Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. P-02-1655 February 6, 2007
EMMANUEL M. PATAWARAN, Complainant,
vs.
REYNALDO T. NEPOMUCENO, Deputy Sheriff III, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 77, Parañaque City, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint1 dated September 12, 2000 of Emmanuel M. Patawaran (complainant) charging Reynaldo T. Nepomuceno (respondent), Deputy Sheriff, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 77, Parañaque City, with Dereliction of Duty and Abuse of Authority relative to Civil Case No. 10483 entitled "Emmanuel M. Patawaran v. Miguel P. Acebedo, et al." for Unlawful Detainer.
Complainant alleges: he is the plaintiff in the above-entitled case which was decided in his favor in a decision rendered on December 29, 1997. He was able to obtain a writ of execution but the judgment in his favor has not been satisfied. When the writ of execution was endorsed to respondent, the latter enforced the said writ four times and on those occasions, respondent asked for money which amounted to ₱25,000.00 saying that said amount is his usual price in implementing writs of execution. Since he is in dire need of recovering the large amount expended in prosecuting the case, he had no other recourse but to give respondent the said amount. Subsequently, some personal properties, i.e., two vehicles, among others, were taken or seized from the defendants, but for reasons known only to respondent, no sheriff's return was submitted to the court despite the lapse of several months. Worse, respondent defied the Order of the court to conduct a public auction sale of the seized personal properties.
In his Comment dated January 27, 2001,2 respondent avers: a writ of execution dated December 3, 1998 was issued by the court. On January 8, 1999, accompanied by complainant, he served the writ of execution upon the defendants, through Felix Acebedo III (Acebedo). Complainant and Acebedo came into an agreement whereby the latter would issue post-dated checks to complainant on January 11, 1999, otherwise, the writ of execution will be enforced. For failure of Acebedo to comply with their agreement, he and complainant returned to Acebedo's office on February 8, 1999, ready to seize personal properties therein to answer for the money judgment in the writ of execution. Acebedo chose to issue four post-dated checks totaling ₱199,936.46 which were accepted by complainant. On February 15, 1999, he filed his sheriff's return. When the first post-dated check became due on February 23, 1999, Acebedo asked the bank for a stop payment order for all four post-dated checks on the ground that said checks were involuntarily issued as a result of harassment from him and the complainant. On July 21, 1999, the court issued an alias writ of execution. On July 23, 1999, he enforced the writ of execution and levied upon and pulled out some personal properties of the defendants - one Tamaraw FX with Plate No. UUD790, one Nissan Crewcab with Plate No. TPD866 and one Selex xerox machine. Before he could post his notice of public auction for the said personal properties, defendants' counsel filed a motion on July 28, 1999 questioning his enforcement of the writ of execution, specifically, that he did not give the defendants the option to choose what should be levied from among defendants' properties. On October 5, 1999, the court directed him to allow the defendants to choose properties belonging to them which may be levied, in addition to the offer of ₱150,000.00 as partial satisfaction of the judgment debt. Defendants' counsel sent a letter to him offering the photocopying machine as the property to be levied and to deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount of ₱150,000.00. On December 28, 1999, the court directed the defendants to deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount of ₱200,000.00 as payment of the judgment debt and incidental expenses and ordered him to release the two levied vehicles after deposit is made. Complainant's counsel filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, which issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the release of the two vehicles. Sometime in August 2000, during the pendency of the certiorari case, complainant's counsel informed him that he has to sell the levied vehicles at public auction pursuant to the order issued by the MeTC, otherwise, an administrative case for dereliction of duty will be filed against him. No Order was issued by the MeTC to sell the levied properties at public auction. It is very clear from the Order that he can only sell at public auction the property chosen to be levied by the defendants and only upon determination of the insufficiency of the proceeds thereof plus the offer of ₱150,000.00, that he can proceed to levy on other properties of the defendants. It is not true that he demanded ₱25,000.00 from the complainant for the enforcement of the writ. The truth is, it was complainant himself who defrayed the expenses in the implementation of the writ of execution as evidenced by the Bill of Costs submitted by complainant's counsel to the MeTC. He strongly denies that he ever told complainant that said amount of ₱25,000.00 is his usual asking for enforcement of writs of execution. He failed to file his sheriff's return for the alias writ of execution but did so on January 4, 2000 immediately after he became aware that he had not filed a return. The reason for his oversight was the fact that the court was already informed of the proceedings taken on said alias writ of execution through defendants' first omnibus motion questioning the levy. In an Order dated December 18, 2000, the parties have agreed, among others, that the total amount of the judgment debt excluding incidental expenses is ₱216,000.00. Defendants will deposit the additional amount of ₱16,000.00 with the MeTC Clerk of Court, and after withdrawal thereof, the levied vehicles will be released to the rightful owners.
In his Reply dated February 21, 2001,3 complainant asserts that respondent cannot deny having received from him the amount of ₱25,000.00 saying that he was the one who actually gave the said amount to respondent. He also suspects that respondent exacted some other amount from the defendants, the reason why he was delaying the implementation of the supposed writ of execution. He says that there are other litigants who can attest to respondent's illegal practice which is a menace to the judiciary.
On January 23, 2003, upon recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the matter was referred to Executive Judge Jansen R. Rodriguez, MeTC, Branch 78, Parañaque City for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Report dated April 12, 2004,4 Executive Judge Jansen R. Rodriguez finds that the respondent cannot be faulted for not selling the seized properties on auction sale. He notes that in an Order dated December 28, 1999, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to replace the seized vehicles with the cash deposit of ₱200,000.00 which the defendants in fact deposited later. Be that as it may, Judge Rodriguez finds the respondent guilty of delay in filing the Sheriff's Partial Return dated January 3, 2000, and he recommends that respondent be penalized to pay a ₱5,000.00 fine. As regards the allegation that respondent demanded and received from complainant the amount of ₱25,000.00, the investigating judge reports that the same is unsubstantiated.
In its Resolution of June 7, 2004,5 the Court referred the matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its Memorandum of July 10, 2006,6 the OCA submits as follows:
x x x x
We agree with the findings of the investigating judge that respondent was prevented by the orders of the trial court from proceeding with the public auction of the seized properties. In the order dated 5 October 1999, the trial court, among others, ordered the respondent "to allow the defendants to choose properties belonging to them which may be levied," while in the order dated 28 December 1999, the court directed him to release the two vehicles upon the deposit of P200,000.00 by the defendants. Clearly, with these orders, respondent cannot proceed with the auction sale. We are not unmindful that the sheriff, in the performance of his duties, is deemed to know what is inherently right and inherently wrong and is bound to discharge such duties with prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs (Malmis vs. Bunagbong, A.M. No. P-03-1721, 30 September 2004, 439 SCRA 538).
Nevertheless, respondent is guilty of neglect of duty for his delay in submitting the sheriff's return on the alias writ and for failure to make the periodic reports. Neglect of duty is the failure to give due attention, especially to the performance of a task or duty, a designed refusal, indifference or unwillingness to perform one's duty (Magallanes vs. Provincial Board, 66 OG 7839). Records show that respondent enforced the alias writ of execution on 23 July 1999 where he was able to seize a Tamaraw FX, a Nissan Crewcub, [sic] and a Selex xerox photocopier; however, he filed the corresponding sheriff's return on the writ only on 04 January 2000. No periodic reports were filed by the respondent relative thereto.
Section 14 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court explicitly mandates the manner in which a writ of execution is to be returned to court, as well as the requisite reports to be made by the sheriff or officer, should the judgment be returned unsatisfied or only partially satisfied. In any case, every 30 days until the full satisfaction of a judgment, the sheriff or officer much make a periodic report to the court on the proceedings taken in connection with the writ. Section 14 reads:
Sec. 14. Return of writ of execution. - The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof furnished the parties.7
The submission of the return and periodic reports is not an empty requirement. It serves to update the court as to the status of the execution and to give it an idea as to why the judgment was not satisfied. It also provides insights for the court as to how efficient court processes are after judgment has been promulgated. The over-all purpose of the requirement is to ensure the speedy execution of decisions (Benitez vs. Acosta, A.M. No. P-01-1473, 27 March 2001, 355 SCRA 380).
Sheriffs, a[s] public officers are repositories of public trust and are under obligation to perform the duties of their office honestly, faithfully and to the best of their ability. They are bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of their official duties particularly where the rights of individuals may be jeopardized by their neglect (Spouses Pecson vs. Sicat, Jr., 358 SCRA 606). It must be borne in mind that the conduct required of court personnel must be beyond reproach and must be always free from suspicion that may taint the judiciary family to work hand in hand in restoring and upholding, rather than destroying the integrity of the courts which they belong (Atty. Contreras vs. Miranco, A.M. No. P-03-174, 18 September 2003, 411 SCRA 259).
Inasmuch as respondent denied the accusation that he received from the complainant the amount of ₱25,000 to facilitate the execution of the judgment, the issue ultimately boils down to the credibility of both the complainant and the respondent. The determination of this issue is primarily lodged in the investigating judge inasmuch as he is in a better position, he having heard them when they testified and observed their deportment and manner of testifying (Rita M. Melecio vs. Tyrone V. Tan, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-04-1566, 22 August 2005, citing Meneses vs. Zaragoza, A.M. No. P-04-1768, 11 February 2004, 422 SCRA 434). On this score, we agree with the findings of Judge Rodriguez that "respondent should not suffer from an unsubstantiated accusation which was not independently confirmed by competent evidence or disinterested person."
In sum, [respondent] should be held liable for simple neglect of duty. Under CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, dated 31 August 1999, simple neglect of duty is classified as a less grave offense punishable by suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six months for the first offense, and with dismissal for the second offense.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that Reynaldo T. Nepomuceno, Deputy Sheriff III, Metropolitan Trial Court, Parañaque City, be SUSPENDED from work for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
We adopt the findings of the OCA except as to the recommended penalty.
This Court has pointed out, time and again, the heavy burden and responsibility court personnel are saddled with in view of their exalted positions as keepers of the public faith.8 Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must therefore be avoided.9 Court personnel should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency and must discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence.10 Any conduct, act or omission on the part of those who would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.11
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as agents of the law high standards are expected of them.12 Being ranking officers of the court and agents of the law, they must discharge their duties with great care and diligence.13 It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work there, from the judge to the lowest employee.14 As such, the Court will not tolerate or condone any conduct of judicial agents or employees which would tend to or actually diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.15
On the charge that respondent asked ₱25,000.00 from complainant, we find the same to be bereft of merit. The charge is belied by the fact that a Bill of Costs in enforcing the writ of execution16 was submitted by the complainant's counsel to the MeTC. Also, during the investigation hearing,17 complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence that he gave respondent ₱25,000.00 for the enforcement of the writ of execution. As aptly observed by the investigating judge, the allegation was unsubstantiated by any other evidence. And considering that complainant is a businessman for almost twenty years, it is implausible that he will let go of a big amount as ₱25,000.00 without even knowing where the same will be expended and without even noting the date when he parted with the money, which is contrary to the normal course of business transactions. As pointed out by the investigating judge, it is expected of a prudent businessman to demand a receipt whenever he pays for something just as an ordinary person does.
The suspicion of the complainant that respondent exacted some other amount from the defendants to cause the delay in the implementation of the writ of execution is without basis. It is clear from the records that the delay in the execution of the writ was due to various court Orders (1) directing respondent to allow the defendants to choose properties which may be levied;18 (2) directing defendants to deposit ₱200,000.00 with the clerk of court as payment of the judgment debt;19 and (3) issuing a temporary restraining order enjoining the release of the two vehicles,20 which are beyond the control of respondent.
As the Court held in Ebero v. Camposano,21 in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.22 Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.23 The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof.24
On the charge that no sheriff's return was submitted by the respondent, we agree with the OCA that he is guilty of simple neglect of duty for delay in filing the same.
The duties of the sheriff relative to the making of a return of the writ of execution were spelled out by the Court in Arevalo v. Loria,25 opining that it is mandatory for a sheriff to make a return on the writ of execution to the clerk or judge issuing it. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason or reasons therefor. The officer is, likewise, tasked to make a report to the court every thirty days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires.
There is neglect in the performance of duty on the part of respondent when he failed to submit his report on time.26 Records show that respondent failed to timely make a sheriff's return on the alias writ of execution as required under Section 14, Rule 39, Rules of Civil Procedure as hereinbefore quoted. Respondent admitted that his failure was due to oversight and the fact that when defendants filed an omnibus motion questioning the levy, the court was already informed of the proceedings taken on the said alias writ of execution. Records also show that the alias writ was placed in the hands of respondent on July 21, 1999 and the return was made only on January 3, 2000 or more than five months after its execution. Respondent cannot escape liability for not filing his return on time as mandated by the above cited Rule.
As pointed out by the OCA, the submission of the return and periodic reports is not an empty requirement. It serves to update the court as to the status of the execution and to give it an idea as to why the judgment was not satisfied. It also provides insights for the court as to how efficient court processes are after judgment has been promulgated. The overall purpose of the requirement is to ensure the speedy execution of decisions.27
On the charge that respondent defied the Order of the court to conduct a public auction sale on the levied vehicles, we find the same devoid of merit. It is very clear from the record that respondent was prevented from proceeding with the auction sale of the two vehicles due to the Order28 of the court directing the defendants to deposit with the clerk of court the amount of ₱200,000.00 as payment of the judgment debt and incidental expenses in order to release the two levied vehicles.
Settled is the rule that the duty of a sheriff is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter.29 His function is not discretionary.30 In this case, respondent cannot be faulted for not conducting the auction sale as he is without discretion absent any court order requiring him to do so.1awphi1.net
Under Sec. 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, simple neglect of duty is punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense. However, under Sec. 19, Rule XIV, the penalty of fine, instead of suspension, may also be imposed in the alternative. Considering the fact that this is respondent's first administrative offense and following the Court's ruling in several cases31 involving simple neglect of duty, we find the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱5,000.00, as recommended by the Investigating Judge, just and reasonable.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds REYNALDO T. NEPOMUCENO guilty of simple neglect of duty and is fined FIVE THOUSAND PESOS ₱5,000.00 with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Asscociate Justice |
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 2-3.
2 Id. at 18-21.
3 Id. at 63-64.
4 Id. at 692-701.
5 Id. at 743.
6 Id. at 746-749.
7 Emphasis ours.
8 Flores v. Falcotelo, A.M. No. P-05-2038, January 25, 2006, citing Apuyan, Jr. v. Sta. Isabel, A.M. No. P-01-1497, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 1, 15.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Villarico v. Javier, A.M. No. P-04-1828, February 14, 2005, 451 SCRA 218, 224.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 224.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 33.
17 Rollo, pp. 161-170.
18 Id. at 27-29.
19 Id. at 30.
20 Id. at 31-32.
21 A.M. No. P-04-1792, March 12, 2004, 425 SCRA 420.
22 Id. at 425.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 450 Phil. 48 (2003).
26 San Jose v. Centeno, 315 Phil. 296, 303 (1995).
27 Rollo, p. 748.
28 Id. at 55-56.
29 Escober Vda. de Lopez v. Luna, A.M. No. P-04-1786, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 265, 274.
30 Id. at 275.
31 Balanag, Jr. v. Osita, 437 Phil. 452, 460 (2002); Casano v. Magat, 425 Phil. 356, 363 (2002); Tiongco v. Molina, 416 Phil. 676, 684 (2001); Beso v. Daguman, 380 Phil. 544, 555 (2000).
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