Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 169008 August 14, 2007
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 28, 2004 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83276 and the July 15, 2005 resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Undisputed are the following antecedent facts:
After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), on November 16, 1993, of respondent Martinez’s 62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres, Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered ₱1,955,485.60 as just compensation.3 Convinced that the proffered amount was unjust and confiscatory, respondent rejected it. Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of just compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the CARL.
On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, finding some marked inconsistencies in the figures and factors made as bases by LBP in its computation, rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
Ordering the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay landowner-protestant RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ for her property covered and embraced by TCT No. T-712 with an area of 62.5369 hectares, more or less, which the Department of Agrarian Reform intends to acquire, the total amount of TWELVE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO and 50/100 Pesos (Php12,179,492.50), in the manner provided for by law.
SO ORDERED.4
A petition for the fixing of just compensation5 docketed as Agrarian Case No. 696 was then filed by LBP’s counsel before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC), the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82. After filing her answer to the said petition,6 respondent, contending that the orders, rulings and decisions of the DARAB become final after the lapse of 15 days from their receipt, moved for the dismissal of the petition for being filed out of time.7 Petitioner opposed the motion.8
Meanwhile, respondent, still asserting the finality of PARAD Sorita’s decision, filed before the Office of the PARAD a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was eventually granted on November 11, 2003.9 Ascertaining that the petition before the SAC was filed by LBP 26 days after it received a copy of PARAD Sorita’s decision, the Office of the PARAD denied LBP’s motion for reconsideration and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution on February 23, 2004.10 Aggrieved by these developments, LBP, on March 12, 2004, moved to quash the said February 23, 2004 PARAD resolution.11
On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash was yet unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari12 before the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83276, assailing both the November 11, 2003 and the February 23, 2004 PARAD resolutions. LBP primarily contended that the Office of the PARAD gravely abused its discretion when it issued the writ of execution despite the pendency with the SAC of a petition for the fixing of just compensation.
The CA, finding LBP guilty of forum-shopping for not disclosing the pendency of the Motion to Quash dated March 12, 2004, dismissed the petition on September 28, 2004,13 thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition for certiorari is DISMISSED outright.
Consequently, in view of the dismissal of the above-entitled case, we are no longer in a position to act on the private respondent’s motion for execution pending appeal.
Further, this Court, mindful that under Sec. 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, willful and deliberate forum-shopping constitutes direct contempt of court and cause for administrative sanctions, which may both be resolved and imposed in the same case where the forum shopping is found, WARNS the counsel of record of the petitioner that a repetition of a similar act of submitting a false certification shall be dealt with most severely.
SO ORDERED.14
Not persuaded by LBP’s motion for reconsideration, the appellate court denied the same on July 15, 2005.15 Thus, LBP, through its legal department, elevated the case to this Court on September 9, 2005 via a petition for review on certiorari16 under Rule 45, contending, among others, that it did not commit deliberate forum shopping for what it filed with the Office of the PARAD was a motion to quash, which is not an initiatory pleading, and that the decision of the PARAD cannot be executed due to the pending petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC.
On September 14, 2005, we issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) restraining the appellate court and the DAR adjudicators from implementing the November 11, 2003 and the February 23, 2004 resolutions. 17
For her part, respondent contends that petitioner committed forum-shopping when it filed a certiorari petition without first awaiting the resolution by the Office of the PARAD of the motion to quash;18 and that petitioner has lost its standing to sue considering that it is being represented by its lawyers and not the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC).19
On the basis of these antecedents, the Court shall now resolve seriatim the following issues: (1) whether or not petitioner may file the instant appeal solely through its legal department; (2) whether or not petitioner has committed forum shopping; and (3) whether or not the PARAD, in this case, gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of execution despite the pendency of LBP’s petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC.
After meticulously reviewing the records and considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds the appeal devoid of merit.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Teresita Panlilio-Luciano,20 the Court explained in one of its resolutions that nothing in the LBP charter expressly authorizes the LBP Legal Department to appear in behalf of LBP in any court or quasi-judicial proceeding and that the Administrative Code of 1987 mandates the OGCC, not the LBP Legal Department, to act as the principal law office of the LBP, thus:
There is nothing in the LBP charter that expressly authorizes the said Legal Department to appear in behalf of LBP in any court or quasi-judicial proceeding. Attys. Beramo and Berbaño insist that the creation of the LBP Legal Department "necessarily entails conferment of the power to represent [LBP] in any and all cases" and consequently confers the power to "exercise such incidental powers or perform such acts as are necessary to make the conferred power effective." At first blush, this is not an unreasonable position; yet, we are precluded from adopting the same, owing to the explicit proviso in Section 10, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987, which reads:
Section 10. Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. — The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) shall act as the principal law office of all government-owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings and government acquired asset corporations and shall exercise control and supervision over all legal departments or divisions maintained separately and such powers and functions as are now or may hereafter be provided by law. In the exercise of such control and supervision, the Government Corporate Counsel shall promulgate rules and regulations to effectively implement the objectives of the Office.
The OGCC is authorized to receive the attorney's fees adjudged in favor of their client government-owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries/other corporate offsprings and government acquired asset corporations. These attorney's fees shall accrue to a Special fund of the OGCC, and shall be deposited in an authorized government depository as trust liability and shall be made available for expenditure without the need for a Cash Disbursement Ceiling, for purposes of upgrading facilities and equipment, granting of employee's incentive pay and other benefits, and defraying such other incentive expenses not provided for in the General Appropriations Act as may be determined by the Government Corporate Counsel. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above provision mandates the OGCC, and not the LBP Legal Department, as the principal law office of the LBP. Moreover, it establishes the proper hierarchical order in that the LBP Legal Department remains under the control and supervision of the OGCC. Indeed, if we were to accede to the position of Attys. Beramo and Berbaño that the mere constitution of an LBP Legal Department ipso facto confers upon it the capacity to litigate cases in behalf of LBP in any legal proceeding, then the role of the OGCC as the principal law office of all GOCCs would be rendered nugatory in all GOCCs with Legal Departments.
At the same time, the existence of the OGCC does not render the LBP Legal Department a superfluity. We do not doubt that the LBP Legal Department carries out vital legal services to LBP. However, the performance of such functions cannot deprive the OGCC’s role as overseer of the LBP Legal Department and its mandate of exercising control and supervision over all GOCC legal departments. For the purpose of filing petitions and making submissions before this Court, such control and supervision imply express participation by the OGCC as principal legal counsel of LBP. Our succeeding disposition of the OGCC’s pending Manifestation would delve in detail the extent of the OGCC’s required participation. But suffice for now, Attys. Beramo and Berbaño are in error when they assert that the OGCC’s participation in the present petition is not required at all.
It should also be noted that the aforementioned Section 10, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the OGCC to receive the attorney's fees adjudged in favor of their client GOCCs, such fees accruing to a special fund of the OGCC. Evidently, the non-participation of the OGCC in litigations pursued by GOCCs would deprive the former of its due funding as authorized by law. Hence, this is another reason why we cannot sustain Attys. Beramo and Berbaño's position that the OGCC need not participate in litigations pursued by LBP.
It may strike as disruptive to the flow of a GOCC’s daily grind to require the participation of the OGCC as its principal law office, or the exercise of control and supervision by the OGCC over the acts of the GOCC’s legal departments. For reasons such as proximity and comfort, the GOCC may find it convenient to rely instead on its in-house legal departments, or more irregularly, on private practitioners. Yet the statutory role of the OGCC as principal law office of GOCCs is one of long-standing, and we have to recognize such function as part of public policy. Since the jurisdiction of the OGCC includes all GOCCs, its perspective is less myopic than that maintained by a particular legal department of a GOCC. It is not inconceivable that left to its own devices, the legal department of a given GOCC may adopt a legal position inconsistent with or detrimental to other GOCCs. Since GOCCs fall within the same governmental framework, it would be detrimental to have GOCCs foisted into adversarial positions by their respective legal departments. Hence, there is indubitable wisdom in having one overseer over all these legal departments which would ensure that the legal positions adopted by the GOCCs would not conflict with each other or the government.
Attys. Beramo and Berbaño claim that the LBP Legal Department had handled some cases which had been decided by the Court and that the OGCC has never been involved in the litigation and handling of LBP’s appellate cases involving specialized fields such as banking and agrarian reform. These points should not be dismissed lightly, but then again, years of wrong practice do not make a statutory right. The Administrative Code of 1987, adopting a decades-old legal precept, expressly provides that it is the OGCC that acts as the principal law office of GOCCs and exercises control and supervision over the legal departments of GOCCs. If the LBP Legal Department has long operated as an independent fiefdom absent any control, supervision, or even concern from the OGCC, then this practice must end now. As to the pending litigations of LBP which are [handled] exclusively by the LBP Legal Department, it shall be the individual courts with jurisdiction over those cases that shall decide how to proceed next. We shall not, by reason of this Resolution, interfere with the dispensation of those cases. Certainly, Section 10, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987 can be invoked by adverse parties or by the courts in citing as deficient the exclusive representation of LBP by its Legal Department. Then again, if neither the adverse parties nor the courts of jurisdiction choose to contest this point, there would be no impediment to the litigation to maintain.
Of course, if the principle that the OGCC is the principal law office of GOCCs proves persistently inconvenient in practice, it would be up to Congress to amend the Administrative Code, or for the OGCC itself to promulgate rules and regulations that would alleviate the problems in practice without abdicating its legal mandate. The succeeding discussion on the OGCC's pending Manifestation involves a review of the OGCC's current practices, including the present rules and regulations.21
In the present controversy, we find nothing in the record which shows that the OGCC has entered its appearance as the principal legal counsel of petitioner LBP or that it has expressly given its conformity to the LBP Legal Department’s filing of the instant petition. On this ground alone, the appeal must be denied. Petitioner should have been more circumspect, considering that the instant petition was filed on September 9, 2005, or several months after we issued the said resolution in LBP v. Panlilio-Luciano. Further, respondent precisely raised in her pleadings this issue of lack of authority to sue of petitioner’s Law Department. Prudence, therefore, should have impelled LBP to request its principal counsel, the OGCC, to participate in the case. Up to this date, however, petitioner remains insensitive to the import of its charter and the Administrative Code as elucidated in our ruling. Certainly, we cannot simply close our eyes to LBP’s intransigence to and disrespect for the rule of law.
Even if we allow the LBP’s filing of the instant petition without any authority from the OGCC, we must still deny the same for we find no reversible error in the CA’s ruling that LBP forum shopped. In Repol v. Commission on Elections,22 we found forum shopping in the filing of a petition for certiorari during the pendency of an omnibus motion to reconsider, set aside and quash a writ of execution with the trial court. Likewise, in Go v. Judge Abrogar,23 we deemed as a violation of the rules against forum shopping the institution of a separate action for annulment of auction sale with injunction, simultaneous with a third-party adverse claim and motion to quash writ of execution, and a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Further, in La Campana Development Corporation v. See,24 we explained that the simultaneous filing of a motion to quash writ of execution and an action for the annulment of a judgment run afoul of the prohibition on forum shopping, thus:
In essence, forum shopping is the practice of litigants resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. In determining whether forum shopping exists, it is important to consider the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by a person who asks appellate courts and/or administrative entities to rule on the same related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same relief, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions by the different courts or fora on the same issues. We have ruled that forum shopping is present when, in two or more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties (2) rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.1avvphi1
The parties in the two cases are indisputably identical. The allegations of facts giving rise to respondents’ rights, such as extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, are also essentially the same, as are the reliefs prayed for. Finally, in the light of these close similarities, res judicata may arise. Acting on the documents filed with them, the RTC and the MeTC may well come up with completely opposite rulings on the question of whether or not the latter court’s decision should be implemented. This is the very evil that the proscription on forum shopping seeks to avert. If they wanted to avoid this kind of problem, respondents should not have filed what were essentially the same documents with two different courts.25
Similarly, in this case, petitioner moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their annulment via certiorari under Rule 65. In both proceedings, the parties are identical and the reliefs prayed for are the same. In the two actions, petitioner also has a singular stance: the PARAD resolutions should not be executed in view of the pendency of the petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC. Thus a situation is created where the two fora could come up with conflicting decisions. This is precisely the evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum-shopping.
Finally and most importantly, we find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure,26 which was then applicable, provides that:
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. - The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals27 and in Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,28 we explained the consequence of the said rule to the effect that the adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period. Considering therefore that, in this case, LBP’s petition with the SAC for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days after its receipt of the PARAD’s decision, or eleven days beyond the reglementary period, the latter had already attained finality. The PARAD could very well issue the writ of execution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83276 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with then Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, concurring; rollo, pp. 58-60.
2 Also penned by Associate Justice Abdulwahid, but with the concurrence of Associate Justices Salazar-Fernando and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo; id. at 63-64.
3 Id. at 93-94.
4 Id. at 100.
5 Id. at 102-105.
6 Id. at 106-113.
7 Id. at 114-116.
8 Id. at 117-120.
9 Id. at 154-157.
10 Id. at 158-161.
11 Id. at 125-126.
12 Id. at 127-153.
13 Supra note 1.
14 Rollo, p. 60.
15 Supra note 2.
16 Rollo, pp. 21-57.
17 Id. at 245-249.
18 Id. at 367-368.
19 Id. at 368-369.
20 G.R. No. 165428, July 13, 2005 (Resolution).
21 Id.
22 G.R. No. 161418, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 321, 334-335.
23 446 Phil. 227, 239 (2003).
24 G.R. No. 149195, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 584.
25 La Campana Development Corporation v. See, id. at 588-589.
26 These rules were superseded by the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure done and adopted on January 17, 2003.
27 379 Phil. 141, 148-149 (2000).
28 G.R. No. 159145, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 800, 812-813.
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