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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 152007             January 22, 2007

PROCOPIO TAPUROC, HEIRS OF ANTONIA EBE (Deceased) represented by her children namely: HEIRS OF CELEDONIA PUTONG, namely: FORTUNATO ESCUDERO, TERESITA TABALDINA, CONCORDIO E. NEBRIA, PEDRO ESCUDERO and LUISA PEDRERA; HEIRS OF EUFEMIO PUTONG, namely: RICARDO PUTONG and PORFERIA PUTONG; HEIRS OF GREGORIO PUTONG, namely: ROSALIO PUTONG, PERSEVERANDA LOPEZ, BERNARDO PUTONG and ROSALINDA OMAGAC; HEIRS OF MARIANO PUTONG, namely: SERAPIA DALHOG, TEODORA AYENG, MARCIANO PUTONG, RESTITUTA LIQUIT, SERAPIA LUAY, FAUSTINO PUTONG and SOFRONIA PATROLLA, ALL REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN- FACT, AUREA P. MERCIDOR, Petitioners,
vs.
CARMELITA LOQUELLANO VDA. DE MENDE and the HEIRS OF EVANS MENDE, namely: ERIC MITCHEL, ERIC LYNDON, ERIC FERDINAND, JOSE ERIC ERVIN and JENNIFER MILDRED, ALL SURNAMED MENDE and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF TAGBILARAN, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:

Under consideration is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64548, to wit:

1. Decision¹ dated September 21, 2001, affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Branch 47, in an action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (8585) T-4767 and all Subsequent Documents and Damages, thereat commenced by the herein petitioners against the respondents; and

2. Resolution² dated January 23, 2002, denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The petition embodies an alternative prayer for this Court to remand the case to the trial court for the presentation of an expert witness.

The facts:

On September 19, 1996, in the RTC of Tagbilaran City, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Cancellation of TCT No. (8585) T-4767 and all Subsequent Documents and Damages³ was filed by the petitioners against respondents Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de Mende, the Heirs of Evans B. Mende, and the Register of Deeds of the City of Tagbilaran. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 5970 and raffled to Branch 47 of the court, the Complaint alleges that petitioners Procopio Tapuroc and all the successors-in-interest of deceased co-owner Antonia Ebe are the co-owners, co-heirs and/or descendants of the original owners of a parcel of land with an area of 5,795 square meters, more or less, situated in the Barrio (now District) of Booy, Tagbilaran, Bohol and previously covered by TCT No. 3444; that sometime in 1992, when the petitioners decided to partition the subject property, they discovered from the Office of the City Assessor that the title covering the land was already in the name of a certain Evans Mende by virtue of a Deed of Sale purportedly executed in favor of the latter by their predecessors-in-interest on December 30, 1967; that said Deed of Sale is a forged document because the alleged vendors therein, who were Procopio Tapuroc and the predecessors-in-interest of the other petitioners, did not sign the conveying deed nor receive any consideration therefor; and that one of the alleged vendors, Antonia Ebe, had already passed away in 1960, or long before the purported Deed of Sale was said to have been executed in 1967. Petitioners, as plaintiffs, thus pray for the nullification of the same Deed of Sale, the cancellation of the title issued pursuant thereto in the name of Evans Mende and the restoration of the previous title in their names, plus damages.

In their Answer,⁴ the respondent Mendes, as defendants, denied the material allegations of the Complaint and averred that the late Evans Mende, husband of respondent Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de Mende and father of the herein co-respondents, bought the subject parcel of land from its previous owners on December 12, 1967 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale duly notarized by Atty. Rodolfo Yap. They further assert that they had been in open, continuous, and peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of said sale, and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due thereon. By way of affirmative defense, the respondents assert that petitioners’ cause of action, if any, had already prescribed in view of the unreasonable delay in filing the suit in court, let alone the fact that their (respondents’) title has become indefeasible.

On June 7, 1999, after due proceedings, the trial court came out with its decision⁵ finding that the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs (now petitioners) was insufficient to establish their claim that the questioned Deed of Sale was a forgery. The court explained that despite the opportunity given them, the plaintiffs failed to present a handwriting expert to determine whether the said Deed of Sale was indeed a forged instrument, adding that laches had already set in because of plaintiffs’ inaction and neglect in questioning the supposed forged character of the document after the lapse of more than twenty-nine (29) years from the time of its execution. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint, thus:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit. No compensation for damages, moral, exemplary and litigation expenses is awarded for failure of plaintiffs (sic) to prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of malice or bad faith in filing the instant case.

SO ORDERED.

From the adverse decision of the trial court, the petitioners went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 64548, faulting the court of origin in ruling that they failed to present convincing evidence to prove the fact of forgery in the execution of the assailed Deed of Sale. They likewise faulted the lower court in denying their motion to have the original copy of the Deed of Sale in dispute and their own Special Power of Attorney containing the genuine signatures of their predecessors-in-interest, be examined by a handwriting expert.

As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in its Decision⁶ of September 21, 2001, dismissed the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed that of the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its Resolution⁷ of January 23, 2002, the petitioners are now with this Court via the instant recourse on their main submission that -

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED THE APPEAL OF THE PETITIONERS DESPITE SUFFICIENCY OF SUPPORTING EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A FAVORABLE JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONERS,

and presenting for our resolution the following issues:

I

WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED ON DECEMBER 30, 1967 BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS’ PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST AND THE RESPONDENTS IS VALID.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CONTRADICTED ITSELF AND ARRIVED AT A CONCLUSION CONTRARY TO THE RECORDS, LAW AND THE APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.

The recourse must fail.

As it is, the petitioners call for a review of the facts of the case. This is evident from the pleadings they filed with this Court. In their main petition⁸ and Memorandum,⁹ the petitioners emphatically state:

The issue in the case at bar boils down to whether or not the signatures of the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest and Procopio Tapuroc (the only surviving vendor to the alleged deed of sale) were forged; and if they were, is the declaration of nullity of the said deed of sale dated December 13, 1967 is proper (sic).

Clearly, the foregoing statement calls for a determination of the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, a matter not for this Court to resolve. Well-settled is the rule that factual questions may not be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is explicit. It reads:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)

Evident it is from the above that the function of the Court in petitions for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. And, as a matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts, more so when, as here, such findings are undisturbed by the appellate court. This factual determination, as a matter of long and sound appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal, save only for the most compelling reasons,¹⁰ such as when that determination is clearly without evidentiary support or when grave abuse of discretion has been committed.¹¹ This is as it should be since the Court, in petitions for review of CA decisions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only to questions of law. Stated otherwise, it is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of the factual holdings of lower courts.¹² The Court refrains from further scrutiny of factual findings of trial courts, more so when those findings are affirmed by the CA, as here. To do otherwise would defeat the very essence of Rule 45 and would convert the Court into a trier of facts, which it is not meant to be.¹³

What is more, it appears undisputed that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public document, having been duly notarized by a certain Atty. Rodolfo Yap who, unfortunately, had already passed away. Being a notarial instrument, the deed in question is a public document and as such enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution. To overthrow that presumption, sufficient, clear and convincing evidence is required, otherwise the document should be upheld.¹⁴

Petitioners maintain, however, that by merely examining the signatures in the questioned Deed of Sale and the genuine signatures of their predecessors-in-interest in their Special Power of Attorney, the glaring dissimilarities between the two sets of signatures are immediately evident to support their claim of forgery.

We are not convinced.

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging it.¹⁵ Here, the petitioners failed to discharge their burden.

As it were, the petitioners merely alleged that they filed two motions before the trial court to have the original copy of the documents in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tagbilaran City be examined by handwriting experts but their motions were ignored by the trial court. They then harp on the excuse that they could not be expected to prove forgery if the trial court denied them the opportunity to do so.

We are not persuaded.

The trial court correctly ruled that the parties themselves dictate the course and flow of the presentation of evidence, as well as the witnesses for each side. Considering that the case before it is civil, not criminal, the lower court certainly cannot, on its own, issue an order requiring a handwriting expert to appear before it and compare the documents presented by the parties. It behooves upon the parties themselves to call forth their own set of witnesses and present their own evidence to bolster their respective claims. If the petitioners failed to present an expert witness, only themselves ought to be blamed. For, as the trial court itself pointed out in its decision:

x x x. Plaintiffs, despite the opportunity given them by this Court, failed to present a handwriting expert to determine whether there was indeed forgery in the execution of the subject Deed of Sale. In the absence of the testimony of the handwriting expert, the allegations of forgery by the plaintiffs is merely self-serving. Unfortunately, this Court is not in the position to assess or evaluate the differences and similarities in the questioned signatures, much less, categorically state whether or not forgery exists. Neither could this court rely on the observation of the plaintiffs as to the alleged "glaring differences and dissimilarities" of the questioned signatures. (Underscoring ours)

Moreover, the technical procedure utilized by handwriting experts, while usually helpful in the examination of forged documents, is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or comparison of handwritings.^[16]

In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the USA,^[17] the Court identified and explained the factors involved in the examination and comparison of handwritings:

xxx [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signatures and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former’s authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of the questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one.

And to determine forgery, the Court in Cesar v. Sandiganbayan¹⁸ (quoting Osborn, The Problem of Proof) wrote:

The process of identification, therefore, must include the determination of the extent, kind, and significance of this resemblance as well as of the variation. It then becomes necessary to determine whether the variation is due to the operation of a different personality, or is only the expected and inevitable variation found in the genuine writing of the same writer. It is also necessary to decide whether the resemblance is the result of a more or less skillful imitation, or is the habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally appears in a genuine handwriting. When these two questions are correctly answered the whole problem of identification is solved.

In the present case, all that the petitioners had to offer by way of evidence on the issue of forgery was their bare denial that their predecessors-in-interest signed the subject Deed of Sale. Such denial will not suffice to overcome the presumption of regularity of notarized documents, to overthrow which, the countervailing evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.¹⁹

Moreover, and as aptly pointed out by the lower court in its decision of June 7, 1999:

However, even if it were true that the signature of Antonia Ebe is forged, it cannot brush aside the fact that all the heirs of Antonia Ebe, namely: Celedonia Putong, Eufemio Putong, Gregorio Putong and Mariano Putong all signed in the Deed of Absolute Sale. As earlier discussed their signatures cannot be said to have been forged as evidence presented to prove the same is found to be insufficient. Henceforth, all the rightful heirs who could question the subject sale are themselves signatories of the supposed questionable transaction.

Meanwhile, granting that Procopio Tapuroc’s signature found on Exh. C is indeed a forgery, he testified in open court that he discovered the sale and the fact of Mende’s possession of the subject land in 1967 yet – and did not do anything about it.

At the other end of the spectrum, the respondents presented sufficient proof of their claim of ownership over the property in dispute. The respondent Mendes maintain that they had been in continuous, peaceful and open possession of the property since 1967, the year of the alleged sale, or for more than thirty (30) years now. No less than the petitioners themselves acknowledged this in their pleadings²⁰ before this Court. And beginning the year 1968, the respondents have been religiously paying the realty taxes due on the same property. Likewise, when TCT No. 3444 was lost, respondent Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de Mende filed a petition for judicial reconstitution to secure a second owner’s copy of the lost title. Said petition went through the proper procedure and thereafter Carmelita was issued a second owner’s copy of TCT No. 3444 which was later changed to TCT No. (8585) T-4767.

All told, we find that the petitioners, who initiated in the court of origin the basic complaint in this case, have not sufficiently met the burden of proof to sustain their cause. Additionally, we agree with the CA in ruling that laches had barred the petitioners:

xxx The records show that they [petitioners] did not institute any action against the order of the then Court of First Instance, 14th Judiciary District. Their inaction and failure to assert any right, if any, over the disputed lot, bars them from recovering the same as said failure clearly asserts to laches.

Not to be overlooked is the fact that the petitioners filed their complaint of declaration of nullity only after twenty-nine (29) years from the execution of the alleged forged deed of sale. In the meanwhile, title to the property had already been in the name of respondent Mendes since 1967. The Mendes had been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject land, and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due thereon. These are hard facts that ought not to be disregarded. The Court, in a long line of cases,²¹ has uniformly held in favor of the registered owner who had been in possession of a disputed property for a considerable period of time. With the Mendes’ possession in this case having been in the concept of an owner and the land itself registered in their names for more than thirty (30) years now, their title thereto had become indefeasible and their possession could no longer be disturbed. The petitioners’ failure to take the necessary steps to assert their alleged right for at least twenty-nine (29) years from date of registration of title is fatal to their cause of action on the ground of laches.

As a final note, we emphasize that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The question on the validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled in a collateral proceeding. The action for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale commenced by the petitioners in the RTC of Tagbilaran City is not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens certificate of title.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice Working Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA Asscociate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ Penned by then Associate Justice (now ret.) Eugenio S. Labitoria with then Associate Justices (now ret.) Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring; Rollo, pp. 117-123.

² Id. at 129-130.

³ Id. at 30-34.

⁴ Id. at 35-37.

⁵ Id. at 68-80.

⁶ Supra note 1.

⁷ Supra note 2.

⁸ Page 9 of Petitioners’ Petition for Review on Certiorari dated March 07, 2002, Id. at 18.

⁹ Page 7 of the Memorandum for the Petitioners dated December 19, 2002, Id. at 185.

¹⁰ Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 116372, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 45.

¹¹ Floro v. Llenado, G.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 713, citing Remalante v. Tibe, 158 SCRA 145 (1988); Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 117434, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 445.

¹² PT & T v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152057, September 29, 2003, 412 SCRA 263.

¹³ American President Lines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110853, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 582, citing Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 534, 539 (1996); First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259, 309 (1996), citing South Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 744 (1995).

¹⁴ Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros, 449 Phil. 824 (2003); Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107791, May 12, 2000, 332 SCRA 1, citing Spouses Caoili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128325, September 14, 1999, 314 SCRA 345.

¹⁵ Victor Lingan v. Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga, A.C. No. 5377, June 15, 2006, citing Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 550; People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 153119, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 28; and Fernandez v. Fernandez, 416 Phil. 322 (2001).

¹⁶ Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117609, December 29, 1998, 300 SCRA 565.

¹⁷ G.R. No. 140472, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA 326; citing Lorenzo v. Diaz, 53 OG, 4107, 4110-4111, July 15, 1957, cited in Punzalan v. Comelec, 289 SCRA 702, April 27, 1998, and in Francisco, Evidence, Vol. VII, Part I, 1997 ed., p. 674.

¹⁸ G.R. Nos. L- 54719-50, January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 105.

¹⁹ Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the USA, supra.

²⁰ Page 9 of the Memorandum for the Petitioners dated December 19, 2002, Rollo, p. 187.

²¹ Ladignon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122973, July 18, 2000, 336 SCRA 42, citing Pasay City & Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199 (1998), Carreon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112041, June 22, 1998, 291 SCRA 78, citing Trinidad v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 204 SCRA 524 (1991); Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laman, G.R. No. L-27088, July 31, 1975, 65 SCRA 605; Sinaon, et al. v. Sorongon, et al., G.R. No. L-59879, May 13, 1985, 136 SCRA 407; and Caragay-Layno v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-52064, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 718.

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