Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164547 March 28, 2007
CGP TRANSPORTATION AND SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the 26 March 2004 Decision1 and 13 July 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 68528 entitled "PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Hon. Alberto L. Lerma in His Capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City and CGP Transportation and Services Corporation." In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 27 March 20013 and 30 August 20014 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 256, of the City of Muntinlupa in LRC Case No. 99-020 entitled "In re: Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession for Real Properties Covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 172319 and 180241 of the Register of Deeds for Makati City (CGP Transportation & Services Corporation Properties)." Herein respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Incorporated (PCI) was originally the petitioner in the aforequoted case, while herein petitioner CGP Transportation and Services Corporation (CGP) was the oppositor therein.
This case stemmed from the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings instituted by herein respondent PCI against the Real Estate Mortgage5 and the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage6 executed by herein petitioner CGP.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner CGP obtained two loans from respondent PCI, the collective principal sum of which amounted to Sixteen Million (₱16,000,000.00) pesos. Both loans were secured by real estate mortgages over two parcels of land7 located in Bo. Cupang, Muntinlupa City, and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 172319 and 180241 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Petitioner CGP failed to pay its indebtedness to respondent PCI pursuant to the terms and conditions extant on the face of the Promissory Notes covering the two loans aforementioned. Accordingly, the latter filed a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the real properties subject of the Real Estate Mortgage and the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage, pursuant to Act No. 3135,8 as amended.
During the public auction held thereafter, respondent PCI was the highest bidder of the subject real properties. Consequently, the corresponding Certificates of Sale were issued in the name of respondent PCI.
On 19 November 1997, the above-mentioned Certificates of Sale were registered with the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Petitioner CGP, however, failed to redeem the real properties during the redemption period; thus, respondent PCI insisted that actual possession thereof be turned over to it. Expectedly, petitioner CGP balked at the idea and refused the demand. On 12 April 1999, respondent PCI9 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, and docketed as LRC Case No. 99-020, a petition for an ex-parte issuance of a Writ of Possession. Petitioner CGP opposed the subject petition.
On 15 November 2000, the RTC issued an Order ruling against oppositor (herein petitioner) CGP’s stance. The Order, in part, reads:
The petitioner is correct, the law expressly authorized the purchaser to petition for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an Ex-parte Motion under oath for that purpose and that the pendency of any separate civil action can be no obstacle to the issuance of the writ of possession which is a ministerial act of the trial court after a title on the property has been consolidated in the mortgage.
Accordingly, Ex-parte reception of evidence is scheduled on December 1, 2000, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.10
In its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner CGP averred that the scheduled hearing was violative of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in its favor by the same trial court, albeit in a different case involving the same parties – particularly Civil Case No. 99-234, respecting a complaint for the annulment of the foreclosure proceedings earlier mentioned. It argued that notwithstanding the fact that the complaint for annulment of foreclosure proceedings had already been dismissed by the trial court, such order had not yet become final and executory inasmuch as it was appealed to the Court of Appeals. That being the case, the writ should still be considered in effect and subsisting.
On 27 March 2001, the RTC reconsidered its Order, viz:
[F]inding the grounds relied upon by the oppositor to be meritorious and considering further that there are several motions to be resolved yet by the court, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED, the order of this court dated October 20, 2000 is set aside and the ex-parte proceedings is hereby nullified and set aside. The Preliminary Injunction previously issued is reinstated.11
Consequently, it was respondent PCI’s turn to file a Motion for Reconsideration.
In an Order dated 30 August 2001, the RTC stood pat on its position that the Opposition filed by herein petitioner CGP raised issues that needed to be heard in the presence of both parties. Said Order stated:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner on the order of this court dated March 27, 2001, which granted the motion for reconsideration filed by Oppositor to the Order dated November 15, 2000.
There is basis to the pending motion of petitioner insofar as the reinstatement of preliminary injunction earlier issued by this court and submission for resolution of motions are concerned, as they all refer to Civil Case No. 99-234. This Court recognizes the snafu brought about by the several pleadings and pending incidents both in the instant case and Civil Case No. 99-234 which involved the same parties and the same subject matter.
Be that as it may, this court, after a careful review of the verified opposition of the oppositor, including it annexes, is not inclined to grant the ex-parte proceedings as asserted by the petitioner. This court reviewed the grounds of oppositor in its motion for reconsideration of the order dated November 15, 2000, which allowed ex-parte presentation of evidence in this case. These grounds are: (a) Presence on record of a verified opposition to the petition and (b) there was an injunction earlier issued by this court on September 3, 1999 on the complaint for annulment of foreclosure proceedings of the subject properties filed by oppositor in Civil Case No. 99-234 also before this court.
It is the considered view of this court that the verified opposition on record joined issues that need to be heard in the presence of both parties, a basic requirement of due process. The general rule frowns [on] ex-parte proceedings. When this court issued a writ of injunction in Civil Case No. 99-234, taking into consideration the allegations in the complaint it was convinced that there was a need for a status quo between the parties until all the issues joined therein are heard and disposed. On technical ground, the complaint in Civil Case No. 99-234 was dismissed by this court. Although it may be too late for this court to say, there were indeed pending incidents that needed to be resolved in Civil Case No. 99-234. Precisely, when this court mentioned of pending motions, it was actually referring to the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 99-234, as correctly pointed out by the Oppositor, petitioner at the time of the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 99-234, it has not filed yet its answer to the complaint in intervention of the plaintiff-intervenor. Petitioner, apparently, took advantage of the inadvertence in the issuance of the order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 99-234 when it kept silent of the fact that it has not filed yet an answer to the complaint in intervention.
This court is cognizant of the rule that the dismissal of the complaint on the merits automatically dissolves the injunction issued therein even if the decision or order of dismissal is on appeal. The dismissal of this court however, of the complaint in Civil Case No. 99-234 was not the result of trial on the merits but rather on mere technicality. It is in this light that this court believes that considering that the dissolution of the injunction was the consequence of the order of dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 99-234, which was not the result of a trial on the merits, and the said order of dismissal is now the subject of appeal, there is a need to suspend the proceedings in this case until the said appeal is disposed.12
Aggrieved, respondent PCI filed before this Court, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, premised on the following grounds:
1. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE THE EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE A QUO.
2. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT REINSTATED IN THE CASE A QUO THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHICH WAS ISSUED IN ANOTHER CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 99-234).
3. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT SET ASIDE IN THE CASE A QUO THE ORDER DATED 20 OCTOBER 2000 WHICH WAS ISSUED IN CIVIL CASE NO. 99-234.
4. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT SUSPENDED THE PROCEEDINGS A QUO UNTIL THE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 99-234 IS RESOLVED.13
The petition (G.R. No. 150483) was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals by this Court for appropriate action in a Resolution,14 dated 3 December 2001, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 56 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, factual issues being involved.
In response to the referral, the Court of Appeals docketed the petition as CA G.R. SP No. 68528.
In its Decision promulgated on 26 March 2004, the Court of Appeals granted herein respondent PCI’s petition and set aside the RTC Order dated 30 August 2001. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The orders dated March 27, 2001 and August 28 (sic), 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, in LRC Case No. 99-020 are SET ASIDE. Further, the public respondent judge is ordered to continue with the proceedings and to decide the case with dispatch.15
The appellate court found public respondent RTC Judge to have gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in suspending the proceedings in LRC Case No. 99-020 relating to the writ of possession asked for by herein respondent PCI. The Court of Appeals did not favor the RTC Judge who, "in effect took cognizance of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-234, an action for annulment of foreclosure proceedings filed by"16 herein petitioner CGP – one that is entirely separate from the case earlier filed. Moreover, "[w]ith the dismissal of the main case, (an) injunction (issued therein) is automatically lifted and the dissolution thereof is not appealable." The Court of Appeals then clarified that though the preceding principle is the general rule, the circumstances surrounding the reinstatement of the subject writ of preliminary injunction do not necessarily entitle the application of the exception stated in Section 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
SEC. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. – Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and support, and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support.
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of the adverse party.
It likewise noted that the fact that there was no dispute vis-à-vis herein petitioner CGP’s failure to redeem the foreclosed real properties within the period, herein respondent PCI’s right to possession thereof is quite patent and absolute; and that "any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession xxx."17
On 13 July 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner CGP.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner CGP does not question at all the substantive aspect of the decision of the Court of Appeals. It’s petition is predicated solely on the issue of "whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari of respondent, there being already a final finding by this Honorable Court in its Resolution dated December 3, 2001, in G.R. No. 150483, that the said petition raised questions of facts and therefore not proper for petition for certiorari."18
In its one page argument, Petitioner CGP contends, in whole, that:
It is undisputed that this Honorable Court in its resolution dated December 3, 2001 in G.R. No. 150483 has found that issues of facts are raised in the petition filed therein. That these conclusion and finding of this Honorable Court are final and therefore no court for that matter, including the Court of Appeals, can disturb the same. [In fact and in truth, the factual issues are pending for resolution in the case before the Court of Appeals, in the case entitled CGP TRANSPORTATION AND SERVICES CORPORATION, Plaintiff-appellant versus PCI LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, defendant-appellee docketed as C.A. G.R. No. 69466.] With this factual backdrop, petitioner honestly believes, that there can be no other fate on the said petition [of respondent] but the dismissal, it being a settled jurisprudence that in a petition for review, only questions of law can be raised. Even the Honorable Court of Appeals agree on this point when it says in its aforequoted decision, citing the doctrine laid down by this Honorable Court in BCI Employees & Workers Union v. Marcos, 39 SCRA 178, that "It is however basic that when facts are disputed, certiorari is not an appropriate remedy".19
Respondent PCI, in contrast, maintains that in rendering its assailed Decision, the "… Honorable Court of Appeals simply discharged the duty assigned to it by this Honorable Court," apropos the latter’s 3 December 2001 Resolution.
We sustain respondent PCI’s importunings and dismiss petitioner CGP’s petition.
Although the form or mode of the original petition filed by herein respondent PCI from the Order of the RTC was a special civil action for certiorari, an incorrect mode of appeal there being questions of fact as assigned errors, i.e., the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstance, their relation to each other and to the whole situation,20 this Court, in order to serve the demands of substantial justice, considers and disposes of the case as an appeal by certiorari instead.
In an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised.21 In petitions such as the one filed in G.R. No. 150483, questions of fact may not be the proper subject of appeal under Rule 45 as this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of law.22 Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.23 The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding on us subject to certain exceptions.24 Cases where an appeal involved questions of fact, of law, or both fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.25 This is attested to by Section 15, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The section reads:
SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. – x x x he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.
It was on this score that we referred the subject petition to the appellate court.
Under Section 5(f) of Rule 56 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, an appeal may be dismissed on the ground of erroneous choice or mode of appeal. Said section reads:
SEC. 5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – The appeal MAY be dismissed motu proprio or on motion of the respondent on the following grounds:
x x x x
(f) Error in the choice or mode of appeal.
This notwithstanding, the Court may refer the case to the Court of Appeals under par. 2, Section 6 of the same rule. Said section states:
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. – x x x
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final. [Emphasis supplied.]
This Court’s discretion to refer the case to the Court of Appeals is by reason of the term "may" in both sections. Such term denotes discretion on our part in dismissing an appeal or referring one to the Court of Appeals.
Besides, it must be borne in mind that procedural rules are intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice.26 A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts.
In the case at bar, substantial ends of justice warranted the referral of the case to the appellate court for further appropriate proceedings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed 26 March 2004 Decision and 13 July 2004 Resolution, both of the Court of Appeals, in CA G.R. SP No. 68528 entitled "PCI Leasing and Finances, Inc. v. Hon. Alberto L. Lerma, In His Capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City and CGP Transportation and Services Corporation," are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Asscociate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Foonotes
1 Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Jose L. Sabio, Jr. concurring; Annex "A" of the Petition; rollo, pp. 19-26.
2 Annex "B" of the Petition; id. at 27-28.
3 Penned by Presiding Judge Alberto L. Lerma; CA rollo, p. 35.
4 Id. at 36-37.
5 CA Decision, p. 2; rollo, p. 20.
6 Id.
7 Together with all the buildings and improvements existing thereon.
8 An Act To Regulate The Sale Of Property Under Special Powers Inserted In Or Annexed To Real-Estate Mortgages.
9 Annex "M" of the Petition for Certiorari was originally filed before this Court; CA rollo, pp. 85-88.
10 Id. at 38.
11 Id. at 35.
12 Id. at 36-37.
13 Rollo, pp. 14-15.
14 The Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals, for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, quoted as follows:
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final.
15 Rollo, p. 26.
16 CA Decision, p. 6; id. at 24.
17 Id. at 7-8; id. at 25-26.
18 Id.
19 Rollo, p. 15.
20 Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW, Vol. II. (2000 ed.), p. 650.
21 Ybañez v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 643, 651 (1996).
22 De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil. 534, 544 (2002).
23 Universal Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47432, 27 January 1992, 205 SCRA 448, 455.
24 Id. at 456.
25 Crisologo v. Globe Telecom, Inc., G.R. No. 167631, 16 December 2005, 478 SCRA 433, 441.
26 Morales v. The Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161172, 13 December 2004, 446 SCRA 227, 238-239.
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