Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167760 March 7, 2007
MANILA JOCKEY CLUB EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-PTGWO, Petitioner,
vs.
MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision1 dated December 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA), as reiterated in its resolution2 of April 4, 2005, dismissing the petition for review of herein petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 69240, entitled Manila Jockey Club Employees Labor Union- PTGWO v. Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
The facts:
Petitioner Manila Jockey Club Employees Labor Union-PTGWO and respondent Manila Jockey Club, Inc., a corporation with a legislative franchise to conduct, operate and maintain horse races, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2000. The CBA governed the economic rights and obligations of respondent’s regular monthly paid rank-and-file employees.3 In the CBA, the parties agreed to a 7-hour work schedule from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on a work week of Monday to Saturday, as contained under Section 1, Article IV,4 of the same CBA, to wit:
Section 1. Both parties to this Agreement agree to observe the seven-hour work schedule herewith scheduled to be from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. to 5 p.m. on work week of Monday to Saturday. All work performed in excess of seven (7) hours work schedule and on days not included within the work week shall be considered overtime and paid as such. Except those monthly compensation which includes work performed during Saturday, Sunday, and Holiday when races are held at the Club.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, overtime on an ordinary working day shall be remunerated in an amount equivalent to the worker's regular basic wage plus twenty five percent (25%) thereof. Where the employee is permitted or suffered to work on legally mandated holidays or on his designated rest day which is not a legally mandated holiday, thirty percent (30%) shall be added to his basic wage for a seven hour work; while work rendered in excess of seven hours on legally mandated holidays and rest days not falling within the aforestated categories day shall be additionally compensated for the overtime work equivalent to his rate for the first seven hours on a legally mandated holiday or rest day plus thirty percent (30%) thereof.
The CBA likewise reserved in respondent certain management prerogatives, including the determination of the work schedule, as provided under Section 2, Article XI:
Section 2. The COMPANY shall have exclusive control in the management of the offices and direction of the employees. This shall include, but shall not be limited to, the right to plan, direct and control office operations, to hire, assign and transfer employees from one job to another or from one department to another; to promote, demote, discipline, suspend, discharge or terminate employees for proper cause and/or in accordance with law, to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons; or to introduce new or improved methods or facilities; or to change existing methods or facilities to change the schedules of work; and to make and enforce rules and regulations to carry out the functions of management, provided, however, that the COMPANY will not use these rights for the purpose of discrimination against any employee because of his membership in the UNION. Provided, further, that the prerogatives provided for under this Section shall be subject to, and in accordance with pertinent directives, proclamations and their implementing rules and regulations.
On April 3, 1999, respondent issued an inter-office memorandum declaring that, effective April 20, 1999, the hours of work of regular monthly-paid employees shall be from 1:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. when horse races are held, that is, every Tuesday and Thursday. The memorandum, however, maintained the 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. schedule for non-race days.
On October 12, 1999, petitioner and respondent entered into an Amended and Supplemental CBA retaining Section 1 of Article IV and Section 2 of Article XI, supra, and clarified that any conflict arising therefrom shall be referred to a voluntary arbitrator for resolution.
Subsequently, before a panel of voluntary arbitrators of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), petitioner questioned the above office memorandum as violative of the prohibition against non-diminution of wages and benefits guaranteed under Section 1, Article IV, of the CBA which specified the work schedule of respondent's employees to be from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Petitioner claimed that as a result of the memorandum, the employees are precluded from rendering their usual overtime work from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
The NCMB’s panel of voluntary arbitrators, in a decision dated October 18, 2001, upheld respondent's prerogative to change the work schedule of regular monthly-paid employees under Section 2, Article XI, of the CBA. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the panel denied the motion.
Dissatisfied, petitioner then appealed the panel’s decision to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 69240. In the herein assailed decision of December 17, 2004, the CA upheld that of the panel and denied petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration via its equally challenged resolution of April 4, 2005.
Hence, petitioner’s present recourse, raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT MJCI DID NOT RELINQUISH PART OF ITS MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE WHEN IT STIPULATED A WORK SCHEDULE IN THE CBA.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT MJCI DID NOT VIOLATE THE NON-DIMINUTION PROVISION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 100 OF THE LABOR CODE.
We DENY.
Respondent, as employer, cites the change in the program of horse races as reason for the adjustment of the employees’ work schedule. It rationalizes that when the CBA was signed, the horse races started at 10:00 a.m. When the races were moved to 2:00 p.m., there was no other choice for management but to change the employees' work schedule as there was no work to be done in the morning. Evidently, the adjustment in the work schedule of the employees is justified.
We are not unmindful that every business enterprise endeavors to increase profits. As it is, the Court will not interfere with the business judgment of an employer in the exercise of its prerogative to devise means to improve its operation, provided that it does not violate the law, CBAs, and the general principles of justice and fair play. We have thus held that management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, layoff of workers and discipline, dismissal, and recall of workers.5
While it is true that Section 1, Article IV of the CBA provides for a 7-hour work schedule from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. from Mondays to Saturdays, Section 2, Article XI, however, expressly reserves on respondent the prerogative to change existing methods or facilities to change the schedules of work. As aptly ruled by the CA:
x x x. Such exact language lends no other meaning but that while respondent may have allowed the initial determination of the work schedule to be done through collective bargaining, it expressly retained the prerogative to change it.
Moreover, it cannot be said that in agreeing to Section 1 of Article IV, respondent already waived that customary prerogative of management to set the work schedule. Had that been the intention, Section 2 of Article XI would not have made any reference at all to the retention by respondent of that prerogative. The CBA would have instead expressly prohibited respondent from exercising it. x x x As it were, however, the CBA expressly recognized in respondent the prerogative to change the work schedule. This effectively rules out any notion of waiver on the part of respondent of its prerogative to change the work schedule.
The same provision of the CBA also grants respondent the prerogative to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work. Petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the change in work schedule violates Article 100 of the Labor Code because it resulted in the diminution of the benefit enjoyed by regular monthly-paid employees of rendering overtime work with pay, is untenable. Section 1, Article IV, of the CBA does not guarantee overtime work for all the employees but merely provides that "all work performed in excess of seven (7) hours work schedule and on days not included within the work week shall be considered overtime and paid as such.".5
While it is true that Section 1, Article IV of the CBA provides for a 7-hour work schedule from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. from Mondays to Saturdays, Section 2, Article XI, however, expressly reserves on respondent the prerogative to change existing methods or facilities to change the schedules of work. As aptly ruled by the CA:
x x x. Such exact language lends no other meaning but that while respondent may have allowed the initial determination of the work schedule to be done through collective bargaining, it expressly retained the prerogative to change it.
Moreover, it cannot be said that in agreeing to Section 1 of Article IV, respondent already waived that customary prerogative of management to set the work schedule. Had that been the intention, Section 2 of Article XI would not have made any reference at all to the retention by respondent of that prerogative. The CBA would have instead expressly prohibited respondent from exercising it. x x x As it were, however, the CBA expressly recognized in respondent the prerogative to change the work schedule. This effectively rules out any notion of waiver on the part of respondent of its prerogative to change the work schedule.
The same provision of the CBA also grants respondent the prerogative to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work. Petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the change in work schedule violates Article 100 of the Labor Code because it resulted in the diminution of the benefit enjoyed by regular monthly-paid employees of rendering overtime work with pay, is untenable. Section 1, Article IV, of the CBA does not guarantee overtime work for all the employees but merely provides that "all work performed in excess of seven (7) hours work schedule and on days not included within the work week shall be considered overtime and paid as such."
Respondent was not obliged to allow all its employees to render overtime work everyday for the whole year, but only those employees whose services were needed after their regular working hours and only upon the instructions of management. The overtime pay was not given to each employee consistently, deliberately and unconditionally, but as a compensation for additional services rendered. Thus, overtime pay does not fall within the definition of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code on prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits.
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be presumed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. The partiality for labor has not in any way diminished our belief that justice in every case is for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.6
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA
Asscociate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnote
1 Penned by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Jose Catral Mendoza; Rollo, pp. 23-30.
2 Id. at 32-33.
3 Sec. 1. Appropriate Bargaining Unit. The appropriate bargaining unit covered by this Agreement consists of all regular monthly paid rank-and file employees employed by the Company to work Monday to Friday, and, in certain instances, also on Saturdays when races are not held at the Club. Consequently, supervisory personnel, security guards, temporary and/or probationary personnel, and especially the hundred of workers and employees working in the Club on weekend when races are held therein, are understood to be outside the Scope of this Agreement. x x x; id. at 35.
4 Id. at 37.
5 United Kimberly-Clark Employees Union-Philippine Transport General Workers' Organization (UKCEU-PTGWO) v. Kimberly-Clark Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 162957, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 187.
6 Abella v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, G.R. No. 159469, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 724.
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