Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 152827 February 6, 2007
GERARDO MENDOZA, TRINIA and IYLENE all surnamed MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
SOLEDAD SALINAS, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Order dated April 2, 2002 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72, acting as Land Registration Court, in LRC Case No. N-04-0-97, granting respondent's prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession in her favor.1
The assailed Order was issued by the RTC after it rendered a favorable judgment on respondent's application for registration in its Decision dated November 3, 1998, and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-10053 was issued in her name covering a parcel of land described as follows:
A parcel of land (Plan Psu-224228, LR Case No. N-04-0-97, LRA Record No. N-68955), situated in the Barrio of Barretto, Municipality of Olongapo, Province of Zambales, Island of Luzon, Bounded on the NW., points 1-3 by Road (6.00 m. wide) (unimproved); on the NE., points 3-4 by Public Land claimed by C. Panaligan; on the E., SE., and SW., points 4-19 by Makinaya River (10.00 m. wide); on the SW., points 19-29 by Public Land; and on the NW., points 29-1 by Road (6.00 m. wide) unimproved. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S.84 deg. 47'E., 2644.65 m. from B.L.B.M. 2, Barrio of Matain, Subic, Zambales, thence
x x x x
beginning; containing an area of TWENTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY NINE (20, 149) SQUARE METERS, more or less. x x x2
Petitioners opposed respondent's application for the issuance of a writ of possession claiming that they were not oppositors/parties to the registration case and they have been in actual physical possession of the property since 1964. The RTC, however, rejected their arguments and granted respondent's application for the issuance of a writ of possession per herein assailed Order.
Hence, the present petition.1avvphi1.net
Petitioners set forth the lone assignment of error that the RTC erred in issuing the writ of possession and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction.3 Petitioners reiterate their argument that they cannot be ousted of their possession of the property, having been in actual possession of the property since 1964, as evidenced by petitioner Gerardo C. Mendoza's Sales Application made in January 1986 over the following property:
A parcel of land situated at Burgos St., Bo. Barretto, O.C. Bounded on the North., by Benjamin Salinas; South., by Gloria Montemayor; East., by Benjamin Salinas & Conrado Pilapil and West., Burgos St. situated in Bo. Barretto, Olongapo City, Zambales, and containing an area of 932 square meters x x x.4
and a Declaration of Real Property for the years 1976 and 1985,5 among others.
Respondent counters that the present petition should be dismissed, arguing that the petition should have been initially with the Court of Appeals, based on the principle of hierarchy of courts, and that the general order of default on October 8, 1998 issued by the RTC binds them and personal notice was not necessary.
The petition must be granted.
On the procedural issue, it should be pointed out that what petitioners filed with the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of Court, and not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. The principle of hierarchy of courts does not find any application in this case. Under Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that in all cases where only questions of law are raised, the appeal from a decision or order of the RTC shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45, Section 1 of which provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.6
The substantive issue posed for resolution in the present case pertains to the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession by the RTC. This, obviously, is a question of law; consequently, direct resort to this Court is proper.
There is no question that the writ of possession granted in this case was made by the RTC acting as a land registration court, after finality of its Decision dated November 3, 1998 and the corresponding OCT No. P-10053 was issued in the name of respondent. As the soundness of the order granting the writ of possession is a matter of judgment, the remedy is ordinary appeal by way of petition for review on certiorari. An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as "grave abuse of discretion." Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, while those of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari.7
Petitioners, therefore, filed the proper petition before the Court.
On the substantive issue of the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession, the Court finds that the RTC committed a reversible error in granting the issuance of the writ of possession.
A writ of possession may be issued under the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings under Sec. 17 of Act No. 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118.
In land registration cases, principles regarding the issuance of a writ of possession are well-settled. A judgment confirming the title of the applicant in a registration case and ordering its registration in his name necessarily carries with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the right of ownership.8 This is sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests.9
Also, a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree,10 and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the successful claimant.11
Based on these tenets, the issuance of a writ of possession, therefore, is clearly a ministerial duty of the land registration court. Such ministerial duty, however, ceases to be so with particular regard to petitioners who are actual possessors of the property under a claim of ownership. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. This conclusion is supported by Article 433 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
Under said provision, one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The term "judicial process" could mean no less than an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.12
It is noted that there already exists a final and executory decision disregarding respondent's claim for possession over the property. In a Decision dated January 21, 2002, rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Olongapo City, Branch 3, in Civil Case No. 4643, an action for unlawful detainer filed by respondent and her spouse against petitioners and several other occupants of the property, the case against petitioners was dismissed by the MTCC for lack of cause of action.13 While the MTCC Decision was appealed by the other defendants, respondent and her spouse manifested that they will not appeal the decision and, instead, will file for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. N-04-0-97.
Note should also be made that petitioners registered their opposition to respondent's application for the issuance of a writ of possession and apprised the RTC of their actual, peaceful, physical and uninterrupted possession since 1964,14 including therein documents supporting their claim, consisting of Gerardo C. Mendoza's Sales Application made on January 1986 and a Declaration of Real Property for the years 1976 and 1985, among others.15 The RTC, nevertheless, disregarded their opposition and, instead, relied on the ruling in Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals [195 SCRA 482],16 that a writ of possession may be issued in a land registration proceeding.
A reading of the Serra Serra case, however, supports the Court's conclusion that a writ of possession should not have been issued in this case. It was ruled by the Court that while a writ of possession may be issued only pursuant to a decree of registration in an original land registration proceedings, it cannot issue against possessors under claim of ownership, as actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership, and the true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property, not summarily through a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession.17
Thus, it was erroneous for the RTC to have issued the writ of possession against petitioners. This conclusion, of course, is without prejudice to any case that respondent may file for the recovery of the property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated April 2, 2002 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, acting as Land Registration Court, in LRC Case No. N-04-0-97, is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Respondent’s application for the issuance of a writ of possession is DENIED, without prejudice to any case that she may file for recovery of the property.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Asscociate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 57.
2 Records, pp. 119-120.
3 Rollo, p. 7.
4 Id. at 19.
5 Id. at 21, 22.
6 Bukidnon Doctors' Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 161882, July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA 222, 233.
7 Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 287, 306.
8 Heirs of Avila v. Court of Appeals, 229 Phil. 536, 543-544 (1986).
9 Vencilao v. Vano, G.R. No. 25660, February 23, 1990, 182 SCRA 491, 505.
10 Barroga v. Albano, No. L-43445, January 20, 1988, 157 SCRA 131, 134.
11 Vencilao v. Vano, supra note 9, at 505.
12 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 757, 769-770 (2002).
13 Records, pp. 149-150.
14 Rollo, p. 55.
15 Id. at 21, 22.
16 Id. at 57.
17 Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 34080, March 22, 1991, 195 SCRA 482, 491-492.
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