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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 167973             February 28, 2007

TEOTIMO M. REDULLA, Petitioner
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Pursuant to an audit¹ conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) on several reforestation contracts, five complaints, OMB-MIN 96-0336, 96-0339, 96-0365, 96-0367, and 96-0369,² were filed against petitioner Teotimo M. Redulla (Redulla) and several others with the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.

After an investigation conducted by Prosecutor Florita S. Linco (Prosecutor Linco),³ the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three Informations for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3(e). In one of the Informations,⁴ Redulla, along with six others, was indicted. The information reads:

That on or about the period from March 7, 1991 to March 15, 1991, and for sometime immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Hilarion Ramos, a high ranking public officer being then Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO); Eusebio Ybanez, being then Certifying Officer; Cirilo Salamanca, being then Forestry Specialist; Teotimo Redulla, being then Countersigning Officer; Antonio Marquez, being then countersigning officer; Laksmi Palomares, being then a private contractor, while in the performance of their official and administrative functions as such public officers, taking advantage of their official positions, acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring and confederating with accused Luis Tan, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits, advantage, and preference to accused Luis Tan, by facilitating with undue haste, the payment to said accused, the sum of ₱518,654.01 for the seedlings production project, out of ₱600,000.00 total contract price, despite the knowledge that there were no "detail of accomplishments" submitted, as accused Luis Tan failed to account for the total number of seedlings produced, in violation of the contract and DENR rules and regulations implementing the seedlings production project (of the government), to the damage and prejudice of the people/government in the aforementioned sum of ₱518,654.01 and detriment to public service.

Contrary to law.⁵ (Emphasis supplied)

Following the filing of the Information in Criminal Case No. 26035, Redulla filed before the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) an Expanded Motion for Reinvestigation⁶ praying that

the Honorable Office of the Special Prosecutor [OSP] conduct a careful and thorough review/reinvestigation of the instant case, and that thereafter, the findings of the Ombudsman Prosecutor I Florita S. Linco dated 6 March 2000 against the Accused be reversed or set aside and the OSP recommends for the dismissal/withdrawal of the above-entitled information for lack of merit.⁷ (Underscoring supplied)1awphi1.net

Redulla’s motion was granted and a reinvestigation was conducted.

After reinvestigation, then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto (Ombudsman Desierto) approved the OSP’s finding that there was no probable cause to hale Redulla, et al. into court and accordingly approved the recommendation to withdraw the Information.⁸

A Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Information In Criminal Case No. 26035⁹ was thus filed by the Office of the Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan which was granted by Order of May 20, 2002.¹⁰

In June 2003, then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo (Ombudsman Marcelo) ordered the review of the original complaints against petitioner, et al. which the COA filed with his Office. Acting on the order, Prosecutor Jovito A. Coresis, Jr. (Prosecutor Coresis) reviewed the complaints and found sufficient evidence to conclude that a crime for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3(e), as amended, had been committed and Redulla and his co-accused are probably guilty thereof.¹¹

The Office of the Ombudsman thus filed an Information¹² with the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27853, against Redulla, et al., alleging

That on or about the period from 20 October 1990 to 15 March 1991 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Teotimo Redulla, Antionio Marques, Laksmi Palomares, Hilarion Ramos, Cirilo Salamanca and Eusebio Ybanez, all public officers being then a Regional Technical Director with salary grade 27, a Finance Officer, an Accountant, an OIC-PENRO, an OIC-CENRO and a Forestry Specialist, respectively, of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region 9, Zamboanga City (DENR9-Zamboanga City), acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality while in the performance of their official administrative functions and taking advantage of their public positions, mutually aiding, conniving and conspiring with each other as well as with accused Luis Tan, a private contractor, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to accused Tan by making payments to the latter the total sum of ₱518,654.01 for a seedling production project despite knowledge that accused Tan was obligated, under the contract to produce 363,637 seedlings, maintain and protect them for a period of eight (8) months but that said accused Tan had failed to perform his obligation under the said contract to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforementioned sum.

Contrary to law.¹³ (Emphasis in the original)

Redulla thereafter filed before the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause,¹⁴ arguing that

WITH THE ORDER OF THE HONORABLE COURT DATED MAY 20, 2003, GRANTING THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26035 IN RELATION TO THE OMBUDSMAN’S ORDER OF 18 FEBRUARY 2002 WHICH EXPRESSLY FOUND THAT NO PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS AGAINST ACCUSED REDULLA AND HIS CO-ACCUSED TO CHARGE THEM FOR THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 ARISING FROM EXACTLY THE SAME FACTS AND TRANSACTION SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT INFORMATION, NO PRIMA FACIE CASE CAN BE SAID TO EXIST AGAINST THE ACCUSED TO WARRANT THE FILING/REFILING OF THE INSTANT CASE FOR GRAFT.¹⁵ (Italics in the original)

and that

APPLYING THE CASE OF SISTOZA V. DESIERTO, NO PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS AGAINST ACCUSED REDULLA TO BIND HIM OVER FOR TRIAL FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(E) OF REP. ACT NO. 3019 UNDER A SWEEPING "CONSPIRACY" THEORY, AS HE HAD ADMITTEDLY MERELY COUNTERSIGNED THE QUESTIONED CHECK PAYMENTS TO ACCUSED LUIS TAN AS DENR REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR AFTER RELYING IN GOOD FAITH ON THE PRIOR APPROVALS, REPORTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF HIS SUBORDINATES, AND THERE BEING NO OTHER EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER AGAINST HIM OF HIS ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIME CHARGED OR IN ANY SUPPOSED "CONSPIRACY" TO COMMIT THE SAME.¹⁶ (Italics in the original, citation omitted)

The Sandiganbayan, by Resolution¹⁷ of September 1, 2004, denied Redulla’s motion, citing its policy of according respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman; and, in any event, it noted the absence of any irregularity in the finding of the existence of probable cause.¹⁸

On Redulla’s claim of good faith in countersigning the checks which were the subject of the Information, the Sandiganbayan brushed it aside, holding that it could be better appreciated during trial on the merits of the case.¹⁹

His Motion for Reconsideration²⁰ having been denied,²¹ Redulla filed on June 1, 2005 the instant Petition²² for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, proffering that

[t]he respondent Sandiganbayan is guilty of positive evasion of duty enjoined by law in refusing to dismiss the case below on the ground of lack of probable cause, as previously found by respondent OSP and respondent Ombudsman, and as correctly affirmed by respondent Sandiganbayan, ²³

and that

[a]pplying the doctrine of Sistoza v. Desierto, petitioner as countersigning director, could not be held criminally liable for relying in good faith upon the actions of his subordinates, which showed no patent nor palpable irregularities.²⁴

In its Comment²⁵ to the present petition, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the OSP, maintains that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion when it denied Redulla’s Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause.²⁶ It adds that since Redulla, et al. in Criminal Case No. 27853 had been arraigned (on April 15, 2005) and the case had been set for initial presentation of prosecution evidence on November 15, 17, and 18, 2005, the issues in Redulla’s petition had been rendered moot.²⁷

First, a word on the Office of the Ombudsman’s contention that the arraignment of Redulla and his co-accused rendered moot the issues in the present petition.

An accused does not waive the right to a preliminary investigation if he invokes it before or at the time he enters his plea.²⁸ In the case at bar, Redulla filed his Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause on September 23, 2003²⁹ which is akin to a motion for the conduct of preliminary investigation, the purpose of which is to determine the existence of probable cause,³⁰ before he was arraigned on April 15, 2005;³¹ hence, the above-said contention does not lie.

The Sandiganbayan’s denial of petitioner’s Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause is in order. This is in line with this Court’s policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated powers.

This Court has almost always adopted, quite aptly, a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated powers. This rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions . . . with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they were compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals, or prosecuting attorneys, each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.³²

While there are exceptions to this policy,³³ the case at bar does not fall among the exceptions. It is settled that as long as the Ombudsman’s resolution is supported with substantial evidence, it will not be overturned.³⁴

Prosecutor Coresis’ findings, which were approved by the Ombudsman, of the existence of probable cause, were based on an examination of the audit report, including the supporting documents prepared by the COA.³⁵

Redulla argues, however, as follows:

. . . First, there is no dispute that respondent Ombudsman and respondent OSP had already found that no probable cause existed against petitioner. As a result of that finding, the respondent Sandiganbayan had, once before, already ordered that the Information for graft in Criminal Case No. 26305 be withdrawn upon the motu proprio motion of Prosecutor Pesquera.

Secondly, what was further "re-reviewed" by Prosecutor Coresis was not the withdrawal of Criminal Case No. 26035, or the Pesquera Memorandum and Tansiongco Memorandum, it was a re-review of the Linco Memorandum "recommending the filing of criminal Information with the Sandiganbayan." The basis for this apparently is a mere "verbal order" of Ombudsman Marcelo. Indeed, this "procedure" is not supported by any legal basis. In any case, Prosecutor Coresis obviously failed to take into consideration in his Coresis Memorandum the previous filing of Criminal Case No. 26035, by reason of the Linco Memorandum, and its subsequent withdrawal for lack of probable cause, by reason of the Pesquera Memorandum and Tansiongco Memorandum. Moreover, at any time during the "re-review" of the findings of Prosecutor Linco, petitioner was never apprised of the same, nor, worse, given any opportunity to present his side. He could have, at least, availed of remedies available to him under the law to defeat the very filing of the present Information. Petitioner was thus completely denied [of] his right to due process, which cannot be simply brushed off as a harmless procedural lapse since its consequence may well be petitioner’s unnecessarily undergoing the rigors of trial.³⁶ (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioner’s arguments do not mirror the presence of grave abuse of discretion. There was nothing irregular in Ombudsman Marcelo’s order to re-review Prosecutor Linco’s memorandum, as R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 places the OSP under the control and

supervision of the Ombudsman.³⁷ Thus this Court declared in Cruz, Jr. v. People:³⁸

. . . Verily, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact of the investigating prosecutor in making a review of the latter’s report and recommendation, as the Ombudsman can very well make his own findings of fact. There is nothing to prevent him from acting one way or the other. As a matter of fact, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides that "where the investigating assistant fiscal recommends the dismissal of the case but his findings are reversed by the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the corresponding information against the respondent or direct any other assistant fiscal or state prosecutor to do so, without conducting another preliminary investigation."

With more reason may the Ombudsman not be faulted in arriving at a conclusion different from that of the investigating prosecutor on the basis of the same set of facts. It cannot be said that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion simply because he opines contrarily to the prosecutor that, under the facts obtaining in the case, there is probable cause to believe that herein petitioner is guilty of the offense charged.³⁹

Ombudsman Desierto’s statement that "[t]he documents adduced in the Expanded Motion for Reinvestigation in C[riminal] C[ase] N[o.] 26035 sufficiently overturned the previous findings of probable cause against the accused therein"⁴⁰ did not preclude Ombudsman Marcelo from ordering a re-review of the said memorandum because an administrative officer may revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of his predecessor in office.⁴¹

Redulla’s claim that he was denied due process does not avail him. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.⁴²

The records of the case show that Redulla filed a Counter-Affidavit to the complaints that the COA filed before the Office of the Ombudsman.⁴³ He also filed an Expanded Motion for Reinvestigation⁴⁴ in relation to the first Information filed, as well as an affidavit⁴⁵ in support of such motion.

As for Redulla’s claim that he could not be held liable as countersigning director for relying in good faith upon the actions of his subordinates, the same was correctly brushed aside by the Sandiganbayan. As this Court, on a similar claim, held:⁴⁶

Petitioner’s argument that he could not be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, because he acted in good faith when he approved the disbursement voucher, purchase order, invitation to bid and signed the checks after the same had been processed by his subordinates, are evidentiary in nature and are matters of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. A preliminary investigation is conducted for the purpose of determining whether a crime has been committed, and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It is not the occasion for full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.⁴⁷ (Underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA Asscociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ Sandiganbayan rollo, Vol. I, pp. 80-100.

² Rollo, p. 23.

³ Supra note 1 at 5-9.

⁴ Supra note 2 at 104-107.

⁵ Id. at 105.

⁶ Id. at 108-130.

⁷ Id. at 130.

⁸ Id. at 142.

⁹ Id. at 143-145.

¹⁰ Id. at 146-147.

¹¹ Id. at 168.

¹² Supra note 1 at 1-4.

¹³ Id. at 2-3.

¹⁴ Id. at 184-197.

¹⁵ Id. at 189-190.

¹⁶ Id. at 190.

¹⁷ Penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Teresita Leonardo-de Castro and Roland B. Jurado; Supra note 1 at 378-384.

¹⁸ Supra note 1 at 382-383; Supra note 2 at 44-46.

¹⁹ Supra note 1 at 383.

²⁰ Id. at 404-413.

²¹ Id. at 491-494.

²² Supra note 2 at 17-40.

²³ Id. at 29.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Id. at 241-250.

²⁶ Id. at 244-248.

²⁷ Id. at 245-246.

²⁸ Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 138, 153-154.

²⁹ Supra note 1 at 184.

³⁰ Rules of Court, Rule 112, Section 1; Cruz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 110436, June 27, 1994, 233 SCRA 439, 458.

³¹ Sandiganbayan rollo, Vol. II, pp. 18, 20A-20B.

³² Nava v. Commission on Audit, 419 Phil. 544, 553 (2001).

³³ Thus, the courts may interfere with the investigatory powers of the Ombudsman ─

a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;

c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;

d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.

Vide Cabahug v. People, 426 Phil. 490, 500-501 (2002).

³⁴ Vide Tan v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 114332 & 114895, September 10, 1998, 295 SCRA 315, 323.

³⁵ Vide supra note 1 at 10-31.

³⁶ Supra note 2 at 34-35.

³⁷ Republic Act No. 6770, Section 11(3).

³⁸ G.R. No. 110436, June 27, 1994, 233 SCRA 439.

³⁹ Id. at 451.

⁴⁰ Supra note 2 at 142.

⁴¹ Vide Philippine National Oil Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 109976 & 112800, April 26, 2005, 457 SCRA 32, 102.

⁴² Vide Roxas v. Hon. Vazquez, 411 Phil. 276, 287 (2001).

⁴³ Supra note 1 at 101-108.

⁴⁴ Supra note 2 at 108-130.

⁴⁵ Id. at 131-134.

⁴⁶ Nava v. Commission on Audit, supra note 32.

⁴⁷ Id. at 554.

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