRETED SOME FACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES AND COMMITTED SOME MISAPPREHENSION OF THE FACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW/S WHICH HAD ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
We DENY.
The Court notes that petitioners Aratea and Canonigo do not assail the decisions of the two courts below insofar as their co-defendants in the court of origin, namely: SAMDECO; SPMI; Dy; and SEIKO, were held liable to Suico. As it were, petitioners take exception from both decisions only, insofar as they are held personally and solidarily liable with their co-defendants. They strongly assert that "the records of this case clearly show that the loans, cash advances and capital infusion made by xxx Suico to SAMDECO are the sole and exclusive liability and/or responsibility of SAMDECO and/or its transferee/s."3 Relying heavily on the allegations in Suico’s complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-10618, whereunder they were referred to as mere representatives/agents of SAMDECO, petitioners seek to be declared free from any liability which their co-defendants in the suit may be adjudged liable for.
We must first stress that petitioners’ personal and solidary liability depends on whether the Court finds SAMDECO’s monetary obligations on account of the loans and cash advances made to it by Suico are due and demandable as borne by the evidence.
After carefully and thoroughly reviewing the records of the proceedings before the trial court, we find no cogent reason to depart from the factual findings of both the trial and appellate courts holding all defendants liable for said loans and cash advances.
However, in determining whether SAMDECO’s stockholders and/or representatives (petitioners Aratea and Canonigo) may be held solidarily liable with SAMDECO’s obligations, the Court must determine whether, upon the same facts found by the two courts below, there is basis to pierce the veil of corporate fiction and hold SAMDECO’s stockholders and/or officers personally and solidarily liable with the corporation.
Prudential Bank v. Alviar4 stated:
Well-settled is the rule that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of its officers and stockholders. Officers of a corporation are not personally liable for their acts as such officers unless it is shown that they have exceeded their authority. However, the legal fiction that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from stockholders and members may be disregarded if it is used as a means to perpetuate fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues.
SAMDECO must generally be treated as separate and distinct entity from petitioners Aratea and Canonigo unless there are facts and circumstances that would justify the Court to pierce the veil of corporate fiction and treat them as one and the same. From the facts, as found by the trial court and reechoed by the appellate court, the Court has no reason to doubt that Suico was very well aware that he was dealing with SAMDECO and that Aratea and Canonigo were mere authorized representatives acting for and in behalf of the corporation. In fact, Suico took note that Aratea and Canonigo were duly authorized by the corresponding board resolution. There were no indications whatsoever that Suico was misled to believe that the loans and cash advances were initially intended for the personal benefit of Aratea and/or Canonigo, and that the corporation was only used thereafter for the purpose of hiding behind the veil of corporate fiction to evade personal liability. The evidence sufficiently established that all loans and cash advances were used for the mining operations of SAMDECO, and there were neither allegations nor proofs to the contrary. Absent any proof of fraud or double dealing, therefore, the doctrine on piercing the veil of corporate entity would not apply.
Considering that the veil of corporate fiction cannot be pierced in this case but the evidence indisputably established that Suico released loans and cash advances in favor of SAMDECO, which loans and cash advances remain unpaid to the present, to Suico’s damage and prejudice, may Aratea and Canonigo, as SAMDECO’s controlling stockholders and/or representatives, be nonetheless held personally and solidarily liable with SAMDECO and its successors-in-interest for obligations the corporation incurred under the facts herein obtaining?
We rule in the affirmative.
In MAM Realty Development Corporation v. NLRC,5 the Court stated:
A corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from the people comprising it. The general rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. There are times, however, when solidary liabilities may be incurred but only when exceptional circumstances warrant such as in the following cases:
1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation:
(a) vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation;
(b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate affairs;
(c) are guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of the corporation, its stockholders or members, and other persons;6
2. When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto;7
3. When a director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation;8 or
4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law, personally liable for his corporate action.9
In labor cases, particularly, corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of corporate employees done with malice or in bad faith. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners Aratea and Canonigo, despite having separate and distinct personalities from SAMDECO may be held personally liable for the loans and advances made by Suico to SAMDECO which they represent on account of their bad faith in carrying out the business of the corporation. In the words of the trial court:
As evidenced by the transcripts of the direct examination of [respondent Suico] (TSN, Arnejo, 10 August 1995, pp. 20-21), [petitioners] Canonigo, Aratea and SAMDECO prevented the full implementation of the marketing agreement concerning the coal produced from the mining site, specifically called the Arizona project, by not agreeing to the price of the coal offered by the buyers procured by [Suico] even though the prices offered were competitive and fair enough. [Petitioners] Canonigo, Aratea and SAMDECO made no explanation as to why they did not accept the offered price save to say that they were low. They also did not set any criterion or standard against which any offered price would be measured. By not acquiescing in to the proffered price, [respondent] Suico was not able to obtain his share of 50% of the profits from the sale of the coal produced by the mining site.
1awphi1.nét
On the other hand, the [petitioners] were able to sell coal produced in the mining site in question. Hence, this undoubtedly exhibits their bad faith, malice and wanton disregard of the [respondent’s] rights in not complying with their part of the covenant. While the [petitioners] were able to market their share of the coal, they precluded the [respondent] from marketing his. xxx.
Moreover, notwithstanding the unequivocal language of Title 4, paragraph 1, [petitioners] Canonigo and Aratea further violated the [respondent’s] rights when they without informing [respondent] sold their shares of SAMDECO to defendants Dy and SPMI thereby vesting on the latter the right to operate SAMDECO’s coal mining area as evidence by the Memorandum of Agreement labeled Exhibits "B". Title 4, paragraph 1 of Exhibit "A" expressly states that [respondent] Suico had the right of first priority in acquiring the coal area of SAMDECO. The most prudent action for [petitioners] would have been to first offer to sell SAMDECO to [respondent] as what was stipulated under the contract prior to entering into an agreement with defendants SPMI and Dy. xxx. (Words in brackets supplied.)
Petitioners Aratea and Canonigo acted in bad faith when they, as officers of SAMDECO, unreasonably prevented Suico from selling his part of the coal-produce of the mining site, in gross violation of their MOA. This resulted in Suico not being unable to realize profits from his 50% share of the coal-produce, from which Suico could obtain part of the payment for the loans and advances he made in favor of SAMDECO. Moreover, petitioners also acted in bad faith when they sold, transferred and assigned their proprietary rights over the mining area in favor of SPMI and Dy, thereby causing SAMDECO to grossly violate its MOA with Suico. Suico suffered grave injustice because he was prevented from acquiring the opportunity to obtain payment of his loans and cash advances, while petitioners Aratea and Canonigo profited from the sale of their shareholdings in SAMDECO in favor of SPMI and Dy. These facts duly established Aratea and Canonigo’s personal liability as officers/stockholders of SAMDECO and their solidary liability with SAMDECO for its obligations in favor of Suico for the loans and cash advances received by the corporation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed CA decision and resolution are AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA
Asscociate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Foonotes
1 Rendered by its Twentieth Division stationed in Cebu City, Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, ponente, with Associate Justices Vicente L. Yap and Enrico Lanzanas, concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-31.
2 Id. at 46-47.
3 Id. at 15.
4 G.R. No. 150197, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 353.
5 G.R. No. 114787, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 797, 802-803.
6 See Section 31, Corporation Code.
7 See Section 65, Corporation Code.
8 See De Asis and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-61549, May 27, 1985, 136 SCRA 599.
9 Exemplified in Article 144, Corporation Code; See also Section 13, Presidential Decree 115 (Trust Receipts Law).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
